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From: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
To: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
Cc: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>,
	Atish Patra <atish.patra@linux.dev>,
	 Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	 Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
	Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
	 Bingyu Xian <shanbeeyoo@gmail.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	 linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time
Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2026 17:40:29 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <awB1hZGh3LYztjqL@orel> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118062242.2914385-2-den@valinux.co.jp>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 03:22:41PM +0900, Koichiro Den wrote:
> Updating the SBI STA shared structure performs 2x get_user() + 3x
> put_user() calls, each of which toggles sstatus.SUM.
> 
> Keep SUM enabled across all five accesses to the shared structure.
> 
> Note that write barriers are added to order the odd sequence store
> before the steal-time update and the even sequence store after it.

The barrier additions should probably be posted separately with a Fixes
tag.

> 
> Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
> ---
> To reviewers: please let me know if you'd prefer
> scoped_user_rw_access() here.
> 
>  arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
> index 60e50296a008..cfc6f22c3e33 100644
> --- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
> +++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
> @@ -8,13 +8,14 @@
>  #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
>  #include <linux/mm.h>
>  #include <linux/sizes.h>
> +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
>  
> +#include <asm/barrier.h>
>  #include <asm/bug.h>
>  #include <asm/current.h>
>  #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_sbi.h>
>  #include <asm/page.h>
>  #include <asm/sbi.h>
> -#include <asm/uaccess.h>
>  
>  static void kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_sta_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
> @@ -26,13 +27,13 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  {
>  	gpa_t shmem = vcpu->arch.sta.shmem;
>  	u64 last_steal = vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal;
> -	__le32 __user *sequence_ptr;
> -	__le64 __user *steal_ptr;
> +	struct sbi_sta_struct __user *st;
>  	__le32 sequence_le;
>  	__le64 steal_le;
>  	u32 sequence;
>  	u64 steal;
>  	unsigned long hva;
> +	bool dirty = false, success = false;
>  	gfn_t gfn;
>  
>  	if (shmem == INVALID_GPA)
> @@ -51,31 +52,39 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>  		return;
>  	}
>  
> -	sequence_ptr = (__le32 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
> -			       offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, sequence));
> -	steal_ptr = (__le64 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
> -			    offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, steal));
> -
> -	if (WARN_ON(get_user(sequence_le, sequence_ptr)))
> -		return;
> -
> -	sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le);
> -	sequence += 1;
> -
> -	if (WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr)))
> +	st = (struct sbi_sta_struct __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem));
> +	might_fault();

We're probably safe to drop this might_fault(). But either way it's fine.

> +	if (WARN_ON(!user_access_begin(st, sizeof(*st))))
>  		return;
>  
> -	if (!WARN_ON(get_user(steal_le, steal_ptr))) {
> -		steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le);
> -		vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay);
> -		steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal;
> -		WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), steal_ptr));
> -	}
> -
> +	unsafe_get_user(sequence_le, &st->sequence, fault);
> +	sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le) + 1;
> +	unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), &st->sequence, fault);
> +	dirty = true;
> +
> +	/* Publish the odd sequence before updating stolen time. */
> +	smp_wmb();
> +	unsafe_get_user(steal_le, &st->steal, update_sequence);
> +	steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le);
> +	vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay);
> +	steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal;
> +	unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), &st->steal, update_sequence);
> +	success = true;
> +
> +update_sequence:
> +	/* Publish stolen time before completing the update. */
> +	smp_wmb();
>  	sequence += 1;
> -	WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr));
> -
> -	kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
> +	unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), &st->sequence, fault);
> +	goto out;
> +
> +fault:
> +	success = false;
> +out:
> +	user_access_end();
> +	WARN_ON(!success);
> +	if (dirty)
> +		kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
>  }
>  
>  static int kvm_sbi_sta_steal_time_set_shmem(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> -- 
> 2.54.0
>

Otherwise,

Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-20 16:41 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-18  6:22 [PATCH 0/2] RISC-V: KVM: Lessen steal time update overhead Koichiro Den
2026-11-18  6:22 ` [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time Koichiro Den
2026-11-20 16:40   ` Andrew Jones [this message]
2026-11-20 17:20     ` Koichiro Den
2026-11-18  6:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] RISC-V: KVM: Skip steal-time updates when run_delay is unchanged Koichiro Den
2026-11-20 16:45   ` Andrew Jones
2026-11-20 17:25     ` Koichiro Den

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