Linux-ARM-Kernel Archive on lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: marc.zyngier@arm.com (Marc Zyngier)
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH 05/14] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option
Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 16:06:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180522150648.28297-6-marc.zyngier@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180522150648.28297-1-marc.zyngier@arm.com>

On a system where the firmware implements ARCH_WORKAROUND_2,
it may be useful to either permanently enable or disable the
workaround for cases where the user decides that they'd rather
not get a trap overhead, and keep the mitigation permanently
on or off instead of switching it on exception entry/exit.

In any case, default to the mitigation being enabled.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  17 ++++
 arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h             |   6 ++
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c                  | 102 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 3 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index f2040d46f095..646e112c6f63 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4092,6 +4092,23 @@
 			expediting.  Set to zero to disable automatic
 			expediting.
 
+	ssbd=		[ARM64,HW]
+			Speculative Store Bypass Disable control
+
+			On CPUs that are vulnerable to the Speculative
+			Store Bypass vulnerability and offer a
+			firmware based mitigation, this parameter
+			indicates how the mitigation should be used:
+
+			force-on:  Unconditionnaly enable mitigation for
+				   for both kernel and userspace
+			force-off: Unconditionnaly disable mitigation for
+				   for both kernel and userspace
+			kernel:    Always enable mitigation in the
+				   kernel, and offer a prctl interface
+				   to allow userspace to register its
+				   interest in being mitigated too.
+
 	stack_guard_gap=	[MM]
 			override the default stack gap protection. The value
 			is in page units and it defines how many pages prior
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
index 09b0f2a80c8f..9bc548e22784 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h
@@ -537,6 +537,12 @@ static inline u64 read_zcr_features(void)
 	return zcr;
 }
 
+#define ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN		-1
+#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE	0
+#define ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY		1
+#define ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE		2
+#define ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED		3
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 7fd6d5b001f5..f1d4e75b0ddd 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -235,6 +235,38 @@ enable_smccc_arch_workaround_1(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
 
+int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY;
+
+static const struct ssbd_options {
+	const char	*str;
+	int		state;
+} ssbd_options[] = {
+	{ "force-on",	ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE, },
+	{ "force-off",	ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE, },
+	{ "kernel",	ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY, },
+};
+
+static int __init ssbd_cfg(char *buf)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!buf || !buf[0])
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssbd_options); i++) {
+		int len = strlen(ssbd_options[i].str);
+
+		if (strncmp(buf, ssbd_options[i].str, len))
+			continue;
+
+		ssbd_state = ssbd_options[i].state;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+early_param("ssbd", ssbd_cfg);
+
 void __init arm64_update_smccc_conduit(struct alt_instr *alt,
 				       __le32 *origptr, __le32 *updptr,
 				       int nr_inst)
@@ -272,44 +304,82 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 				    int scope)
 {
 	struct arm_smccc_res res;
-	bool supported = true;
+	bool required = true;
+	s32 val;
 
 	WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
-	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0)
+	if (psci_ops.smccc_version == SMCCC_VERSION_1_0) {
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
 		return false;
+	}
 
-	/*
-	 * The probe function return value is either negative
-	 * (unsupported or mitigated), positive (unaffected), or zero
-	 * (requires mitigation). We only need to do anything in the
-	 * last case.
-	 */
 	switch (psci_ops.conduit) {
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_HVC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_hvc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
-		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
-			supported = false;
 		break;
 
 	case PSCI_CONDUIT_SMC:
 		arm_smccc_1_1_smc(ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID,
 				  ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_2, &res);
-		if ((int)res.a0 != 0)
-			supported = false;
 		break;
 
 	default:
-		supported = false;
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
+		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (supported) {
-		__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
+	val = (s32)res.a0;
+
+	switch (val) {
+	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED:
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
+		return false;
+
+	case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
+		ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
+		return false;
+
+	case SMCCC_RET_SUCCESS:
+		required = true;
+		break;
+
+	case 1:	/* Mitigation not required on this CPU */
+		required = false;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	switch (ssbd_state) {
+	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE:
+		pr_info_once("%s disabled from command-line\n", entry->desc);
+		do_ssbd(false);
+		required = false;
+		break;
+
+	case ARM64_SSBD_EL1_ENTRY:
+		if (required) {
+			__this_cpu_write(arm64_ssbd_callback_required, 1);
+			do_ssbd(true);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
+		pr_info_once("%s forced from command-line\n", entry->desc);
 		do_ssbd(true);
+		required = true;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON(1);
+		break;
 	}
 
-	return supported;
+	return required;
 }
 #endif	/* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
-- 
2.14.2

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-05-22 15:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-05-22 15:06 [PATCH 00/14] arm64 SSBD (aka Spectre-v4) mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 01/14] arm/arm64: smccc: Add SMCCC-specific return codes Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 10:55   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 02/14] arm64: Call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 on transitions between EL0 and EL1 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23  9:23   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 10:52     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:10       ` Robin Murphy
2018-05-24 11:00   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:23     ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:28       ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 03/14] arm64: Add per-cpu infrastructure to call ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:03   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:14   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 04/14] arm64: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 probing Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:06   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24  9:58   ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24 11:39     ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 13:34       ` Suzuki K Poulose
2018-05-24 11:27   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` Marc Zyngier [this message]
2018-05-22 15:29   ` [PATCH 05/14] arm64: Add 'ssbd' command-line option Randy Dunlap
2018-05-23 10:08   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:40   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 11:52     ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 06/14] arm64: ssbd: Add global mitigation state accessor Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:11   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:41   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 07/14] arm64: ssbd: Skip apply_ssbd if not using dynamic mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:13   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:43   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 08/14] arm64: ssbd: Disable mitigation on CPU resume if required by user Marc Zyngier
2018-05-23 10:52   ` Julien Grall
2018-05-24 11:55   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 09/14] arm64: ssbd: Introduce thread flag to control userspace mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:01   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:16     ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:19       ` Will Deacon
2018-05-24 12:36         ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 10/14] arm64: ssbd: Add prctl interface for per-thread mitigation Marc Zyngier
2018-05-22 15:48   ` Dominik Brodowski
2018-05-22 16:30     ` Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:10   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-24 12:24   ` Will Deacon
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 11/14] arm64: KVM: Add HYP per-cpu accessors Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:11   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 12/14] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 support for guests Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:15   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 13/14] arm64: KVM: Handle guest's ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 requests Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:22   ` Mark Rutland
2018-05-22 15:06 ` [PATCH 14/14] arm64: KVM: Add ARCH_WORKAROUND_2 discovery through ARCH_FEATURES_FUNC_ID Marc Zyngier
2018-05-24 12:25   ` Mark Rutland

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180522150648.28297-6-marc.zyngier@arm.com \
    --to=marc.zyngier@arm.com \
    --cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox