* Re: [PATCH 2/2] procfs/tasks: add a simple per-task procfs hidepid= field
[not found] ` <1478187038-19954-2-git-send-email-wluikil@gmail.com>
@ 2016-11-03 16:12 ` Kees Cook
2016-11-03 17:55 ` Jann Horn
0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Kees Cook @ 2016-11-03 16:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Lafcadio Wluiki
Cc: LKML, Andrew Morton, linux-arch, Jann Horn,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 9:30 AM, Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com> wrote:
> (Third, rebased submission, since first two submissions yielded no replies.)
>
> This adds a new per-task hidepid= flag that is honored by procfs when
> presenting /proc to the user, in addition to the existing hidepid= mount
> option. So far, hidepid= was exclusively a per-pidns setting. Locking
> down a set of processes so that they cannot see other user's processes
> without affecting the rest of the system thus currently requires
> creation of a private PID namespace, with all the complexity it brings,
> including maintaining a stub init process as PID 1 and losing the
> ability to see processes of the same user on the rest of the system.
>
> With this patch all acesss and visibility checks in procfs now
> honour two fields:
>
> a) the existing hide_pid field in the PID namespace
> b) the new hide_pid in struct task_struct
>
> Access/visibility is only granted if both fields permit it; the more
> restrictive one wins. By default the new task_struct hide_pid value
> defaults to 0, which means behaviour is not changed from the status quo.
>
> Setting the per-process hide_pid value is done via a new PR_SET_HIDEPID
> prctl() option which takes the same three supported values as the
> hidepid= mount option. The per-process hide_pid may only be increased,
> never decreased, thus ensuring that once applied, processes can never
> escape such a hide_pid jail. When a process forks it inherits its
> parent's hide_pid value.
>
> Suggested usecase: let's say nginx runs as user "www-data". After
> dropping privileges it may now call:
>
> …
> prctl(PR_SET_HIDEPID, 2);
> …
>
> And from that point on neither nginx itself, nor any of its child
> processes may see processes in /proc anymore that belong to a different
> user than "www-data". Other services running on the same system remain
> unaffected.
>
> This should permit Linux distributions to more comprehensively lock down
> their services, as it allows an isolated opt-in for hidepid= for
> specific services. Previously hidepid= could only be set system-wide,
> and then specific services had to be excluded by group membership,
> essentially a more complex concept of opt-out.
>
> A test-tool that validates this functionality is available here:
>
> https://paste.fedoraproject.org/412975/71967605/
>
> Signed-off-by: Lafcadio Wluiki <wluikil@gmail.com>
I like this idea: it meaningfully reduces attack surface, even though
it doesn't ensure the same confinement as a pid namespace (e.g. a
process with this prctl set can still direct syscalls to pids that are
hidden). However, the attack surface in /proc is relatively large
compared to the syscalls that use pids.
For task launchers, this may overlap nicely with no_new_privs too.
Some suggestions/nits below...
> ---
> fs/proc/array.c | 3 +++
> fs/proc/base.c | 6 ++++--
> include/linux/init_task.h | 1 +
> include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
> include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 4 ++++
> kernel/fork.c | 1 +
> kernel/sys.c | 10 ++++++++++
> 7 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/proc/array.c b/fs/proc/array.c
> index 81818ad..ea801e5 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/array.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/array.c
> @@ -163,6 +163,7 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> const struct cred *cred;
> pid_t ppid, tpid = 0, tgid, ngid;
> unsigned int max_fds = 0;
> + int hide_pid;
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> ppid = pid_alive(p) ?
