From: Tian Zheng <zhengtian10@huawei.com>
To: <sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev>
Cc: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>, Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>,
<kvmarm@lists.linux.dev>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 4/6] KVM: arm64: Add HDBSS per-vCPU buffer management
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 17:37:21 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <67dcf2d1-48e6-4aac-b516-1bb78b537c3f@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260709111538.0AEDD1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
On 7/9/2026 7:15 PM, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 6 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [High] Broken error handling in `kvm_arch_vcpu_create` leads to success masking and hypervisor memory leaks.
> - [High] The hardware producer index `SYS_HDBSSPROD_EL2` is lost during vCPU context switch.
> - [High] `__load_hdbss()` risks a fatal UNDEFINED exception on hardware lacking HDBSS.
> - [High] Misinterpretation of the `order` parameter causes memory waste or buffer undersizing on non-4KB page granules.
> - [Medium] Missing context synchronization event (ISB) after control-plane system register write.
> - [Low] Memory leak when an allocation resolves to physical address 0.
> --
>
> --- Patch [4]: [PATCH v4 4/6] KVM: arm64: Add HDBSS per-vCPU buffer management ---
> commit 1967caa637e339cacc49eecff93c9e0e02ecad9e
> Author: eillon <yezhenyu2@huawei.com>
>
> KVM: arm64: Add HDBSS per-vCPU buffer management
>
> This commit introduces the infrastructure for HDBSS (Hardware Dirty Bit State
> Structure) per-vCPU buffer management, including allocation, freeing, and
> loading of HDBSS registers during vCPU load.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
>> @@ -565,6 +566,12 @@ int kvm_arch_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> err = kvm_share_hyp(vcpu, vcpu + 1);
>> if (err)
>> kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
>>
>> + if (vcpu->kvm->arch.enable_hdbss) {
>> + err = kvm_arm_vcpu_alloc_hdbss(vcpu, vcpu->kvm->arch.hdbss_order);
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does this code mask kvm_share_hyp() failures? If kvm_share_hyp() fails, the
> code falls through. If HDBSS is enabled and allocation succeeds, err is
> overwritten to 0.
>
> Additionally, if kvm_share_hyp() succeeds but kvm_arm_vcpu_alloc_hdbss() fails,
> is the hypervisor mapping leaked since kvm_unshare_hyp() isn't called before
> returning?
>
>> + if (err)
>> + kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
>> + }
>> +
>> return err;
>> }
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/dirty_bit.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/dirty_bit.c
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/dirty_bit.c
> [ ... ]
>> +int kvm_arm_vcpu_alloc_hdbss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int order)
>> +{
>> + struct page *hdbss_pg = NULL;
>> +
>> + if (vcpu->arch.hdbss.hdbssbr_el2 || !system_supports_hdbss())
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + if (order > HDBSS_MAX_ORDER)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + hdbss_pg = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT, order);
>> + if (!hdbss_pg)
>> + return -ENOMEM;
>> +
>> + vcpu->arch.hdbss = (struct vcpu_hdbss_state) {
>> + .base_phys = page_to_phys(hdbss_pg),
>> + .hdbssbr_el2 = HDBSSBR_EL2(page_to_phys(hdbss_pg), order),
>
Addressed in v5, The error path now returns immediately on
kvm_share_hyp() failure, and HDBSS allocation failure calls
kvm_unshare_hyp():
```
err = kvm_share_hyp(vcpu, vcpu + 1);
if (err) {
kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
return err;
}
err = kvm_arm_vcpu_alloc_hdbss(vcpu);
if (err) {
kvm_unshare_hyp(vcpu, vcpu + 1);
kvm_vgic_vcpu_destroy(vcpu);
return err;
}
```
> [Severity: High]
> Is the order parameter interpreted differently depending on the page granule
> size? The order parameter is used both for alloc_pages() (which scales by
> PAGE_SIZE) and HDBSSBR_EL2() (which expects an absolute hardware size).
>
> On 64KB pages, supplying order=9 for a 2MB buffer would allocate 32MB from the
> buddy allocator, while order=5 would configure the hardware for 128KB.
>
>> + .hdbssprod_el2 = 0,
>> + };
>> +
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +void kvm_arm_vcpu_free_hdbss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + struct page *hdbss_pg;
>> +
>> + if (!vcpu->arch.hdbss.hdbssbr_el2) {
>> + return;
>> + }
>
Fixed in v5. The order parameter is removed. Buffer size is tracked in
bytes, with separate conversions for the buddy allocator (get_order) and
hardware SZ encoding (ilog2(size) - 12).
> [Severity: Low]
> Could this leak the buffer if the buddy allocator returns physical address 0
> and order is 0? The resulting HDBSSBR_EL2 value would be 0, causing this
> early return to intercept a valid allocation.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
>> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/vhe/switch.c
> [ ... ]
>> @@ -213,6 +214,19 @@ static void __vcpu_put_deactivate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> local_irq_restore(flags);
>> }
>>
>> +static void __load_hdbss(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> +{
>> + struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
>> +
>> + if (!kvm->arch.enable_hdbss)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + write_sysreg_s(vcpu->arch.hdbss.hdbssbr_el2, SYS_HDBSSBR_EL2);
>
Addressed in v5. vcpu_hdbss_state now stores a struct page * instead of
a physical address, and the allocation check uses the page pointer. This
eliminates the PA == 0 special case entirely.
