* [PATCH v26 1/7] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces
2026-06-29 12:21 [PATCH v26 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 12:21 ` pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:21 ` [PATCH v26 2/7] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc pankaj.gupta
` (5 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: pankaj.gupta @ 2026-06-29 12:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree, imx, linux-arm-kernel
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Documents i.MX SoC's Service layer and C_DEV driver for selected SoC(s)
that contains the NXP hardware IP(s) for Secure Enclaves(se) like:
- NXP EdgeLock Enclave on i.MX93 & i.MX8ULP
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
---
.../driver-api/firmware/other_interfaces.rst | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 133 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/firmware/other_interfaces.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/firmware/other_interfaces.rst
index 06ac89adaafb..6c6fa9a0ba1d 100644
--- a/Documentation/driver-api/firmware/other_interfaces.rst
+++ b/Documentation/driver-api/firmware/other_interfaces.rst
@@ -49,3 +49,136 @@ of the requests on to a secure monitor (EL3).
.. kernel-doc:: drivers/firmware/stratix10-svc.c
:export:
+
+NXP Secure Enclave Firmware Interface
+=====================================
+
+Introduction
+------------
+The NXP's i.MX HW IP like EdgeLock Enclave, V2X etc., creates an embedded secure
+enclave within the SoC boundary to enable features like:
+
+- Hardware Security Module (HSM)
+- Security Hardware Extension (SHE)
+- Vehicular to Anything (V2X)
+
+Each of the above features is enabled through dedicated NXP H/W IP on the SoC.
+On a single SoC, multiple hardware IP (or can say more than one secure enclave)
+can exist.
+
+NXP SoCs enabled with the such secure enclaves(SEs) IPs are:
+i.MX93, i.MX8ULP
+
+To communicate with one or more co-existing SE(s) on SoC, there is/are dedicated
+messaging units(MU) per SE. Each co-existing SE can have one or multiple exclusive
+MUs, dedicated to itself. None of the MU is shared between two SEs. Communication
+of the MU is realized using the mailbox driver. Each secure enclave can cater to
+multiple clients by virtue of these exclusive MUs. Also, they can distinguish
+transactions originating from these clients based on the MU used and core security
+state. The communication between the clients and secure enclaves is in the form of
+a command/response mechanism. Each client could expose a specific set of secure enclave
+features to the higher layers, based on the commands supported by that client. For
+example, the secure enclave could simultaneously support an OPTEE TA and Linux
+middleware as clients. Each of these clients can expose a specific set of secure
+enclave features based on the command set supported by them.
+
+NXP Secure Enclave(SE) Interface
+--------------------------------
+MU(s) is/are not shared between SE(s). But for an SoC like i.MX95 which has
+multiple SE(s) like HSM, V2X-HSM, V2X-SHE, all the SE(s) and their interfaces 'se-if'
+that is/are dedicated to a particular SE will be enumerated and provisioned using the
+single compatible node("fsl,imx95-se").
+
+Each 'se-if' comprises two layers:
+
+- (C_DEV Layer) User-Space software-access interface.
+- (Service Layer) OS-level software-access interface.
+
+::
+
+ +--------------------------------------------+
+ | Character Device(C_DEV) |
+ | |
+ | +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ |
+ | | misc #1 | | misc #2 | ... | misc #n | |
+ | | dev | | dev | | dev | |
+ | +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ |
+ | +-------------------------+ |
+ | | Misc. Dev Synchr. Logic | |
+ | +-------------------------+ |
+ | |
+ +--------------------------------------------+
+
+ +--------------------------------------------+
+ | Service Layer |
+ | |
+ | +-----------------------------+ |
+ | | Message Serialization Logic | |
+ | +-----------------------------+ |
+ | +---------------+ |
+ | | imx-mailbox | |
+ | | mailbox.c | |
+ | +---------------+ |
+ | |
+ +--------------------------------------------+
+
+- service layer:
+ This layer is responsible for ensuring the communication protocol that is defined
+ for communication with firmware.
+
+ FW Communication protocol ensures two things:
+
+ - Serializing the messages to be sent over an MU.
+ - FW can handle one command message at a time.
+
+- c_dev:
+ This layer offers character device contexts, created as '/dev/<se>_mux_chx'.
+ Using these multiple device contexts that are multiplexed over a single MU,
+ userspace application(s) can call fops like write/read to send the command message,
+ and read back the command response message to/from Firmware.
+ fops like read & write use the above defined service layer API(s) to communicate with
+ Firmware.
+
+ Misc-device(/dev/<se>_mux_chn) synchronization protocol::
+
+ Non-Secure + Secure
+ |
+ |
+ +-----------+ +-------------+ |
+ | se_ctrl.c +<---->+imx-mailbox.c| |
+ | | | mailbox.c +<-->+------+ +------+
+ +-----+-----+ +-------------+ | MU X +<-->+ ELE |
+ | +------+ +------+
+ +----------------+ |
+ | | |
+ v v |
+ logical logical |
+ receiver waiter |
+ + + |
+ | | |
+ | | |
+ | +----+------+ |
+ | | | |
+ | | | |
+ device_ctx device_ctx device_ctx |
+ |
+ User 0 User 1 User Y |
+ +------+ +------+ +------+ |
+ |misc.c| |misc.c| |misc.c| |
+ kernel space +------+ +------+ +------+ |
+ |
+ +---------------------------------------------------- |
+ | | | |
+ userspace /dev/ele_muXch0 | | |
+ /dev/ele_muXch1 | |
+ /dev/ele_muXchY |
+ |
+
+When a user sends a command to the firmware, it registers its device_ctx
+as waiter of a response from firmware.
+
+Enclave's Firmware owns the storage management over a Linux filesystem.
+For this c_dev provisions a dedicated slave device called "receiver".
+
+.. kernel-doc:: drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
+ :export:
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v26 2/7] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc
2026-06-29 12:21 [PATCH v26 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:21 ` [PATCH v26 1/7] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 12:21 ` pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:21 ` [PATCH v26 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
` (4 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: pankaj.gupta @ 2026-06-29 12:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree, imx, linux-arm-kernel
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
The NXP security hardware IP(s) like: i.MX EdgeLock Enclave, V2X etc.,
creates an embedded secure enclave within the SoC boundary to enable
features like:
- HSM
- SHE
- V2X
Secure-Enclave(s) communication interface are typically via message
unit, i.e., based on mailbox linux kernel driver. This driver enables
communication ensuring well defined message sequence protocol between
Application Core and enclave's firmware.
Driver configures multiple misc-device on the MU, for multiple
user-space applications, to be able to communicate over single MU.
It exists on some i.MX processors. e.g. i.MX8ULP, i.MX93 etc.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <robh@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
---
.../devicetree/bindings/firmware/fsl,imx-se.yaml | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 91 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/firmware/fsl,imx-se.yaml b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/firmware/fsl,imx-se.yaml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fa81adbf9b80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/firmware/fsl,imx-se.yaml
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0-only OR BSD-2-Clause)
+%YAML 1.2
+---
+$id: http://devicetree.org/schemas/firmware/fsl,imx-se.yaml#
+$schema: http://devicetree.org/meta-schemas/core.yaml#
+
+title: NXP i.MX HW Secure Enclave(s) EdgeLock Enclave
+
+maintainers:
+ - Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
+
+description: |
+ NXP's SoC may contain one or multiple embedded secure-enclave HW
+ IP(s) like i.MX EdgeLock Enclave, V2X etc. These NXP's HW IP(s)
+ enables features like
+ - Hardware Security Module (HSM),
+ - Security Hardware Extension (SHE), and
+ - Vehicular to Anything (V2X)
+
+ Communication interface to the secure-enclaves(se) is based on the
+ messaging unit(s).
+
+properties:
+ compatible:
+ enum:
+ - fsl,imx8ulp-se-ele-hsm
+ - fsl,imx93-se-ele-hsm
+ - fsl,imx95-se-ele-hsm
+
+ mboxes:
+ items:
+ - description: mailbox phandle to send message to se firmware
+ - description: mailbox phandle to receive message from se firmware
+
+ mbox-names:
+ items:
+ - const: tx
+ - const: rx
+
+ memory-region:
+ maxItems: 1
+
+ sram:
+ maxItems: 1
+
+required:
+ - compatible
+ - mboxes
+ - mbox-names
+
+allOf:
+ # memory-region
+ - if:
+ properties:
+ compatible:
+ contains:
+ enum:
+ - fsl,imx8ulp-se-ele-hsm
+ - fsl,imx93-se-ele-hsm
+ then:
+ required:
+ - memory-region
+ else:
+ properties:
+ memory-region: false
+
+ # sram
+ - if:
+ properties:
+ compatible:
+ contains:
+ enum:
+ - fsl,imx8ulp-se-ele-hsm
+ then:
+ required:
+ - sram
+
+ else:
+ properties:
+ sram: false
+
+additionalProperties: false
+
+examples:
+ - |
+ secure-enclave {
+ compatible = "fsl,imx95-se-ele-hsm";
+ mboxes = <&ele_mu0 0 0>, <&ele_mu0 1 0>;
+ mbox-names = "tx", "rx";
+ };
+...
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v26 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave
2026-06-29 12:21 [PATCH v26 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:21 ` [PATCH v26 1/7] Documentation/firmware: add imx/se to other_interfaces pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:21 ` [PATCH v26 2/7] dt-bindings: arm: fsl: add imx-se-fw binding doc pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 12:21 ` pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 7:50 ` Lothar Waßmann
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 4/7] firmware: imx: device context dedicated to priv pankaj.gupta
` (3 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: pankaj.gupta @ 2026-06-29 12:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree, imx, linux-arm-kernel,
Frieder Schrempf, kernel test robot, sashiko-bot
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Add MU-based communication interface for secure enclave.
NXP hardware IP(s) for secure-enclaves like Edgelock Enclave(ELE), are
embedded in the SoC to support the features like HSM, SHE & V2X, using
message based communication interface.
The secure enclave FW communicates with Linux over single or multiple
dedicated messaging unit(MU) based interface(s).
Exists on i.MX SoC(s) like i.MX8ULP, i.MX93, i.MX95 etc.
For i.MX9x SoC(s) there is at least one dedicated ELE MU(s) for each
world - Linux(one or more) and OPTEE-OS (one or more).
Other dependent kernel drivers will be:
- NVMEM: that supports non-volatile devices like EFUSES,
managed by NXP's secure-enclave.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de>
Reviewed-by: Frieder Schrempf <frieder.schrempf@kontron.de>
---
Changes v25 to v26:
1. imx: depend on MAILBOX for EdgeLock Enclave driver
The EdgeLock Enclave driver uses mailbox core APIs such as
mbox_request_channel_byname(), mbox_free_channel(), and
mbox_send_message(). The current Kconfig allows the driver to be built
with COMPILE_TEST even when MAILBOX is disabled, which leads to linker
failures from unresolved mailbox symbols.
Require MAILBOX explicitly so COMPILE_TEST builds still include the
mailbox core when this driver is selected.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202605270101.2FFpzoFg-lkp@intel.com/
2. ele_common: harden response waiter timeout handling
The synchronous command/response path stores the caller-owned response
buffer in waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg until se_if_rx_callback() copies
the firmware response and completes the waiter.
That breaks down when the response wait times out: the caller can return
and free the response buffer while a delayed firmware response is still
in flight. If the callback later copies into the stale rx_msg pointer,
it can corrupt freed memory.
Fix this by protecting the response-waiter buffer handoff with a
dedicated spinlock. On timeout, clear waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg under
that lock before returning. In the RX callback, check rx_msg under the
same lock and drop late rsp_tag messages instead of copying into a stale
buffer. Use a small "firmware busy" circuit breaker to reject new
command/response transactions after timeout until the delayed response is
observed.
Also avoid a livelock in ele_msg_rcv(): if a signal interrupts the wait
after a command has already been sent, record the interruption and
continue waiting non-interruptibly for the remaining timeout budget.
This preserves firmware/kernel synchronization while avoiding an
infinite loop of repeated -ERESTARTSYS returns.
The main lifetime fix applies to the synchronous response-waiter path
(waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl / rsp_tag). The command-receiver path is also
hardened with basic state validation and bounded copy handling.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260514090457.2186933-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
3. se_ctrl: Move priv to explicit lifetime management.
Allocating priv via devm, will lead to UAF while teardown with active
misc devices & dev_ctx.
---
drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig | 13 ++
drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c | 277 +++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h | 98 ++++++++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c | 435 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h | 45 ++++
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c | 418 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h | 95 ++++++++
include/linux/firmware/imx/se_api.h | 14 ++
9 files changed, 1397 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig b/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig
index 127ad752acf8..e3cb7f965e70 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/Kconfig
@@ -55,3 +55,16 @@ config IMX_SCMI_MISC_DRV
core that could provide misc functions such as board control.
This driver can also be built as a module.
+
+config IMX_SEC_ENCLAVE
+ tristate "i.MX Embedded Secure Enclave - EdgeLock Enclave Firmware driver."
+ depends on MAILBOX && ((IMX_MBOX && ARCH_MXC && ARM64) || COMPILE_TEST)
+ select FW_LOADER
+ default m if ARCH_MXC
+
+ help
+ Exposes APIs supported by the iMX Secure Enclave HW IP called:
+ - EdgeLock Enclave Firmware (for i.MX8ULP, i.MX93),
+ like base, HSM, V2X & SHE using the SAB protocol via the shared Messaging
+ Unit. This driver exposes these interfaces via a set of file descriptors
+ allowing to configure shared memory, send and receive messages.
