From: Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
To: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: arm64: Only consider S1PTW a write fault if HA is set
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 14:00:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ajxFe5N2CXySmLbU@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260624204025.519861F000E9@smtp.kernel.org>
On Wed, Jun 24, 2026 at 08:40:24PM +0000, sashiko-bot@kernel.org wrote:
> > + /*
> > + * The architecture sucks; assume that the S1PTW fetched for write if
> > + * HA is enabled at stage-1. Note that hardware updates to dirty state
> > + * and table AF are predicated on HA=1 (DDI0487 M.a D24.2.194; R_SNVTX).
> > + */
> > + if (kvm_vcpu_abt_iss1tw(vcpu))
> > + return effective_tcr_ha(vcpu);
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does unconditionally treating S1PTW faults as writes when HA is enabled break
> guests that use pre-populated page tables in read-only memslots?
>
> If a guest populates its page tables with the Access Flag already set, places
> them in an RO memslot, and enables HA in its TCR, the hardware only needs read
> access during a walk. However, if a translation fault occurs,
> kvm_is_write_fault() will unconditionally evaluate to true because of
> effective_tcr_ha().
>
> This will cause kvm_handle_guest_abort() to see a write fault on an RO memslot
> and inject a spurious Synchronous External Abort (SEA) into the guest, even
> though the hardware only needed to read the page table. Could we retain the
> conditional check for permission faults to avoid this?
Gah, I tested with QEMU+EDK2 for this exact purpose but did so on an
implementation without HAFDBS.
> > +static enum trans_regime vcpu_trans_regime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> > +{
> > + if (!is_hyp_ctxt(vcpu))
> > + return TR_EL10;
> > +
> > + return vcpu_el2_e2h_is_set(vcpu) ? TR_EL20 : TR_EL2;
> > +}
>
> [Severity: High]
> Does vcpu_trans_regime() correctly handle unprivileged memory accesses
> like LDTR/STTR executed from EL2?
>
> By returning TR_EL2 based strictly on the vCPU's execution context, KVM
> disregards that unprivileged instructions at EL2 use the EL1 and 0 translation
> regime (TCR_EL1) when HCR_EL2.E2H is 0 or TGE is 0.
>
> Since KVM cannot distinguish an LDTR fault from an LDR fault via the ESR
> syndrome, it will read TCR_EL2.HA in __effective_tcr_ha() instead of
> TCR_EL1.HA. If TCR_EL1.HA is 1 but TCR_EL2.HA is 0, KVM incorrectly evaluates
> HA as disabled.
>
> This causes KVM to treat a legitimate S1PTW permission fault (generated to
> update the Access Flag) as a read fault, refusing to grant write permissions.
> The hardware will then fault again on retry, creating an infinite stage-2 fault
> loop that hangs the guest vCPU.
This is wrong, the LDTR instruction does not use an out-of-context
translation regime.
If HCR_EL2.{E2H,TGE} != {1,1}, LDTR silently upgrades to a privileged
access.
"""
func AArch64_IsUnprivAccessPriv() => boolean
begin
var privileged : boolean;
case PSTATE.EL of
when EL0 =>
privileged = FALSE;
when EL1 => privileged = EffectiveHCR_EL2_NVx()[1:0] == '11';
when EL2 => privileged = !ELIsInHost(EL0);
when EL3 =>
privileged = TRUE;
end;
if IsFeatureImplemented(FEAT_UAO) && PSTATE.UAO == '1' then
privileged = PSTATE.EL != EL0;
end;
return privileged;
end;
"""
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-24 21:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-24 20:24 [PATCH v2 0/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Fix permission checks for S1PTW faults Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:24 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: arm64: Only consider S1PTW a write fault if HA is set Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-24 21:00 ` Oliver Upton [this message]
2026-06-25 15:43 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-25 19:34 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-25 20:43 ` Marc Zyngier
2026-06-25 22:18 ` Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:24 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: arm64: nv: Treat S1PTW permission faults specially Oliver Upton
2026-06-24 20:35 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-24 21:22 ` Oliver Upton
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