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From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
To: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	Oliver Upton <oupton@kernel.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
	Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>,
	Vincent Donnefort <vdonnefort@google.com>,
	Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com>,
	Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 26/36] KVM: arm64: Return -EFAULT from VCPU_RUN on access to a poisoned pte
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 14:58:56 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <acFVMCb0pMY7r46_@willie-the-truck> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <86341u5uhr.wl-maz@kernel.org>

On Fri, Mar 20, 2026 at 04:35:44PM +0000, Marc Zyngier wrote:
> On Thu, 05 Mar 2026 14:43:39 +0000,
> Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> wrote:
> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> > index 4ff31947579b..7f705f662c40 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/mem_protect.c
> > @@ -890,6 +890,49 @@ static int get_valid_guest_pte(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm, u64 ipa, kvm_pte_t *ptep,
> >  	return 0;
> >  }
> >  
> > +int __pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
> > +{
> > +	struct pkvm_hyp_vm *vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(hyp_vcpu);
> > +	kvm_pte_t pte;
> > +	s8 level;
> > +	u64 ipa;
> > +	int ret;
> > +
> > +	switch (kvm_vcpu_trap_get_class(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu)) {
> > +	case ESR_ELx_EC_DABT_LOW:
> > +	case ESR_ELx_EC_IABT_LOW:
> > +		if (kvm_vcpu_trap_is_translation_fault(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu))
> > +			break;
> > +		fallthrough;
> > +	default:
> > +		return -EINVAL;
> > +	}
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * The host has the faulting IPA when it calls us from the guest
> > +	 * fault handler but we retrieve it ourselves from the FAR so as
> > +	 * to avoid exposing an "oracle" that could reveal data access
> > +	 * patterns of the guest after initial donation of its pages.
> > +	 */
> > +	ipa = kvm_vcpu_get_fault_ipa(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
> > +	ipa |= kvm_vcpu_get_hfar(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu) & GENMASK(11, 0);
> 
> nit: we now have FAR_TO_FIPA_OFFSET() for this.

Neat, I'll use that. Thanks.

> > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c
> > index 32294bd21dde..da0a45dab203 100644
> > --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c
> > +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/pkvm.c
> > @@ -417,10 +417,13 @@ int pkvm_pgtable_stage2_map(struct kvm_pgtable *pgt, u64 addr, u64 size,
> >  			return -EINVAL;
> >  
> >  		/*
> > -		 * We raced with another vCPU.
> > +		 * We either raced with another vCPU or the guest PTE
> > +		 * has been poisoned by an erroneous host access.
> >  		 */
> > -		if (mapping)
> > -			return -EAGAIN;
> > +		if (mapping) {
> > +			ret = kvm_call_hyp_nvhe(__pkvm_vcpu_in_poison_fault);
> > +			return ret ? -EFAULT : -EAGAIN;
> > +		}
> 
> I guess this considers that racing against another vcpu is an unlikely
> situation, because calling back into EL2 and walking the PTs isn't
> exactly cheap.

Yeah, I wanted to avoid walking the stage-2 page-table at EL2 on every
fault, so it ends up being deferred to here in the case that we find an
existing mapping for the faulting IPA.

> I wonder if there is a mechanism we could use to directly return this
> information to the host at the point of the guest fault. The only
> things I can figure out would require the PTE to be valid (access or
> permission faults, for example), and that'd break the "full PTE
> dedicated to annotations"...

Oh, I see what you mean... using the fault type as a proxy feels like it
probably won't scale so well if we ever want to use those faults for
anything else.

If we want to optimise the common case, perhaps I could set a flag in
the host kvm structure (from EL2) when the page is poisoned in
__pkvm_host_force_reclaim_page_guest() and then check that here? In that
case, only VMs that have had a page forcefully-reclaimed will issue the
hypercall. There's a race, but I think it's ok because we'll get -EAGAIN
and pick up the flag the next time around.

WDYT? It might be premature optimisation, but it also feels do-able?

Will


  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-23 14:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 63+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-05 14:43 [PATCH v3 00/36] KVM: arm64: Add support for protected guest memory with pKVM Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 01/36] KVM: arm64: Don't leak stage-2 page-table if VM fails to init under pKVM Will Deacon
2026-03-11 12:48   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 02/36] KVM: arm64: Move handle check into pkvm_pgtable_stage2_destroy_range() Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:15   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 03/36] KVM: arm64: Rename __pkvm_pgtable_stage2_unmap() Will Deacon
2026-03-11 12:49   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 04/36] KVM: arm64: Don't advertise unsupported features for protected guests Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:15   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 05/36] KVM: arm64: Expose self-hosted debug regs as RAZ/WI " Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 06/36] KVM: arm64: Remove is_protected_kvm_enabled() checks from hypercalls Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:16   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 07/36] KVM: arm64: Ignore MMU notifier callbacks for protected VMs Will Deacon
2026-03-11 12:50   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 08/36] KVM: arm64: Prevent unsupported memslot operations on " Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:16   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 09/36] KVM: arm64: Ignore -EAGAIN when mapping in pages for the pKVM host Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:10   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 10/36] KVM: arm64: Split teardown hypercall into two phases Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:22   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 11/36] KVM: arm64: Introduce __pkvm_host_donate_guest() Will Deacon
2026-03-20 12:38   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-03-23 14:55     ` Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 12/36] KVM: arm64: Hook up donation hypercall to pkvm_pgtable_stage2_map() Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 13/36] KVM: arm64: Handle aborts from protected VMs Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:22   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 14/36] KVM: arm64: Introduce __pkvm_reclaim_dying_guest_page() Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 15/36] KVM: arm64: Hook up reclaim hypercall to pkvm_pgtable_stage2_destroy() Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 16/36] KVM: arm64: Factor out pKVM host exception injection logic Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:12   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 17/36] KVM: arm64: Support translation faults in inject_host_exception() Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:12   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 18/36] KVM: arm64: Inject SIGSEGV on illegal accesses Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:13   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 19/36] KVM: arm64: Avoid pointless annotation when mapping host-owned pages Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 20/36] KVM: arm64: Generalise kvm_pgtable_stage2_set_owner() Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 21/36] KVM: arm64: Introduce host_stage2_set_owner_metadata_locked() Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 22/36] KVM: arm64: Change 'pkvm_handle_t' to u16 Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 23/36] KVM: arm64: Annotate guest donations with handle and gfn in host stage-2 Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 24/36] KVM: arm64: Introduce hypercall to force reclaim of a protected page Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 25/36] KVM: arm64: Reclaim faulting page from pKVM in spurious fault handler Will Deacon
2026-03-20 16:20   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-03-21  9:39     ` Marc Zyngier
2026-03-23 14:58       ` Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 26/36] KVM: arm64: Return -EFAULT from VCPU_RUN on access to a poisoned pte Will Deacon
2026-03-20 16:35   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-03-23 14:58     ` Will Deacon [this message]
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 27/36] KVM: arm64: Add hvc handler at EL2 for hypercalls from protected VMs Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 28/36] KVM: arm64: Implement the MEM_SHARE hypercall for " Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 29/36] KVM: arm64: Implement the MEM_UNSHARE " Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 30/36] KVM: arm64: Allow userspace to create protected VMs when pKVM is enabled Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:25   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-20 13:22   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-03-23 15:00     ` Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 31/36] KVM: arm64: Add some initial documentation for pKVM Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:25   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 32/36] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest donation Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 33/36] KVM: arm64: Register 'selftest_vm' in the VM table Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 34/36] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover forced reclaim Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 35/36] KVM: arm64: Extend pKVM page ownership selftests to cover guest hvcs Will Deacon
2026-03-05 14:43 ` [PATCH v3 36/36] KVM: arm64: Rename PKVM_PAGE_STATE_MASK Will Deacon
2026-03-11 10:26   ` Fuad Tabba
2026-03-11 10:07 ` [PATCH v3 00/36] KVM: arm64: Add support for protected guest memory with pKVM Fuad Tabba

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