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From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xilinx.com>,
	Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>,
	Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>,
	"Daniel P . Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	"Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>,
	"Edgar E. Iglesias" <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>,
	Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>,
	Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel@redhat.com>,
	Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>,
	Peter Crosthwaite <crosthwaite.peter@gmail.com>,
	Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>,
	Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
	Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@gmail.com>,
	Thomas Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Richard Henderson <r
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 05/26] target/i386: add memory encryption feature cpuid support
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2018 17:54:41 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <70d2e5cd-6b31-efc0-a48d-259defe4316b@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180207160638.98872-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On 07/02/2018 17:06, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> AMD EPYC processors support memory encryption feature. The feature
> is reported through CPUID 8000_001F[EAX].
> 
> Fn8000_001F [EAX]:
>  Bit 0   Secure Memory Encryption (SME) supported
>  Bit 1   Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) supported
>  Bit 2   Page flush MSR supported
>  Bit 3   Ecrypted State (SEV-ES) support
> 
> when memory encryption feature is reported, CPUID 8000_001F[EBX] should
> provide additional information regarding the feature (such as which page
> table bit is used to mark pages as encrypted etc). The information in EBX
> and ECX may vary from one family to another hence we use the host cpuid
> to populate the EBX information.
> 
> The details for memory encryption CPUID is available in AMD APM
> (https://support.amd.com/TechDocs/24594.pdf) Section E.4.17
> 
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
> Cc: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  target/i386/cpu.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  target/i386/cpu.h |  6 ++++++
>  2 files changed, 42 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
> index a49d2221adc9..4147eb6e18a9 100644
> --- a/target/i386/cpu.c
> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
> @@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ static void x86_cpu_vendor_words2str(char *dst, uint32_t vendor1,
>  #define TCG_EXT4_FEATURES 0
>  #define TCG_SVM_FEATURES 0
>  #define TCG_KVM_FEATURES 0
> +#define TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES 0
>  #define TCG_7_0_EBX_FEATURES (CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMEP | CPUID_7_0_EBX_SMAP | \
>            CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI1 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_BMI2 | CPUID_7_0_EBX_ADX | \
>            CPUID_7_0_EBX_PCOMMIT | CPUID_7_0_EBX_CLFLUSHOPT |            \
> @@ -545,6 +546,20 @@ static FeatureWordInfo feature_word_info[FEATURE_WORDS] = {
>          .cpuid_reg = R_EDX,
>          .tcg_features = ~0U,
>      },
> +    [FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] = {
> +        .feat_names = {
> +            "sme", "sev", "page-flush-msr", "sev-es",

Why would sme ever be on in a guest?  That is, would a guest care about
whether SME is on in the host?

