Re: [PATCH 1/4] kvm: svm: Streamline VMSA setting for VCPUs

[Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>]

On 6/11/26 07:35, Jörg Rödel wrote:
> From: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
> 
> Streamline the VMSA setting state of vcpus, where a VMSA can be either
> KVM-allocated or guest-provided. This consolidates the various
> tracking state around VMSAs.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <joerg.roedel@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 301 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h |  31 ++++-
>  2 files changed, 237 insertions(+), 95 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 6c6a6d663e29..9b1280222e20 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ static bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
>  }
>  
>  static int snp_decommission_context(struct kvm *kvm);
> +static int kvm_rmp_make_shared(struct kvm *kvm, u64 pfn, enum pg_level level);
> +static void sev_flush_encrypted_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *va);
> +static int snp_page_reclaim(struct kvm *kvm, u64 pfn);

Can this be worked so that we don't add more forward declarations?

>  
>  struct enc_region {
>  	struct list_head list;
> @@ -156,6 +159,173 @@ struct enc_region {
>  	unsigned long size;
>  };
>  
> +static void *sev_es_vmsa_ref(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

sev_es_get_kvm_shared_vmsa ?

> +{
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	void *vmsa = NULL;
> +
> +	if (svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state == VMSA_SHARED) {
> +		vmsa = page_address(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page);
> +	}
> +
> +	return vmsa;

How about just:

	if (svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state == VMSA_SHARED)
		return page_address(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page);

	return NULL;

> +}
> +
> +static int sev_es_vcpu_alloc_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

sev_es_alloc_kvm_vmsa ?

> +{
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	struct page *vmsa_page;
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state != VMSA_NONE))
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * SEV-ES guests require a separate (from the VMCB) VMSA page used to
> +	 * contain the encrypted register state of the guest.
> +	 */
> +	vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page();
> +	if (!vmsa_page)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state = VMSA_SHARED;
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page = vmsa_page;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_es_vcpu_vmsa_make_private(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

sev_es_make_kvm_vmsa_private ?

> +{
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(vcpu->kvm);
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	void *vmsa = sev_es_vmsa_ref(vcpu);
> +
> +	if (!vmsa)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	if (is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu)) {
> +		u64 pfn = __pa(vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		int ret;
> +
> +		/* Transition the VMSA page to a firmware state. */
> +		ret = rmp_make_private(pfn, INITIAL_VMSA_GPA, PG_LEVEL_4K, sev->asid, true);
> +		if (ret)
> +			return ret;
> +	}
> +
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state = VMSA_PRIVATE;
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_es_vcpu_free_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

sev_es_free_kvm_vmsa ?

> +{
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	void *vmsa_ptr;

s/vmsa_ptr/vmsa/

> +
> +	switch (svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state) {
> +	case VMSA_NONE:
> +	case VMSA_GUEST:
> +		break;
> +	case VMSA_PRIVATE:
> +		vmsa_ptr = page_address(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page);
> +
> +		if (is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu)) {
> +			u64 pfn = __pa(vmsa_ptr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;

PHYS_PFN(__pa(vmsa));

> +
> +			if (kvm_rmp_make_shared(vcpu->kvm, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K)) {
> +				pr_err("Failed to make VMSA page shared - leaking it to avoid re-use\n");
> +				goto out;

s/goto out/break/
> +			}
> +		}
> +
> +		if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> +			sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, vmsa_ptr);
> +
> +		fallthrough;
> +	case VMSA_SHARED:
> +		__free_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page);
> +		break;
> +	default:
> +		BUG();

WARN_ON or WARN_ON_ONCE() instead of BUG().
> +	}
> +out:

If using the 'break' above, then no need for this label.

> +
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page = NULL;
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state = VMSA_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_snp_vcpu_reclaim_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)

sev_snp_reclaim_kvm_vmsa ?

> +{
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	void *vmsa_ptr;

s/vmsa_ptr/vmsa/

> +	u64 pfn;
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu) ||
> +	                 svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state != VMSA_PRIVATE))
> +		return;
> +
> +	vmsa_ptr = page_address(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page);
> +	pfn = __pa(vmsa_ptr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;

PHYS_PFN()

> +
> +	if (!snp_page_reclaim(vcpu->kvm, pfn))
> +		__free_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page);

Should you issue a message here similar to above about leaking the page
if snp_page_reclaim() fails?