> @@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> task_lock(p);
> if (p->files)
> max_fds = files_fdtable(p->files)->max_fds;
> + hide_pid = p->hide_pid;
> task_unlock(p);
> rcu_read_unlock();
>
> @@ -201,6 +203,7 @@ static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\t", from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->egid));
> seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\t", from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->sgid));
> seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\t", from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->fsgid));
> + seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nHidePID:\t", hide_pid);
> seq_put_decimal_ull(m, "\nFDSize:\t", max_fds);
>
> seq_puts(m, "\nGroups:\t");
This should get an addition to table 1-2 of
Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt that covers the contents of
/proc/$pid/status
> diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
> index ae5e13c..6c9a42b 100644
> --- a/fs/proc/base.c
> +++ b/fs/proc/base.c
> @@ -709,7 +709,8 @@ static bool has_pid_permissions(struct pid_namespace *pid,
> struct task_struct *task,
> int hide_pid_min)
> {
> - if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
> + if (pid->hide_pid < hide_pid_min &&
> + current->hide_pid < hide_pid_min)
> return true;
> if (in_group_p(pid->pid_gid))
> return true;
> @@ -730,7 +731,8 @@ static int proc_pid_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
> put_task_struct(task);
>
> if (!has_perms) {
> - if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
> + if (pid->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE ||
> + current->hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) {
> /*
> * Let's make getdents(), stat(), and open()
> * consistent with each other. If a process
Instead of open-coding both of these "||" tests, I think it might be
cleaner to just choose the highest protection value, and use that in
both comparisons. e.g.
int hide_pid = max(pid->hide_pid, current->hide_pid);
if (hide_pid < hide_pid_min) ...
9if (hide_pid == HIDEPID_INVISIBLE) ...
> diff --git a/include/linux/init_task.h b/include/linux/init_task.h
> index 325f649..c87de0e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/init_task.h
> +++ b/include/linux/init_task.h
> @@ -250,6 +250,7 @@ extern struct task_group root_task_group;
> .cpu_timers = INIT_CPU_TIMERS(tsk.cpu_timers), \
> .pi_lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(tsk.pi_lock), \
> .timer_slack_ns = 50000, /* 50 usec default slack */ \
> + .hide_pid = 0, \
> .pids = { \
> [PIDTYPE_PID] = INIT_PID_LINK(PIDTYPE_PID), \
> [PIDTYPE_PGID] = INIT_PID_LINK(PIDTYPE_PGID), \
> diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
> index 348f51b..3e8ca16 100644
> --- a/include/linux/sched.h
> +++ b/include/linux/sched.h
> @@ -1572,6 +1572,7 @@ struct task_struct {
> /* unserialized, strictly 'current' */
> unsigned in_execve:1; /* bit to tell LSMs we're in execve */
> unsigned in_iowait:1;
> + unsigned hide_pid:2; /* per-process procfs hidepid= */
> #if !defined(TIF_RESTORE_SIGMASK)
> unsigned restore_sigmask:1;
> #endif
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> index a8d0759..ada62b6 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h
> @@ -197,4 +197,8 @@ struct prctl_mm_map {
> # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER 3
> # define PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL 4
>
> +/* Per process, non-revokable procfs hidepid= option */
> +#define PR_SET_HIDEPID 48
> +#define PR_GET_HIDEPID 49
> +
> #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
> index 623259f..d4fe951 100644
> --- a/kernel/fork.c
> +++ b/kernel/fork.c
> @@ -1562,6 +1562,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
> #endif
>
> p->default_timer_slack_ns = current->timer_slack_ns;
> + p->hide_pid = current->hide_pid;
>
> task_io_accounting_init(&p->ioac);
> acct_clear_integrals(p);
> diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
> index 89d5be4..c0a1d3e 100644
> --- a/kernel/sys.c
> +++ b/kernel/sys.c
> @@ -2270,6 +2270,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
> case PR_GET_FP_MODE:
> error = GET_FP_MODE(me);
> break;
> + case PR_SET_HIDEPID:
> + if (arg2 < HIDEPID_OFF || arg2 > HIDEPID_INVISIBLE)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (arg2 < me->hide_pid)
> + return -EPERM;
> + me->hide_pid = arg2;
> + break;
> + case PR_GET_HIDEPID:
> + error = put_user((int) me->hide_pid, (int __user *)arg2);
> + break;
> default:
> error = -EINVAL;
> break;
> --
> 2.7.4
>
Since this adds a new prctl interface, it's best to Cc linux-arch
(which I added now).
Thanks for proposing this!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Nexus Security
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread