From: Danesh Petigara <danesh.petigara@broadcom.com>
To: mmayer@broadcom.com, krzk@kernel.org, florian.fainelli@broadcom.com
Cc: bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Danesh Petigara <danesh.petigara@broadcom.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] Harden DPFE driver against buggy/malicious DCPU
Date: Wed, 26 Aug 2026 13:14:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260826201500.3000125-1-danesh.petigara@broadcom.com> (raw)
This patch series hardens the Broadcom STB DPFE driver against potential
exploitation through a buggy or compromised DCPU coprocessor.
The DPFE driver exchanges messages with the DCPU over shared memory-mapped
regions and currently trusts DCPU supplied values without bounds checking
them before use.
A compromised or malfunctioning DCPU could:
- On API v1/v2 boards, provide an arbitrary MMIO read/write primitive
through the offset supplied in get_msg_ptr(), combined with
root-writable and world-readable sysfs files.
- Make a user who reads world-readable sysfs files trigger an out-of-bounds
stack read of arbitrary extent via an unvalidated checksum index.
Patch 1 addresses the MMIO read/write issue by rejecting an offset that,
along with the largest field accessed (DRAM_VENDOR_ERROR + sizeof(u32)),
exceeds the recorded mapping size.
Patch 2 addresses the stack over-read via the checksum index by checking
it against MSG_FIELD_MAX after reading the response from the DCPU message
RAM.
Justin Chen (2):
memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset
memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Bounds check DCPU-supplied MSG_ARG_COUNT
drivers/memory/brcmstb_dpfe.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--
2.54.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-08-26 20:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-26 20:14 Danesh Petigara [this message]
2026-08-26 20:14 ` [PATCH 1/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Fix out-of-bounds access due to DCPU offset Danesh Petigara
2026-08-26 23:07 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-08-27 6:48 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-08-27 17:37 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-08-27 21:31 ` Krzysztof Kozlowski
2026-08-28 0:04 ` Danesh Petigara
2026-08-28 0:54 ` Markus Mayer
2026-08-26 20:14 ` [PATCH 2/2] memory: brcmstb_dpfe: Bounds check DCPU-supplied MSG_ARG_COUNT Danesh Petigara
2026-08-26 23:07 ` Florian Fainelli
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260826201500.3000125-1-danesh.petigara@broadcom.com \
--to=danesh.petigara@broadcom.com \
--cc=bcm-kernel-feedback-list@broadcom.com \
--cc=florian.fainelli@broadcom.com \
--cc=krzk@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mmayer@broadcom.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox