From: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
James Morris
<james.l.morris-QHcLZuEGTsvQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>,
David Drysdale <drysdale-hpIqsD4AKlfQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)"
<mtk.manpages-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
Will Drewry <wad-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
Julien Tinnes <jln-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>,
linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
x86-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org,
linux-arm-kernel-IAPFreCvJWM7uuMidbF8XUB+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
linux-mips-6z/3iImG2C8G8FEW9MqTrA@public.gmane.org,
linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
linux-security-module-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Subject: [PATCH v12 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 11:08:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1405620518-18495-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1405620518-18495-1-git-send-email-keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
Separates the two mode setting paths to make things more readable with
fewer #ifdefs within function bodies.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto-kltTT9wpgjJwATOyAt5JVQ@public.gmane.org>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 9df7def86c3b..05cac2c2eca1 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -489,48 +489,66 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
}
/**
- * seccomp_set_mode: internal function for setting seccomp mode
- * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
- * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
- *
- * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
- * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters. Every filter
- * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
- * call the task makes.
+ * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
*
* Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
*/
-static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
+static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
long ret = -EINVAL;
if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
goto out;
- switch (seccomp_mode) {
- case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
- ret = 0;
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
- disable_TSC();
+ disable_TSC();
#endif
- break;
+ seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
- case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
- ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
+/**
+ * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
+ * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
+ *
+ * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
+ * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
+ * for each system call the task makes.
+ *
+ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
+ long ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
out:
return ret;
}
+#else
+static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
/**
* prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
@@ -541,5 +559,12 @@ out:
*/
long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
{
- return seccomp_set_mode(seccomp_mode, filter);
+ switch (seccomp_mode) {
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
+ return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
+ return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
--
1.7.9.5
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com>,
"Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)" <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>,
linux-api@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org,
linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v12 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines
Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 11:08:30 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1405620518-18495-4-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
Message-ID: <20140717180830.IVFPtsHZItV5bFkwy7j65i3jCTAAQCoDJ7AMUjJqLSU@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1405620518-18495-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Separates the two mode setting paths to make things more readable with
fewer #ifdefs within function bodies.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 9df7def86c3b..05cac2c2eca1 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -489,48 +489,66 @@ long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
}
/**
- * seccomp_set_mode: internal function for setting seccomp mode
- * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
- * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
- *
- * This function may be called repeatedly with a @seccomp_mode of
- * SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER to install additional filters. Every filter
- * successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order) for each system
- * call the task makes.
+ * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
*
* Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
*/
-static long seccomp_set_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
+static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
long ret = -EINVAL;
if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
goto out;
- switch (seccomp_mode) {
- case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
- ret = 0;
#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
- disable_TSC();
+ disable_TSC();
#endif
- break;
+ seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
- case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
- ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
- if (ret)
- goto out;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
+/**
+ * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
+ * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
+ *
+ * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
+ * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
+ * for each system call the task makes.
+ *
+ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
+ long ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = seccomp_attach_user_filter(filter);
+ if (ret)
goto out;
- }
seccomp_assign_mode(seccomp_mode);
out:
return ret;
}
+#else
+static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(char __user *filter)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
/**
* prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
@@ -541,5 +559,12 @@ out:
*/
long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, char __user *filter)
{
- return seccomp_set_mode(seccomp_mode, filter);
+ switch (seccomp_mode) {
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
+ return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
+ return seccomp_set_mode_filter(filter);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
}
--
1.7.9.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-17 18:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-17 18:08 [PATCH v12 11/11] seccomp: add thread sync ability Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 01/11] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 02/11] seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 04/11] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 05/11] ARM: add seccomp syscall Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 06/11] MIPS: " Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 07/11] sched: move no_new_privs into new atomic flags Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 08/11] seccomp: split filter prep from check and apply Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <1405620518-18495-1-git-send-email-keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 03/11] seccomp: split mode setting routines Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 09/11] seccomp: introduce writer locking Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 10/11] seccomp: allow mode setting across threads Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` [PATCH v12 11/11] seccomp: implement SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC Kees Cook
2014-07-17 18:08 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-18 3:26 ` [PATCH v12 11/11] seccomp: add thread sync ability James Morris
2014-07-18 3:26 ` James Morris
[not found] ` <alpine.LRH.2.11.1407181325200.15709-gx6/JNMH7DfYtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org>
2014-07-18 17:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-18 17:17 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-18 18:13 ` Kees Cook
2014-07-18 18:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-18 18:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2014-07-18 18:58 ` Kees Cook
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