> [Severity: High]
> Will __load_hdbss() trigger a fatal UNDEFINED exception on hardware without
> HDBSS? The function relies solely on kvm->arch.enable_hdbss. If it is enabled
> but the hardware lacks support, accessing SYS_HDBSSBR_EL2 could panic the
> hypervisor.
>
>> + write_sysreg_s(vcpu->arch.hdbss.hdbssprod_el2, SYS_HDBSSPROD_EL2);
>
v5 already handles this. vcpu_hdbss_enabled() checks hw_mmu->vtcr &
VTCR_EL2_HDBSS, and that bit only gets set through
kvm_arm_enable_hdbss_global(), which is guarded by
system_supports_hdbss(). So __load_hdbss() doesn't need to check again.
Hardware support is already guaranteed at that point.
> [Severity: Medium]
> Is an isb() required immediately after writing to SYS_HDBSSBR_EL2? ARM64
> subsystem rules state that every write to a control-plane system register must
> be followed by an isb() as the very next instruction.
>
>> +
>> + isb();
>> +}
>> +
>> void kvm_vcpu_load_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> {
>> host_data_ptr(host_ctxt)->__hyp_running_vcpu = vcpu;
>> @@ -220,6 +234,7 @@ void kvm_vcpu_load_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> __vcpu_load_switch_sysregs(vcpu);
>> __vcpu_load_activate_traps(vcpu);
>> __load_stage2(vcpu->arch.hw_mmu);
>> + __load_hdbss(vcpu);
>> }
>>
>> void kvm_vcpu_put_vhe(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> {
>> __vcpu_put_deactivate_traps(vcpu);
>> __vcpu_put_switch_sysregs(vcpu);
>>
>> host_data_ptr(host_ctxt)->__hyp_running_vcpu = NULL;
>> }
>
Not required. The architecture only requires an ISB to make the effects
visible, and it's fine to batch multiple system register writes with one
trailing ISB. __load_hdbss() follows the same pattern as
__load_stage2(), which writes VTCR_EL2 and VTTBR_EL2 back-to-back with a
single ISB. So the existing isb() in __load_hdbss() is sufficient.
> [Severity: High]
> Are the hardware producer index updates lost during context switch?
>
> The producer index is loaded in kvm_vcpu_load_vhe(), but it doesn't appear KVM
> reads and saves it back to vcpu->arch.hdbss.hdbssprod_el2 during
> kvm_vcpu_put_vhe(). Would this rewind the hardware index on the next load?
>
Addressed in v5, kvm_vcpu_put_vhe() now saves HDBSSPROD_EL2 into vcpu-
>arch.hdbss.hdbssprod_el2, and __load_hdbss() restores it on the next
load, so the producer index survives context switches and cross-CPU
migration.
Thanks!
Tian
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-31 9:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 87+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-09 10:40 [PATCH v4 0/6] Support the FEAT_HDBSS introduced in Armv9.5 Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 10:40 ` [PATCH v4 1/6] KVM: arm64: Enable eager hugepage splitting if HDBSS is available Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 11:03 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:52 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 10:40 ` [PATCH v4 2/6] KVM: arm64: Add support for FEAT_HDBSS Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 11:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 8:55 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 10:40 ` [PATCH v4 3/6] KVM: arm64: Add auto DBM support for hardware dirty tracking Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 11:14 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 9:14 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-13 11:17 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 1:14 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 7:23 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-07-14 7:44 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 10:20 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-16 7:39 ` Oliver Upton
2026-07-17 3:58 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-17 15:21 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-20 12:58 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-29 8:51 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-29 15:16 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-03 1:33 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-03 4:04 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-03 10:21 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-03 13:57 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-03 16:32 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-03 16:34 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-04 4:54 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-04 11:10 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-05 3:41 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-10 11:01 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-21 15:58 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-31 12:36 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-31 12:33 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-05 3:43 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-28 8:49 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 10:40 ` [PATCH v4 4/6] KVM: arm64: Add HDBSS per-vCPU buffer management Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 11:15 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 9:37 ` Tian Zheng [this message]
2026-07-13 13:39 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 7:15 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 10:47 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-15 9:16 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-15 14:28 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-17 4:06 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 10:40 ` [PATCH v4 5/6] KVM: arm64: Add HDBSS fault handling and buffer flush Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 11:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 13:57 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-13 14:06 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 7:38 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 10:50 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 13:27 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 14:19 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-17 6:51 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-17 15:44 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-21 8:53 ` Inochi Amaoto
2026-07-21 14:18 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-22 5:14 ` Inochi Amaoto
2026-07-22 11:04 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-23 1:17 ` Inochi Amaoto
2026-07-28 7:52 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-29 15:30 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-03 3:15 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-03 10:43 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-08-04 8:26 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-03 3:22 ` Tian Zheng
2026-08-03 10:24 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-09 10:40 ` [PATCH v4 6/6] KVM: arm64: Add auto HDBSS enable/disable on dirty logging change Tian Zheng
2026-07-09 11:34 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-31 12:23 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-13 14:50 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 8:58 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 11:16 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 14:33 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-16 8:37 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-17 7:23 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-17 15:50 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-16 7:15 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-17 15:53 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-13 10:31 ` [PATCH v4 0/6] Support the FEAT_HDBSS introduced in Armv9.5 Leonardo Bras
2026-07-13 16:27 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 10:39 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 11:20 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 13:29 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 9:37 ` Tian Zheng
2026-07-14 10:19 ` Leonardo Bras
2026-07-14 13:34 ` Tian Zheng
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