From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Vincent Donnefort" <vdonnefort@google.com>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 17/20] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest block split
Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2026 11:01:55 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260803110156.3BF3C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260803100904.3563942-18-vdonnefort@google.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] __pkvm_host_split_guest fails to roll back host stage-2 metadata mutations if the subsequent guest stage-2 split fails, permanently desynchronizing EL2 metadata.
- [High] __pkvm_host_split_guest does not verify that the guest page is exclusively owned before splitting, allowing the host to crash EL2.
--
--- Patch [17]: [PATCH 17/20] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest block split ---
commit 44307942b6acd5f1f5aeff005f1df6122f7a4e1e
Author: Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>
KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest block split
This commit extends the pKVM page ownership selftests to cover the split
of a guest stage-2 block. It also adds tests for the per-page reclaim of
that same block.
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> index 71ebd1856cb0c..e22a7991f8ec7 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> @@ -2070,6 +2070,38 @@ int __pkvm_ownership_selftest(u64 pfn, u64 nr_pages, u64 pgtable_pfn,
> assert_transition_res(-EPERM, __pkvm_host_donate_guest, pfn, gfn, nr_pages, vcpu);
> assert_transition_res(-EPERM, __pkvm_host_share_guest, pfn, gfn, nr_pages, vcpu, prot);
>
> + if (size == PMD_SIZE) {
> + /* [gfn, gfn + nr_pages) was poisoned. Skip it */
> + gfn += nr_pages;
> +
> + selftest_state.host = PKVM_NOPAGE;
> + selftest_state.guest[1] = PKVM_PAGE_OWNED;
> + assert_transition_res(0, __pkvm_host_donate_guest, pfn, gfn, nr_pages, vcpu);
> + assert_transition_res(0, __pkvm_host_split_guest, gfn, nr_pages, vcpu);
[Severity: High]
Is a rollback missing in __pkvm_host_split_guest() if the guest stage-2 split
fails?
Looking at __pkvm_host_split_guest(), if kvm_pgtable_stage2_split() fails
(e.g., due to -ENOMEM from an empty memcache), the function returns without
undoing the host_mmu.pgt mutation performed by host_stage2_split_gfn_meta():
ret = host_stage2_split_gfn_meta(phys, ipa, size, vm);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
ret = kvm_pgtable_stage2_split(&vm->pgt, ipa, size, mc);
unlock:
This would leave the host tracking split into PAGE_SIZE annotations while the
guest stage-2 retains an unsplit PMD block.
Since host_stage2_split_gfn_meta() fails if the host block is already split,
any future attempt to split the block would fail with -EINVAL, permanently
desynchronizing EL2 metadata.
[Severity: High]
Can a guest page that is not exclusively owned be split by
__pkvm_host_split_guest()?
If the host issues the __pkvm_host_split_guest HVC for a guest page that is
currently shared with the host (guest PTE state is PKVM_PAGE_SHARED_OWNED):
ret = get_valid_guest_pte(vm, ipa, size, &pte, &phys);
if (ret)
goto unlock;
ret = host_stage2_split_gfn_meta(phys, ipa, size, vm);
get_valid_guest_pte() only verifies that the PTE is valid, so it succeeds
without checking the actual ownership state.
Then, host_stage2_split_gfn_meta() reads the host stage-2 leaf PTE (which is
valid because the page is shared and ID mapped) and passes it to
host_stage2_decode_gfn_meta().
Could this trigger WARN_ON(kvm_pte_valid(pte)), crashing the hypervisor and
allowing the host to take down EL2?
> +
> + assert_transition_res(-E2BIG, __pkvm_host_split_guest, gfn, nr_pages, vcpu);
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260803100904.3563942-1-vdonnefort@google.com?part=17
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-03 11:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-03 10:08 [PATCH 00/20] Huge mapping support for protected VMs Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 01/20] KVM: arm64: Prefault host stage-2 entries on block split Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:31 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 02/20] KVM: arm64: Propagate host stage-2 annotated " Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 03/20] KVM: arm64: Allow block-level stage-2 annotation Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 04/20] KVM: arm64: Use block-level annotations when setting up the host stage-2 Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 05/20] KVM: arm64: Make pKVM ownership selftest an HVC Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 06/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_share/unshare_hyp() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 07/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_donate_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:26 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 08/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_host_reclaim_page_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 09/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_guest_share_host() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 10/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to __pkvm_guest_unshare_host() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 11/20] KVM: arm64: Add a range to pKVM ownership selftest Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:48 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 12/20] KVM: arm64: Handle huge mappings in __pkvm_host_force_reclaim_page_guest() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 13/20] KVM: arm64: Handle huge mappings in __pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault() Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 14/20] KVM: arm64: pkvm: Warn on guest stage-2 block collapse Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:08 ` [PATCH 15/20] KVM: arm64: Add pkvm_hyp_req infrastructure Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:46 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 16/20] KVM: arm64: Add __pkvm_host_split_guest HVC Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:54 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 17/20] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest block split Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 11:01 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 18/20] KVM: arm64: Add PKVM_HYP_REQ_SPLIT Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 10:54 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 19/20] KVM: arm64: Raise PKVM_HYP_REQ_SPLIT on guest to host sharing Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 11:02 ` sashiko-bot
2026-08-03 10:09 ` [PATCH 20/20] KVM: arm64: Stage-2 huge mappings for protected VMs Vincent Donnefort
2026-08-03 11:04 ` sashiko-bot
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