From: Naveen N Rao <naveen@kernel.org>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tianyu Lan <tiala@microsoft.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/apic: Drop savic_eoi() in favor of native_apic_msr_eoi() for Secure AVIC
Date: Tue, 14 Jul 2026 14:32:51 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alX59ewiXXSx7J3R@blrnaveerao1> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5f6bcceb-1c48-43e5-bafc-8f86676c4092@amd.com>
On Mon, Jul 13, 2026 at 12:43:45PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 7/8/26 01:32, Naveen N Rao (AMD) wrote:
> > Drop savic_eoi() in favor of using the native helper that writes to the
> > APIC_EOI MSR. savic_eoi() was added mainly to be able to handle
> > level-triggered interrupts. However, it relies on APIC_TMR indicating a
> > vector to be level-triggered, but APIC_TMR can never have a bit set
> > since it is only updated when the LAPIC accepts a level-triggered
> > interrupt. In the case of a Secure AVIC SEV-SNP guest, all
> > level-triggered interrupt sources are in the VMM (emulated IOAPIC
> > primarily) and KVM accepts them on behalf of the guest resulting in the
> > APIC_TMR in KVM APIC backing page having a bit set. This is never seen
> > by the guest, which has its own private APIC backing page. As such, the
> > savic_eoi() handler is dead code. Remove it.
> >
> > Fixes: 43b6687ac877 ("x86/apic: Handle EOI writes for Secure AVIC guests")
> > Signed-off-by: Naveen N Rao (AMD) <naveen@kernel.org>
>
> Another guest change which should be separate from this series.
Yes, I have called this out in the cover letter. I see now that I should
have used a better subject for the cover letter though.
>
> Is this causing issues with this hypervisor support or is just code that
> is never invoked? Do other hypervisors behave the same way and will
> removing this break them?
This is code that is never invoked and is independent of the hypervisor.
No impact to hypervisor code.
- Naveen
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-14 9:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-08 6:31 [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:31 ` [RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/apic: Propagate APIC_SPIV writes to hv for " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-10 2:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-10 15:02 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-11 4:37 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-07-13 17:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 8:57 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/apic: Drop savic_eoi() in favor of native_apic_msr_eoi() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 9:02 ` Naveen N Rao [this message]
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 03/27] x86/kvm: Disable PV_SEND_IPI if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 9:42 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 04/27] x86/apic: Use AVIC_INCOMPLETE_IPI VMGEXIT for Secure AVIC IPI handling Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 17:59 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-14 10:03 ` Naveen N Rao
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 05/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 18:32 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 06/27] KVM: SVM: Add helper to check if Secure AVIC is enabled for a guest Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-13 18:35 ` Tom Lendacky
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 07/27] KVM: SVM: Set guest_apic_protected if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 08/27] kvm: irqfd: Have kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass() take struct kvm pointer Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 09/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IRQ bypass for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 10/27] KVM: SVM: Add avic_ipiv_is_soft_disabled() as a wrapper around enable_ipiv Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 11/27] KVM: SVM: Disable IPIv for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 12/27] KVM: SVM: Short-circuit a few AVIC flows " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 13/27] KVM: SVM: Warn if we ever receive AVIC_UNACCELERATED_ACCESS #VMEXIT Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 14/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inhibit AVIC for SEV-SNP guests if Secure AVIC is enabled Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 15/27] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 16/27] KVM: SVM: Add handler for VMGEXIT Secure AVIC NAE event Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 17/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 18/27] KVM: x86: Add a new kvm_x86_op protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 19/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_injectable_intr() for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 20/27] KVM: SVM: Implement kvm_x86_ops->protected_apic_has_interrupt() " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 21/27] KVM: SVM: Add interrupt delivery support for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 22/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for incomplete IPI handling for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 23/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for injecting NMIs for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 24/27] KVM: SVM: Mandate use of split irqchip for Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 25/27] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exceptions " Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 26/27] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 6:32 ` [RFC PATCH v3 27/27] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SEV-SNP guests Naveen N Rao (AMD)
2026-07-08 9:20 ` [RFC PATCH v3 00/27] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-SNP Secure AVIC Naveen N Rao
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