From: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
To: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
<binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 4/5] KVM: x86: emulation: Apply LAM mask when emulating data access in 64-bit mode
Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2023 16:55:11 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZABkb0wPffBt9W8u@gao-cwp> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230227084547.404871-5-robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
On Mon, Feb 27, 2023 at 04:45:46PM +0800, Robert Hoo wrote:
>Emulate HW LAM masking when doing data access under 64-bit mode.
>
>kvm_lam_untag_addr() implements this: per CR4/CR3 LAM bits configuration,
>firstly check the linear addr conforms LAM canonical, i.e. the highest
>address bit matches bit 63. Then mask out meta data per LAM configuration.
>If failed in above process, emulate #GP to guest.
>
>Signed-off-by: Robert Hoo <robert.hu@linux.intel.com>
>---
> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 13 ++++++++
> arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+)
>
>diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
>index 5cc3efa0e21c..77bd13f40711 100644
>--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
>+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
>@@ -700,6 +700,19 @@ static __always_inline int __linearize(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
> *max_size = 0;
> switch (mode) {
> case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
>+ /* LAM applies only on data access */
>+ if (!fetch && guest_cpuid_has(ctxt->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_LAM)) {
>+ enum lam_type type;
>+
>+ type = kvm_vcpu_lam_type(la, ctxt->vcpu);
>+ if (type == LAM_ILLEGAL) {
>+ *linear = la;
>+ goto bad;
>+ } else {
>+ la = kvm_lam_untag_addr(la, type);
>+ }
>+ }
>+
> *linear = la;
> va_bits = ctxt_virt_addr_bits(ctxt);
> if (!__is_canonical_address(la, va_bits))
...
>+static inline u64 kvm_lam_untag_addr(u64 addr, enum lam_type type)
>+{
>+ switch (type) {
>+ case LAM_U57:
>+ case LAM_S57:
>+ addr = __canonical_address(addr, 57);
>+ break;
>+ case LAM_U48:
>+ case LAM_S48:
>+ addr = __canonical_address(addr, 48);
>+ break;
>+ case LAM_NONE:
>+ default:
>+ break;
>+ }
>+
>+ return addr;
>+}
LAM's change to canonicality check is:
before performing the check, software metadata in pointers is masked by
sign-extending the value of bit 56/47.
so, to emulate this behavior, in kvm_lam_untag_addr(), we can simply:
1. determine which LAM configuration is enabled, LAM57 or LAM48.
2. mask software metadata by sign-extending the bit56/47, i.e.,
addr = (sign_extern64(addr, X) & ~BIT_ULL(63)) |
(addr & BIT_ULL(63));
where X=56 for LAM57 and X=47 for LAM48.
Note that this doesn't ensure the resulting @addr is canonical. It
isn't a problem because the original canonicality check
(__is_canonical_address() above) can identify non-canonical addresses
and raise #GP/#SS to the guest.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-02 8:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-27 8:45 [PATCH v5 0/5] Linear Address Masking (LAM) KVM Enabling Robert Hoo
2023-02-27 8:45 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR4.LAM_SUP Robert Hoo
2023-03-02 7:17 ` Chao Gao
2023-03-02 12:03 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-02 13:00 ` Robert Hoo
2023-02-27 8:45 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] [Trivial]KVM: x86: Explicitly cast ulong to bool in kvm_set_cr3() Robert Hoo
2023-03-02 7:24 ` Chao Gao
2023-03-03 3:23 ` Robert Hoo
2023-03-10 20:22 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-20 12:05 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-20 13:56 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-21 16:03 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-27 8:45 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] KVM: x86: Virtualize CR3.LAM_{U48,U57} Robert Hoo
2023-03-03 6:21 ` Chao Gao
2023-03-03 14:23 ` Robert Hoo
2023-03-03 15:53 ` Chao Gao
2023-03-05 1:31 ` Robert Hoo
2023-03-10 20:12 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-20 6:57 ` Binbin Wu
2023-02-27 8:45 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] KVM: x86: emulation: Apply LAM mask when emulating data access in 64-bit mode Robert Hoo
2023-03-02 6:41 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-02 13:16 ` Robert Hoo
2023-03-03 1:08 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-03 3:16 ` Robert Hoo
2023-03-03 3:35 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-03 9:00 ` Robert Hoo
2023-03-03 10:18 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-10 20:26 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-03-02 8:55 ` Chao Gao [this message]
2023-03-02 11:31 ` Binbin Wu
2023-03-10 20:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-02-27 8:45 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] KVM: x86: LAM: Expose LAM CPUID to user space VMM Robert Hoo
2023-03-03 6:46 ` Chao Gao
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