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
index 3bbaffa6e347..4412b15846b1 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/Makefile
@@ -4,3 +4,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMX_SCU) += imx-scu.o misc.o imx-scu-irq.o rm.o imx-scu-soc.o
obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_CPU_DRV} += sm-cpu.o
obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_MISC_DRV} += sm-misc.o
obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SCMI_LMM_DRV} += sm-lmm.o
+sec_enclave-objs = se_ctrl.o ele_common.o ele_base_msg.o
+obj-${CONFIG_IMX_SEC_ENCLAVE} += sec_enclave.o
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..54d79c3d75af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
+#include <linux/completion.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/genalloc.h>
+
+#include "ele_base_msg.h"
+#include "ele_common.h"
+
+#define FW_DBG_DUMP_FIXED_STR "ELE"
+
+int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
+{
+ dma_addr_t get_info_addr = 0;
+ u32 *get_info_data = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!priv)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(s_info, 0x0, sizeof(*s_info));
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (priv->mem_pool)
+ get_info_data = gen_pool_dma_alloc(priv->mem_pool,
+ ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ,
+ &get_info_addr);
+ else
+ get_info_data = dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev,
+ ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ,
+ &get_info_addr,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!get_info_data) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "%s: Failed to allocate get_info_addr.", __func__);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
+ ELE_GET_INFO_REQ, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ,
+ true);
+ if (ret)
+ goto exit;
+
+ tx_msg->data[0] = upper_32_bits(get_info_addr);
+ tx_msg->data[1] = lower_32_bits(get_info_addr);
+ tx_msg->data[2] = sizeof(*s_info);
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ, rx_msg,
+ ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto exit;
+
+ ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ,
+ ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ, true);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto exit;
+
+ memcpy(s_info, get_info_data, sizeof(*s_info));
+exit:
+ if (priv->mem_pool)
+ gen_pool_free(priv->mem_pool, (unsigned long)get_info_data,
+ ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ);
+ else
+ dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ,
+ get_info_data, get_info_addr);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ele_fetch_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *data)
+{
+ return ele_get_info(priv, data);
+}
+
+int ele_ping(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!priv)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = kzalloc(ELE_PING_REQ_SZ,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = kzalloc(ELE_PING_RSP_SZ,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
+ ELE_PING_REQ, ELE_PING_REQ_SZ, true);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Error: se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr failed.");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_PING_REQ_SZ, rx_msg,
+ ELE_PING_RSP_SZ);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, ELE_PING_REQ,
+ ELE_PING_RSP_SZ, true);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ele_service_swap(struct se_if_priv *priv,
+ phys_addr_t addr,
+ u32 addr_size, u16 flag)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!priv)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
+ ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ,
+ ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ, true);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ tx_msg->data[0] = flag;
+ tx_msg->data[1] = addr_size;
+ tx_msg->data[2] = ELE_NONE_VAL;
+ tx_msg->data[3] = lower_32_bits(addr);
+ tx_msg->data[4] = se_get_msg_chksum((u32 *)&tx_msg[0],
+ ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ);
+ if (!tx_msg->data[4])
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ,
+ rx_msg, ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ,
+ ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ, true);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (flag == ELE_IMEM_EXPORT)
+ ret = rx_msg->data[1];
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ele_fw_authenticate(struct se_if_priv *priv, phys_addr_t contnr_addr,
+ phys_addr_t img_addr)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!priv)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (upper_32_bits(contnr_addr) || upper_32_bits(img_addr)) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Wrong address: %pap %pap\n", &contnr_addr, &img_addr);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(ELE_FW_AUTH_RSP_MSG_SZ, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
+ ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ, ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ, true);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ tx_msg->data[0] = lower_32_bits(contnr_addr);
+ tx_msg->data[1] = 0;
+ tx_msg->data[2] = lower_32_bits(img_addr);
+
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ, rx_msg,
+ ELE_FW_AUTH_RSP_MSG_SZ);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ,
+ ELE_FW_AUTH_RSP_MSG_SZ, true);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ele_debug_dump(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ bool keep_logging;
+ int msg_ex_cnt;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!priv)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = kzalloc(ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) = kzalloc(ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ret = se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, &tx_msg->header, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ,
+ ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ, true);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ msg_ex_cnt = 0;
+ do {
+ memset(rx_msg, 0x0, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ);
+
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ,
+ rx_msg, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(priv, rx_msg, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ,
+ ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ, true);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Dump_Debug_Buffer Error: %x.", ret);
+ break;
+ }
+ keep_logging = (rx_msg->header.size >= (ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ >> 2) &&
+ msg_ex_cnt < ELE_MAX_DBG_DMP_PKT);
+
+ rx_msg->header.size -= 2;
+
+ if (rx_msg->header.size > 2)
+ rx_msg->header.size--;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rx_msg->header.size; i += 2)
+ dev_info(priv->dev, "%s%02x_%02x: 0x%08x 0x%08x",
+ FW_DBG_DUMP_FIXED_STR, msg_ex_cnt, i,
+ rx_msg->data[i + 1], rx_msg->data[i + 2]);
+
+ msg_ex_cnt++;
+ } while (keep_logging);
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..74f87f57d96b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ *
+ * Header file for the EdgeLock Enclave Base API(s).
+ */
+
+#ifndef ELE_BASE_MSG_H
+#define ELE_BASE_MSG_H
+
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#include "se_ctrl.h"
+
+#define ELE_NONE_VAL 0x0
+
+#define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ 0xda
+#define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x10
+#define ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x08
+
+#define MAX_UID_SIZE (16)
+#define DEV_GETINFO_ROM_PATCH_SHA_SZ (32)
+#define DEV_GETINFO_FW_SHA_SZ (32)
+#define DEV_GETINFO_OEM_SRKH_SZ (64)
+#define DEV_GETINFO_MIN_VER_MASK 0xff
+#define DEV_GETINFO_MAJ_VER_MASK 0xff00
+#define ELE_DEV_INFO_EXTRA_SZ 0x60
+
+struct dev_info {
+ u8 cmd;
+ u8 ver;
+ u16 length;
+ u16 soc_id;
+ u16 soc_rev;
+ u16 lmda_val;
+ u8 ssm_state;
+ u8 dev_atts_api_ver;
+ u8 uid[MAX_UID_SIZE];
+ u8 sha_rom_patch[DEV_GETINFO_ROM_PATCH_SHA_SZ];
+ u8 sha_fw[DEV_GETINFO_FW_SHA_SZ];
+};
+
+struct dev_addn_info {
+ u8 oem_srkh[DEV_GETINFO_OEM_SRKH_SZ];
+ u8 trng_state;
+ u8 csal_state;
+ u8 imem_state;
+ u8 reserved2;
+};
+
+struct ele_dev_info {
+ struct dev_info d_info;
+ struct dev_addn_info d_addn_info;
+};
+
+#define ELE_GET_INFO_BUFF_SZ (sizeof(struct ele_dev_info) \
+ + ELE_DEV_INFO_EXTRA_SZ)
+
+#define GET_SERIAL_NUM_FROM_UID(x, uid_word_sz) ({\
+ const u32 *__x = (const u32 *)(x); \
+ size_t __sz = (uid_word_sz); \
+ ((u64)__x[__sz - 1] << 32) | __x[0]; \
+ })
+
+#define ELE_MAX_DBG_DMP_PKT 50
+#define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ 0x21
+#define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ 0x4
+#define ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ 0x5c
+
+#define ELE_PING_REQ 0x01
+#define ELE_PING_REQ_SZ 0x04
+#define ELE_PING_RSP_SZ 0x08
+
+#define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ 0xdf
+#define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x18
+#define ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x0c
+#define ELE_IMEM_SIZE 0x10000
+#define ELE_IMEM_STATE_OK 0xca
+#define ELE_IMEM_STATE_BAD 0xfe
+#define ELE_IMEM_STATE_WORD 0x27
+#define ELE_IMEM_STATE_MASK 0x00ff0000
+#define ELE_IMEM_EXPORT 0x1
+#define ELE_IMEM_IMPORT 0x2
+
+#define ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ 0x02
+#define ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ 0x10
+#define ELE_FW_AUTH_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x08
+
+int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info);
+int ele_fetch_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *data);
+int ele_ping(struct se_if_priv *priv);
+int ele_service_swap(struct se_if_priv *priv, phys_addr_t addr,
+ u32 addr_size, u16 flag);
+int ele_fw_authenticate(struct se_if_priv *priv, phys_addr_t contnr_addr,
+ phys_addr_t img_addr);
+int ele_debug_dump(struct se_if_priv *priv);
+#endif
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ba606f4e8be8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,435 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ */
+
+#include "ele_base_msg.h"
+#include "ele_common.h"
+
+/*
+ * se_get_msg_chksum() - to calculate checksum word by word.
+ *
+ * @msg : reference to the input msg-data.
+ * @msg_len : reference to the input msg-data length in bytes.
+ * Includes extra 4 bytes (or 1 words) chksum.
+ *
+ * This function returns the checksum calculated by ORing word by word.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0: if the input length is not 4 byte aligned, or num of words < 5.
+ * chksum: calculated word by word.
+ */
+u32 se_get_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len)
+{
+ u32 nb_words = msg_len / (u32)sizeof(u32);
+ u32 chksum = 0;
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (nb_words < 5)
+ return chksum;
+
+ if (msg_len % SE_MSG_WORD_SZ) {
+ pr_err("Msg-len is not 4-byte aligned.");
+ return chksum;
+ }
+
+ /* nb_words include one checksum word, so skip it. */
+ nb_words--;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nb_words; i++)
+ chksum ^= *(msg + i);
+
+ return chksum;
+}
+
+int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
+{
+ bool wait_uninterruptible = false;
+ unsigned long remaining_jiffies;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret;
+
+ remaining_jiffies = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
+ do {
+ if (wait_uninterruptible)
+ ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
+ remaining_jiffies);
+ else
+ ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
+ remaining_jiffies);
+ if (ret == -ERESTARTSYS) {
+ /*
+ * Record that a signal was observed, then continue waiting non-
+ * interruptibly until the response arrives or the timeout
+ * expires. The caller can surface the interruption to userspace
+ * after the protocol transaction is brought back to a
+ * synchronized state.
+ */
+ if (priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg) {
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.signal_rcvd = true;
+ wait_uninterruptible = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ ret = -EINTR;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The response buffer belongs to the caller of ele_msg_send_rcv()
+ * and may be freed as soon as this function returns. Clear rx_msg
+ * under clbk_rx_lock so that a late se_if_rx_callback() can
+ * observe that the waiter has timed out and must not copy into
+ * the stale buffer.
+ *
+ * If the completion has not yet been signaled, mark the firmware
+ * path busy. This acts as a circuit breaker: reject new
+ * command/response transactions until the delayed response
+ * arrives and the callback closes the breaker.
+ */
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
+ if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done))
+ atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
+
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "Fatal Error: SE interface: %s0, hangs indefinitely.\n",
+ get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz;
+ break;
+ } while (ret < 0);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_priv *priv,
+ void *tx_msg,
+ int tx_msg_sz)
+{
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header = tx_msg;
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Check that the size passed as argument matches the size
+ * carried in the message.
+ */
+ if (header->size << 2 != tx_msg_sz) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "User buf hdr: 0x%x, sz mismatced with input-sz (%d != %d).",
+ *(u32 *)header, header->size << 2, tx_msg_sz);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ err = mbox_send_message(priv->tx_chan, tx_msg);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Error: mbox_send_message failure.\n");
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return tx_msg_sz;
+}
+
+/* API used for send/receive blocking call. */
+int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *tx_msg, int tx_msg_sz,
+ void *rx_msg, int exp_rx_msg_sz)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ guard(mutex)(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy)) {
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "ELE became unresponsive.\n");
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ reinit_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = exp_rx_msg_sz;
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = rx_msg;
+
+ err = ele_msg_send(priv, tx_msg, tx_msg_sz);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+
+ err = ele_msg_rcv(priv, &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl);
+
+ if (priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.signal_rcvd) {
+ err = -EINTR;
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.signal_rcvd = false;
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Err[0x%x]:Interrupted by signal.", err);
+ }
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = NULL;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static bool check_hdr_exception_for_sz(struct se_if_priv *priv,
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header)
+{
+ /*
+ * List of API(s) header that can be accepte variable length
+ * response buffer.
+ */
+ if (header->command == ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ &&
+ header->ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver &&
+ header->size >= 2 && header->size <= (ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ / 4))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Callback called by mailbox FW, when data is received.
+ */
+void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
+{
+ struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl;
+ struct device *dev = mbox_cl->dev;
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header;
+ bool sz_mismatch = false;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 rx_msg_sz;
+
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ /* The function can be called with NULL msg */
+ if (!msg) {
+ dev_err(dev, "Message is invalid\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ header = msg;
+ rx_msg_sz = header->size << 2;
+
+ /* Incoming command: wake up the receiver if any. */
+ if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) {
+ se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ dev_warn(dev, "No command receiver registered for message: %.8x\n",
+ *((u32 *)header));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * cmd_tag messages are delivered only to the explicitly registered
+ * command receiver. Unlike the synchronous response waiter path, the
+ * command receiver uses a dedicated long-lived buffer installed by
+ * SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV and is not subject to the timeout/circuit-
+ * breaker handling used for rsp_tag messages.
