From: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
To: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 09:20:46 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116132046.GI2532299@ziepe.ca> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <yq5amrr8yldi.fsf@kernel.org>
On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 06:38:25PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V wrote:
> > +static inline bool
> > +pci_dev_default_is_restricted(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
> > +{
> > + enum device_trust_policy policy = READ_ONCE(pdev->dev.trust_policy);
> > +
> > + return policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED ||
> > + policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY;
> > +}
> > +
>
> Could you clarify how this series will work alongside device acceptance
> and private-memory access?
>
> In particular, what should callers of device_cc_accepted() use under
> this model?
Who is calling device_cc_accepted? I thought we were keeping that
internal to the DMA PI?
> My understanding is that trust describes the operating
> policy, not TDISP acceptance or DMA access to private memory.
Right.
> Therefore,
> neither FULL nor ADVERSARY alone indicates whether a device can access
> private memory?
Right.
Once you turn on TDISP you effectively activate DMA, just like turning
on the IOMMU.
Userspace then gets to choose how the rest of the system behavess. You
can still run a strict viommu with an adversarial driver even if you
enabled TDISP and can DMA to all memory.
I don't know if many people would choose that combination, but it is
there.
> You also mention that once a trust level other than DISABLED is set, it
> cannot be changed during the device's lifetime. If a device initially
> operates in ADVERSARY mode and later attestation justifies FULL
> operation, is that transition intentionally unsupported for the existing
> device object? As documented, unbind/rebind and reset preserve the
> committed level.
I think it should only be for the duration of a bound driver?
> It would help to describe how the trust framework fits together with
> those separate mechanisms, including which pieces are left for follow-up
> series.
The main thing it brings is the pause to allow userspace to measure
the device and put it into RUN if it so chooses before any driver is
bound.
It doesn't change how any of the DMA or TDSIP flows work.
Jason
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 13:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-05 11:42 [PATCH 00/17] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 01/17] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/17] Input: serio " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:05 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-05 19:19 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:34 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-06 14:33 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 03/17] net: phy: Attach generic PHY " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:50 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:35 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 15:33 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:45 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 04/17] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 05/17] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:24 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-05 18:44 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:04 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-08 11:09 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-08 16:59 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-09 9:23 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 06/17] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 07/17] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 08/17] driver core: Allow userspace to detect EPROBE_DEFER when using sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 09/17] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 10/17] driver core: Expose device trust authorization through sysfs Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:27 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:59 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 14:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:17 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:26 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 15:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 14:43 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 14:59 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:09 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 13:42 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 17:02 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 19:06 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 11/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 12/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 13/17] driver core: Preserve trust commitment beyond driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 14/17] driver core: Add a global initial device trust policy Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 15/17] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 16/17] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:18 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 16:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 18:26 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-16 13:08 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V
2026-11-16 13:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe [this message]
2026-11-16 14:41 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-16 14:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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