From: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>,
Keir Fraser <keirf@google.com>,
Kalesh Singh <kaleshsingh@google.com>,
Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
Hiroyuki Katsura <hk590@cam.ac.uk>, Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: arm64: Match hyp text by physical address in fix_host_ownership()
Date: Tue, 8 Sep 2026 12:07:11 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260908110713.1540304-3-fuad.tabba@linux.dev> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260908110713.1540304-1-fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
On a non-hVHE host, fix_host_ownership_walker()'s test for PAGE_HYP_EXEC
never matches: KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_UX is cleared at map time and only PX is
reported on read-back. Hyp text is therefore donated rather than left
read-only in the host stage-2, and the instruction dump in
nvhe_hyp_panic_handler() reads a page the host has no access to.
Match the text by physical address instead, in a helper a later patch
reuses. A test on the permissions would leave any other executable
mapping host-readable too.
Fixes: 80cbfd7174f31 ("KVM: arm64: Honor UX/PX attributes for EL2 S1 mappings")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <fuad.tabba@linux.dev>
---
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h
index 29935c7da1dec..cab27f7bd423a 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/nvhe/mem_protect.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ int __pkvm_host_test_clear_young_guest(u64 gfn, u64 nr_pages, bool mkold, struct
int __pkvm_host_mkyoung_guest(u64 gfn, struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *vcpu);
bool addr_is_memory(phys_addr_t phys);
+bool addr_is_hyp_text(phys_addr_t phys);
int host_stage2_idmap_locked(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size, enum kvm_pgtable_prot prot);
int host_stage2_set_owner_locked(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size, u8 owner_id);
int kvm_host_prepare_stage2(void *pgt_pool_base);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
index 39aa8911f62c1..d026f446bd8ef 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
@@ -450,6 +450,14 @@ bool addr_is_memory(phys_addr_t phys)
return !!find_mem_range(phys, &range);
}
+bool addr_is_hyp_text(phys_addr_t phys)
+{
+ phys_addr_t start = ALIGN_DOWN(__hyp_pa(__hyp_text_start), PAGE_SIZE);
+ phys_addr_t end = PAGE_ALIGN(__hyp_pa(__hyp_text_end));
+
+ return phys >= start && phys < end;
+}
+
static bool is_in_mem_range(u64 addr, struct kvm_mem_range *range)
{
return range->start <= addr && addr < range->end;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
index 362f2891cb32e..bb667cd7080b4 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/setup.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ static int fix_host_ownership_walker(const struct kvm_pgtable_visit_ctx *ctx,
case PKVM_PAGE_OWNED:
set_hyp_state(page, PKVM_PAGE_OWNED);
/* hyp text is RO in the host stage-2 to be inspected on panic. */
- if (prot == PAGE_HYP_EXEC) {
+ if (addr_is_hyp_text(phys)) {
set_host_state(page, PKVM_NOPAGE);
return host_stage2_idmap_locked(phys, PAGE_SIZE, KVM_PGTABLE_PROT_R);
} else {
--
2.39.5
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-09-08 11:15 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-09-08 11:07 [PATCH 0/4] KVM: arm64: Fix host access to the EL2 stacks Fuad Tabba
2026-09-08 11:07 ` [PATCH 1/4] KVM: arm64: Transfer the hyp stack pages out of the host stage-2 Fuad Tabba
2026-09-08 11:07 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-09-08 11:07 ` [PATCH 3/4] KVM: arm64: Move the private VA allocation cursor to __io_map_next Fuad Tabba
2026-09-08 11:07 ` [PATCH 4/4] KVM: arm64: Check every private mapping is hyp-owned at pKVM init Fuad Tabba
2026-09-08 12:53 ` [PATCH 0/4] KVM: arm64: Fix host access to the EL2 stacks Marc Zyngier
2026-09-08 13:04 ` Vincent Donnefort
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