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From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nikunj@amd.com,
	Santosh.Shukla@amd.com, Vasant.Hegde@amd.com,
	Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com, bp@alien8.de,
	David.Kaplan@amd.com, huibo.wang@amd.com, naveen.rao@amd.com,
	tiala@microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 15/17] KVM: SVM: Check injected timers for Secure AVIC guests
Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2025 11:32:30 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d2f7ae16-6326-3f62-ac0b-c83b68decc1a@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250923050317.205482-16-Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>

On 9/23/25 00:03, Neeraj Upadhyay wrote:
> The kvm_wait_lapic_expire() function is a pre-VMRUN optimization that
> allows a vCPU to wait for an imminent LAPIC timer interrupt. However,
> this function is not fully compatible with protected APIC models like
> Secure AVIC because it relies on inspecting KVM's software vAPIC state.
> For Secure AVIC, the true timer state is hardware-managed and opaque
> to KVM. For this reason, kvm_wait_lapic_expire() does not check whether
> timer interrupt is injected for the guests which have protected APIC
> state.
> 
> For the protected APIC guests, the check for injected timer need to be
> done by the callers of kvm_wait_lapic_expire(). So, for Secure AVIC
> guests, check to be injected vectors in the requested_IRR for injected
> timer interrupt before doing a kvm_wait_lapic_expire().
> 
> Signed-off-by: Neeraj Upadhyay <Neeraj.Upadhyay@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++-
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 2 ++
>  3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 5be2956fb812..3f6cf8d5068a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -5405,3 +5405,11 @@ bool sev_savic_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  	return READ_ONCE(to_svm(vcpu)->sev_savic_has_pending_ipi) ||
>  		kvm_apic_has_interrupt(vcpu) != -1;
>  }
> +
> +bool sev_savic_timer_int_injected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> +{
> +	u32 reg  = kvm_lapic_get_reg(vcpu->arch.apic, APIC_LVTT);

Extra space before the "="

> +	int vec = reg & APIC_VECTOR_MASK;
> +
> +	return to_svm(vcpu)->vmcb->control.requested_irr[vec / 32] & BIT(vec % 32);
> +}
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index a945bc094c1a..d0d972731ea7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -4335,7 +4335,8 @@ static __no_kcsan fastpath_t svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags)
>  	    vcpu->arch.host_debugctl != svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl)
>  		update_debugctlmsr(svm->vmcb->save.dbgctl);
>  
> -	kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
> +	if (!sev_savic_active(vcpu->kvm) || sev_savic_timer_int_injected(vcpu))
> +		kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
>  
>  	/*
>  	 * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index 8043833a1a8c..ecc4ea11822d 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -878,6 +878,7 @@ static inline bool sev_savic_active(struct kvm *kvm)
>  }
>  void sev_savic_set_requested_irr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool reinjected);
>  bool sev_savic_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
> +bool sev_savic_timer_int_injected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
>  #else
>  static inline struct page *snp_safe_alloc_page_node(int node, gfp_t gfp)
>  {
> @@ -917,6 +918,7 @@ static inline struct vmcb_save_area *sev_decrypt_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  static inline void sev_free_decrypted_vmsa(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcb_save_area *vmsa) {}
>  static inline void sev_savic_set_requested_irr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool reinjected) {}
>  static inline bool sev_savic_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return false; }
> +static inline bool sev_savic_timer_int_injected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { return true; }

Shouldn't this return false? If CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV isn't defined, then
sev_savic_active() will always be false and this won't be called anyway.

Thanks,
Tom

>  #endif
>  
>  /* vmenter.S */

  reply	other threads:[~2025-09-23 16:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-09-23  5:03 [RFC PATCH v2 00/17] AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/17] KVM: x86/lapic: Differentiate protected APIC interrupt mechanisms Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/17] x86/cpufeatures: Add Secure AVIC CPU feature Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/17] KVM: SVM: Add support for Secure AVIC capability in KVM Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/17] KVM: SVM: Set guest APIC protection flags for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept SECURE_AVIC_CONTROL MSR for SAVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 13:55   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-25  5:16     ` Upadhyay, Neeraj
2025-09-25 13:54       ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/17] KVM: SVM: Implement interrupt injection for Secure AVIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 14:47   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/17] KVM: SVM: Add IPI Delivery Support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/17] KVM: SVM: Do not inject exception " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:00   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/17] KVM: SVM: Do not intercept exceptions for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/17] KVM: SVM: Set VGIF in VMSA area " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:16   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/17] KVM: SVM: Enable NMI support " Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 15:25   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/17] KVM: SVM: Add VMGEXIT handler for Secure AVIC backing page Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:02   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/17] KVM: SVM: Add IOAPIC EOI support for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:15   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/17] KVM: x86/ioapic: Disable RTC EOI tracking for protected APIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:23   ` Tom Lendacky
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/17] KVM: SVM: Check injected timers for Secure AVIC guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 16:32   ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/17] KVM: x86/cpuid: Disable paravirt APIC features for protected APIC Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23  5:03 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/17] KVM: SVM: Advertise Secure AVIC support for SNP guests Neeraj Upadhyay
2025-09-23 10:02 ` [syzbot ci] Re: AMD: Add Secure AVIC KVM Support syzbot ci
2025-09-23 10:17   ` Upadhyay, Neeraj

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