+ */
+ dev_dbg(dev, "Selecting cmd receiver: for mesg header:0x%x.",
+ *(u32 *)header);
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-allocated buffer of MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN
+ * as the NVM command are initiated by FW.
+ * Size is revealed as part of this call function.
+ */
+
+ if (rx_msg_sz > MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN) {
+ /* Store the response buffer maxsize in local variable.*/
+ rx_msg_sz = MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN;
+ sz_mismatch = true;
+ }
+
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = rx_msg_sz;
+ memcpy(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg, msg, se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz);
+ complete(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (sz_mismatch)
+ dev_err(dev,
+ "CMD-RCVER NVM: hdr(0x%x) with different sz(%d != %d).\n",
+ *(u32 *)header,
+ (header->size << 2), rx_msg_sz);
+ } else if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->rsp_tag) {
+ bool exception_for_sz_mismatch = check_hdr_exception_for_sz(priv, header);
+ u32 exp_rx_msg_sz = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg is owned by the synchronous sender in
+ * ele_msg_send_rcv(). After timeout or error, that path clears rx_msg
+ * under clbk_rx_lock before returning to its caller, which may then free
+ * the buffer. Check rx_msg under the same lock here so a delayed response
+ * can be detected and dropped instead of copying into freed memory.
+ *
+ * A late response also closes the firmware-busy circuit breaker, allowing
+ * future command/response transactions to proceed again.
+ */
+ se_clbk_hdl = &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl;
+ exp_rx_msg_sz = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
+ /* Close circuit breaker on spinlock race */
+ atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ dev_info(dev, "ELE responded (late), recovery FW available.");
+ return;
+ }
+ dev_dbg(dev, "Selecting resp waiter: for mesg header:0x%x.",
+ *(u32 *)header);
+
+ /*
+ * For rsp_tag traffic, the sender provides the expected response
+ * buffer size. If firmware returns a different size, clamp the copy
+ * length to the caller's buffer capacity before memcpy() and report the
+ * mismatch after dropping the spinlock.
+ */
+ if (rx_msg_sz != exp_rx_msg_sz) {
+ if (!exception_for_sz_mismatch)
+ sz_mismatch = true;
+
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = min(rx_msg_sz, exp_rx_msg_sz);
+ }
+ memcpy(se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg, msg, se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz);
+ complete(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+
+ if (sz_mismatch)
+ dev_err(dev,
+ "Rsp to CMD: hdr(0x%x) with different sz(%d != %d).\n",
+ *(u32 *)header,
+ (header->size << 2), exp_rx_msg_sz);
+ } else {
+ dev_err(dev, "Failed to select a device for message: %.8x\n",
+ *((u32 *)header));
+ }
+}
+
+int se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_api_msg *msg,
+ u8 msg_id, u8 sz, bool is_base_api)
+{
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header = &msg->header;
+ u32 status;
+
+ if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->rsp_tag) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "MSG[0x%x] Hdr: Resp tag mismatch. (0x%x != 0x%x)",
+ msg_id, header->tag, priv->if_defs->rsp_tag);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (header->command != msg_id) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "MSG Header: Cmd id mismatch. (0x%x != 0x%x)",
+ header->command, msg_id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((sz % 4) || (header->size != (sz >> 2) &&
+ !check_hdr_exception_for_sz(priv, header))) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "MSG[0x%x] Hdr: Cmd size mismatch. (0x%x != 0x%x)",
+ msg_id, header->size, (sz >> 2));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (is_base_api && header->ver != priv->if_defs->base_api_ver) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "MSG[0x%x] Hdr: Base API Vers mismatch. (0x%x != 0x%x)",
+ msg_id, header->ver, priv->if_defs->base_api_ver);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (!is_base_api && header->ver != priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "MSG[0x%x] Hdr: FW API Vers mismatch. (0x%x != 0x%x)",
+ msg_id, header->ver, priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ status = RES_STATUS(msg->data[0]);
+ if (status != priv->if_defs->success_tag) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Command Id[%x], Response Failure = 0x%x",
+ header->command, status);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int se_save_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem)
+{
+ struct ele_dev_info s_info = {0};
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = ele_get_info(priv, &s_info);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to get info from ELE.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for the imem-state before continue to save imem state. */
+ if (s_info.d_addn_info.imem_state == ELE_IMEM_STATE_BAD)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /*
+ * EXPORT command will save encrypted IMEM to given address,
+ * so later in resume, IMEM can be restored from the given
+ * address.
+ *
+ * Size must be at least 64 kB.
+ */
+ ret = ele_service_swap(priv, imem->phyaddr, ELE_IMEM_SIZE, ELE_IMEM_EXPORT);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to export IMEM.");
+ imem->size = 0;
+ } else {
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev,
+ "Exported %d bytes of encrypted IMEM.",
+ ret);
+ imem->size = ret;
+ }
+
+ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+}
+
+int se_restore_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem)
+{
+ struct ele_dev_info s_info;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* get info from ELE */
+ ret = ele_get_info(priv, &s_info);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to get info from ELE.");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ imem->state = s_info.d_addn_info.imem_state;
+
+ /* Check for the imem-state and imem-size before continue to
+ * restore imem state.
+ */
+ if (s_info.d_addn_info.imem_state != ELE_IMEM_STATE_BAD || !imem->size)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ /*
+ * IMPORT command will restore IMEM from the given
+ * address, here size is the actual size returned by ELE
+ * during the export operation
+ */
+ ret = ele_service_swap(priv, imem->phyaddr, imem->size, ELE_IMEM_IMPORT);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to import IMEM");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * After importing IMEM, check if IMEM state is equal to 0xCA
+ * to ensure IMEM is fully loaded and
+ * ELE functionality can be used.
+ */
+ ret = ele_get_info(priv, &s_info);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to get info from ELE.");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ imem->state = s_info.d_addn_info.imem_state;
+
+ if (s_info.d_addn_info.imem_state == ELE_IMEM_STATE_OK)
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Successfully restored IMEM.");
+ else
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to restore IMEM.");
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..96e987ef6f88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ELE_COMMON_H__
+#define __ELE_COMMON_H__
+
+#include "se_ctrl.h"
+
+#define ELE_SUCCESS_IND 0xD6
+
+#define IMX_ELE_FW_DIR "imx/ele/"
+
+u32 se_get_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len);
+
+int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl);
+
+int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *tx_msg, int tx_msg_sz);
+
+int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *tx_msg, int tx_msg_sz,
+ void *rx_msg, int exp_rx_msg_sz);
+
+void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg);
+
+int se_val_rsp_hdr_n_status(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_api_msg *msg,
+ u8 msg_id, u8 sz, bool is_base_api);
+
+/* Fill a command message header with a given command ID and length in bytes. */
+static inline int se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_msg_hdr *hdr,
+ u8 cmd, u32 len, bool is_base_api)
+{
+ hdr->tag = priv->if_defs->cmd_tag;
+ hdr->ver = (is_base_api) ? priv->if_defs->base_api_ver : priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver;
+ hdr->command = cmd;
+ hdr->size = len >> 2;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int se_save_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
+
+int se_restore_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
+
+#endif /*__ELE_COMMON_H__ */
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a2c3c611146
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2026 NXP
+ */
+
+#include <linux/bitfield.h>
+#include <linux/completion.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/dev_printk.h>
+#include <linux/dma-direct.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/firmware.h>
+#include <linux/firmware/imx/se_api.h>
+#include <linux/genalloc.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/of_platform.h>
+#include <linux/of_reserved_mem.h>
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/sys_soc.h>
+
+#include "ele_base_msg.h"
+#include "ele_common.h"
+#include "se_ctrl.h"
+
+#define MAX_SOC_INFO_DATA_SZ 256
+#define MBOX_TX_NAME "tx"
+#define MBOX_RX_NAME "rx"
+
+#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg"
+#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm"
+
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1
+
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2
+
+struct se_fw_img_name {
+ const u8 *prim_fw_nm_in_rfs;
+ const u8 *seco_fw_nm_in_rfs;
+};
+
+struct se_fw_load_info {
+ const struct se_fw_img_name *se_fw_img_nm;
+ bool is_fw_tobe_loaded;
+ bool imem_mgmt;
+ struct se_imem_buf imem;
+};
+
+struct se_var_info {
+ u16 soc_rev;
+ struct se_fw_load_info load_fw;
+};
+
+/* contains fixed information */
+struct se_soc_info {
+ const u16 soc_id;
+ const char *soc_name;
+ const struct se_fw_img_name se_fw_img_nm;
+};
+
+struct se_if_node {
+ struct se_soc_info *se_info;
+ u8 *pool_name;
+ bool reserved_dma_ranges;
+ struct se_if_defines if_defs;
+};
+
+/* common for all the SoC. */
+static struct se_var_info var_se_info;
+
+static struct se_soc_info se_imx8ulp_info = {
+ .soc_id = SOC_ID_OF_IMX8ULP,
+ .soc_name = "i.MX8ULP",
+ .se_fw_img_nm = {
+ .prim_fw_nm_in_rfs = IMX_ELE_FW_DIR
+ "mx8ulpa2-ahab-container.img",
+ .seco_fw_nm_in_rfs = IMX_ELE_FW_DIR
+ "mx8ulpa2ext-ahab-container.img",
+ },
+};
+
+static struct se_if_node imx8ulp_se_ele_hsm = {
+ .se_info = &se_imx8ulp_info,
+ .pool_name = "sram",
+ .reserved_dma_ranges = true,
+ .if_defs = {
+ .se_if_type = SE_TYPE_ID_HSM,
+ .cmd_tag = 0x17,
+ .rsp_tag = 0xe1,
+ .success_tag = ELE_SUCCESS_IND,
+ .base_api_ver = MESSAGING_VERSION_6,
+ .fw_api_ver = MESSAGING_VERSION_7,
+ },
+};
+
+static struct se_soc_info se_imx93_info = {
+ .soc_id = SOC_ID_OF_IMX93,
+};
+
+static struct se_if_node imx93_se_ele_hsm = {
+ .se_info = &se_imx93_info,
+ .reserved_dma_ranges = true,
+ .if_defs = {
+ .se_if_type = SE_TYPE_ID_HSM,
+ .cmd_tag = 0x17,
+ .rsp_tag = 0xe1,
+ .success_tag = ELE_SUCCESS_IND,
+ .base_api_ver = MESSAGING_VERSION_6,
+ .fw_api_ver = MESSAGING_VERSION_7,
+ },
+};
+
+static const struct of_device_id se_match[] = {
+ { .compatible = "fsl,imx8ulp-se-ele-hsm", .data = &imx8ulp_se_ele_hsm},
+ { .compatible = "fsl,imx93-se-ele-hsm", .data = &imx93_se_ele_hsm},
+ {},
+};
+
+char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id)
+{
+ switch (se_if_id) {
+ case SE_TYPE_ID_DBG: return SE_TYPE_STR_DBG;
+ case SE_TYPE_ID_HSM: return SE_TYPE_STR_HSM;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static struct se_fw_load_info *get_load_fw_instance(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ return &var_se_info.load_fw;
+}
+
+static int get_se_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, const struct se_soc_info *se_info)
+{
+ struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+ struct soc_device_attribute *attr;
+ u8 data[MAX_SOC_INFO_DATA_SZ];
+ struct ele_dev_info *s_info;
+ struct soc_device *sdev;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * This function should be called once.
+ * Check if the se_soc_rev is zero to continue.
+ */
+ if (var_se_info.soc_rev)
+ return err;
+
+ err = ele_fetch_soc_info(priv, &data);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, err, "Failed to fetch SoC Info.");
+ s_info = (void *)data;
+ var_se_info.soc_rev = s_info->d_info.soc_rev;
+ load_fw->imem.state = s_info->d_addn_info.imem_state;
+
+ if (!se_info->soc_name)
+ return 0;
+
+ attr = devm_kzalloc(priv->dev, sizeof(*attr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!attr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (FIELD_GET(DEV_GETINFO_MIN_VER_MASK, var_se_info.soc_rev))
+ attr->revision = devm_kasprintf(priv->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "%x.%x",
+ FIELD_GET(DEV_GETINFO_MIN_VER_MASK,
+ var_se_info.soc_rev),
+ FIELD_GET(DEV_GETINFO_MAJ_VER_MASK,
+ var_se_info.soc_rev));
+ else
+ attr->revision = devm_kasprintf(priv->dev, GFP_KERNEL, "%x",
+ FIELD_GET(DEV_GETINFO_MAJ_VER_MASK,
+ var_se_info.soc_rev));
+
+ attr->soc_id = se_info->soc_name;
+
+ err = of_property_read_string(of_root, "model", &attr->machine);
+ if (err)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ attr->family = "Freescale i.MX";
+
+ attr->serial_number = devm_kasprintf(priv->dev,
+ GFP_KERNEL, "%016llX",
+ GET_SERIAL_NUM_FROM_UID(s_info->d_info.uid,
+ MAX_UID_SIZE >> 2));
+
+ sdev = soc_device_register(attr);
+ if (IS_ERR(sdev))
+ return PTR_ERR(sdev);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* interface for managed res to free a mailbox channel */
+static void if_mbox_free_channel(void *mbox_chan)
+{
+ mbox_free_channel(mbox_chan);
+}
+
+static int se_if_request_channel(struct device *dev, struct mbox_chan **chan,
+ struct mbox_client *cl, const char *name)
+{
+ struct mbox_chan *t_chan;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ t_chan = mbox_request_channel_byname(cl, name);
+ if (IS_ERR(t_chan))
+ return dev_err_probe(dev, PTR_ERR(t_chan),
+ "Failed to request %s channel.", name);
+
+ ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, if_mbox_free_channel, t_chan);
+ if (ret)
+ return dev_err_probe(dev, -EPERM,
+ "Failed to add-action for removal of mbox: %s.",
+ name);
+ *chan = t_chan;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
+{
+ struct platform_device *pdev = plat_dev;
+ struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw;
+ struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+
+ priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ if (!priv)
+ return;
+
+ load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+
+ /*
+ * In se_if_request_channel(), passed the clean-up functional
+ * pointer reference as action to devm_add_action_or_reset().
+ * No need to free the mbox channels here.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * free the buffer in se remove, previously allocated
+ * in se probe to store encrypted IMEM
+ */
+ if (load_fw && load_fw->imem.buf) {
+ dmam_free_coherent(dev, ELE_IMEM_SIZE, load_fw->imem.buf,
+ load_fw->imem.phyaddr);
+ load_fw->imem.buf = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No need to check, if reserved memory is allocated
+ * before calling for its release. Or clearing the
+ * un-set bit.
+ */
+ of_reserved_mem_device_release(dev);
+ dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
+ kfree(priv);
+}
+
+static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
+{
+ const struct se_soc_info *se_info;
+ const struct se_if_node *if_node;
+ struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw;
+ struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ dma_addr_t imem_dma_addr;
+ int ret;
+
+ if_node = device_get_match_data(dev);
+ if (!if_node)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ se_info = if_node->se_info;
+
+ priv = kzalloc_obj(*priv, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!priv)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ priv->dev = dev;
+ priv->if_defs = &if_node->if_defs;
+ dev_set_drvdata(dev, priv);
+
+ mutex_init(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
+ atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
+ init_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
+ init_completion(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.done);
+
+ ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, se_if_probe_cleanup, pdev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* Mailbox client configuration */
+ priv->se_mb_cl.dev = dev;
+ priv->se_mb_cl.tx_block = false;
+ priv->se_mb_cl.knows_txdone = true;
+ priv->se_mb_cl.rx_callback = se_if_rx_callback;
+
+ ret = se_if_request_channel(dev, &priv->tx_chan, &priv->se_mb_cl, MBOX_TX_NAME);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = se_if_request_channel(dev, &priv->rx_chan, &priv->se_mb_cl, MBOX_RX_NAME);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (if_node->pool_name) {
+ priv->mem_pool = of_gen_pool_get(dev->of_node, if_node->pool_name, 0);
+ if (!priv->mem_pool)
+ return dev_err_probe(dev, -ENOMEM,
+ "Unable to get sram pool = %s.",
+ if_node->pool_name);
+ }
+
+ if (if_node->reserved_dma_ranges) {
+ ret = of_reserved_mem_device_init(dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return dev_err_probe(dev, ret,
+ "Failed to init reserved memory region.");
+ }
+
+ if (if_node->if_defs.se_if_type == SE_TYPE_ID_HSM) {
+ ret = get_se_soc_info(priv, se_info);
+ if (ret)
+ return dev_err_probe(dev, ret, "Failed to fetch SoC Info.");
+ }
+
+ /* By default, there is no pending FW to be loaded.*/
+ if (se_info->se_fw_img_nm.seco_fw_nm_in_rfs) {
+ load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+ load_fw->se_fw_img_nm = &se_info->se_fw_img_nm;
+ load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded = true;
+
+ if (load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->prim_fw_nm_in_rfs) {
+ /* allocate buffer where SE store encrypted IMEM */
+ imem_dma_addr = phys_to_dma(priv->dev, load_fw->imem.phyaddr);
+ load_fw->imem.buf = dmam_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, ELE_IMEM_SIZE,
+ &imem_dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!load_fw->imem.buf)
+ return dev_err_probe(dev, -ENOMEM,
+ "dmam-alloc-failed: To store encr-IMEM.");
+ load_fw->imem_mgmt = true;
+ }
+ }
+ dev_info(dev, "i.MX secure-enclave: %s0 interface to firmware, configured.",
+ get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static int se_suspend(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+
+ if (load_fw->imem_mgmt) {
+ ret = se_save_imem_state(priv, &load_fw->imem);
+ if (ret)
+ dev_err(dev, "Failure saving IMEM state[0x%x]", ret);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int se_resume(struct device *dev)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+
+ if (load_fw->imem_mgmt) {
+ se_restore_imem_state(priv, &load_fw->imem);
+ if (ret)
+ dev_err(dev, "Failure restoring IMEM state[0x%x]", ret);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct dev_pm_ops se_pm = {
+ SET_SYSTEM_SLEEP_PM_OPS(se_suspend, se_resume)
+};
+
+#define SE_PM_OPS (&se_pm)
+#else
+#define SE_PM_OPS NULL
+#endif
+
+static struct platform_driver se_driver = {
+ .driver = {
+ .name = "fsl-se",
+ .of_match_table = se_match,
+ .pm = SE_PM_OPS,
+ },
+ .probe = se_if_probe,
+};
+MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, se_match);
+
+module_platform_driver(se_driver);
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("iMX Secure Enclave Driver.");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ef834a845e30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2026 NXP
+ */
+
+#ifndef SE_MU_H
+#define SE_MU_H
+
+#include <linux/bitfield.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/mailbox_client.h>
+
+#define MAX_FW_LOAD_RETRIES 50
+#define SE_MSG_WORD_SZ 0x4
+
+#define RES_STATUS(x) FIELD_GET(0x000000ff, x)
+#define MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN (256)
+#define MESSAGING_VERSION_6 0x6
+#define MESSAGING_VERSION_7 0x7
+
+struct se_clbk_handle {
+ struct completion done;
+ bool signal_rcvd;
+ u32 rx_msg_sz;
+ /*
+ * Assignment of the rx_msg buffer to held till the
+ * received content as part callback function, is copied.
+ */
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg;
+ /*
+ * Serialise the timeout path in ele_msg_rcv() against
+ * se_if_rx_callback() so that the callback can never
+ * memcpy into a buffer that the timeout path has already
+ * freed.
+ */
+ spinlock_t clbk_rx_lock;
+};
+
+struct se_imem_buf {
+ u8 *buf;
+ phys_addr_t phyaddr;
+ u32 size;
+ u32 state;
+};
+
+/* Header of the messages exchange with the EdgeLock Enclave */
+struct se_msg_hdr {
+ u8 ver;
+ u8 size;
+ u8 command;
+ u8 tag;
+} __packed;
+
+#define SE_MU_HDR_SZ 4
+
+struct se_api_msg {
+ struct se_msg_hdr header;
+ u32 data[];
+};
+
+struct se_if_defines {
+ const u8 se_if_type;
+ u8 cmd_tag;
+ u8 rsp_tag;
+ u8 success_tag;
+ u8 base_api_ver;
+ u8 fw_api_ver;
+};
+
+struct se_if_priv {
+ struct device *dev;
+
+ struct se_clbk_handle cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
+ /*
+ * Update to the waiting_rsp_dev, to be protected
+ * under se_if_cmd_lock.
+ */
+ struct se_clbk_handle waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl;
+ /*
+ * prevent new command to be sent on the se interface while previous
+ * command is still processing. (response is awaited)
+ */
+ struct mutex se_if_cmd_lock;
+
+ struct mbox_client se_mb_cl;
+ struct mbox_chan *tx_chan, *rx_chan;
+
+ struct gen_pool *mem_pool;
+ const struct se_if_defines *if_defs;
+ atomic_t fw_busy;
+};
+
+char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id);
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/firmware/imx/se_api.h b/include/linux/firmware/imx/se_api.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b1c4c9115d7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/firmware/imx/se_api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ */
+
+#ifndef __SE_API_H__
+#define __SE_API_H__
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define SOC_ID_OF_IMX8ULP 0x084d
+#define SOC_ID_OF_IMX93 0x9300
+
+#endif /* __SE_API_H__ */
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v26 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave
2026-06-29 12:21 ` [PATCH v26 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 7:50 ` Lothar Waßmann
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Lothar Waßmann @ 2026-06-29 7:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: pankaj.gupta
Cc: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta, linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree,
imx, linux-arm-kernel, Frieder Schrempf, kernel test robot,
sashiko-bot
Hi,
On Mon, 29 Jun 2026 17:51:59 +0530 pankaj.gupta@oss.nxp.com wrote:
> From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
>
> Add MU-based communication interface for secure enclave.
>
> NXP hardware IP(s) for secure-enclaves like Edgelock Enclave(ELE), are
> embedded in the SoC to support the features like HSM, SHE & V2X, using
> message based communication interface.
>
> The secure enclave FW communicates with Linux over single or multiple
> dedicated messaging unit(MU) based interface(s).
> Exists on i.MX SoC(s) like i.MX8ULP, i.MX93, i.MX95 etc.
>
> For i.MX9x SoC(s) there is at least one dedicated ELE MU(s) for each
> world - Linux(one or more) and OPTEE-OS (one or more).
>
[...]
> + ret = se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(priv, (struct se_msg_hdr *)&tx_msg->header,
> + ELE_GET_INFO_REQ, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ,
> + true);
> + if (ret)
> + goto exit;
[...]
> +/* Fill a command message header with a given command ID and length in bytes. */
> +static inline int se_fill_cmd_msg_hdr(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_msg_hdr *hdr,
> + u8 cmd, u32 len, bool is_base_api)
> +{
> + hdr->tag = priv->if_defs->cmd_tag;
> + hdr->ver = (is_base_api) ? priv->if_defs->base_api_ver : priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver;
> + hdr->command = cmd;
> + hdr->size = len >> 2;
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
>
I don't see a point in having a function always return zero and
implement error checks that will never be used.
[...]
> +static const struct of_device_id se_match[] = {
> + { .compatible = "fsl,imx8ulp-se-ele-hsm", .data = &imx8ulp_se_ele_hsm},
> + { .compatible = "fsl,imx93-se-ele-hsm", .data = &imx93_se_ele_hsm},
> + {},
>
Since the last entry in this array must be a NULL entry, there should be
no comma after the {}. This will generate a compile error if (e.g. by
patch conflict resolution) an entry is added after the end marker.
Lothar Waßmann
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v26 4/7] firmware: imx: device context dedicated to priv
2026-06-29 12:21 [PATCH v26 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-29 12:21 ` [PATCH v26 3/7] firmware: imx: add driver for NXP EdgeLock Enclave pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 12:22 ` pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 5/7] firmware: drivers: imx: adds miscdev pankaj.gupta
` (2 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: pankaj.gupta @ 2026-06-29 12:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree, imx, linux-arm-kernel
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Add priv_dev_ctx to prepare enabling misc-device context based send-receive
path, to communicate with FW.
No functionality change.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
---
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c | 14 ++++-----
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h | 8 ++---
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h | 9 ++++++
5 files changed, 94 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
index 54d79c3d75af..66bae4c7d464 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
tx_msg->data[0] = upper_32_bits(get_info_addr);
tx_msg->data[1] = lower_32_bits(get_info_addr);
tx_msg->data[2] = sizeof(*s_info);
- ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ, rx_msg,
- ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ);
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv->priv_dev_ctx, tx_msg, ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ,
+ rx_msg, ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ);
if (ret < 0)
goto exit;
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ int ele_ping(struct se_if_priv *priv)
return ret;
}
- ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_PING_REQ_SZ, rx_msg,
- ELE_PING_RSP_SZ);
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv->priv_dev_ctx, tx_msg, ELE_PING_REQ_SZ,
+ rx_msg, ELE_PING_RSP_SZ);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ int ele_service_swap(struct se_if_priv *priv,
if (!tx_msg->data[4])
return -EINVAL;
- ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ,
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv->priv_dev_ctx, tx_msg, ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_REQ_MSG_SZ,
rx_msg, ELE_SERVICE_SWAP_RSP_MSG_SZ);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ int ele_fw_authenticate(struct se_if_priv *priv, phys_addr_t contnr_addr,
tx_msg->data[1] = 0;
tx_msg->data[2] = lower_32_bits(img_addr);
- ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ, rx_msg,
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv->priv_dev_ctx, tx_msg, ELE_FW_AUTH_REQ_SZ, rx_msg,
ELE_FW_AUTH_RSP_MSG_SZ);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ int ele_debug_dump(struct se_if_priv *priv)
do {
memset(rx_msg, 0x0, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ);
- ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv, tx_msg, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ,
+ ret = ele_msg_send_rcv(priv->priv_dev_ctx, tx_msg, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ_SZ,
rx_msg, ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
index ba606f4e8be8..b37ea1f14f75 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ u32 se_get_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len)
return chksum;
}
-int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
+int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
{
bool wait_uninterruptible = false;
unsigned long remaining_jiffies;
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
* after the protocol transaction is brought back to a
* synchronized state.
*/
- if (priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg) {
- priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.signal_rcvd = true;
+ if (dev_ctx->priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) {
+ dev_ctx->priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.signal_rcvd = true;
wait_uninterruptible = true;
continue;
}
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = NULL;
if (!completion_done(&se_clbk_hdl->done))
- atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 1);
+ atomic_set(&dev_ctx->priv->fw_busy, 1);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
- dev_err(priv->dev,
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
"Fatal Error: SE interface: %s0, hangs indefinitely.\n",
- get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
+ get_se_if_name(dev_ctx->priv->if_defs->se_if_type));
break;
}
ret = se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz;
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
return ret;
}
-int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_priv *priv,
+int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
void *tx_msg,
int tx_msg_sz)
{
@@ -119,15 +119,16 @@ int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_priv *priv,
* carried in the message.
