From: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
To: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
Cc: Anup Patel <anup@brainfault.org>,
Atish Patra <atish.patra@linux.dev>,
Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>,
Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
Albert Ou <aou@eecs.berkeley.edu>,
Alexandre Ghiti <alex@ghiti.fr>,
Bingyu Xian <shanbeeyoo@gmail.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvm-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 02:20:17 +0900 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <awB6FpVOpZ9fhMt1@z790sl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <awB1hZGh3LYztjqL@orel>
On Fri, Nov 20, 2026 at 05:40:29PM +0100, Andrew Jones wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 03:22:41PM +0900, Koichiro Den wrote:
> > Updating the SBI STA shared structure performs 2x get_user() + 3x
> > put_user() calls, each of which toggles sstatus.SUM.
> >
> > Keep SUM enabled across all five accesses to the shared structure.
> >
> > Note that write barriers are added to order the odd sequence store
> > before the steal-time update and the even sequence store after it.
Hi Andrew, thanks for the review.
>
> The barrier additions should probably be posted separately with a Fixes
> tag.
That's exactly what I wasn't sure about when I read the ISA spec.
It was unclear to me from the Zicsr ordering rules whether the SUM toggle in
the old code's get_user() and put_user() calls also order the stores to 'sequence'
and 'steal' as seen by another hart.
(I don't think they do, but I'm not 100% sure. It feels a bit like trying to
prove a negative, as I couldn't find a clear statement. I may have missed one
though. OTOH, the new code surely needs the barrier, so I included them.)
Do you read the spec as allowing another hart to observe those stores out of
order in the old code? If so, I agree the barriers can go in a separate patch.
>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <den@valinux.co.jp>
> > ---
> > To reviewers: please let me know if you'd prefer
> > scoped_user_rw_access() here.
> >
> > arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
> > 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
> > index 60e50296a008..cfc6f22c3e33 100644
> > --- a/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
> > +++ b/arch/riscv/kvm/vcpu_sbi_sta.c
> > @@ -8,13 +8,14 @@
> > #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
> > #include <linux/mm.h>
> > #include <linux/sizes.h>
> > +#include <linux/uaccess.h>
> >
> > +#include <asm/barrier.h>
> > #include <asm/bug.h>
> > #include <asm/current.h>
> > #include <asm/kvm_vcpu_sbi.h>
> > #include <asm/page.h>
> > #include <asm/sbi.h>
> > -#include <asm/uaccess.h>
> >
> > static void kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_sta_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > {
> > @@ -26,13 +27,13 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > {
> > gpa_t shmem = vcpu->arch.sta.shmem;
> > u64 last_steal = vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal;
> > - __le32 __user *sequence_ptr;
> > - __le64 __user *steal_ptr;
> > + struct sbi_sta_struct __user *st;
> > __le32 sequence_le;
> > __le64 steal_le;
> > u32 sequence;
> > u64 steal;
> > unsigned long hva;
> > + bool dirty = false, success = false;
> > gfn_t gfn;
> >
> > if (shmem == INVALID_GPA)
> > @@ -51,31 +52,39 @@ void kvm_riscv_vcpu_record_steal_time(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > return;
> > }
> >
> > - sequence_ptr = (__le32 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
> > - offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, sequence));
> > - steal_ptr = (__le64 __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem) +
> > - offsetof(struct sbi_sta_struct, steal));
> > -
> > - if (WARN_ON(get_user(sequence_le, sequence_ptr)))
> > - return;
> > -
> > - sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le);
> > - sequence += 1;
> > -
> > - if (WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr)))
> > + st = (struct sbi_sta_struct __user *)(hva + offset_in_page(shmem));
> > + might_fault();
>
> We're probably safe to drop this might_fault(). But either way it's fine.
I kept it to preserve the check we get from get_user()/put_user().
I don't think it's indispensable here either. I'll probably drop it in v2.
Best regards,
Koichiro Den
>
> > + if (WARN_ON(!user_access_begin(st, sizeof(*st))))
> > return;
> >
> > - if (!WARN_ON(get_user(steal_le, steal_ptr))) {
> > - steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le);
> > - vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay);
> > - steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal;
> > - WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), steal_ptr));
> > - }
> > -
> > + unsafe_get_user(sequence_le, &st->sequence, fault);
> > + sequence = le32_to_cpu(sequence_le) + 1;
> > + unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), &st->sequence, fault);
> > + dirty = true;
> > +
> > + /* Publish the odd sequence before updating stolen time. */
> > + smp_wmb();
> > + unsafe_get_user(steal_le, &st->steal, update_sequence);
> > + steal = le64_to_cpu(steal_le);
> > + vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal = READ_ONCE(current->sched_info.run_delay);
> > + steal += vcpu->arch.sta.last_steal - last_steal;
> > + unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le64(steal), &st->steal, update_sequence);
> > + success = true;
> > +
> > +update_sequence:
> > + /* Publish stolen time before completing the update. */
> > + smp_wmb();
> > sequence += 1;
> > - WARN_ON(put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), sequence_ptr));
> > -
> > - kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
> > + unsafe_put_user(cpu_to_le32(sequence), &st->sequence, fault);
> > + goto out;
> > +
> > +fault:
> > + success = false;
> > +out:
> > + user_access_end();
> > + WARN_ON(!success);
> > + if (dirty)
> > + kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gfn);
> > }
> >
> > static int kvm_sbi_sta_steal_time_set_shmem(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > --
> > 2.54.0
> >
>
> Otherwise,
>
> Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <andrew.jones@linux.dev>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-20 17:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-18 6:22 [PATCH 0/2] RISC-V: KVM: Lessen steal time update overhead Koichiro Den
2026-11-18 6:22 ` [PATCH 1/2] RISC-V: KVM: Batch user accesses when updating steal time Koichiro Den
2026-11-20 16:40 ` Andrew Jones
2026-11-20 17:20 ` Koichiro Den [this message]
2026-11-18 6:22 ` [PATCH 2/2] RISC-V: KVM: Skip steal-time updates when run_delay is unchanged Koichiro Den
2026-11-20 16:45 ` Andrew Jones
2026-11-20 17:25 ` Koichiro Den
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