Re: [PATCH RFC 10/12] accel/kvm: Don't default to private attributes for in-place conversion

[Lorenzo Pieralisi <lpieralisi@kernel.org>]

On Wed, May 27, 2026 at 07:03:35PM -0500, Michael Roth wrote:
> Without in-place conversion, QEMU can still access shared memory to load
> initial state into guest memory prior to launch even if the GPA's memory
> attributes default to private, since userspace is accessing a completely
> separate pool of memory. With in-place conversion, all these accesses
> would need to first be converted to shared, then back to private, since
> the memory all comes from guest_memfd and only shared memory can be
> accessed by userspace.
> 
> To avoid sprinkling these differences in behavior throughout QEMU when
> in-place conversion is enabled, just default to shared. This does not
> compromise guest security, since Confidential VMs will necessarily
> enforce this via trusted entities, and simply generate implicit page
> state changes if their default expectations don't match KVM's. However,
> in most cases a guest will explicitly convert memory to a particular
> state before actually using it, so even these implicit conversion
> requests should be rare.

I assume you want to prevent peppering code with convert-in-place
conditional paths where, if we default to private, certain mem copies
to guest memory would fault.

Flip side: we default to shared, we leave the current code paths unchanged
(that assume double backing) but we end up (eg on CCA) populating guest memory
twice, once with a copy to shared guest memfd memory (that is basically
useless because populating in CCA is destructive) and then populating
the guest memory region using CCA KVM interface (KVM_ARM_RMI_POPULATE).

I am just thinking aloud and sharing what I have noticed so far.

Lorenzo

> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
> ---
>  accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>  1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index fd01435a0f..c3d399517d 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -1808,7 +1808,26 @@ static void kvm_set_phys_mem(KVMMemoryListener *kml,
>              abort();
>          }
>  
> -        if (memory_region_has_guest_memfd(mr)) {
> +        /*
> +         * Without in-place conversion, QEMU can still access shared memory
> +         * to load initial state into guest memory prior to launch even if
> +         * the GPA's memory attributes default to private, since userspace
> +         * is accessing a completely separate pool of memory. With in-place
> +         * conversion, all these accesses would need to first be converted
> +         * to shared, then back to private, since the memory all comes from
> +         * guest_memfd and only shared memory can be accessed by userspace.
> +         *
> +         * To avoid sprinkling these differences in behavior throughout QEMU
> +         * when in-place conversion is enabled, just default to shared. This
> +         * does not compromise guest security, since Confidential VMs will
> +         * necessarily enforce this via trusted entities, and simply generate
> +         * implicit page state changes if their default expectations don't
> +         * match KVM's. However, in most cases a guest will explicitly
> +         * convert memory to a particular state before actually using it, so
> +         * even these implicit conversion requests should be rare.
> +         */
> +        if (memory_region_has_guest_memfd(mr) &&
> +            !(current_machine->cgs && current_machine->cgs->convert_in_place)) {
>              err = kvm_set_memory_attributes_private(start_addr, slot_size);
>              if (err) {
>                  error_report("%s: failed to set memory attribute private: %s",
> -- 
> 2.43.0
>