From: marc.zyngier@arm.com (Marc Zyngier)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 00/14] arm64 SSBD (aka Spectre-v4) mitigation
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 16:06:34 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180522150648.28297-1-marc.zyngier@arm.com> (raw)
Hi all,
This patch series implements the Linux kernel side of the "Spectre-v4"
(CVE-2018-3639) mitigation known as "Speculative Store Bypass Disable"
(SSBD).
More information can be found at:
https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1528
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability
For all released Arm Cortex-A CPUs that are affected by this issue, then
the preferred mitigation is simply to set a chicken bit in the firmware
during CPU initialisation and therefore no change to Linux is required.
Other CPUs may require the chicken bit to be toggled dynamically (for
example, when switching between user-mode and kernel-mode) and this is
achieved by calling into EL3 via an SMC which has been published as part
of the latest SMCCC specification:
https://developer.arm.com/cache-speculation-vulnerability-firmware-specification
as well as an ATF update for the released ARM cores affected by SSDB:
https://github.com/ARM-software/arm-trusted-firmware/pull/1392
These patches provide the following:
1. Safe probing of firmware to establish which CPUs in the system
require calling into EL3 as part of the mitigation.
2. For CPUs that require it, call into EL3 on exception entry/exit
from EL0 to apply the SSBD mitigation when running at EL1.
3. A command-line option to force the SSBD mitigation to be always on,
always off, or dymamically toggled (default) for CPUs that require
the EL3 call.
4. An initial implementation of a prctl() backend for arm64 that allows
userspace tasks to opt-in to the mitigation explicitly. This is
intended to match the interface provided by x86, and so we rely on
their core changes here. There still is an annoying issue with
multithreaded seccomp tasks that get flagged with the mitigation
whilst they are running in userspace.
5. An initial implementation of the call via KVM, which exposes the
mitigation to the guest via an HVC interface. This isn't yet
complete and doesn't include save/restore functionality for the
workaround state.
All comments welcome,
M.
Marc Zyngier (14):
arm/arm64: smccc: Add SMCCC-specific return codes
arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1
arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2
arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing
arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option
arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor
arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation
arm64: ssbd: Disable mitigation on CPU resume if required by user
arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation
arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation
arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors
arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests
arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests
arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through
ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 17 +++
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 12 ++
arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 5 +
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 9 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 22 +++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 30 +++-
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 26 ++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 24 ++++
arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 30 ++++
arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c | 107 +++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/suspend.c | 8 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 38 +++++-
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/switch.c | 42 ++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/reset.c | 4 +
include/linux/arm-smccc.h | 10 ++
virt/kvm/arm/arm.c | 4 +
virt/kvm/arm/psci.c | 18 ++-
22 files changed, 579 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c
--
2.14.2
next reply other threads:[~2018-05-22 15:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-05-22 15:06 Marc Zyngier [this message]
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 01/14] arm/arm64: smccc: Add SMCCC-specific return codes Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 10:55 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 02/14] arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 9:23 ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 10:52 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:10 ` Robin Murphy
2018-05-24 11:00 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:23 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:28 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 03/14] arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:03 ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:14 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 04/14] arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:06 ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 9:58 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24 11:39 ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 13:34 ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24 11:27 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 05/14] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:29 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-05-23 10:08 ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:40 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:52 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 06/14] arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:11 ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:41 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/14] arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:13 ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:43 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64: ssbd: Disable mitigation on CPU resume if required by user Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:52 ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:55 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 09/14] arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:01 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:16 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:19 ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 12:36 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 10/14] arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:48 ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-05-22 16:30 ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:10 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:24 ` Will Deacon
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 11/14] arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:11 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 12/14] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:15 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 13/14] arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:22 ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 14/14] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:25 ` Mark Rutland
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