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From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com>,
	Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>,
	Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>,
	Vincenzo Frascino <Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature
Date: Fri, 28 Feb 2020 12:03:14 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200228120314.GD36089@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200228115736.GA3275@willie-the-truck>

On Fri, Feb 28, 2020 at 11:57:37AM +0000, Will Deacon wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 19, 2020 at 06:30:39PM +0530, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote:
> > This patch add changes for Pointer Authentication enhanced features
> > mandatory for Armv8.6. These features are,
> > 
> > * Uses an enhanced PAC generation logic which hardens finding the
> >   correct PAC value of the authenticated pointer. However, no code
> >   change is required for this.
> > 
> > * Fault is generated now when the ptrauth authentication instruction
> >   fails in authenticating the PAC present in the address. This is
> >   different from earlier case when such failures just adds an error
> >   code in the top byte and waits for subsequent load/store to abort.
> >   The ptrauth instructions which may cause this fault are autiasp,
> >   retaa etc.
> > 
> > The above features are now represented by additional configurations
> > for the Address Authentication cpufeature. These different
> > configurations are now updated to FTR_EXACT instead of FTR_LOWER_SAFE
> > as they all have different behaviour.
> > 
> > The fault received in the kernel due to FPAC is treated as Illegal
> > instruction and hence signal SIGILL is injected with ILL_ILLOPN as the
> > signal code. Note that this is different from earlier ARMv8.3 ptrauth
> > where signal SIGSEGV is issued due to Pointer authentication failures.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
> > ---
> >  arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h       |  4 +++-
> >  arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h |  1 +
> >  arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h    | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
> >  arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c     |  4 ++--
> >  arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c   | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> >  arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c          | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
> >  6 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h
> > index cb29253..5a1406f 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/esr.h
> > @@ -35,7 +35,9 @@
> >  #define ESR_ELx_EC_SYS64	(0x18)
> >  #define ESR_ELx_EC_SVE		(0x19)
> >  #define ESR_ELx_EC_ERET		(0x1a)	/* EL2 only */
> > -/* Unallocated EC: 0x1b - 0x1E */
> > +/* Unallocated EC: 0x1B */
> > +#define ESR_ELx_EC_FPAC		(0x1C)	/* EL1 and above */
> > +/* Unallocated EC: 0x1D - 0x1E */
> >  #define ESR_ELx_EC_IMP_DEF	(0x1f)	/* EL3 only */
> >  #define ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW	(0x20)
> >  #define ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_CUR	(0x21)
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h
> > index 7a6e81ca..de76772 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/exception.h
> > @@ -46,4 +46,5 @@ void bad_el0_sync(struct pt_regs *regs, int reason, unsigned int esr);
> >  void do_cp15instr(unsigned int esr, struct pt_regs *regs);
> >  void do_el0_svc(struct pt_regs *regs);
> >  void do_el0_svc_compat(struct pt_regs *regs);
> > +void do_ptrauth_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long esr);
> >  #endif	/* __ASM_EXCEPTION_H */
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
> > index b91570f..77728f5 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h
> > @@ -585,14 +585,22 @@
> >  #define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT		4
> >  #define ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT		0
> >  
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_NI		0x0
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED	0x1
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_NI		0x0
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF	0x1
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_NI		0x0
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_ARCHITECTED	0x1
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI		0x0
> > -#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF	0x1
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_NI			0x0
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCHITECTED		0x1
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC		0x2
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2		0x3
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2_FPAC	0x4
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_ARCH_EPAC2_FPAC_CMB	0x5
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_NI			0x0
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF		0x1
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC		0x2
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2		0x3
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2_FPAC	0x4
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_API_IMP_DEF_EPAC2_FPAC_CMB	0x5
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_NI			0x0
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPA_ARCHITECTED		0x1
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_NI			0x0
> > +#define ID_AA64ISAR1_GPI_IMP_DEF		0x1
> >  
> >  /* id_aa64pfr0 */
> >  #define ID_AA64PFR0_CSV3_SHIFT		60
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> > index 8d1c979..a4f8adb 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
> > @@ -154,9 +154,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = {
> >  	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
> >  	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0),
> >  	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),
> > -		       FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0),
> > +		       FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0),
> >  	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH),
> > -		       FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
> > +		       FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
> >  	ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
> >  	ARM64_FTR_END,
> 
> Hmm. This is a user-visible change and should probably be in its own patch.
> It also means we will no longer advertise PAC on systems where not all of
> the cores have "Enhanced PAC"; is that really necessary?

It matters for KVM, since a guest won't expect the enhanced PAC trap if
the ID registers say it does not have it.

For userspace, the difference is it'll get a SIGILL on the AUT*
instruction rather than a SIGSEGV when using the result of the AUT*
instruction.

> Generally we rely on incremental updates to unsigned ID register fields
> being a superset (i.e. compatible with) the old behaviour. If that's not
> the case here, then older kernels are broken and we may need new HWCAPs.

In this case, the behaviour isn't a strict superset. Enhanced PAC
unconditionally changed the behaviour of AUT* (i.e. there's no opt-in
with a control bit), but it's not clear to me how much this matters for
userspace.

Thanks,
Mark.

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  reply	other threads:[~2020-02-28 12:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-02-19 13:00 [PATCH 0/2] arm64: add Armv8.6 pointer authentication Amit Daniel Kachhap
2020-02-19 13:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] arm64: ptrauth: add pointer authentication Armv8.6 enhanced feature Amit Daniel Kachhap
2020-02-28 11:57   ` Will Deacon
2020-02-28 12:03     ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2020-02-28 12:23       ` Will Deacon
2020-03-02 12:48         ` Amit Kachhap
2020-03-02 16:29           ` Will Deacon
2020-02-19 13:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] arm64: kprobe: disable probe of fault prone ptrauth instruction Amit Daniel Kachhap
2020-02-27 16:48   ` Mark Rutland
2020-02-28 11:12     ` Amit Kachhap
2020-02-28 11:18       ` Will Deacon
2020-02-28 11:31         ` Mark Rutland

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