Paolo

> +            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
> +            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
> +            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
> +            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
> +            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
> +            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
> +            NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
> +        },
> +        .cpuid_eax = 0x8000001F, .cpuid_reg = R_EAX,
> +        .tcg_features = TCG_MEM_ENCRYPT_FEATURES,
> +    }
>  };
>  
>  typedef struct X86RegisterInfo32 {
> @@ -1965,6 +1980,9 @@ static X86CPUDefinition builtin_x86_defs[] = {
>              CPUID_XSAVE_XGETBV1,
>          .features[FEAT_6_EAX] =
>              CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT,
> +        /* Missing: SEV_ES */
> +        .features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] =
> +            CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SME | CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV,
>          .xlevel = 0x8000000A,
>          .model_id = "AMD EPYC Processor",
>      },
> @@ -3589,6 +3607,19 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
>              *edx = 0;
>          }
>          break;
> +    case 0x8000001F:
> +        if (env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV) {
> +            *eax = env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT];
> +            host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, ebx, NULL, NULL);
> +            *ecx = 0;
> +            *edx = 0;
> +        } else {
> +            *eax = 0;
> +            *ebx = 0;
> +            *ecx = 0;
> +            *edx = 0;
> +        }
> +        break;
>      case 0xC0000000:
>          *eax = env->cpuid_xlevel2;
>          *ebx = 0;
> @@ -4036,10 +4067,15 @@ static void x86_cpu_expand_features(X86CPU *cpu, Error **errp)
>          x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_C000_0001_EDX);
>          x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_SVM);
>          x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_XSAVE);
> +        x86_cpu_adjust_feat_level(cpu, FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT);
>          /* SVM requires CPUID[0x8000000A] */
>          if (env->features[FEAT_8000_0001_ECX] & CPUID_EXT3_SVM) {
>              x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000000A);
>          }
> +        /* SEV requires CPUID[0x8000001F] */
> +        if ((env->features[FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT] & CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV)) {
> +            x86_cpu_adjust_level(cpu, &env->cpuid_min_xlevel, 0x8000001F);
> +        }
>      }
>  
>      /* Set cpuid_*level* based on cpuid_min_*level, if not explicitly set */
> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.h b/target/i386/cpu.h
> index f91e37d25dea..f7a0ab20fdd1 100644
> --- a/target/i386/cpu.h
> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.h
> @@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ typedef enum FeatureWord {
>      FEAT_6_EAX,         /* CPUID[6].EAX */
>      FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_LO, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EAX */
>      FEAT_XSAVE_COMP_HI, /* CPUID[EAX=0xd,ECX=0].EDX */
> +    FEAT_MEM_ENCRYPT,   /* CPUID[8000_001F].EAX */
>      FEATURE_WORDS,
>  } FeatureWord;
>  
> @@ -679,6 +680,11 @@ typedef uint32_t FeatureWordArray[FEATURE_WORDS];
>  
>  #define CPUID_6_EAX_ARAT       (1U << 2)
>  
> +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SME             (1U << 0) /* SME */
> +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV             (1U << 1) /* SEV */
> +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_PAGE_FLUSH_MSR  (1U << 2) /* Page flush MSR */
> +#define CPUID_8000_001F_EAX_SEV_ES          (1U << 3) /* SEV-ES */
> +
>  /* CPUID[0x80000007].EDX flags: */
>  #define CPUID_APM_INVTSC       (1U << 8)
>  
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2018-02-07 16:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-07 16:06 [PATCH v7 01/26] memattrs: add debug attribute Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/26] exec: add ram_debug_ops support Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:19   ` Eric Blake
2018-02-07 16:33     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:46       ` Eric Blake
2018-02-07 16:51   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-07 20:26     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/26] exec: add debug version of physical memory read and write API Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/26] monitor/i386: use debug APIs when accessing guest memory Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:53   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/26] target/i386: add memory encryption feature cpuid support Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:54   ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2018-02-07 18:28     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/26] machine: add -memory-encryption property Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/26] kvm: update kvm.h to include memory encryption ioctls Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/26] docs: add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/26] accel: add Secure Encrypted Virtulization (SEV) object Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/26] sev: add command to initialize the memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 11/26] sev: register the guest memory range which may contain encrypted data Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 12/26] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 13/26] qmp: add query-sev command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:22   ` Eric Blake
2018-02-07 16:36     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 14/26] hmp: add 'info sev' command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 15/26] sev: add command to create launch memory encryption context Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 16/26] sev: add command to encrypt guest memory region Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 17/26] target/i386: encrypt bios rom Brijesh Singh
2018-02-09 18:28   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-02-09 20:49     ` Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 18/26] sev: add support to LAUNCH_MEASURE command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 19/26] sev: Finalize the SEV guest launch flow Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 20/26] hw: i386: set ram_debug_ops when memory encryption is enabled Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 21/26] sev: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 22/26] target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 23/26] include: add psp-sev.h header file Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 24/26] sev: add support to query PLATFORM_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 25/26] sev: add support to KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:06 ` [PATCH v7 26/26] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command Brijesh Singh
2018-02-07 16:29   ` Eric Blake
2018-02-07 18:12     ` Brijesh Singh

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