From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
To: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux.dev, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 18:38:25 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <yq5amrr8yldi.fsf@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261105-device-trust-core-v1-17-1e536825b4eb@nvidia.com>
Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org> writes:
> From: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
>
> Convert the PCI specific untrusted to use the common device trust
> level. Adversarial means the same thing untrusted does.
>
> PCI discovery keeps the logic that set untrusted: it looks for removable
> PCI devices with arch_pci_dev_is_removable() and defaults them to an
> adversarial policy. Treat a disabled policy the same way when choosing
> the IOMMU domain. Do not record the ATS capability of such a device, as
> pci_ats_supported() rejected untrusted ones. Let the Intel write-buffer
> quirk apply, as it only adds flushing.
>
[ ... 28 lines skipped ... ]
> diff --git a/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c b/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
> index 78742aeba932d..a48fb511bfe6f 100644
> --- a/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
> +++ b/drivers/iommu/dma-iommu.c
> @@ -589,16 +589,11 @@ static int iova_reserve_iommu_regions(struct device *dev,
> return ret;
> }
>
> -static bool dev_is_untrusted(struct device *dev)
> -{
> - return dev_is_pci(dev) && to_pci_dev(dev)->untrusted;
> -}
> -
[ ... 244 lines skipped ... ]
> diff --git a/include/linux/device.h b/include/linux/device.h
> index 65ea07c9ac35b..870ce14924905 100644
> --- a/include/linux/device.h
> +++ b/include/linux/device.h
> @@ -934,6 +934,11 @@ static inline bool device_iommu_mapped(struct device *dev)
> return (dev->iommu_group != NULL);
> }
>
> +static inline bool device_policy_is_adversarial(const struct device *dev)
> +{
> + return READ_ONCE(dev->trust_policy) == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY;
> +}
> +
> /* Get the wakeup routines, which depend on struct device */
> #include <linux/pm_wakeup.h>
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/pci.h b/include/linux/pci.h
> index aa3765a20a96c..087c63b177c85 100644
> --- a/include/linux/pci.h
> +++ b/include/linux/pci.h
> @@ -490,14 +490,6 @@ struct pci_dev {
> unsigned int shpc_managed:1; /* SHPC owned by shpchp */
> unsigned int is_thunderbolt:1; /* Thunderbolt controller */
> unsigned int is_cxl:1; /* Compute Express Link (CXL) */
> - /*
> - * Devices marked being untrusted are the ones that can potentially
> - * execute DMA attacks and similar. They are typically connected
> - * through external ports such as Thunderbolt but not limited to
> - * that. When an IOMMU is enabled they should be getting full
> - * mappings to make sure they cannot access arbitrary memory.
> - */
> - unsigned int untrusted:1;
> /*
> * Info from the platform, e.g., ACPI or device tree, may mark a
> * device as "external-facing". An external-facing device is
> @@ -616,6 +608,28 @@ static inline struct pci_dev *to_pci_dev(const struct device *dev)
> {
> return container_of(dev, struct pci_dev, dev);
> }
> +
> +static inline bool
> +pci_dev_default_is_restricted(const struct pci_dev *pdev)
> +{
> + enum device_trust_policy policy = READ_ONCE(pdev->dev.trust_policy);
> +
> + return policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_DISABLED ||
> + policy == DEVICE_TRUST_POLICY_ADVERSARY;
> +}
> +
Could you clarify how this series will work alongside device acceptance
and private-memory access?
In particular, what should callers of device_cc_accepted() use under
this model? My understanding is that trust describes the operating
policy, not TDISP acceptance or DMA access to private memory. Therefore,
neither FULL nor ADVERSARY alone indicates whether a device can access
private memory?
You also mention that once a trust level other than DISABLED is set, it
cannot be changed during the device's lifetime. If a device initially
operates in ADVERSARY mode and later attestation justifies FULL
operation, is that transition intentionally unsupported for the existing
device object? As documented, unbind/rebind and reset preserve the
committed level.
Some of these details are discussed in this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260708143153.GH118978@ziepe.ca/
It would help to describe how the trust framework fits together with
those separate mechanisms, including which pieces are left for follow-up
series.
-aneesh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 13:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-05 11:42 [PATCH 00/17] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 01/17] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/17] Input: serio " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:05 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-05 19:19 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:34 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-06 14:33 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 03/17] net: phy: Attach generic PHY " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:50 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:35 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 15:33 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:45 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 04/17] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 05/17] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:24 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-05 18:44 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:04 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-08 11:09 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-08 16:59 ` Alan Stern
2026-11-09 9:23 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 06/17] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 07/17] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 08/17] driver core: Allow userspace to detect EPROBE_DEFER when using sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 09/17] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 10/17] driver core: Expose device trust authorization through sysfs Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:27 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:59 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 14:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:17 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:26 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 15:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:06 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 14:43 ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 14:59 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:09 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 13:42 ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 17:02 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 19:06 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 11/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 12/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 13/17] driver core: Preserve trust commitment beyond driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 14/17] driver core: Add a global initial device trust policy Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 15/17] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 16/17] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:18 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:26 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:03 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 16:26 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 18:26 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-16 13:08 ` Aneesh Kumar K.V [this message]
2026-11-16 13:20 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 14:41 ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-16 14:45 ` Jason Gunthorpe
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