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From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<yu.c.zhang@linux.intel.com>, <yuan.yao@linux.intel.com>,
	<jingqi.liu@intel.com>, <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	<isaku.yamahata@intel.com>, <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: x86: Untag LAM bits when applicable
Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2023 23:04:54 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y+ZdFtr1fJkdCtRL@gao-cwp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230209024022.3371768-6-robert.hu@linux.intel.com>

On Thu, Feb 09, 2023 at 10:40:18AM +0800, Robert Hoo wrote:
>Define kvm_untagged_addr() per LAM feature spec: Address high bits are sign
>extended, from highest effective address bit.

>Note that LAM_U48 and LA57 has some effective bits overlap. This patch
>gives a WARN() on that case.

Why emit a WARN()? the behavior is undefined or something KVM cannot
emulated?

>
>Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
>Reviewed-by: Jingqi Liu <jingqi.liu@intel.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  3 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.c     |  4 ++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h     | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>index 66edd091f145..e4f14d1bdd2f 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
>@@ -2163,6 +2163,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> 		    (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
> 		     !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
> 			return 1;
>+
>+		data = kvm_untagged_addr(data, vcpu);

This is a MSR write, so LAM masking isn't performed on this write
according to LAM spec. Am I misunderstanding something?

>+
> 		if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
> 		    (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
> 			return 1;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>index 312aea1854ae..1bdc8c0c80c0 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>@@ -1809,6 +1809,10 @@ static int __kvm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 index, u64 data,
> 	case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
> 	case MSR_CSTAR:
> 	case MSR_LSTAR:
>+		/*
>+		 * The strict canonical checking still applies to MSR
>+		 * writing even LAM is enabled.
>+		 */
> 		if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))

LAM spec says:

	Processors that support LAM continue to require the addresses written to
	control registers or MSRs be 57-bit canonical if the processor supports
	5-level paging or 48-bit canonical if it supports only 4-level paging

My understanding is 57-bit canonical checking is performed if the processor
__supports__ 5-level paging. Then the is_noncanonical_address() here is
arguably wrong. Could you double-confirm and fix it?

> 			return 1;
> 		break;
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>index 8ec5cc983062..7228895d4a6f 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
>@@ -201,6 +201,38 @@ static inline bool is_noncanonical_address(u64 la, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> 	return !__is_canonical_address(la, vcpu_virt_addr_bits(vcpu));
> }
> 
>+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64

I don't get the purpose of the #ifdef. Shouldn't you check if the vcpu
is in 64-bit long mode?

>+/* untag addr for guest, according to vCPU CR3 and CR4 settings */
>+static inline u64 kvm_untagged_addr(u64 addr, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>+{
>+	if (addr >> 63 == 0) {
>+		/* User pointers */
>+		if (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_LAM_U57)
>+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 57);

braces are missing.

https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/coding-style.html#placing-braces-and-spaces

>+		else if (kvm_read_cr3(vcpu) & X86_CR3_LAM_U48) {
>+			/*
>+			 * If guest enabled 5-level paging and LAM_U48,
>+			 * bit 47 should be 0, bit 48:56 contains meta data
>+			 * although bit 47:56 are valid 5-level address
>+			 * bits.
>+			 * If LAM_U48 and 4-level paging, bit47 is 0.
>+			 */
>+			WARN_ON(addr & _BITUL(47));
>+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 48);
>+		}
>+	} else if (kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) & X86_CR4_LAM_SUP) { /* Supervisor pointers */
>+		if (kvm_read_cr4(vcpu) & X86_CR4_LA57)

use kvm_read_cr4_bits here to save potential VMCS_READs.

>+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 57);
>+		else
>+			addr = __canonical_address(addr, 48);
>+	}
>+
>+	return addr;
>+}
>+#else
>+#define kvm_untagged_addr(addr, vcpu)	(addr)
>+#endif
>+
> static inline void vcpu_cache_mmio_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> 					gva_t gva, gfn_t gfn, unsigned access)
> {
>-- 
>2.31.1
>

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-10 15:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-09  2:40 [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] KVM: x86: Intercept CR4.LAM_SUP when LAM feature is enabled in guest Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  9:21   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 12:48     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:29   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-10  5:02     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:30       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-14  1:27   ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14  6:11     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  9:00       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-14 12:24         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14 12:36           ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  5:31           ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-16  5:54             ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Clear CR3 LAM bits when allocate shadow root Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  9:55   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09 13:02     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  2:55       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-15  1:17         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  2:14         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:38   ` Yang, Weijiang
2023-02-11  3:12     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Commets update Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  6:59   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10  7:55     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 16:54       ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] KVM: x86: MMU: Integrate LAM bits when build guest CR3 Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 14:04   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-11  6:24     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-11  6:29       ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] KVM: x86: Untag LAM bits when applicable Robert Hoo
2023-02-10 15:04   ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-02-11  5:57     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-16  6:37       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] KVM: x86: When KVM judges CR3 valid or not, consider LAM bits Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  2:01   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13 13:25     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  6:18       ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  7:00         ` Chao Gao
2023-02-18  5:44         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] KVM: x86: When guest set CR3, handle LAM bits semantics Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  3:31   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  5:28     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-14  6:48       ` Chao Gao
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] KVM: x86: emulation: Apply LAM when emulating data access Robert Hoo
2023-02-13  3:53   ` Chao Gao
2023-02-14  5:38     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  2:40 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] KVM: x86: LAM: Expose LAM CPUID to user space VMM Robert Hoo
2023-02-21  5:47   ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21  7:26     ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-21  8:26       ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 11:13         ` Yu Zhang
2023-02-21 13:18           ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-21 14:36             ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09  6:15 ` [PATCH v4 0/9] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Chao Gao
2023-02-09 12:25   ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-09 17:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-10  2:07       ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  3:17         ` Chao Gao
2023-02-10  8:41           ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  8:39         ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-10  9:22           ` Chao Gao
2023-02-13  9:02 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-13 13:16   ` Robert Hoo

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