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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nikunj@amd.com,
	Santosh.Shukla@amd.com, Vasant.Hegde@amd.com,
	Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com, bp@alien8.de,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, huibo.wang@amd.com, naveen.rao@amd.com,
	tiala@microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 05/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for SAVIC guests
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 08:55:31 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <82e85267-460e-39d5-98aa-427dd31cfadc@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250923050317.205482-6-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>

On 9/23/25 00:03, Neeraj Upadhyay wrote:
> Disable interception for SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for Secure AVIC
> enabled guests. The SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR holds the GPA of the
> guest APIC backing page and bitfields to control enablement of Secure
> AVIC and whether the guest allows NMIs to be injected by the hypervisor.
> This MSR is populated by the guest and can be read by the guest to get
> the GPA of the APIC backing page. The MSR can only be accessed in Secure
> AVIC mode; accessing it when not in Secure AVIC mode results in #GP. So,
> KVM should not intercept it.

The reason KVM should not intercept the MSR access is that the guest
would not be able to actually set the MSR if it is intercepted.

Thanks,
Tom

> 
> Co-developed-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Kishon Vijay Abraham I <kvijayab@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 +
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c           | 6 +++++-
>  2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> index b65c3ba5fa14..9f16030dd849 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
> @@ -707,6 +707,7 @@
>  #define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT	0
>  #define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT)
>  #define MSR_AMD64_RMP_SEGMENT_SHIFT(x)	(((x) & GENMASK_ULL(13, 8)) >> 8)
> +#define MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_CONTROL		0xc0010138
>  
>  #define MSR_SVSM_CAA			0xc001f000
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index b2eae102681c..afe4127a1918 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -4487,7 +4487,8 @@ void sev_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  
>  static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  {
> -	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(svm->vcpu.kvm);
> +	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
> +	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(vcpu->kvm);
>  	struct vmcb *vmcb = svm->vmcb01.ptr;
>  
>  	svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
> @@ -4546,6 +4547,9 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
>  
>  	/* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
>  	svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
> +
> +	if (sev_savic_active(vcpu->kvm))
> +		svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_SAVIC_CONTROL, MSR_TYPE_RW, false);
>  }
>  
>  void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)

  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-23 13:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-23  5:03 [RFC PATCH v2 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/17] KVM: x86/lapic: Differentiate protected APIC interrupt mechanisms Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/17] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/17] KVM: SVM: Add support for Secure AVIC capability in KVM Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/17] KVM: SVM: Set guest APIC protection flags for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 13:55   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-09-25  5:16     ` Upadhyay, Neeraj
2025-09-25 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/17] KVM: SVM: Implement interrupt injection for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 14:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/17] KVM: SVM: Add IPI Delivery Support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/17] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exception " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/17] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/17] KVM: SVM: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:25   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/17] KVM: SVM: Add VMGEXIT handler for Secure AVIC backing page Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:02   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/17] KVM: SVM: Add IOAPIC EOI support for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/17] KVM: x86/ioapic: Disable RTC EOI tracking for protected APIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:23   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/17] KVM: SVM: Check injected timers for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:32   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/17] KVM: x86/cpuid: Disable paravirt APIC features for protected APIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/17] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SNP guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 10:02 ` [syzbot ci] Re: AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support syzbot ci
2025-09-23 10:17   ` Upadhyay, Neeraj

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