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From: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
To: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
	linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@chromium.org>,
	"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"Linu Cherian" <linu.cherian@arm.com>,
	"Linus Walleij" <linusw@kernel.org>,
	"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
	"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
	"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
	"Maxwell Bland" <mbland@motorola.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Pierre Langlois" <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	"Pierre-Clément Tosi" <ptosi@google.com>,
	"Quentin Perret" <qperret@google.com>,
	"Rick Edgecombe" <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	"Ryan Roberts" <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	"Vlastimil Babka" <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Yang Shi" <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	"Yeoreum Yun" <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org, "Ira Weiny" <iweiny@kernel.org>,
	"Lorenzo Stoakes" <ljs@kernel.org>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v9 13/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator
Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2026 17:28:29 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7af32e98-f2ab-4961-9e3c-72b8a21416c0@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1dc8739e-4eb6-4a71-9534-e03a15afd620@kernel.org>

On 27/08/2026 20:08, David Hildenbrand (Arm) wrote:
> On 8/18/26 16:08, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
>> The kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature aims to protect all page table
>> pages (PTPs) by mapping them with a privileged pkey. This is primarily
>> handled by kpkeys_pgtable_alloc(), called from pagetable_alloc().
>> However, this does not cover PTPs allocated early, before the
>> buddy allocator is available. These PTPs are allocated by architecture
>> code, either 1. from static pools or 2. using the memblock allocator,
>> and should also be protected.
>>
>> This patch addresses the second category: PTPs allocated via memblock.
>> Such PTPs are notably used to create the linear map. Protecting them as
>> soon as they are allocated would require modifying the linear map while
>> it is being created, which seems at best difficult. Instead, a
>> simple allocator is introduced, obtaining pages from memblock and
>> keeping track of all allocated ranges to set their pkey once it is
>> safe to do so. PTPs allocated at that stage are not freed, so there
>> is no need to manage a free list.
> I'm think of ways to avoid remembering these ranges. I guess we get called that
> early that we don't even have a ptdesc where we could just link the pages.

Correct, in both the direct map and (early) vmemmap cases we can't rely
on struct page as storage.

> If only page tables would be linked in some datastructure where we could find
> them all ... ;)
>
> ... why can't we just scan the page table hierarchy to find all page tables that
> need protection?

It makes sense doesn't it :) In fact this is exactly what RFC v5 did [1]
(a year ago already...). Then in RFC v6 I attempted to support block
mappings, and things got a lot more complicated. In that case there are
(at least) two issues with protecting the early page tables by walking them:

1. On arm64 with BBML3 we cannot split blocks in the direct map until
all secondary cores are up. This makes locking pretty difficult if we're
to walk all page tables at that later stage.

2. Without modifying the allocation strategy, early page tables may not
be contiguous and setting their pkey would generate fragmentation.

Naturally neither of these issues is relevant to the present series,
where we force page granularity in the direct map. I still kept the same
approach as in RFC v6 though, as the goal remains to support block
mappings eventually.

That said, as discussed offline it may be sensible to revert to the
"walk early page tables" approach to start with, even if we would
probably need to change it later. This allows us to drop quite a few
patches, since init_pg_dir no longer needs to be explicitly protected.

One caveat is that in RFC v5, any page table page installed after
smp_prepare_boot_cpu() is called, and allocated using memblock (or
anything else but the buddy allocator), won't be protected. Codex can't
find any such case though so we should be good for now.

- Kevin

[1]
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-hardening/20250815085512.2182322-11-kevin.brodsky@arm.com/



  reply	other threads:[~2026-08-31 15:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-08-18 14:08 [PATCH RFC v9 00/25] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 01/25] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-27 18:00   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-31 15:25     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 02/25] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-01 14:33   ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-03 16:41     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 03/25] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-01 14:39   ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-03 16:41     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-01 14:41   ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-03 16:43     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 04/25] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-01 14:42   ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-03 16:43     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 05/25] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-01 14:48   ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-03 16:44     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 06/25] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 07/25] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-03  5:58   ` Linu Cherian
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 08/25] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-03  5:56   ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-03 16:45     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 09/25] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-03  9:14   ` Linu Cherian
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 10/25] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 11/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 12/25] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 13/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-27 18:08   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-08-31 15:28     ` Kevin Brodsky [this message]
2026-08-27 18:17   ` Dave Hansen
2026-08-31 15:30     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 14/25] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-31 15:33   ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 15/25] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static " Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 16/25] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:08 ` [PATCH RFC v9 17/25] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 18/25] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 19/25] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 20/25] arm64: mm: Map kernel image alias of init_pg_dir read-only Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 21/25] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 22/25] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 23/25] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 24/25] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-18 14:09 ` [PATCH RFC v9 25/25] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky
2026-08-27 17:24 ` [PATCH RFC v9 00/25] pkeys-based page table hardening Yeoreum Yun
2026-08-31 15:35   ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-01 14:24 ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-03 16:47   ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-09-01 15:02 ` Linu Cherian
2026-09-01 15:13   ` Linu Cherian

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