*/
if (header->size << 2 != tx_msg_sz) {
- dev_err(priv->dev,
- "User buf hdr: 0x%x, sz mismatced with input-sz (%d != %d).",
- *(u32 *)header, header->size << 2, tx_msg_sz);
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
+ "%s: User buf hdr: 0x%x, sz mismatched with input-sz (%d != %d).",
+ dev_ctx->devname, *(u32 *)header, header->size << 2, tx_msg_sz);
return -EINVAL;
}
- err = mbox_send_message(priv->tx_chan, tx_msg);
+ err = mbox_send_message(dev_ctx->priv->tx_chan, tx_msg);
if (err < 0) {
- dev_err(priv->dev, "Error: mbox_send_message failure.\n");
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
+ "%s: Error: mbox_send_message failure.", dev_ctx->devname);
return err;
}
@@ -135,33 +136,37 @@ int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_priv *priv,
}
/* API used for send/receive blocking call. */
-int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *tx_msg, int tx_msg_sz,
- void *rx_msg, int exp_rx_msg_sz)
+int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void *tx_msg,
+ int tx_msg_sz, void *rx_msg, int exp_rx_msg_sz)
{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
int err;
guard(mutex)(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
if (atomic_read(&priv->fw_busy)) {
- dev_dbg(priv->dev, "ELE became unresponsive.\n");
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: ELE became unresponsive.\n", dev_ctx->devname);
return -EBUSY;
}
reinit_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = exp_rx_msg_sz;
priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = rx_msg;
- err = ele_msg_send(priv, tx_msg, tx_msg_sz);
+ err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, tx_msg_sz);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- err = ele_msg_rcv(priv, &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl);
+ err = ele_msg_rcv(dev_ctx, &priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl);
if (priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.signal_rcvd) {
err = -EINTR;
priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.signal_rcvd = false;
- dev_err(priv->dev, "Err[0x%x]:Interrupted by signal.", err);
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Err[0x%x]:Interrupted by signal.",
+ dev_ctx->devname, err);
}
priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = NULL;
+ priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx = NULL;
return err;
}
@@ -209,7 +214,7 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) {
se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
- if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
+ if (!se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx || !se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
dev_warn(dev, "No command receiver registered for message: %.8x\n",
*((u32 *)header));
@@ -223,8 +228,8 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
* SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV and is not subject to the timeout/circuit-
* breaker handling used for rsp_tag messages.
*/
- dev_dbg(dev, "Selecting cmd receiver: for mesg header:0x%x.",
- *(u32 *)header);
+ dev_dbg(dev, "Selecting cmd receiver:%s for mesg header:0x%x.",
+ se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx->devname, *(u32 *)header);
/*
* Pre-allocated buffer of MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN
@@ -244,8 +249,8 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
if (sz_mismatch)
dev_err(dev,
- "CMD-RCVER NVM: hdr(0x%x) with different sz(%d != %d).\n",
- *(u32 *)header,
+ "%s: CMD-RCVER NVM: hdr(0x%x) with different sz(%d != %d).\n",
+ se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx->devname, *(u32 *)header,
(header->size << 2), rx_msg_sz);
} else if (header->tag == priv->if_defs->rsp_tag) {
bool exception_for_sz_mismatch = check_hdr_exception_for_sz(priv, header);
@@ -271,8 +276,8 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
dev_info(dev, "ELE responded (late), recovery FW available.");
return;
}
- dev_dbg(dev, "Selecting resp waiter: for mesg header:0x%x.",
- *(u32 *)header);
+ dev_dbg(dev, "Selecting resp waiter:%s for mesg header:0x%x.",
+ se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx->devname, *(u32 *)header);
/*
* For rsp_tag traffic, the sender provides the expected response
@@ -292,8 +297,8 @@ void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg)
if (sz_mismatch)
dev_err(dev,
- "Rsp to CMD: hdr(0x%x) with different sz(%d != %d).\n",
- *(u32 *)header,
+ "%s: Rsp to CMD: hdr(0x%x) with different sz(%d != %d).\n",
+ se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx->devname, *(u32 *)header,
(header->size << 2), exp_rx_msg_sz);
} else {
dev_err(dev, "Failed to select a device for message: %.8x\n",
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
index 96e987ef6f88..5bac14439d7d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
@@ -14,12 +14,12 @@
u32 se_get_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len);
-int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl);
+int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl);
-int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *tx_msg, int tx_msg_sz);
+int ele_msg_send(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void *tx_msg, int tx_msg_sz);
-int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_priv *priv, void *tx_msg, int tx_msg_sz,
- void *rx_msg, int exp_rx_msg_sz);
+int ele_msg_send_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void *tx_msg,
+ int tx_msg_sz, void *rx_msg, int exp_rx_msg_sz);
void se_if_rx_callback(struct mbox_client *mbox_cl, void *msg);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
index 9a2c3c611146..a4823f485f88 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
@@ -199,6 +199,36 @@ static int get_se_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, const struct se_soc_info *se
return 0;
}
+static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
+ struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx)
+{
+ const char *err_str = "Failed to allocate memory";
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!dev_ctx)
+ return ret;
+
+ dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d",
+ get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type),
+ ch_id);
+ if (!dev_ctx->devname)
+ goto exit;
+
+ dev_ctx->priv = priv;
+ *new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+
+ return ret;
+exit:
+ *new_dev_ctx = NULL;
+
+ kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
+ kfree(dev_ctx);
+ return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret, "%s", err_str);
+}
+
/* interface for managed res to free a mailbox channel */
static void if_mbox_free_channel(void *mbox_chan)
{
@@ -262,6 +292,12 @@ static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
*/
of_reserved_mem_device_release(dev);
dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
+
+ if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
+ kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname);
+ kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ priv->priv_dev_ctx = NULL;
+ }
kfree(priv);
}
@@ -329,6 +365,12 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
"Failed to init reserved memory region.");
}
+ ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ if (ret)
+ return dev_err_probe(dev, ret,
+ "Failed[0x%x] to create device contexts.",
+ ret);
+
if (if_node->if_defs.se_if_type == SE_TYPE_ID_HSM) {
ret = get_se_soc_info(priv, se_info);
if (ret)
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
index ef834a845e30..5d7cd10b4d02 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#define MESSAGING_VERSION_7 0x7
struct se_clbk_handle {
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
struct completion done;
bool signal_rcvd;
u32 rx_msg_sz;
@@ -44,6 +45,12 @@ struct se_imem_buf {
u32 state;
};
+/* Private struct for each char device instance. */
+struct se_if_device_ctx {
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ const char *devname;
+};
+
/* Header of the messages exchange with the EdgeLock Enclave */
struct se_msg_hdr {
u8 ver;
@@ -89,6 +96,8 @@ struct se_if_priv {
struct gen_pool *mem_pool;
const struct se_if_defines *if_defs;
atomic_t fw_busy;
+
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *priv_dev_ctx;
};
char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id);
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v26 5/7] firmware: drivers: imx: adds miscdev
2026-06-29 12:21 [PATCH v26 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 4/7] firmware: imx: device context dedicated to priv pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 12:22 ` pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 6/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add secure enclave node pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 7/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp-evk: add reserved memory property pankaj.gupta
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: pankaj.gupta @ 2026-06-29 12:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree, imx, linux-arm-kernel,
sashiko-bot
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Adds the driver for communication interface to secure-enclave, that
enables exchanging messages with NXP secure enclave HW IP(s)
like EdgeLock Enclave, from:
- User-Space Applications via character driver.
ABI documentation for the NXP secure-enclave driver.
User-space library using this driver:
- i.MX Secure Enclave library:
-- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
- i.MX Secure Middle-Ware:
-- URL: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git
Following checks are performed on the incoming msg-header,
to block exchanging invalid arbitrary commands:
- maximum allowed words,
- check if command-tag & response-tag are valid
- version,
- command id validation check, to allow limited base-line API(s)
and restrict following:
- exchanging power management commands.
- reset requests.
- BBSM configuration requests.
- re-initializing the FW.
- RNG init
- CAAM resource release management
- SE's internal memory management.
from user-space.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
---
Changed from v25 to v26:
1. se_ctrl: serialize command receiver registration
SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV updates the global command receiver state in
priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl, but it is currently protected only by the
per-file dev_ctx->fops_lock. Concurrent ioctl calls from different file
descriptors can therefore race and register multiple receivers against
the same priv instance.
Protect command receiver registration with priv->modify_lock, a global
mutex lock, which serializes modification to priv structure members.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260514090457.2186933-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
2. se_ctrl: keep priv alive for already-open device contexts
Open file descriptors keep per-file se_if_device_ctx objects alive after
driver teardown begins, but those contexts retain a pointer to struct
se_if_priv. Since priv was allocated with devm, teardown could free it
while existing file descriptors were still able to reach read(), write(),
ioctl(), or release(), leading to use-after-free.
Fix this by moving priv to explicit lifetime management and adding a
kref to keep it alive until the last already-open device context is
released. Each new device context takes a reference on priv and drops it
on final file close.
During teardown, mark active device contexts as cleaned up and tear down
their per-context resources without freeing the dev_ctx itself. Existing
file descriptors then fail subsequent read(), write(), and ioctl()
operations with -ENODEV, while close() performs the final dev_ctx free
and drops the corresponding priv reference.
This also folds in the close-path cleanup fix so the device context is
not freed while still inside the fops lock protected cleanup flow.
This ensures that priv remains valid for device contexts that were
already opened before teardown and prevents use-after-free when those
contexts later reach read(), write(), ioctl(), or release().
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260514090457.2186933-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
3. se_ctrl: pin active contexts and serialize during teardown
fixing the teardown-side synchronization for active contexts.
se_if_probe_cleanup() walks the global dev_ctx_list while close()
can concurrently act on the same se_if_device_ctx objects. Add a kref to
struct se_if_device_ctx and split global detach from local per-context
cleanup so teardown can pin one context, detach it from global state,
clean it outside the global lock, and only then drop the temporary
reference. This prevents the cleanup walk from racing with concurrent
close on the lifetime of the current context.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260514090457.2186933-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
4. se_ctrl: preserve ioctl error across cleanup
se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler() can set err to -EFAULT when copying
the response payload to userspace fails, but then immediately overwrites
that error with the return value of se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup().
If cleanup succeeds, the function returns 0 and falsely reports success
to userspace even though the response copy failed.
Preserve the original operation error and only use the cleanup return
value when no earlier error was set.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260528091446.3331006-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
5. se_ctrl: copy userspace messages before header validation
The write path and the synchronous command/response ioctl path validate
message headers directly from userspace pointers before copying the full
message into kernel memory. That violates uaccess rules and can fault on
architectures that enforce privileged access restrictions to userspace
memory.
It also creates a double-fetch window where userspace can modify the
buffer after header validation but before the payload is copied, causing
the validated header to no longer match the data actually used by the
driver.
Fix this by copying the TX message into kernel memory first and
validating the header from that kernel-owned buffer in both the write
path and the command-send ioctl path.
Also reject userspace-provided response buffer sizes that are smaller
than a message header or larger than the maximum supported response size
for debug-dump replies before allocating the response buffer.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260528091532.3331051-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
6. se_ctrl: roll back iobuf reservation on setup failure
se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler() reserves space from the per-file shared
memory pool before copying user data and linking a buffer descriptor.
If copy_from_user() or add_b_desc_to_pending_list() fails after the
reservation, the function returns without restoring shared_mem->pos,
which permanently consumes part of the shared memory pool for that file
descriptor.
In addition, add_b_desc_to_pending_list() failure currently falls
through to the copy_to_user() path, which can return an ELE address to
userspace even though the setup failed.
Fix both issues by rolling back the reserved shared-memory position on
pre-link failures and returning immediately when descriptor linking
fails instead of falling through to the success copyout path.
If copy_to_user() fails after the descriptor has already been linked,
unlink the descriptor before rolling back the reserved shared-memory
position so the pool state and pending list remain consistent.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260528091532.3331051-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
7. se_ctrl: detect round_up() overflow in iobuf setup
se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler() aligns io.length with round_up(..., 8)
before checking the available shared memory space. On 32-bit builds,
round_up() can overflow for large io.length values and wrap aligned_len
to a smaller value, which can bypass the bounds check while later
memset() still uses the original unbounded io.length.
Detect the overflow by checking whether the aligned value became smaller
than the original length. Valid alignment must never reduce the value,
so this catches wraparound without relying on a SIZE_MAX-based check that
triggers tautological-compare warnings on 64-bit builds.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
8. se_ctrl: pin miscdev-ctx to serialize open during teardown
fixing the teardown-side synchronization for new open attempts.
se_if_fops_open() can still race with teardown after starting
from the miscdevice and attempting to reach priv. Introduce a small
open-gate object associated with the miscdevice. The open path first
pins this gate, checks whether teardown has started, and then safely
takes a temporary reference on priv before dereferencing priv state.