> +
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page = NULL;
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state = VMSA_NONE;
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_es_set_guest_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t vmsa_gpa)
> +{
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +
> +	sev_es_vcpu_free_vmsa(vcpu);
> +
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state = VMSA_GUEST;
> +	svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_gpa = vmsa_gpa;
> +}
> +
> +static u64 sev_es_vmsa_pa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	enum vmsa_state vmsa_state = svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state;
> +	u64 vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
> +
> +	if (vmsa_state == VMSA_GUEST) {

Would a switch statement like you have in sev_es_vcpu_free_vmsa() be
more consistent?

Also, you could return INVALID_PAGE directly instead of having the goto's.

	switch (svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_state) {
	case VMSA_NONE:
		return INVALID_PAGE;

	case VMSA_SHARED:
	case VMSA_PRIVATE:
		return __pa(page_address(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page));

	case VMSA_GUEST:
		...
	}

> +		gpa_t vmsa_gpa = svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_gpa;
> +		struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> +		struct page *page;
> +		kvm_pfn_t pfn;
> +		gfn_t gfn;
> +
> +		gfn = gpa_to_gfn(vmsa_gpa);
> +
> +		slot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
> +		if (!slot)
> +			goto out;
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * The new VMSA will be private memory guest memory, so retrieve the
> +		 * PFN from the gmem backend.
> +		 */
> +		if (kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL))
> +			goto out;
> +
> +		vmsa_pa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * gmem pages aren't currently migratable, but if this ever changes
> +		 * then care should be taken to ensure the guest vmsa is pinned
> +		 * through some other means.
> +		 */
> +		kvm_release_page_clean(page);
> +	} else if (vmsa_state == VMSA_PRIVATE || vmsa_state == VMSA_SHARED) {
> +		vmsa_pa = __pa(page_address(svm->sev_es.vmsa.vmsa_page));
> +	}
> +
> +out:
> +	return vmsa_pa;
> +}
> +
>  /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown  */
>  static int sev_flush_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
>  {
> @@ -925,7 +1095,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  {
>  	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
>  	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(vcpu->kvm);
> -	struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
> +	struct sev_es_save_area *save = sev_es_vmsa_ref(vcpu);
>  	struct xregs_state *xsave;
>  	const u8 *s;
>  	u8 *d;
> @@ -1026,6 +1196,7 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  {
>  	struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
>  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	void *vmsa_ref = sev_es_vmsa_ref(vcpu);

Might make more sense rename the sev_data_launch_update_vmsa variable to
vmsa_lu and keep this as just vmsa ?\

>  	int ret;
>  
>  	if (vcpu->guest_debug) {
> @@ -1043,15 +1214,19 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	 * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region
>  	 * with the guest's key), so invalidate it first.
>  	 */
> -	clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
> +	clflush_cache_range(vmsa_ref, PAGE_SIZE);
>  
>  	vmsa.reserved = 0;
>  	vmsa.handle = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm)->handle;
> -	vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
> +	vmsa.address = __sme_pa(vmsa_ref);
>  	vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
>  	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
>  	if (ret)
> -	  return ret;
> +		goto free_vmsa;
> +
> +	ret = sev_es_vcpu_vmsa_make_private(vcpu);
> +	if (ret)
> +		goto free_vmsa;

Similar to the SNP path, you can probably move this to before the
LAUNCH_UPDATE, just for consistency.
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * SEV-ES guests maintain an encrypted version of their FPU
> @@ -1069,7 +1244,13 @@ static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
>  	 * MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR when guest_state_protected is not set.
>  	 */
>  	svm_enable_lbrv(vcpu);
> +
>  	return 0;
> +
> +free_vmsa:
> +	sev_es_vcpu_free_vmsa(vcpu);
> +
> +	return ret;
>  }
>  
>  static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> @@ -2508,23 +2689,22 @@ static int snp_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>  
>  	kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
>  		struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> -		u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> +		void *vmsa = sev_es_vmsa_ref(vcpu);
>  
>  		ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
>  		if (ret)
>  			goto out;
>  
> -		/* Transition the VMSA page to a firmware state. */
> -		ret = rmp_make_private(pfn, INITIAL_VMSA_GPA, PG_LEVEL_4K, sev->asid, true);
> +		ret = sev_es_vcpu_vmsa_make_private(vcpu);
>  		if (ret)
>  			goto out;
>  
>  		/* Issue the SNP command to encrypt the VMSA */
> -		data.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
> +		data.address = __sme_pa(vmsa);
>  		ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
>  				      &data, &argp->error);
>  		if (ret) {
> -			snp_page_reclaim(kvm, pfn);
> +			sev_snp_vcpu_reclaim_vmsa(vcpu);
>  
>  			goto out;
>  		}

It might be nice to break the loop contents out into its own function
like is done with ES. I haven't looked ahead in the series to see if
that would make it easier to supply/measure a single VMSA or not, though.

