From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: "Naveen N Rao (AMD)" <naveen@kernel.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Neeraj Upadhyay <neeraj.upadhyay@amd.com>,
Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/apic: Drop savic_eoi() in favor of native_apic_msr_eoi() for Secure AVIC
Date: Mon, 13 Jul 2026 12:43:45 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5f6bcceb-1c48-43e5-bafc-8f86676c4092@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <36c039713c4b03c87b636635cb4c1f8b98c15eff.1783490022.git.naveen@kernel.org>
On 7/8/26 01:32, Naveen N Rao (AMD) wrote:
> Drop savic_eoi() in favor of using the native helper that writes to the
> APIC_EOI MSR. savic_eoi() was added mainly to be able to handle
> level-triggered interrupts. However, it relies on APIC_TMR indicating a
> vector to be level-triggered, but APIC_TMR can never have a bit set
> since it is only updated when the LAPIC accepts a level-triggered
> interrupt. In the case of a Secure AVIC SEV-SNP guest, all
> level-triggered interrupt sources are in the VMM (emulated IOAPIC
> primarily) and KVM accepts them on behalf of the guest resulting in the
> APIC_TMR in KVM APIC backing page having a bit set. This is never seen
> by the guest, which has its own private APIC backing page. As such, the
> savic_eoi() handler is dead code. Remove it.
>
> Fixes: 43b6687ac877 ("x86/apic: Handle EOI writes for Secure AVIC guests")
> Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
Another guest change which should be separate from this series.
Is this causing issues with this hypervisor support or is just code that
is never invoked? Do other hypervisors behave the same way and will
removing this break them?
Thanks,
Tom
> ---
> arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c | 31 +----------------------------
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 30 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
> index cb3b55225ab6..f2af149c6005 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/apic/x2apic_savic.c
> @@ -304,35 +304,6 @@ static void savic_update_vector(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int vector, bool set)
> update_vector(cpu, SAVIC_ALLOWED_IRR, vector, set);
> }
>
> -static void savic_eoi(void)
> -{
> - unsigned int cpu;
> - int vec;
> -
> - cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
> - vec = apic_find_highest_vector(get_reg_bitmap(cpu, APIC_ISR));
> - if (WARN_ONCE(vec == -1, "EOI write while no active interrupt in APIC_ISR"))
> - return;
> -
> - /* Is level-triggered interrupt? */
> - if (apic_test_vector(vec, get_reg_bitmap(cpu, APIC_TMR))) {
> - update_vector(cpu, APIC_ISR, vec, false);
> - /*
> - * Propagate the EOI write to the hypervisor for level-triggered
> - * interrupts. Return to the guest from GHCB protocol event takes
> - * care of re-evaluating interrupt state.
> - */
> - savic_ghcb_msr_write(APIC_EOI, 0);
> - } else {
> - /*
> - * Hardware clears APIC_ISR and re-evaluates the interrupt state
> - * to determine if there is any pending interrupt which can be
> - * delivered to CPU.
> - */
> - native_apic_msr_eoi();
> - }
> -}
> -
> static void savic_teardown(void)
> {
> /* Disable Secure AVIC */
> @@ -421,7 +392,7 @@ static struct apic apic_x2apic_savic __ro_after_init = {
>
> .read = savic_read,
> .write = savic_write,
> - .eoi = savic_eoi,
> + .eoi = native_apic_msr_eoi,
> .icr_read = native_x2apic_icr_read,
> .icr_write = savic_icr_write,
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-13 17:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 6:31 [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/apic: Propagate APIC_SPIV writes to hv for " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-10 2:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-10 15:02 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-11 4:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-13 17:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 8:57 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/apic: Drop savic_eoi() in favor of native_apic_msr_eoi() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:43 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2026-07-14 9:02 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/27] x86/kvm: Disable PV_SEND_IPI if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 9:42 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/27] x86/apic: Use AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI VMGEXIT for Secure AVIC IPI handling Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 10:03 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 18:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] KVM: SVM: Add helper to check if Secure AVIC is enabled for a guest Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 18:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: SVM: Set guest_apic_protected if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/27] kvm: irqfd: Have kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass() take struct kvm pointer Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IRQ bypass for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: SVM: Add avic_ipiv_is_soft_disabled() as a wrapper around enable_ipiv Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IPIv for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: SVM: Short-circuit a few AVIC flows " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: SVM: Warn if we ever receive AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS #VMEXIT Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inhibit AVIC for SEV-SNP guests if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: SVM: Add handler for VMGEXIT Secure AVIC NAE event Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: x86: Add a new kvm_x86_op protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_interrupt() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: SVM: Add interrupt delivery support for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for incomplete IPI handling for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for injecting NMIs for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: SVM: Mandate use of split irqchip for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exceptions " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SEV-SNP guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 9:20 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao
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