Teardown marks the gate dead and detaches priv from it before
misc_deregister(), so new opens either complete while priv is still
valid or fail with -ENODEV without touching stale driver state.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot <sashiko-bot@kernel.org>
Closes: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260514090457.2186933-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1
---
Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev | 44 ++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c | 28 +
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h | 19 +
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c | 38 ++
drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h | 6 +
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c | 1013 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h | 55 ++
include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h | 97 ++++
8 files changed, 1284 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c6b8e16bda78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/se-cdev
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+What: /dev/<se>_mu[0-9]+_ch[0-9]+
+Date: Mar 2025
+KernelVersion: 6.8
+Contact: linux-imx@nxp.com, pankaj.gupta@nxp.com
+Description:
+ NXP offers multiple hardware IP(s) for secure enclaves like EdgeLock-
+ Enclave(ELE), SECO. The character device file descriptors
+ /dev/<se>_mu*_ch* are the interface between userspace NXP's secure-
+ enclave shared library and the kernel driver.
+
+ The ioctl(2)-based ABI is defined and documented in
+ [include]<linux/firmware/imx/ele_mu_ioctl.h>.
+ ioctl(s) are used primarily for:
+
+ - shared memory management
+ - allocation of I/O buffers
+ - getting mu info
+ - setting a dev-ctx as receiver to receive all the commands from FW
+ - getting SoC info
+ - send command and receive command response
+
+ The following file operations are supported:
+
+ open(2)
+ Currently the only useful flags are O_RDWR.
+
+ read(2)
+ Every read() from the opened character device context is waiting on
+ wait_event_interruptible, that gets set by the registered mailbox callback
+ function, indicating a message received from the firmware on message-
+ unit.
+
+ write(2)
+ Every write() to the opened character device context needs to acquire
+ mailbox_lock before sending message on to the message unit.
+
+ close(2)
+ Stops and frees up the I/O contexts that were associated
+ with the file descriptor.
+
+Users: https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-secure-enclave.git,
+ https://github.com/nxp-imx/imx-smw.git,
+ crypto/skcipher,
+ drivers/nvmem/imx-ocotp-ele.c
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
index 66bae4c7d464..ec718d322abc 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.c
@@ -15,6 +15,34 @@
#define FW_DBG_DUMP_FIXED_STR "ELE"
+int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_priv *priv,
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header)
+{
+ switch (header->command) {
+ case ELE_PING_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_COMMIT_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_XIP_DECRYPT_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_WRITE_FUSE: return 0;
+ case ELE_GET_INFO_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ: return 0;
+ case ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ: return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+}
+
int ele_get_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct ele_dev_info *s_info)
{
dma_addr_t get_info_addr = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
index 74f87f57d96b..75e65e279193 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_base_msg.h
@@ -15,6 +15,23 @@
#define ELE_NONE_VAL 0x0
+#define ELE_OEM_AUTH_CONTAINER_REQ 0x87
+#define ELE_OEM_VERIFY_IMAGE_REQ 0x88
+#define ELE_OEM_REL_CONTAINER_REQ 0x89
+#define ELE_FW_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0x95
+#define ELE_READ_FUSE_REQ 0x97
+#define ELE_GET_FW_VERS_REQ 0x9d
+#define ELE_RETURN_LIFE_CYCLE_REQ 0xa0
+#define ELE_GET_EVENT_REQ 0xa2
+#define ELE_COMMIT_REQ 0xa8
+#define ELE_GEN_KEY_BLOB_REQ 0xaf
+#define ELE_GET_FW_STATUS_REQ 0xc5
+#define ELE_XIP_DECRYPT_REQ 0xc6
+#define ELE_WRITE_FUSE 0xd6
+#define ELE_DEV_ATTEST_REQ 0xdb
+#define ELE_WRITE_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf2
+#define ELE_READ_SHADOW_FUSE_REQ 0xf3
+
#define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ 0xda
#define ELE_GET_INFO_REQ_MSG_SZ 0x10
#define ELE_GET_INFO_RSP_MSG_SZ 0x08
@@ -95,4 +112,6 @@ int ele_service_swap(struct se_if_priv *priv, phys_addr_t addr,
int ele_fw_authenticate(struct se_if_priv *priv, phys_addr_t contnr_addr,
phys_addr_t img_addr);
int ele_debug_dump(struct se_if_priv *priv);
+int ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(struct se_if_priv *priv,
+ struct se_msg_hdr *header);
#endif
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
index b37ea1f14f75..79be0f8ed825 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.c
@@ -6,6 +6,23 @@
#include "ele_base_msg.h"
#include "ele_common.h"
+int se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_msg_hdr *header)
+{
+ if (!header->size || header->size > MAX_WORD_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (header->tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag &&
+ header->tag != priv->if_defs->rsp_tag)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->base_api_ver)
+ return ele_uapi_allowed_base_cmd(priv, header);
+ else if (header->ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver)
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
/*
* se_get_msg_chksum() - to calculate checksum word by word.
*
@@ -42,15 +59,36 @@ u32 se_get_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len)
return chksum;
}
+void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_priv *priv, u32 timeout_ms)
+{
+ priv->se_rcv_msg_timeout_ms = timeout_ms;
+}
+
int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl)
{
+ bool is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = false;
bool wait_uninterruptible = false;
unsigned long remaining_jiffies;
+ unsigned long deadline_jiffies;
+ unsigned long timeout_jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
int ret;
remaining_jiffies = MAX_SCHEDULE_TIMEOUT;
+ if (dev_ctx->priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx != dev_ctx) {
+ is_rsp_wait_with_timeout = true;
+ timeout_jiffies = msecs_to_jiffies(dev_ctx->priv->se_rcv_msg_timeout_ms);
+ deadline_jiffies = jiffies + timeout_jiffies;
+ }
do {
+ if (is_rsp_wait_with_timeout) {
+ if (time_after_eq(jiffies, deadline_jiffies)) {
+ ret = -ETIMEDOUT;
+ break;
+ }
+ remaining_jiffies = deadline_jiffies - jiffies;
+ }
+
if (wait_uninterruptible)
ret = wait_for_completion_timeout(&se_clbk_hdl->done,
remaining_jiffies);
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
index 5bac14439d7d..bdc13d1b715d 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/ele_common.h
@@ -12,6 +12,11 @@
#define IMX_ELE_FW_DIR "imx/ele/"
+#define MAX_WORD_SIZE 0x20
+#define SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT 5000
+#define SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT 5000000
+
+void set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(struct se_if_priv *priv, u32 val);
u32 se_get_msg_chksum(u32 *msg, u32 msg_len);
int ele_msg_rcv(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl);
@@ -42,4 +47,5 @@ int se_save_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
int se_restore_imem_state(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_imem_buf *imem);
+int se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(struct se_if_priv *priv, struct se_msg_hdr *header);
#endif /*__ELE_COMMON_H__ */
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
index a4823f485f88..0ea062954baf 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/bitfield.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/dev_printk.h>
@@ -16,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/genalloc.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -25,22 +27,19 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/sys_soc.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h>
#include "ele_base_msg.h"
#include "ele_common.h"
#include "se_ctrl.h"
+/* Maximum response buffer size in bytes for debug-dump replies. */
+#define MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ ELE_DEBUG_DUMP_RSP_SZ
+
#define MAX_SOC_INFO_DATA_SZ 256
#define MBOX_TX_NAME "tx"
#define MBOX_RX_NAME "rx"
-#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg"
-#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm"
-
-#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1
-
-#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2
-
struct se_fw_img_name {
const u8 *prim_fw_nm_in_rfs;
const u8 *seco_fw_nm_in_rfs;
@@ -133,6 +132,13 @@ char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id)
return NULL;
}
+static u32 get_se_soc_id(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ const struct se_soc_info *se_info = device_get_match_data(priv->dev);
+
+ return se_info->soc_id;
+}
+
static struct se_fw_load_info *get_load_fw_instance(struct se_if_priv *priv)
{
return &var_se_info.load_fw;
@@ -199,11 +205,235 @@ static int get_se_soc_info(struct se_if_priv *priv, const struct se_soc_info *se
return 0;
}
+static int load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv, const u8 *se_img_file_to_load)
+{
+ const struct firmware *fw = NULL;
+ dma_addr_t se_fw_dma_addr;
+ phys_addr_t se_fw_phyaddr;
+ u8 *se_fw_buf;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!se_img_file_to_load) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "FW image is not provided.");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ ret = request_firmware(&fw, se_img_file_to_load, priv->dev);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ dev_info(priv->dev, "loading firmware %s.", se_img_file_to_load);
+
+ /* allocate buffer to store the SE FW */
+ se_fw_buf = dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, fw->size, &se_fw_dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!se_fw_buf) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(se_fw_buf, fw->data, fw->size);
+ se_fw_phyaddr = dma_to_phys(priv->dev, se_fw_dma_addr);
+ ret = ele_fw_authenticate(priv, se_fw_phyaddr, se_fw_phyaddr);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "Error %pe: Authenticate & load SE firmware %s.",
+ ERR_PTR(ret), se_img_file_to_load);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ }
+ dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, fw->size, se_fw_buf, se_fw_dma_addr);
+exit:
+ release_firmware(fw);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int se_load_firmware(struct se_if_priv *priv)
+{
+ struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (load_fw->imem.state == ELE_IMEM_STATE_BAD) {
+ ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->prim_fw_nm_in_rfs);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load boot firmware.");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = load_firmware(priv, load_fw->se_fw_img_nm->seco_fw_nm_in_rfs);
+ if (ret) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed to load runtime firmware.");
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ load_fw->is_fw_tobe_loaded = false;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int init_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in);
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate some memory for data exchanges with S40x.
+ * This will be used for data not requiring secure memory.
+ */
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr =
+ dma_alloc_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER,
+ &se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void cleanup_se_shared_mem(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ /* Free non-secure shared buffer. */
+ dma_free_coherent(priv->dev, MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER,
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr,
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr);
+
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.ptr = NULL;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.dma_addr = 0;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.size = 0;
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
+}
+
+/* Need to copy the output data to user-device context.
+ */
+static int se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
+ bool do_cpy = true;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out, link) {
+ if (b_desc->usr_buf_ptr && b_desc->shared_buf_ptr && do_cpy) {
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "Copying output data to user.");
+ if (do_cpy && copy_to_user(b_desc->usr_buf_ptr,
+ b_desc->shared_buf_ptr,
+ b_desc->size)) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failure copying output data to user.");
+ do_cpy = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (b_desc->shared_buf_ptr)
+ memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size);
+
+ list_del(&b_desc->link);
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ }
+
+ return do_cpy ? 0 : -EFAULT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clean the used Shared Memory space,
+ * whether its Input Data copied from user buffers, or
+ * Data received from FW.
+ */
+static void se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct list_head *pending_lists[] = {&se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in,
+ &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out};
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc, *temp;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pending_lists); i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(b_desc, temp, pending_lists[i], link) {
+ if (b_desc->shared_buf_ptr)
+ memset(b_desc->shared_buf_ptr, 0, b_desc->size);
+
+ list_del(&b_desc->link);
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ }
+ }
+ se_shared_mem_mgmt->non_secure_mem.pos = 0;
+}
+
+static struct se_buf_desc *add_b_desc_to_pending_list(void *shared_ptr_with_pos,
+ struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf *io,
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info *se_shared_mem_mgmt = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
+
+ b_desc = kzalloc_obj(*b_desc, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!b_desc)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ b_desc->shared_buf_ptr = shared_ptr_with_pos;
+ b_desc->usr_buf_ptr = io->user_buf;
+ b_desc->size = io->length;
+
+ if (io->flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) {
+ /*
+ * buffer is input:
+ * add an entry in the "pending input buffers" list so
+ * that copied data can be cleaned from shared memory
+ * later.
+ */
+ list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_in);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * buffer is output:
+ * add an entry in the "pending out buffers" list so data
+ * can be copied to user space when receiving Secure-Enclave
+ * response.
+ */
+ list_add_tail(&b_desc->link, &se_shared_mem_mgmt->pending_out);
+ }
+
+ return b_desc;
+}
+
+static void se_if_open_gate_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct se_if_open_gate *gate =
+ container_of(kref, struct se_if_open_gate, refcount);
+
+ kfree(gate);
+}
+
+static bool se_if_open_gate_get(struct se_if_open_gate *gate)
+{
+ if (!gate)
+ return false;
+
+ return kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->refcount);
+}
+
+static void se_if_open_gate_put(struct se_if_open_gate *gate)
+{
+ if (gate)
+ kref_put(&gate->refcount, se_if_open_gate_release);
+}
+
static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
- struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx)
+ struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx,
+ const struct file_operations *se_if_fops)
{
const char *err_str = "Failed to allocate memory";
struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
+ struct se_if_open_gate *gate = NULL;
int ret = -ENOMEM;
dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -217,18 +447,723 @@ static int init_misc_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
if (!dev_ctx->devname)
goto exit;
+ mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+
dev_ctx->priv = priv;
+ kref_init(&dev_ctx->refcount);
+ dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false;
*new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+ gate = kzalloc_obj(*gate, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!gate)
+ goto exit;
+
+ mutex_init(&gate->lock);
+ kref_init(&gate->refcount); /* device-owned reference */
+ gate->priv = priv;
+ gate->dying = false;
+ priv->open_gate = gate;
+
+ /*
+ * The miscdevice storage is now owned by the open gate object.
+ * priv->priv_dev_ctx still keeps a pointer to that miscdevice.
+ */
+ dev_ctx->miscdev = &gate->miscdev;
+
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->name = dev_ctx->devname;
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR;
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->fops = se_if_fops;
+ dev_ctx->miscdev->parent = priv->dev;
+ ret = misc_register(dev_ctx->miscdev);
+ if (ret) {
+ err_str = "Failed to register misc device.";
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
return ret;
exit:
*new_dev_ctx = NULL;
-
+ if (gate) {
+ priv->open_gate = NULL;
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ }
kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
kfree(dev_ctx);
return dev_err_probe(priv->dev, ret, "%s", err_str);
}
+static void se_if_priv_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = container_of(kref, struct se_if_priv, refcount);
+
+ /* Free priv_dev_ctx if it exists */
+ if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
+ /*
+ * miscdev storage belongs to open_gate, not directly to
+ * priv_dev_ctx. The gate should already have been detached
+ * from priv during teardown.
+ */
+
+ kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname);
+ kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ priv->priv_dev_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Be defensive: if teardown did not already drop the device-owned
+ * gate reference for some reason, release it here.
+ */
+ if (priv->open_gate) {
+ se_if_open_gate_put(priv->open_gate);
+ priv->open_gate = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Free any remaining resources that weren't devm-managed */
+ kfree(priv);
+}
+
+static void se_if_dev_ctx_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx =
+ container_of(kref, struct se_if_device_ctx, refcount);
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ kfree(dev_ctx);
+
+ /* drop the priv reference owned by this device context */
+ kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
+}
+
+static void dlink_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ /* check if this device was registered as command receiver */
+ if (priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx == dev_ctx) {
+ kfree(priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg);
+ priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg = NULL;
+ priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!list_empty(&dev_ctx->link)) {
+ list_del_init(&dev_ctx->link);
+ priv->active_devctx_count--;
+ }
+}
+
+static void cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose)
+{
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
+ goto exit;
+
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+ cleanup_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx);
+
+ kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
+ dev_ctx->devname = NULL;
+ dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true;
+ }
+exit:
+ if (is_fclose)
+ kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
+}
+
+static void dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, bool is_fclose)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ if (is_fclose) {
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
+ dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx);
+ }
+
+ cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, is_fclose);
+}
+
+static int init_device_context(struct se_if_priv *priv, int ch_id,
+ struct se_if_device_ctx **new_dev_ctx)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ dev_ctx = kzalloc_obj(*dev_ctx, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!dev_ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ dev_ctx->devname = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s0_ch%d",
+ get_se_if_name(priv->if_defs->se_if_type),
+ ch_id);
+ if (!dev_ctx->devname) {
+ kfree(dev_ctx);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ mutex_init(&dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+ dev_ctx->priv = priv;
+ dev_ctx->cleanup_done = false;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev_ctx->link);
+ *new_dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+
+ ret = init_se_shared_mem(dev_ctx);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(dev_ctx->devname);
+ kfree(dev_ctx);
+ *new_dev_ctx = NULL;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Take a reference to priv for this device context */
+ kref_get(&priv->refcount);
+
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
+ list_add_tail(&dev_ctx->link, &priv->dev_ctx_list);
+ priv->active_devctx_count++;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx, void __user *uarg,
+ struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info *cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info)
+{
+ /* shared memory is allocated before this IOCTL */
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(uarg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, sizeof(*cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info from user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info = {0};
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ int err = 0;
+ int cleanup_err = 0;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info, uarg,
+ sizeof(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info))) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "%s: Failed to copy cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info from user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz < SE_MU_HDR_SZ) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small(%d < %d)",
+ dev_ctx->devname, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz, SE_MU_HDR_SZ);
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ memdup_user(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz);
+ if (IS_ERR(tx_msg)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(tx_msg);
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ err = se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(priv, &tx_msg->header);
+ if (err) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz < sizeof(struct se_msg_hdr) ||
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz > MAX_ALLOWED_RX_MSG_SZ) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (tx_msg->header.tag != priv->if_defs->cmd_tag) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (tx_msg->header.ver == priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver &&
+ get_load_fw_instance(priv)->is_fw_tobe_loaded) {
+ err = se_load_firmware(priv);
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Could not send msg as FW is not loaded.");
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+ set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(priv, SE_RCV_MSG_LONG_TIMEOUT);
+
+ struct se_api_msg *rx_msg __free(kfree) =
+ kzalloc(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rx_msg) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ err = ele_msg_send_rcv(dev_ctx, tx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.tx_buf_sz,
+ rx_msg, cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: %s %s.", dev_ctx->devname, __func__,
+ "message received, start transmit to user");
+
+ /* We may need to copy the output data to user before
+ * delivering the completion message.
+ */
+ err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy data from the buffer */
+ print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4, rx_msg,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz, false);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf, rx_msg,
+ cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info.rx_buf_sz)) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy to user.", dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ cleanup_err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_cleanup(dev_ctx, uarg, &cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info);
+
+ if (!err)
+ err = cleanup_err;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int se_ioctl_get_mu_info(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_if_priv *priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+ struct se_ioctl_get_if_info if_info;
+ struct se_if_node *if_node;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if_node = container_of(priv->if_defs, typeof(*if_node), if_defs);
+
+ if_info.se_if_id = 0;
+ if_info.interrupt_idx = 0;
+ if_info.tz = 0;
+ if_info.did = 0;
+ if_info.cmd_tag = priv->if_defs->cmd_tag;
+ if_info.rsp_tag = priv->if_defs->rsp_tag;
+ if_info.success_tag = priv->if_defs->success_tag;
+ if_info.base_api_ver = priv->if_defs->base_api_ver;
+ if_info.fw_api_ver = priv->if_defs->fw_api_ver;
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: info [se_if_id: %d, irq_idx: %d, tz: 0x%x, did: 0x%x].",
+ dev_ctx->devname, if_info.se_if_id, if_info.interrupt_idx, if_info.tz,
+ if_info.did);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(uarg, &if_info, sizeof(if_info))) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy mu info to user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy a buffer of data to/from the user and return the address to use in
+ * messages
+ */
+static int se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_shared_mem *shared_mem = NULL;
+ struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf io = {0};
+ struct se_buf_desc *b_desc = NULL;
+ size_t aligned_len = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+ u32 pos;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&io, uarg, sizeof(io))) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed copy iobuf config from user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: io [buf: %p(%d) flag: %x].", dev_ctx->devname,
+ io.user_buf, io.length, io.flags);
+
+ if (io.length == 0 || !io.user_buf) {
+ /*
+ * Accept NULL pointers since some buffers are optional
+ * in FW commands. In this case we should return 0 as
+ * pointer to be embedded into the message.
+ * Skip all data copy part of code below.
+ */
+ io.ele_addr = 0;
+ goto copy;
+ }
+
+ aligned_len = round_up((size_t)io.length, 8);
+ if (aligned_len < io.length) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Invalid buffer length.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* No specific requirement for this buffer. */
+ shared_mem = &dev_ctx->se_shared_mem_mgmt.non_secure_mem;
+
+ /* Check there is enough space in the shared memory. */
+ dev_dbg(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: req_size = %zd, max_size= %d, curr_pos = %d",
+ dev_ctx->devname, aligned_len, shared_mem->size,
+ shared_mem->pos);
+
+ if (shared_mem->size < shared_mem->pos ||
+ aligned_len > (shared_mem->size - shared_mem->pos)) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Not enough space in shared memory.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate space in shared memory. 8 bytes aligned. */
+ pos = shared_mem->pos;
+ shared_mem->pos += aligned_len;
+ io.ele_addr = (u64)shared_mem->dma_addr + pos;
+
+ memset(shared_mem->ptr + pos, 0, io.length);
+ if ((io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT) ||
+ (io.flags & SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT)) {
+ /*
+ * buffer is input:
+ * copy data from user space to this allocated buffer.
+ */
+ if (copy_from_user(shared_mem->ptr + pos, io.user_buf, io.length)) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev,
+ "%s: Failed copy data to shared memory.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ goto rollback;
+ }
+ }
+
+ b_desc = add_b_desc_to_pending_list(shared_mem->ptr + pos, &io, dev_ctx);
+ if (IS_ERR(b_desc)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(b_desc);
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to allocate/link b_desc.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ goto rollback;
+ }
+
+copy:
+ /* Provide the EdgeLock Enclave address to user space only if success.*/
+ if (copy_to_user(uarg, &io, sizeof(io))) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy iobuff setup to user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ if (b_desc) {
+ list_del(&b_desc->link);
+ kfree(b_desc);
+ }
+ goto rollback;
+ }
+ return err;
+
+rollback:
+ if (aligned_len) {
+ memset(shared_mem->ptr + pos, 0, aligned_len);
+ shared_mem->pos = pos;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* IOCTL to provide SoC information */
+static int se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
+ void __user *uarg)
+{
+ struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info soc_info;
+ int err = -EINVAL;
+
+ soc_info.soc_id = get_se_soc_id(dev_ctx->priv);
+ soc_info.soc_rev = var_se_info.soc_rev;
+
+ err = copy_to_user(uarg, (u8 *)(&soc_info), sizeof(soc_info));
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Failed to copy soc info to user.",
+ dev_ctx->devname);
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File operations for user-space
+ */
+
+/* Write a message to the MU. */
+static ssize_t se_if_fops_write(struct file *fp, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ int err;
+
+ scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -EBUSY, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: write from buf (%p)%zu, ppos=%lld.", dev_ctx->devname,
+ buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0));
+
+ if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (size < SE_MU_HDR_SZ) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "%s: User buffer too small(%zu < %d).",
+ dev_ctx->devname, size, SE_MU_HDR_SZ);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+
+ struct se_api_msg *tx_msg __free(kfree) = memdup_user(buf, size);
+ if (IS_ERR(tx_msg))
+ return PTR_ERR(tx_msg);
+
+ err = se_chk_tx_msg_hdr(priv, &tx_msg->header);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ print_hex_dump_debug("from user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4,
+ tx_msg, size, false);
+
+ err = ele_msg_send(dev_ctx, tx_msg, size);
+
+ return err;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a message from the MU.
+ * Blocking until a message is available.
+ */
+static ssize_t se_if_fops_read(struct file *fp, char __user *buf, size_t size,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ size_t copy_len;
+ int err;
+
+ scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -EBUSY, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: read to buf %p(%zu), ppos=%lld.", dev_ctx->devname,
+ buf, size, ((ppos) ? *ppos : 0));
+
+ if (dev_ctx != priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.dev_ctx) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ err = ele_msg_rcv(dev_ctx, &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev,
+ "%s: Er[0x%x]: Signal Interrupted. Current act-dev-ctx count: %d.",
+ dev_ctx->devname, err, dev_ctx->priv->active_devctx_count);
+ goto exit;
+ }
+
+ /* We may need to copy the output data to user before
+ * delivering the completion message.
+ */
+ err = se_dev_ctx_cpy_out_data(dev_ctx);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Copy data from the buffer */
+ print_hex_dump_debug("to user ", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, 4, 4,
+ priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg,
+ priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz,
+ false);
+
+ copy_len = min(size, priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(buf, priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg, copy_len))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ err = copy_len;
+
+exit:
+ priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.rx_msg_sz = 0;
+
+ se_dev_ctx_shared_mem_cleanup(dev_ctx);
+
+ return err;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Open a character device. */
+static int se_if_fops_open(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp)
+{
+ struct miscdevice *miscdev = fp->private_data;
+ struct se_if_open_gate *gate;
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *misc_dev_ctx;
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ gate = container_of(miscdev, struct se_if_open_gate, miscdev);
+
+ if (!se_if_open_gate_get(gate))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&gate->lock)) {
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ if (gate->dying || !gate->priv ||
+ !kref_get_unless_zero(&gate->priv->refcount)) {
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock_gate;
+ }
+
+ priv = gate->priv;
+ mutex_unlock(&gate->lock);
+
+ misc_dev_ctx = priv->priv_dev_ctx;
+
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock)) {
+ err = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_put_priv;
+ }
+
+ if (misc_dev_ctx->cleanup_done) {
+ err = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock_misc;
+ }
+
+ priv->dev_ctx_mono_count++;
+ err = init_device_context(priv, priv->dev_ctx_mono_count, &dev_ctx);
+ if (err) {
+ dev_err(priv->dev, "Failed[0x%x] to create dev-ctx.", err);
+ goto out_unlock_misc;
+ }
+
+ fp->private_data = dev_ctx;
+
+out_unlock_misc:
+ mutex_unlock(&misc_dev_ctx->fops_lock);
+out_put_priv:
+ kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ return err;
+out_unlock_gate:
+ mutex_unlock(&gate->lock);
+ se_if_open_gate_put(gate);
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Close a character device. */
+static int se_if_fops_close(struct inode *nd, struct file *fp)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+
+ dlink_n_cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, true);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* IOCTL entry point of a character device */
+static long se_ioctl(struct file *fp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx = fp->private_data;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ void __user *uarg = (void __user *)arg;
+ long err;
+
+ /* Prevent race during change of device context */
+ scoped_cond_guard(mutex_intr, return -EBUSY, &dev_ctx->fops_lock) {
+ if (dev_ctx->cleanup_done)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ priv = dev_ctx->priv;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV: {
+ struct se_clbk_handle *se_clbk_hdl = &priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl;
+ struct se_api_msg *new_rx_msg = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ guard(mutex)(&priv->modify_lock);
+ if (se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx) {
+ err = -EBUSY;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg) {
+ new_rx_msg = kzalloc(MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_rx_msg) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ if (new_rx_msg)
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg = new_rx_msg;
+ reinit_completion(&se_clbk_hdl->done);
+ se_clbk_hdl->rx_msg_sz = MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN;
+ se_clbk_hdl->dev_ctx = dev_ctx;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&se_clbk_hdl->clbk_rx_lock, flags);
+ err = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ case SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO:
+ err = se_ioctl_get_mu_info(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ case SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF:
+ err = se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ case SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO:
+ err = se_ioctl_get_se_soc_info_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ case SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP:
+ err = se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_handler(dev_ctx, uarg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ dev_dbg(priv->dev, "%s: IOCTL %.8x not supported.",
+ dev_ctx->devname, cmd);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/* Char driver setup */
+static const struct file_operations se_if_fops = {
+ .open = se_if_fops_open,
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .release = se_if_fops_close,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = se_ioctl,
+ .read = se_if_fops_read,
+ .write = se_if_fops_write,
+};
+
/* interface for managed res to free a mailbox channel */
static void if_mbox_free_channel(void *mbox_chan)
{
@@ -258,6 +1193,7 @@ static int se_if_request_channel(struct device *dev, struct mbox_chan **chan,
static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
{
+ struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
struct platform_device *pdev = plat_dev;
struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw;
struct device *dev = &pdev->dev;
@@ -269,6 +1205,49 @@ static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
+ /*
+ * Mark the private device context as cleanup_done first.