> @@ -3593,31 +3773,13 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  
>  void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
> -	struct vcpu_svm *svm;
> +	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);

You can probably reduce the churn here by keeping this line unchanged
and not deleting the assignment below.

>  
>  	if (!is_sev_es_guest(vcpu))
>  		return;
>  
> -	svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * If it's an SNP guest, then the VMSA was marked in the RMP table as
> -	 * a guest-owned page. Transition the page to hypervisor state before
> -	 * releasing it back to the system.
> -	 */
> -	if (is_sev_snp_guest(vcpu)) {
> -		u64 pfn = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> -
> -		if (kvm_rmp_make_shared(vcpu->kvm, pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K))
> -			goto skip_vmsa_free;
> -	}
> -
> -	if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> -		sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa);
> -
> -	__free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
> +	sev_es_vcpu_free_vmsa(vcpu);
>  
> -skip_vmsa_free:
>  	__sev_es_unmap_ghcb(svm);
>  }
>  
> @@ -4067,10 +4229,7 @@ static int snp_begin_psc(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  static void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> -	struct kvm_memory_slot *slot;
> -	struct page *page;
> -	kvm_pfn_t pfn;
> -	gfn_t gfn;
> +	u64 vmsa_pa;
>  
>  	guard(mutex)(&svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
>  
> @@ -4092,46 +4251,17 @@ static void sev_snp_init_protected_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	 */
>  	vmcb_mark_all_dirty(svm->vmcb);
>  
> -	if (!VALID_PAGE(svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa))
> -		return;
> -
> -	gfn = gpa_to_gfn(svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa);
> -	svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
> +	sev_es_set_guest_vmsa(vcpu, svm->sev_es.req_vmsa_gpa);
> +	vmsa_pa = sev_es_vmsa_pa(vcpu);
>  
> -	slot = gfn_to_memslot(vcpu->kvm, gfn);
> -	if (!slot)
> +	if (!VALID_PAGE(vmsa_pa))
>  		return;
>  
> -	/*
> -	 * The new VMSA will be private memory guest memory, so retrieve the
> -	 * PFN from the gmem backend.
> -	 */
> -	if (kvm_gmem_get_pfn(vcpu->kvm, slot, gfn, &pfn, &page, NULL))
> -		return;
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * From this point forward, the VMSA will always be a guest-mapped page
> -	 * rather than the initial one allocated by KVM in svm->sev_es.vmsa. In
> -	 * theory, svm->sev_es.vmsa could be free'd and cleaned up here, but
> -	 * that involves cleanups like flushing caches, which would ideally be
> -	 * handled during teardown rather than guest boot.  Deferring that also
> -	 * allows the existing logic for SEV-ES VMSAs to be re-used with
> -	 * minimal SNP-specific changes.
> -	 */
> -	svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa = true;
> -
>  	/* Use the new VMSA */
> -	svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = pfn_to_hpa(pfn);
> +	svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = vmsa_pa;
>  
>  	/* Mark the vCPU as runnable */
>  	kvm_set_mp_state(vcpu, KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE);
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * gmem pages aren't currently migratable, but if this ever changes
> -	 * then care should be taken to ensure svm->sev_es.vmsa is pinned
> -	 * through some other means.
> -	 */
> -	kvm_release_page_clean(page);
>  }
>  
>  static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> @@ -4187,10 +4317,10 @@ static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  		}
>  
> -		target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
> +		target_svm->sev_es.req_vmsa_gpa = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
>  		break;
>  	case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_DESTROY:
> -		target_svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
> +		target_svm->sev_es.req_vmsa_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
>  		break;
>  	default:
>  		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: invalid AP creation request [%#x] from guest\n",
> @@ -4708,20 +4838,7 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool init_event)
>  	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
>  
>  	svm->vmcb->control.misc_ctl |= SVM_MISC_ENABLE_SEV_ES;
> -
> -	/*
> -	 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
> -	 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
> -	 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.  Note,
> -	 * the VMSA will be NULL if this vCPU is the destination for intrahost
> -	 * migration, and will be copied later.
> -	 */
> -	if (!svm->sev_es.snp_has_guest_vmsa) {
> -		if (svm->sev_es.vmsa)
> -			svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
> -		else
> -			svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
> -	}
> +	svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = sev_es_vmsa_pa(&svm->vcpu);
>  
>  	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES))
>  		svm->vmcb->control.allowed_sev_features = sev->vmsa_features |
> @@ -4797,7 +4914,7 @@ void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool init_event)
>  int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> -	struct page *vmsa_page;
> +	int ret;
>  
>  	mutex_init(&svm->sev_es.snp_vmsa_mutex);
>  
> @@ -4808,11 +4925,9 @@ int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	 * SEV-ES guests require a separate (from the VMCB) VMSA page used to
>  	 * contain the encrypted register state of the guest.
>  	 */
> -	vmsa_page = snp_safe_alloc_page();
> -	if (!vmsa_page)
> -		return -ENOMEM;
> -
> -	svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
> +	ret = sev_es_vcpu_alloc_vmsa(vcpu);
> +	if (ret)
> +		return ret;
>  
>  	vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected = snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
>  
> @@ -5227,12 +5342,14 @@ struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	if (!is_sev_es_guest(vcpu))
>  		return NULL;
>  
> +	vmsa = sev_es_vmsa_ref(vcpu);
> +
>  	/*
>  	 * If the VMSA has not yet been encrypted, return a pointer to the
>  	 * current un-encrypted VMSA.
>  	 */
> -	if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
> -		return (struct vmcb_save_area *)svm->sev_es.vmsa;
> +	if (vmsa)
> +		return vmsa;
>  
>  	sev = to_kvm_sev_info(vcpu->kvm);
>  
> @@ -5303,8 +5420,10 @@ struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  
>  void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa)
>  {
> +	struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa_ptr = sev_es_vmsa_ref(vcpu);
> +
>  	/* If the VMSA has not yet been encrypted, nothing was allocated */
> -	if (!vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected || !vmsa)
> +	if (vmsa == vmsa_ptr)

