From: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
To: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Cc: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: arm64: Only consider S1PTW a write fault if HA is set
Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2026 21:43:54 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <86cxxeqrjp.wl-maz@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <aj2C1na3fc_BlvuC@kernel.org>
On Thu, 25 Jun 2026 20:34:46 +0100,
Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jun 25, 2026 at 04:43:34PM +0100, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> > On Wed, 24 Jun 2026 22:00:43 +0100,
> > Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Wed, Jun 24, 2026 at 08:40:24PM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> > > > > + /*
> > > > > + * The architecture sucks; assume that the S1PTW fetched for write if
> > > > > + * HA is enabled at stage-1. Note that hardware updates to dirty state
> > > > > + * and table AF are predicated on HA=1 (DDI0487 M.a D24.2.194; R_SNVTX).
> > > > > + */
> > > > > + if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu))
> > > > > + return effective_tcr_ha(vcpu);
> > > >
> > > > [Severity: High]
> > > > Does unconditionally treating S1PTW faults as writes when HA is enabled break
> > > > guests that use pre-populated page tables in read-only memslots?
> > > >
> > > > If a guest populates its page tables with the Access Flag already set, places
> > > > them in an RO memslot, and enables HA in its TCR, the hardware only needs read
> > > > access during a walk.
> >
> > Correct, this is a consequence of R_HDTRB.
>
> While not _directly_ related, this does seem at odds with the
> implications of R_JCXVS.
>
> I.e. when HD is set, the PTW can speculatively fetch the S2 translation for
> write before knowing if the S1 descriptor is actually subject to an
> update per R_HDTRB.
I agree that this is a bit odd, and has a taste of speculative writes
(always a good idea... not!).
>
> It obviously all still fits together (permission checks are later down
> the line), just weird is all. Anyway...
>
> > I've been chewing on that one for a bit, and came up with the
> > following argument:
> >
> > - We're missing one of Read or Write because of L1's doing, and L1
> > needs to do *something* about it. We don't need to find out about HA
> > in the guest, we just need to forward the fault (and it is probably
> > enough to check that we're in a nested context).
>
> We still need to account for host-induced permission faults, e.g. dirty
> tracking or an RO memslot getting mapped into the L2. So I think we
> still need to evaluate R+W before forwarding to the L1.
Hmm. I had forgotten about this indeed. Ultimately, we need to keep
track of why a S2 entry is RO in the L1 IPA space. We can either use
more SW bits in the PTE (not that many left), or wait until Wei-Lin is
done with his reverse + direct map tracking structure.
> Looking ahead to HAFDBS, for this to work we will need to use a liberal
> interpretation of R_JCXVS at the time of the initial translation fault
> and always walk with intent for write.
Yeah, I'm not too precious about that, and we might as well take
advantage of the architecture.
>
> Basically, there seems to be a subtle difference arising between writes
> as observed from the nested MMU and writes as observed at the virtual
> endpoint (memslot). Funny how something as straightforward as the access
> flag can be so headache inducing :)
Well, you knew NV was just a sorry hack, didn't you? ;-) It's just
another case of "SW will sort it out eventually...".
>
> > - We have checked that HA==1, derived from that that we need R+W, and
> > we're missing the Write permission because the page is marked RO
> > (assuming that KVM still maps with Read permission by default):
> >
> > - either it is "opportunistically" RO (dirty tracking, page never
> > written to), and we flip it to RW, rince, repeat.
> >
> > - or it is hard-wired to RO at the memslot level, and the only
> > possibility is that the PTW is trying to perform an atomic access
> > (as per R_HDTRB), which we should be able to reject with an
> > "Unsupported atomic hardware update fault".
> >
> > Thoughts?
>
> All aboard :) I've just been staring at dirty state crap for too long. I
> really like the unsupported atomic fault over our current behavior of
> injecting an SEA.
>
> I'll fold all of this into v3.
Sounds good. Thank you!
M.
--
Without deviation from the norm, progress is not possible.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-25 20:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-24 20:24 [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Fix permission checks for S1PTW faults Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:24 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: arm64: Only consider S1PTW a write fault if HA is set Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-24 21:00 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-25 15:43 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-25 19:34 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-25 20:43 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2026-06-25 22:18 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:24 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Treat S1PTW permission faults specially Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-24 21:22 ` Oliver Upton
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