+ * This prevents new device contexts from being created in open().
+ */
+ if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock)
+ priv->priv_dev_ctx->cleanup_done = true;
+
+ if (priv->open_gate) {
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->open_gate->lock) {
+ priv->open_gate->dying = true;
+ priv->open_gate->priv = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev)
+ misc_deregister(priv->priv_dev_ctx->miscdev);
+ }
+
+ while (true) {
+ dev_ctx = NULL;
+
+ scoped_guard(mutex, &priv->modify_lock) {
+ if (list_empty(&priv->dev_ctx_list))
+ goto out_done;
+
+ dev_ctx = list_first_entry(&priv->dev_ctx_list,
+ struct se_if_device_ctx, link);
+
+ /* pin this context so close() cannot free it under us */
+ kref_get(&dev_ctx->refcount);
+ dlink_dev_ctx(dev_ctx);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Local cleanup outside the global lock avoids ABBA deadlock
+ * with paths that already take dev_ctx->fops_lock first.
+ */
+ cleanup_dev_ctx(dev_ctx, false);
+ kref_put(&dev_ctx->refcount, se_if_dev_ctx_release);
+ }
+out_done:
+
/*
* In se_if_request_channel(), passed the clean-up functional
* pointer reference as action to devm_add_action_or_reset().
@@ -291,14 +1270,11 @@ static void se_if_probe_cleanup(void *plat_dev)
* un-set bit.
*/
of_reserved_mem_device_release(dev);
+
dev_set_drvdata(dev, NULL);
- if (priv->priv_dev_ctx) {
- kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx->devname);
- kfree(priv->priv_dev_ctx);
- priv->priv_dev_ctx = NULL;
- }
- kfree(priv);
+ /* Drop the initial reference - priv will be freed when last fd closes */
+ kref_put(&priv->refcount, se_if_priv_release);
}
static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
@@ -322,15 +1298,18 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->dev = dev;
+ kref_init(&priv->refcount);
priv->if_defs = &if_node->if_defs;
dev_set_drvdata(dev, priv);
mutex_init(&priv->se_if_cmd_lock);
+ mutex_init(&priv->modify_lock);
spin_lock_init(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
spin_lock_init(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.clbk_rx_lock);
atomic_set(&priv->fw_busy, 0);
init_completion(&priv->waiting_rsp_clbk_hdl.done);
init_completion(&priv->cmd_receiver_clbk_hdl.done);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->dev_ctx_list);
ret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, se_if_probe_cleanup, pdev);
if (ret)
@@ -341,6 +1320,7 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
priv->se_mb_cl.tx_block = false;
priv->se_mb_cl.knows_txdone = true;
priv->se_mb_cl.rx_callback = se_if_rx_callback;
+ set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(priv, SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT);
ret = se_if_request_channel(dev, &priv->tx_chan, &priv->se_mb_cl, MBOX_TX_NAME);
if (ret)
@@ -365,7 +1345,7 @@ static int se_if_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
"Failed to init reserved memory region.");
}
- ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx);
+ ret = init_misc_device_context(priv, 0, &priv->priv_dev_ctx, &se_if_fops);
if (ret)
return dev_err_probe(dev, ret,
"Failed[0x%x] to create device contexts.",
@@ -407,6 +1387,7 @@ static int se_suspend(struct device *dev)
struct se_fw_load_info *load_fw;
int ret = 0;
+ set_se_rcv_msg_timeout(priv, SE_RCV_MSG_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT);
load_fw = get_load_fw_instance(priv);
if (load_fw->imem_mgmt) {
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
index 5d7cd10b4d02..49e619e0b7f8 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
+++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.h
@@ -15,10 +15,20 @@
#define SE_MSG_WORD_SZ 0x4
#define RES_STATUS(x) FIELD_GET(0x000000ff, x)
+#define MAX_DATA_SIZE_PER_USER (65 * 1024)
#define MAX_NVM_MSG_LEN (256)
#define MESSAGING_VERSION_6 0x6
#define MESSAGING_VERSION_7 0x7
+struct se_if_open_gate {
+ struct miscdevice miscdev;
+ struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ /* to lock to update the structure */
+ struct mutex lock;
+ struct kref refcount;
+ bool dying;
+};
+
struct se_clbk_handle {
struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx;
struct completion done;
@@ -45,10 +55,42 @@ struct se_imem_buf {
u32 state;
};
+struct se_buf_desc {
+ u8 *shared_buf_ptr;
+ void __user *usr_buf_ptr;
+ u32 size;
+ struct list_head link;
+};
+
+struct se_shared_mem {
+ dma_addr_t dma_addr;
+ u32 size;
+ u32 pos;
+ u8 *ptr;
+};
+
+struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info {
+ struct list_head pending_in;
+ struct list_head pending_out;
+
+ struct se_shared_mem non_secure_mem;
+};
+
/* Private struct for each char device instance. */
struct se_if_device_ctx {
struct se_if_priv *priv;
+ struct miscdevice *miscdev;
const char *devname;
+ bool cleanup_done;
+
+ /* process one file operation at a time. */
+ struct mutex fops_lock;
+
+ struct se_shared_mem_mgmt_info se_shared_mem_mgmt;
+ struct list_head link;
+
+ /* Add reference counting */
+ struct kref refcount;
};
/* Header of the messages exchange with the EdgeLock Enclave */
@@ -98,6 +140,19 @@ struct se_if_priv {
atomic_t fw_busy;
struct se_if_device_ctx *priv_dev_ctx;
+ struct list_head dev_ctx_list;
+
+ /* prevent modifying priv member variable in parallel. */
+ struct mutex modify_lock;
+ u32 active_devctx_count;
+ u32 dev_ctx_mono_count;
+ u32 se_rcv_msg_timeout_ms;
+
+ /* Add reference counting */
+ struct kref refcount;
+
+ /* stable gate used by .open() */
+ struct se_if_open_gate *open_gate;
};
char *get_se_if_name(u8 se_if_id);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0c948bdc8c26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/se_ioctl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause*/
+/*
+ * Copyright 2025 NXP
+ */
+
+#ifndef SE_IOCTL_H
+#define SE_IOCTL_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define SE_TYPE_STR_DBG "dbg"
+#define SE_TYPE_STR_HSM "hsm"
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_UNKWN 0x0
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_DBG 0x1
+#define SE_TYPE_ID_HSM 0x2
+/* IOCTL definitions. */
+
+struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf {
+ void __user *user_buf;
+ __u32 length;
+ __u32 flags;
+ __u64 ele_addr;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_shared_mem_cfg {
+ __u32 base_offset;
+ __u32 size;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_get_if_info {
+ __u8 se_if_id;
+ __u8 interrupt_idx;
+ __u8 tz;
+ __u8 did;
+ __u8 cmd_tag;
+ __u8 rsp_tag;
+ __u8 success_tag;
+ __u8 base_api_ver;
+ __u8 fw_api_ver;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info {
+ __u32 __user *tx_buf;
+ int tx_buf_sz;
+ __u32 __user *rx_buf;
+ int rx_buf_sz;
+};
+
+struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info {
+ __u16 soc_id;
+ __u16 soc_rev;
+};
+
+/* IO Buffer Flags */
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_OUTPUT (0x00u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_INPUT (0x01u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SEC_MEM (0x02u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_USE_SHORT_ADDR (0x04u)
+#define SE_IO_BUF_FLAGS_IS_IN_OUT (0x10u)
+
+/* IOCTLS */
+#define SE_IOCTL 0x0A /* like MISC_MAJOR. */
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to designated the current fd as logical-reciever.
+ * This is ioctl is send when the nvm-daemon, a slave to the
+ * firmware is started by the user.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_ENABLE_CMD_RCV _IO(SE_IOCTL, 0x01)
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to get the buffer allocated from the memory, which is shared
+ * between kernel and FW.
+ * Post allocation, the kernel tagged the allocated memory with:
+ * Output
+ * Input
+ * Input-Output
+ * Short address
+ * Secure-memory
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_SETUP_IOBUF _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x03, struct se_ioctl_setup_iobuf)
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to get the mu information, that is used to exchange message
+ * with FW, from user-spaced.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_GET_MU_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x04, struct se_ioctl_get_if_info)
+/*
+ * ioctl to get SoC Info from user-space.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_GET_SOC_INFO _IOR(SE_IOCTL, 0x06, struct se_ioctl_get_soc_info)
+
+/*
+ * ioctl to send command and receive response from user-space.
+ */
+#define SE_IOCTL_CMD_SEND_RCV_RSP _IOWR(SE_IOCTL, 0x07, struct se_ioctl_cmd_snd_rcv_rsp_info)
+#endif
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v26 6/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add secure enclave node
2026-06-29 12:21 [PATCH v26 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 5/7] firmware: drivers: imx: adds miscdev pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 12:22 ` pankaj.gupta
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 7/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp-evk: add reserved memory property pankaj.gupta
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: pankaj.gupta @ 2026-06-29 12:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree, imx, linux-arm-kernel
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Add support for NXP secure enclave called EdgeLock Enclave firmware (se-fw)
for imx8ulp-evk.
Add label sram0 for sram@2201f000 and add secure-enclave node
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
---
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp.dtsi | 11 +++++++++--
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp.dtsi b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp.dtsi
index c6d1bb9edf38..933127f870c6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp.dtsi
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR MIT)
/*
- * Copyright 2021 NXP
+ * Copyright 2021, 2025 NXP
*/
#include <dt-bindings/clock/imx8ulp-clock.h>
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ sosc: clock-sosc {
#clock-cells = <0>;
};
- sram@2201f000 {
+ sram0: sram@2201f000 {
compatible = "mmio-sram";
reg = <0x0 0x2201f000 0x0 0x1000>;
@@ -185,6 +185,13 @@ scmi_sensor: protocol@15 {
#thermal-sensor-cells = <1>;
};
};
+
+ hsm0: secure-enclave {
+ compatible = "fsl,imx8ulp-se-ele-hsm";
+ mbox-names = "tx", "rx";
+ mboxes = <&s4muap 0 0>, <&s4muap 1 0>;
+ sram = <&sram0>;
+ };
};
cm33: remoteproc-cm33 {
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread* [PATCH v26 7/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp-evk: add reserved memory property
2026-06-29 12:21 [PATCH v26 0/7] firmware: imx: driver for NXP secure-enclave pankaj.gupta
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-29 12:22 ` [PATCH v26 6/7] arm64: dts: imx8ulp: add secure enclave node pankaj.gupta
@ 2026-06-29 12:22 ` pankaj.gupta
6 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: pankaj.gupta @ 2026-06-29 12:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Rob Herring, Krzysztof Kozlowski,
Conor Dooley, Frank Li, Sascha Hauer, Pengutronix Kernel Team,
Fabio Estevam, Pankaj Gupta
Cc: linux-doc, linux-kernel, devicetree, imx, linux-arm-kernel
From: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reserve 1MB of DDR memory region due to EdgeLock Enclave's hardware
limitation restricting access to DDR addresses from 0x80000000
to 0xafffffff.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Frank Li <Frank.Li@nxp.com>
---
arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp-evk.dts | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp-evk.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp-evk.dts
index 5dea66c1e7aa..16399d921e04 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp-evk.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/imx8ulp-evk.dts
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0+ OR MIT)
/*
- * Copyright 2021 NXP
+ * Copyright 2021, 2025 NXP
*/
/dts-v1/;
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ linux,cma {
linux,cma-default;
};
+ ele_reserved: memory@90000000 {
+ compatible = "shared-dma-pool";
+ reg = <0 0x90000000 0 0x100000>;
+ no-map;
+ };
+
m33_reserved: noncacheable-section@a8600000 {
reg = <0 0xa8600000 0 0x1000000>;
no-map;
@@ -259,6 +265,10 @@ &usdhc0 {
status = "okay";
};
+&hsm0 {
+ memory-region = <&ele_reserved>;
+};
+
&fec {
pinctrl-names = "default", "sleep";
pinctrl-0 = <&pinctrl_enet>;
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread