From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>, <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>,
<jingqi.liu@intel.com>, <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
<isaku.yamahata@intel.com>, <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: x86: Untag LAM bits when applicable
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 23:04:54 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y+ZdFtr1fJkdCtRL@gao-cwp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230209024022.3371768-6-robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 10:40:18AM +0800, Robert Hoo wrote:
>Define kvm_untagged_addr() per LAM feature spec: Address high bits are sign
>extended, from highest effective address bit.
>Note that LAM_U48 and LA57 has some effective bits overlap. This patch
>gives a WARN() on that case.
Why emit a WARN()? the behavior is undefined or something KVM cannot
emulated?
>
>Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
>Reviewed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 4 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index 66edd091f145..e4f14d1bdd2f 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -2163,6 +2163,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
> return 1;
>+
>+ data = kvm_untagged_addr(data, vcpu);
This is a MSR write, so LAM masking isn't performed on this write
according to LAM spec. Am I misunderstanding something?
>+
> if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
> (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
> return 1;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>index 312aea1854ae..1bdc8c0c80c0 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>@@ -1809,6 +1809,10 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
> case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
> case MSR_CSTAR:
> case MSR_LSTAR:
>+ /*
>+ * The strict canonical checking still applies to MSR
>+ * writing even LAM is enabled.
>+ */
> if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
LAM spec says:
Processors that support LAM continue to require the addresses written to
control registers or MSRs be 57-bit canonical if the processor supports
5-level paging or 48-bit canonical if it supports only 4-level paging
My understanding is 57-bit canonical checking is performed if the processor
__supports__ 5-level paging. Then the is_noncanonical_address() here is
arguably wrong. Could you double-confirm and fix it?
> return 1;
> break;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>index 8ec5cc983062..7228895d4a6f 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>@@ -201,6 +201,38 @@ static inline bool is_noncanonical_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> return !__is_canonical_address(la, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu));
> }
>
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
I don't get the purpose of the #ifdef. Shouldn't you check if the vcpu
is in 64-bit long mode?
>+/* untag addr for guest, according to vCPU CR3 and CR4 settings */
>+static inline u64 kvm_untagged_addr(u64 addr, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>+{
>+ if (addr >> 63 == 0) {
>+ /* User pointers */
>+ if (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_LAM_U57)
>+ addr = __canonical_address(addr, 57);
braces are missing.
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#placing-braces-and-spaces
>+ else if (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_LAM_U48) {
>+ /*
>+ * If guest enabled 5-level paging and LAM_U48,
>+ * bit 47 should be 0, bit 48:56 contains meta data
>+ * although bit 47:56 are valid 5-level address
>+ * bits.
>+ * If LAM_U48 and 4-level paging, bit47 is 0.
>+ */
>+ WARN_ON(addr & _BITUL(47));
>+ addr = __canonical_address(addr, 48);
>+ }
>+ } else if (kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) & X86_CR4_LAM_SUP) { /* Supervisor pointers */
>+ if (kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) & X86_CR4_LA57)
use kvm_read_cr4_bits here to save potential VMCS_READs.
>+ addr = __canonical_address(addr, 57);
>+ else
>+ addr = __canonical_address(addr, 48);
>+ }
>+
>+ return addr;
>+}
>+#else
>+#define kvm_untagged_addr(addr, vcpu) (addr)
>+#endif
>+
> static inline void vcpu_cache_mmio_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn, unsigned access)
> {
>--
>2.31.1
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-10 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-09 2:40 [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] KVM: x86: Intercept CR4.LAM_SUP when LAM feature is enabled in guest Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 9:21 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 12:48 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 3:29 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-10 5:02 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-14 1:27 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14 6:11 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 9:00 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14 12:24 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 12:36 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16 5:31 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-16 5:54 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Clear CR3 LAM bits when allocate shadow root Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 9:55 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 13:02 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 2:55 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-15 1:17 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16 2:14 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 3:38 ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-11 3:12 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Commets update Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 6:59 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10 7:55 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Integrate LAM bits when build guest CR3 Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 14:04 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-11 6:24 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-11 6:29 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: x86: Untag LAM bits when applicable Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 15:04 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-02-11 5:57 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16 6:37 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] KVM: x86: When KVM judges CR3 valid or not, consider LAM bits Robert Hoo
2023-02-13 2:01 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13 13:25 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 6:18 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14 7:00 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-18 5:44 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] KVM: x86: When guest set CR3, handle LAM bits semantics Robert Hoo
2023-02-13 3:31 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14 5:28 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 6:48 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] KVM: x86: emulation: Apply LAM when emulating data access Robert Hoo
2023-02-13 3:53 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14 5:38 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 2:40 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] KVM: x86: LAM: Expose LAM CPUID to user space VMM Robert Hoo
2023-02-21 5:47 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 7:26 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-21 8:26 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 11:13 ` Yu Zhang
2023-02-21 13:18 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 14:36 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 6:15 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Chao Gao
2023-02-09 12:25 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 17:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10 2:07 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 3:17 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10 8:41 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 8:39 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 9:22 ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13 9:02 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-13 13:16 ` Robert Hoo
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