From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Vincent Donnefort" <vdonnefort@google.com>
Cc: "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH 16/20] KVM: arm64: Add __pkvm_host_split_guest HVC
Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2026 10:54:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260803105428.76EEF1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260803100904.3563942-17-vdonnefort@google.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Failed guest stage-2 page table splits leave the host stage-2 ownership metadata permanently split, causing subsequent split attempts to fail with -EINVAL.
- [High] Incorrect WARN_ON() semantics in host_stage2_split_gfn_meta() turns a recoverable memory allocation failure into a fatal EL2 panic.
--
--- Patch [16]: [PATCH 16/20] KVM: arm64: Add __pkvm_host_split_guest HVC ---
commit 76334f00eacfa593f4125057892101e13067d2e0
Author: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
KVM: arm64: Add __pkvm_host_split_guest HVC
This HVC allows the host to break an existing block in a protected VM. This
will later allow the guest to share a sub-region of an existing
huge-mapping with the host.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> index e16dde4c5f4b9..71ebd1856cb0c 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -660,14 +658,49 @@ static int host_stage2_decode_gfn_meta(kvm_pte_t pte, struct pkvm_hyp_vm **vm,
[ ... ]
> + end = phys + size;
> + while (phys < end) {
> + u64 meta = host_stage2_encode_gfn_meta(vm, gfn);
> + kvm_pte_t annotation = FIELD_PREP(KVM_HOST_DONATION_PTE_OWNER_MASK, PKVM_ID_GUEST) |
> + FIELD_PREP(KVM_HOST_DONATION_PTE_EXTRA_MASK, meta);
> +
> + ret = host_stage2_try(kvm_pgtable_stage2_annotate, &host_mmu.pgt,
> + phys, PAGE_SIZE, &host_s2_pool,
> + KVM_HOST_INVALID_PTE_TYPE_DONATION, annotation);
> + if (WARN_ON(ret))
[Severity: High]
Can a memory allocation failure here trigger a fatal EL2 panic?
Since WARN_ON() at EL2 expands to a fatal BRK instruction with no "warn and
continue" semantics, an -ENOMEM from host_stage2_try() will cause a hypervisor
panic rather than taking the error path.
> + return ret;
> +
> + phys += PAGE_SIZE;
> + gfn++;
> }
>
> - *gfn = FIELD_GET(KVM_HOST_PTE_OWNER_GUEST_GFN_MASK, meta);
> return 0;
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -1748,6 +1788,39 @@ int __pkvm_host_mkyoung_guest(u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu)
[ ... ]
> + ret = host_stage2_split_gfn_meta(phys, ipa, size, vm);
> + if (ret)
> + goto unlock;
> +
> + ret = kvm_pgtable_stage2_split(&vm->pgt, ipa, size, mc);
[Severity: High]
Does this leave the host stage-2 ownership metadata permanently split if
kvm_pgtable_stage2_split() fails?
If the guest split fails (e.g., due to memory exhaustion returning -ENOMEM
or -EAGAIN), the error is returned immediately without reverting the host
stage-2 modifications made by host_stage2_split_gfn_meta(). This could cause
subsequent split attempts for this block to fail with -EINVAL due to the
desynchronized state.
> +
> +unlock:
> + guest_unlock_component(vm);
> + host_unlock_component();
> +
> + return ret;
> +}
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260803100904.3563942-1-vdonnefort@google.com?part=16
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-03 10:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-03 10:08 [PATCH 00/20] Huge mapping support for protected VMs Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 01/20] KVM: arm64: Prefault host stage-2 entries on block split Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 02/20] KVM: arm64: Propagate host stage-2 annotated " Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 03/20] KVM: arm64: Allow block-level stage-2 annotation Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 04/20] KVM: arm64: Use block-level annotations when setting up the host stage-2 Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 05/20] KVM: arm64: Make pKVM ownership selftest an HVC Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 06/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_share/unshare_hyp() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 07/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_donate_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 08/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_reclaim_page_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 09/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_guest_share_host() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 10/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_guest_unshare_host() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 11/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to pKVM ownership selftest Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:48 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 12/20] KVM: arm64: Handle huge mappings in __pkvm_host_force_reclaim_page_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 13/20] KVM: arm64: Handle huge mappings in __pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 14/20] KVM: arm64: pkvm: Warn on guest stage-2 block collapse Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 15/20] KVM: arm64: Add pkvm_hyp_req infrastructure Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 16/20] KVM: arm64: Add __pkvm_host_split_guest HVC Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:54 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 17/20] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest block split Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 11:01 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 18/20] KVM: arm64: Add PKVM_HYP_REQ_SPLIT Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:54 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 19/20] KVM: arm64: Raise PKVM_HYP_REQ_SPLIT on guest to host sharing Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 11:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 20/20] KVM: arm64: Stage-2 huge mappings for protected VMs Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 11:04 ` sashiko-bot
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