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From: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>
To: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>, linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jeff Xu <jeffxu@chromium.org>, Joey Gouly <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Linus Walleij <linusw@kernel.org>,
	Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Maxwell Bland <mbland@motorola.com>,
	"Mike Rapoport (IBM)" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Pierre Langlois <pierre.langlois@arm.com>,
	Quentin Perret <qperret@google.com>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Ryan Roberts <ryan.roberts@arm.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>,
	Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	x86@kernel.org, Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v8 03/24] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions
Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2026 15:06:24 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <c42354f7-4add-4f56-bb7e-d33000db1f1b@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260526-kpkeys-v8-3-eaaacdacc67c@arm.com>

On 5/26/26 13:15, Kevin Brodsky wrote:
> In preparation of using POE inside the kernel, enable "Overlay
> applied" for kernel memory types in PIR_EL1. This ensures that the
> permissions set in POR_EL1 affect all kernel mappings.
> 
> User memory types must be left untouched (overlays not applied)
> because any privileged access to user memory (e.g. futex atomic
> without FEAT_LSUI) would then be mistakenly checked against POR_EL1.

That makes sense. Still learning the architecture, but ... leaving the user bits
as is sounds good to me (and unrelated to using overlays for kernel memory).

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand (Arm) <david@kernel.org>

> 
> Signed-off-by: Kevin Brodsky <kevin.brodsky@arm.com>
> ---
>  arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h | 8 ++++----
>  1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> index 212ce1b02e15..d4d45ab86a5a 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/pgtable-prot.h
> @@ -183,9 +183,9 @@ static inline bool __pure lpa2_is_enabled(void)
>  	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED_EXEC),   PIE_RW)     | \
>  	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_READONLY),      PIE_R)      | \
>  	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_SHARED),        PIE_RW)     | \
> -	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_ROX),    PIE_RX)     | \
> -	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC),   PIE_RWX)    | \
> -	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_RO),     PIE_R)      | \
> -	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL),        PIE_RW))
> +	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_ROX),    PIE_RX_O)   | \
> +	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC),   PIE_RWX_O)  | \
> +	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL_RO),     PIE_R_O)    | \
> +	PIRx_ELx_PERM_PREP(pte_pi_index(_PAGE_KERNEL),        PIE_RW_O))
>  
>  #endif /* __ASM_PGTABLE_PROT_H */
> 


-- 
Cheers,

David


  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-22 13:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-26 11:15 [PATCH RFC v8 00/24] pkeys-based page table hardening Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 01/24] mm: Introduce kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 13:17   ` Linus Walleij
2026-05-27  8:24     ` Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-16 15:32       ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-16 15:19   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-06-18 13:22     ` Linus Walleij
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 02/24] set_memory: Introduce set_memory_pkey() stub Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-16 15:41   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 03/24] arm64: mm: Enable overlays for all EL1 indirect permissions Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-22 13:06   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm) [this message]
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 04/24] arm64: Introduce por_elx_set_pkey_perms() helper Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-22 13:16   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 05/24] arm64: Implement asm/kpkeys.h using POE Kevin Brodsky
2026-06-22 13:35   ` David Hildenbrand (Arm)
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 06/24] arm64: set_memory: Implement set_memory_pkey() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 07/24] arm64: Context-switch POR_EL1 Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 08/24] arm64: Initialize POR_EL1 register on cpu_resume() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 09/24] arm64: Enable kpkeys Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:15 ` [PATCH RFC v8 10/24] memblock: Move INIT_MEMBLOCK_* macros to header Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 11/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce kpkeys_hardened_pgtables feature Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 12/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect regular page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 13/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce early page table allocator Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 14/24] mm: kpkeys: Protect vmemmap page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 15/24] mm: kpkeys: Introduce hook for protecting static " Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 16/24] arm64: kpkeys: Implement arch_supports_kpkeys_early() Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 17/24] arm64: kpkeys: Support KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 18/24] arm64: kpkeys: Ensure the linear map can be modified Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 19/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect early page tables Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 20/24] arm64: kpkeys: Protect init_pg_dir Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 21/24] arm64: kpkeys: Guard page table writes Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 22/24] arm64: kpkeys: Batch KPKEYS_CTX_PGTABLES switches Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 23/24] arm64: kpkeys: Enable kpkeys_hardened_pgtables support Kevin Brodsky
2026-05-26 11:16 ` [PATCH RFC v8 24/24] mm: Add basic tests for kpkeys_hardened_pgtables Kevin Brodsky

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