Can't this just be

	if (sev_es_vmsa_ref(vcpu))

And then you save defining a new variable.

>  		return;
>  
>  	free_page((unsigned long)vmsa);
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 5137416be593..3d4799f09b23 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -240,9 +240,29 @@ struct svm_nested_state {
>  	bool force_msr_bitmap_recalc;
>  };
>  
> +enum vmsa_state {
> +	/* No VMSA set */
> +	VMSA_NONE,
> +	/* VMSA allocated by KVM - Shared in RMP (if applicable) */
> +	VMSA_SHARED,

VMSA_KVM_SHARED

> +	/* VMSA allocated by KVM - Guest-private in RMP (SEV-SNP only) */
> +	VMSA_PRIVATE,

VMSA_KVM_PRIVATE

> +	/* Guest-owned VMSA */
> +	VMSA_GUEST,

VMSA_GUEST_OWNED

This way ownership of the page becomes more obvious when used in the code.

> +};
> +
> +struct sev_es_vmsa_state {
> +	enum vmsa_state vmsa_state;
> +	union {
> +		/* state == (KVM_SHARED || KVM_PRIVATE) */
> +		struct page *vmsa_page;
> +		/* state == GUEST */
> +		gpa_t vmsa_gpa;
> +	};
> +};
> +
>  struct vcpu_sev_es_state {
>  	/* SEV-ES support */
> -	struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa;
>  	struct ghcb *ghcb;
>  	u8 valid_bitmap[16];
>  	struct kvm_host_map ghcb_map;
> @@ -266,10 +286,13 @@ struct vcpu_sev_es_state {
>  
>  	u64 ghcb_registered_gpa;
>  
> -	struct mutex snp_vmsa_mutex; /* Used to handle concurrent updates of VMSA. */
> -	gpa_t snp_vmsa_gpa;
> +	/* VMSA related state */
> +	struct mutex snp_vmsa_mutex;	/* Used to handle concurrent updates of VMSA. */
> +	struct sev_es_vmsa_state vmsa;	/* VMSA currently used by the VCPU */
> +	gpa_t req_vmsa_gpa;		/* Requested new VMSA GPA */
> +
> +	bool snp_ap_runnable;

I don't see this used in the patch anywhere.

Thanks,
Tom

>  	bool snp_ap_waiting_for_reset;
> -	bool snp_has_guest_vmsa;
>  };
>  
>  struct vcpu_svm {