From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
thomas.lendacky@amd.com, santosh.shukla@amd.com, bp@alien8.de,
isaku.yamahata@intel.com, vaishali.thakkar@suse.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 3/4] KVM: SVM: Add GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for Secure TSC enabled guests
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 07:13:28 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aFwECPca4SbV916d@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250408093213.57962-4-nikunj@amd.com>
On Tue, Apr 08, 2025, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
> Introduce the read-only MSR GUEST_TSC_FREQ (0xc0010134) that returns
> guest's effective frequency in MHZ when Secure TSC is enabled for SNP
> guests. Disable interception of this MSR when Secure TSC is enabled. Note
> that GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR is accessible only to the guest and not from the
> hypervisor context.
>
> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> Tested-by: Vaishali Thakkar <vaishali.thakkar@suse.com>
> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 3 +++
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h | 11 ++++++++++-
> 4 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> index 9b7fa99ae951..6ab66b80e751 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
> @@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
> #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION BIT(3)
> #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)
> #define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
> +#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9)
>
> struct vmcb_seg {
> u16 selector;
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 0bc708ee2788..50263b473f95 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -4504,6 +4504,9 @@ static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
> set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
> set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
> +
> + if (snp_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm))
> + set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ, 1, 1);
> }
>
> void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index 8abeab91d329..e65721db1f81 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
> { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMICT), .always = false },
> { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), .always = false },
> { .index = X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TDCR), .always = false },
> + { .index = MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ, .always = false },
> { .index = MSR_INVALID, .always = false },
> };
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> index d4490eaed55d..711e21b7a3d0 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
> @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ static inline struct page *__sme_pa_to_page(unsigned long pa)
> #define IOPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 3
> #define MSRPM_SIZE PAGE_SIZE * 2
>
> -#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 48
> +#define MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS 49
> #define MSRPM_OFFSETS 32
> extern u32 msrpm_offsets[MSRPM_OFFSETS] __read_mostly;
> extern bool npt_enabled;
> @@ -377,10 +377,19 @@ static __always_inline bool sev_snp_guest(struct kvm *kvm)
> return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE) &&
> !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_es_guest(kvm));
> }
> +
> +static inline bool snp_secure_tsc_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
This is only ever used in sev.c, it has no business living in svm.c. And there's
especially no reason to have a stub for CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=n.
> +{
> + struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
> +
> + return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC) &&
> + !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
> +}
> #else
> #define sev_guest(kvm) false
> #define sev_es_guest(kvm) false
> #define sev_snp_guest(kvm) false
> +#define snp_secure_tsc_enabled(kvm) false
> #endif
>
> static inline bool ghcb_gpa_is_registered(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 val)
> --
> 2.43.0
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-25 14:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-08 9:32 [PATCH v6 0/4] Enable Secure TSC for SEV-SNP Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-04-08 9:32 ` [PATCH v6 1/4] x86/cpufeatures: Add SNP Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-04-08 9:32 ` [PATCH v6 2/4] KVM: SVM: Add missing member in SNP_LAUNCH_START command structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-04-08 9:32 ` [PATCH v6 3/4] KVM: SVM: Add GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-06-25 14:13 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2025-06-26 6:07 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-04-08 9:32 ` [PATCH v6 4/4] KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-06-25 14:27 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-26 8:53 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-04-14 5:50 ` [PATCH v6 0/4] Enable Secure TSC for SEV-SNP Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-05-05 4:50 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-06-09 8:51 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-06-25 22:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2025-06-26 6:10 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=aFwECPca4SbV916d@google.com \
--to=seanjc@google.com \
--cc=bp@alien8.de \
--cc=isaku.yamahata@intel.com \
--cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=nikunj@amd.com \
--cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
--cc=santosh.shukla@amd.com \
--cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
--cc=vaishali.thakkar@suse.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox