* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 8/8] selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
Add a basic KASAN test runner that loads and test-run programs that can
trigger memory management bugs. The test captures kernel logs and ensure
that the expected KASAN splat is emitted by searching for the
corresponding first lines in the report.
This version implements two faulty programs triggering either a
user-after-free, or an out-of-bounds memory usage. The bugs are
triggered thanks to some dedicated kfuncs in bpf_testmod.c, but two
different techniques are used, as some cases can be quite hard to
trigger in a pure "black box" approach:
- for reads, we can make the used kfuncs return some faulty pointers
that ebpf programs will manipulate, they will generate legitimate
kasan reports as a consequence
- applying the same trick for faulty writes is harder, as ebpf programs
can't write kernel data freely. So ebpf programs can call another
specific testing kfunc that will alter the shadow memory matching the
passed memory (eg: a map). When the program will try to write to the
corresponding memory, it will trigger a report as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
The way of bringing kasan_poison into bpf_testmod is definitely not
ideal. But I would like to validate the testing approach (triggering
real faulty accesses, which is hard on some cases, VS manually poisoning
BPF-manipulated memory) before eventually making clean bridges between
KASAN APIs and bpf_testmod.c, if the latter approach is the valid one.
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 79 ++++++++++
3 files changed, 390 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fd628aaa8005
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause
+#include <bpf/bpf.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#include <sys/klog.h>
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include <unpriv_helpers.h>
+#include "kasan.skel.h"
+
+#define SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN 64
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL 3
+#define SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR 5
+
+#define MAX_LOG_SIZE (8*1024)
+#define READ_CHUNK_SIZE 128
+
+#define KASAN_PATTERN_SLAB_UAF "BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_prog_"
+#define KASAN_PATTERN_GLOBAL_OOB "BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_"
+
+static char klog_buffer[MAX_LOG_SIZE];
+
+static int read_kernel_logs(char *buf, size_t max_len)
+{
+ return klogctl(SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL, buf, max_len);
+}
+
+static int clear_kernel_logs(void)
+{
+ return klogctl(SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static int kernel_logs_have_matching_kasan_report(char *buf, char *pattern,
+ bool is_write, int size)
+{
+ char *access_desc_start, *access_desc_end, *tmp;
+ char access_log[READ_CHUNK_SIZE];
+ char *kasan_report_start;
+ int hsize, nsize;
+ /* Searched kasan report is valid if
+ * - it contains the expected kasan pattern
+ * - the next line is the description of the faulty access
+ * - faulty access properties match the tested type and size
+ */
+ kasan_report_start = strstr(buf, pattern);
+
+ if (!kasan_report_start)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Find next line */
+ access_desc_start = strchr(kasan_report_start, '\n');
+ if (!access_desc_start)
+ return 1;
+ access_desc_start++;
+
+ access_desc_end = strchr(access_desc_start, '\n');
+ if (!access_desc_end)
+ return 1;
+
+ nsize = snprintf(access_log, READ_CHUNK_SIZE, "%s of size %d at addr",
+ is_write ? "Write" : "Read", size);
+
+ hsize = access_desc_end - access_desc_start;
+ tmp = memmem(access_desc_start, hsize, access_log, nsize);
+
+ if (!tmp)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct test_spec {
+ char *prog_name;
+ char *expected_report_pattern;
+};
+
+static struct test_spec tests[] = {
+ {
+ .prog_name = "bpf_kasan_uaf",
+ .expected_report_pattern = KASAN_PATTERN_SLAB_UAF
+ },
+ {
+ .prog_name = "bpf_kasan_oob",
+ .expected_report_pattern = KASAN_PATTERN_GLOBAL_OOB
+ }
+};
+
+static void run_test_with_type_and_size(struct kasan *skel,
+ struct test_spec *test, bool is_write,
+ int access_size)
+{
+ char subtest_name[SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN];
+ struct bpf_program *prog;
+ uint8_t buf[ETH_HLEN];
+ int ret;
+
+ prog = bpf_object__find_program_by_name(skel->obj, test->prog_name);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(prog, "find test prog"))
+ return;
+
+ snprintf(subtest_name, SUBTEST_NAME_MAX_LEN, "%s_%s_%d",
+ test->prog_name, is_write ? "write" : "read", access_size);
+
+ if (!test__start_subtest(subtest_name))
+ return;
+
+ ret = clear_kernel_logs();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "reset log buffer"))
+ return;
+
+ LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts);
+ topts.sz = sizeof(struct bpf_test_run_opts);
+ topts.data_size_in = ETH_HLEN;
+ topts.data_in = buf;
+ skel->bss->is_write = is_write;
+ skel->bss->access_size = access_size;
+ ret = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(bpf_program__fd(prog), &topts);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(ret, "run prog"))
+ return;
+
+ ret = read_kernel_logs(klog_buffer, MAX_LOG_SIZE);
+ if (ASSERT_GE(ret, 0, "read kernel logs"))
+ ASSERT_OK(kernel_logs_have_matching_kasan_report(
+ klog_buffer, test->expected_report_pattern,
+ is_write, access_size),
+ test->prog_name);
+}
+
+static void run_test_with_type(struct kasan *skel, struct test_spec *test,
+ bool is_write)
+{
+ run_test_with_type_and_size(skel, test, is_write, 1);
+ run_test_with_type_and_size(skel, test, is_write, 2);
+ run_test_with_type_and_size(skel, test, is_write, 4);
+ run_test_with_type_and_size(skel, test, is_write, 8);
+}
+
+static void run_test(struct kasan *skel, struct test_spec *test)
+{
+ run_test_with_type(skel, test, false);
+ run_test_with_type(skel, test, true);
+}
+
+void test_kasan(void)
+{
+ struct test_spec *test;
+ struct kasan *skel;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!is_jit_enabled() || !get_kasan_jit_enabled()) {
+ test__skip();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ skel = kasan__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "open and load prog"))
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tests); i++) {
+ test = &tests[i];
+
+ run_test(skel, test);
+ }
+
+ kasan__destroy(skel);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f713c9b7c9ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause
+
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
+
+#define KASAN_SLAB_FREE 0xFB
+#define KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE 0xF9
+
+extern __u8 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_1(void) __ksym;
+extern __u16 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_2(void) __ksym;
+extern __u32 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_4(void) __ksym;
+extern __u64 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_8(void) __ksym;
+extern __u8 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_1(void) __ksym;
+extern __u16 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_2(void) __ksym;
+extern __u32 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_4(void) __ksym;
+extern __u64 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_8(void) __ksym;
+extern void bpf_kfunc_kasan_poison(void *mem, __u32 mem__sz, __u8 byte) __ksym;
+
+int access_size;
+int is_write;
+
+struct kasan_write_val {
+ __u8 data_1;
+ __u16 data_2;
+ __u32 data_4;
+ __u64 data_8;
+};
+
+struct {
+ __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
+ __uint(max_entries, 1);
+ __type(key, __u32);
+ __type(value, struct kasan_write_val);
+} test_map SEC(".maps");
+
+static void bpf_kasan_faulty_write(int size, __u8 poison_byte)
+{
+ struct kasan_write_val *val;
+ __u32 key = 0;
+
+ val = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&test_map, &key);
+ if (!val)
+ return;
+
+ bpf_kfunc_kasan_poison(val, sizeof(struct kasan_write_val),
+ poison_byte);
+ switch (size) {
+ case 1:
+ val->data_1 = 0xAA;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ val->data_2 = 0xAA;
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ val->data_4 = 0xAA;
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ val->data_8 = 0xAA;
+ break;
+ }
+ bpf_kfunc_kasan_poison(val, sizeof(struct kasan_write_val), 0x00);
+}
+
+
+static int bpf_kasan_uaf_read(int size)
+{
+ __u8 *result_1;
+ __u16 *result_2;
+ __u32 *result_4;
+ __u64 *result_8;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (size) {
+ case 1:
+ result_1 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_1();
+ ret = result_1[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ result_2 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_2();
+ ret = result_2[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ result_4 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_4();
+ ret = result_4[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ result_8 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_8();
+ ret = result_8[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SEC("tcx/ingress")
+int bpf_kasan_uaf(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (is_write) {
+ bpf_kasan_faulty_write(access_size, KASAN_SLAB_FREE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return bpf_kasan_uaf_read(access_size);
+}
+
+static int bpf_kasan_oob_read(int size)
+{
+ __u8 *result_1;
+ __u16 *result_2;
+ __u32 *result_4;
+ __u64 *result_8;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ switch (size) {
+ case 1:
+ result_1 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_1();
+ ret = result_1[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ result_2 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_2();
+ ret = result_2[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ result_4 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_4();
+ ret = result_4[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ result_8 = bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_8();
+ ret = result_8[0] ? 1 : 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+SEC("tcx/ingress")
+int bpf_kasan_oob(struct __sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ if (is_write) {
+ bpf_kasan_faulty_write(access_size, KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return bpf_kasan_oob_read(access_size);
+}
+
+char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c
index d876314a4d67..01554bcbbbb0 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c
@@ -271,6 +271,76 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_kfunc_put_default_trusted_ptr_test(struct prog_test_member
*/
}
+static void *kasan_uaf(void)
+{
+ void *p = kmalloc(64, GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+ memset(p, 0xAA, 64);
+ kfree(p);
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+extern void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init);
+
+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_kfunc_kasan_poison(void *mem, u32 mem__sz, u8 byte)
+{
+ kasan_poison(mem, mem__sz, byte, false);
+}
+#else
+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_kfunc_kasan_poison(void *mem, u32 mem__sz, u8 byte) { }
+#endif
+
+__bpf_kfunc u8 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_1(void)
+{
+ return kasan_uaf();
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc u16 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_2(void)
+{
+ return kasan_uaf();
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc u32 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_4(void)
+{
+ return kasan_uaf();
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc u64 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_8(void)
+{
+ return kasan_uaf();
+}
+
+static u8 test_oob_buffer[64];
+
+static void *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob(void)
+{
+ return test_oob_buffer+64;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc u8 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_1(void)
+{
+ return bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob();
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc u16 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_2(void)
+{
+ return bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob();
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc u32 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_4(void)
+{
+ return bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob();
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc u64 *bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_8(void)
+{
+ return bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob();
+}
+
__bpf_kfunc struct bpf_testmod_ctx *
bpf_testmod_ctx_create(int *err)
{
@@ -740,6 +810,15 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_testmod_ops3_call_test_1)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_testmod_ops3_call_test_2)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_get_default_trusted_ptr_test);
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_put_default_trusted_ptr_test);
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_poison)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_1)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_2)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_4)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_uaf_8)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_1)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_2)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_4)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_kasan_oob_8)
BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_testmod_common_kfunc_ids)
BTF_ID_LIST(bpf_testmod_dtor_ids)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 7/8] bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
Mark x86 as supporting KASAN checks in JITed programs so that the
corresponding JIT compiler inserts checks on the translated
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index e2df1b147184..a50aa9a0b93c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT if X86_64
select HAVE_SAMPLE_FTRACE_DIRECT_MULTI if X86_64
select HAVE_EBPF_JIT
+ select HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN if X86_64
select HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
select HAVE_EISA if X86_32
select HAVE_EXIT_THREAD
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 6/8] selftests/bpf: do not run verifier JIT tests when BPF_JIT_KASAN is enabled
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
Multiple verifier tests validate the exact list of JITed instructions.
Even if the test offers some flexibility in its checks (eg: not
enforcing the first instruction to be verified right at the beginning of
jited code, but rather searching where the expected JIT instructions
could be located), it is confused by the new KASAN instrumentation JITed
in programs: this instrumentation can be inserted anywhere in-between
searched instructions, leading to test failures despite the correct
instructions being generated.
Prevent those failures by skipping tests involving JITed instructions
checks when kernel is built with KASAN _and_ JIT is enabled, as those
two conditions lead the JITed code to contains KASAN checks.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c | 5 +++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 5 +++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
index c4c34cae6102..d2c0062ef31a 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c
@@ -1175,6 +1175,11 @@ void run_subtest(struct test_loader *tester,
return;
}
+ if (is_jit_enabled() && subspec->jited.cnt && get_kasan_jit_enabled()) {
+ test__skip();
+ return;
+ }
+
if (unpriv) {
if (!can_execute_unpriv(tester, spec)) {
test__skip();
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
index f997d7ec8fd0..25bd08648f5f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c
@@ -142,3 +142,8 @@ bool get_unpriv_disabled(void)
}
return mitigations_off;
}
+
+bool get_kasan_jit_enabled(void)
+{
+ return config_contains("CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN=y");
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h
index 151f67329665..bc5f4c953c9d 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h
@@ -5,3 +5,4 @@
#define UNPRIV_SYSCTL "kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled"
bool get_unpriv_disabled(void);
+bool get_kasan_jit_enabled(void);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 5/8] bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks into x86 JITed programs
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
Insert KASAN shadow memory checks before memory load and store
operations in JIT-compiled BPF programs. This helps detect memory safety
bugs such as use-after-free and out-of-bounds accesses at runtime.
The main instructions being targeted are BPF_LDX and BPF_STX, but not
all of them are being instrumented:
- if the load/store instruction is in fact accessing the program stack,
emit_kasan_check silently skips the instrumentation, as we already
have page guards to monitor stack accesses. Stack accesses _could_ be
monitored more finely by adding kasan checks, but it would need JIT
compiler to insert red zones around any variable on stack, and we likely
do not have enough info in JIT compiler to do so.
- if the load/store instruction is a BPF_PROBE_MEM or a BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC
instruction, we do not instrument it, as the passed address can fault
(hence the custom fault management with BPF_PROBE_XXX instructions),
and so the corresponding kasan check could fault as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
This RFC also ignores for now atomic operations, because I am not
perfectly clear yet about how they are JITed and so how much kasan
instrumentation is legitimate here.
---
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index b90103bd0080..111fe1d55121 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1811,6 +1811,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *
const s32 imm32 = insn->imm;
u32 dst_reg = insn->dst_reg;
u32 src_reg = insn->src_reg;
+ bool accesses_stack;
u8 b2 = 0, b3 = 0;
u8 *start_of_ldx;
s64 jmp_offset;
@@ -1831,6 +1832,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *
EMIT_ENDBR();
ip = image + addrs[i - 1] + (prog - temp);
+ accesses_stack = bpf_insn_accesses_stack(env, bpf_prog, i - 1);
switch (insn->code) {
/* ALU */
@@ -2242,6 +2244,11 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))
case BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H:
case BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W:
case BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW:
+ err = emit_kasan_check(&prog, dst_reg, insn,
+ image + addrs[i - 1],
+ accesses_stack);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
emit_stx(&prog, BPF_SIZE(insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn->off);
break;
@@ -2390,6 +2397,12 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))
/* populate jmp_offset for JAE above to jump to start_of_ldx */
start_of_ldx = prog;
end_of_jmp[-1] = start_of_ldx - end_of_jmp;
+ } else {
+ err = emit_kasan_check(&prog, src_reg, insn,
+ image + addrs[i - 1],
+ accesses_stack);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_PROBE_MEMSX ||
BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_MEMSX)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 4/8] bpf, x86: add helper to emit kasan checks in x86 JITed programs
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
Add the emit_kasan_check() function that emits KASAN shadow memory
checks before memory accesses in JIT-compiled BPF programs. The
implementation relies on the existing __asan_{load,store}X functions
from KASAN subsystem. The helper:
- ensures that the kasan instrumention is actually needed: if the
instruction being processed accesses the program stack, we skip the
instrumentation, as those accesses are already protected with page
guards
- saves registers. This includes caller-saved registers, but also
temporary registers, as those were possibly used by the
affected program
- computes the accessed address and stores it in %rdi
- calls the relevant function, depending on the instruction being a load
or a store, and the size of the access.
- restores registeres
The special care needed when inserting this instrumentation comes at the
cost of a non negligeable increase in JITed code size. For example, a
bare
mov 0x0(%si),rbx # Load in rbx content at address stored in rsi
becomes
push %rax
push %rcx
push %rdx
push %rsi
push %rdi
push %r8
push %r9
push %r10
push %r11
sub $0x8,%rsp
mov %rsi,%rdi
call 0xffffffff81da0a60 <__asan_load8>
add $0x8,%rsp
pop %r11
pop %r10
pop %r9
pop %r8
pop %rdi
pop %rsi
pop %rdx
pop %rcx
pop %rax
mov 0x0(%rsi),rbx
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 93 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index ea9e707e8abf..b90103bd0080 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@
#include <asm/unwind.h>
#include <asm/cfi.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
+#endif
+
static bool all_callee_regs_used[4] = {true, true, true, true};
static u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len)
@@ -1301,6 +1305,95 @@ static void emit_store_stack_imm64(u8 **pprog, int reg, int stack_off, u64 imm64
emit_stx(pprog, BPF_DW, BPF_REG_FP, reg, stack_off);
}
+static int emit_kasan_check(u8 **pprog, u32 addr_reg, struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ u8 *ip, bool accesses_stack)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN
+ bool is_write = BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX;
+ u32 bpf_size = BPF_SIZE(insn->code);
+ s32 off = insn->off;
+ u8 *prog = *pprog;
+ void *kasan_func;
+
+ if (accesses_stack)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Derive KASAN check function from access type and size */
+ switch (bpf_size) {
+ case BPF_B:
+ kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store1 : __asan_load1;
+ break;
+ case BPF_H:
+ kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store2 : __asan_load2;
+ break;
+ case BPF_W:
+ kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store4 : __asan_load4;
+ break;
+ case BPF_DW:
+ kasan_func = is_write ? __asan_store8 : __asan_load8;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Save rax */
+ EMIT1(0x50);
+ /* Save rcx */
+ EMIT1(0x51);
+ /* Save rdx */
+ EMIT1(0x52);
+ /* Save rsi */
+ EMIT1(0x56);
+ /* Save rdi */
+ EMIT1(0x57);
+ /* Save r8 */
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x50);
+ /* Save r9 */
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x51);
+ /* Save r10 */
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x52);
+ /* Save r11 */
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x53);
+ /* We have pushed 72 bytes, realign stack to 16 bytes: sub rsp, 8 */
+ EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 8);
+
+ /* mov rdi, addr_reg */
+ EMIT_mov(BPF_REG_1, addr_reg);
+
+ /* add rdi, off (if offset is non-zero) */
+ if (off) {
+ if (is_imm8(off)) {
+ /* add rdi, imm8 */
+ EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xC7, (u8)off);
+ } else {
+ /* add rdi, imm32 */
+ EMIT3_off32(0x48, 0x81, 0xC7, off);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Adjust ip to account for the instrumentation generated so far */
+ ip += (prog - *pprog);
+ /* call kasan_func */
+ if (emit_call(&prog, kasan_func, ip))
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ /* Restore registers */
+ EMIT4(0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 8);
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x5B);
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x5A);
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x59);
+ EMIT2(0x41, 0x58);
+ EMIT1(0x5F);
+ EMIT1(0x5E);
+ EMIT1(0x5A);
+ EMIT1(0x59);
+ EMIT1(0x58);
+
+ *pprog = prog;
+#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN */
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int emit_atomic_rmw(u8 **pprog, u32 atomic_op,
u32 dst_reg, u32 src_reg, s16 off, u8 bpf_size)
{
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 3/8] bpf: add BPF_JIT_KASAN for KASAN instrumentation of JITed programs
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
Add a new Kconfig option CONFIG_BPF_JIT_KASAN that automatically enables
KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) memory access checks for JIT-compiled
BPF programs, when both KASAN and JIT compiler are enabled. When
enabled, the JIT compiler will emit shadow memory checks before memory
loads and stores to detect use-after-free, out-of-bounds, and other
memory safety bugs at runtime. The option is gated behind
HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN, as it needs proper arch-specific implementation.
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
kernel/bpf/Kconfig | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/Kconfig b/kernel/bpf/Kconfig
index eb3de35734f0..28392adb3d7e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/Kconfig
+++ b/kernel/bpf/Kconfig
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ config HAVE_CBPF_JIT
config HAVE_EBPF_JIT
bool
+# KASAN support for JIT compiler
+config HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN
+ bool
+
# Used by archs to tell that they want the BPF JIT compiler enabled by
# default for kernels that were compiled with BPF JIT support.
config ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_BPF_JIT
@@ -101,4 +105,9 @@ config BPF_LSM
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+config BPF_JIT_KASAN
+ bool
+ depends on HAVE_EBPF_JIT_KASAN
+ default y if BPF_JIT && KASAN_GENERIC
+
endmenu # "BPF subsystem"
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 2/8] bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
In order to prepare to emit KASAN checks in JITed programs, JIT
compilers need to be aware about whether some load/store instructions
are targeting the bpf program stack, as those should not be monitored
(we already have guard pages for that, and it is difficult anyway to
correctly monitor any kind of data passed on stack).
To support this need, make the BPF verifier mark the instructions that
access program stack:
- add a setter that allows the verifier to mark instructions accessing
the program stack
- add a getter that allows JIT compilers to check whether instructions
being JITed are accessing the stack
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 ++
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 ++
kernel/bpf/core.c | 10 ++++++++++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +++++++
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index b4b703c90ca9..774a0395c498 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -1543,6 +1543,8 @@ void bpf_jit_uncharge_modmem(u32 size);
bool bpf_prog_has_trampoline(const struct bpf_prog *prog);
bool bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struct bpf_prog *prog,
int insn_idx);
+bool bpf_insn_accesses_stack(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_prog *prog, int insn_idx);
#else
static inline int bpf_trampoline_link_prog(struct bpf_tramp_link *link,
struct bpf_trampoline *tr,
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
index b148f816f25b..ab99ed4c4227 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
@@ -660,6 +660,8 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
u16 const_reg_map_mask;
u16 const_reg_subprog_mask;
u32 const_reg_vals[10];
+ /* instruction accesses stack */
+ bool accesses_stack;
};
#define MAX_USED_MAPS 64 /* max number of maps accessed by one eBPF program */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 8b018ff48875..340abfdadbed 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1582,6 +1582,16 @@ bool bpf_insn_is_indirect_target(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const struc
insn_idx += prog->aux->subprog_start;
return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].indirect_target;
}
+
+bool bpf_insn_accesses_stack(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_prog *prog, int insn_idx)
+{
+ if (!env)
+ return false;
+ insn_idx += prog->aux->subprog_start;
+ return env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].accesses_stack;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_JIT */
/* Base function for offset calculation. Needs to go into .text section,
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 1e36b9e91277..7bce4fb4e540 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -3502,6 +3502,11 @@ static void mark_indirect_target(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
env->insn_aux_data[idx].indirect_target = true;
}
+static void mark_insn_accesses_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx)
+{
+ env->insn_aux_data[idx].accesses_stack = true;
+}
+
#define LR_FRAMENO_BITS 3
#define LR_SPI_BITS 6
#define LR_ENTRY_BITS (LR_SPI_BITS + LR_FRAMENO_BITS + 1)
@@ -6490,6 +6495,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
else
err = check_stack_write(env, regno, off, size,
value_regno, insn_idx);
+
+ mark_insn_accesses_stack(env, insn_idx);
} else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer(reg)) {
if (t == BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data(env, NULL, t)) {
verbose(env, "cannot write into packet\n");
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 1/8] kasan: expose generic kasan helpers
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
In-Reply-To: <20260413-kasan-v1-0-1a5831230821@bootlin.com>
In order to prepare KASAN helpers to be called from the eBPF subsystem
(to add KASAN instrumentation at runtime when JITing eBPF programs),
expose the __asan_{load,store}X functions in linux/kasan.h
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
include/linux/kasan.h | 13 +++++++++++++
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 10 ----------
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 338a1921a50a..6f580d4a39e4 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -710,4 +710,17 @@ void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr);
static inline void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC || CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
+void __asan_load1(void *p);
+void __asan_store1(void *p);
+void __asan_load2(void *p);
+void __asan_store2(void *p);
+void __asan_load4(void *p);
+void __asan_store4(void *p);
+void __asan_load8(void *p);
+void __asan_store8(void *p);
+void __asan_load16(void *p);
+void __asan_store16(void *p);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
+
#endif /* LINUX_KASAN_H */
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index fc9169a54766..3bfce8eb3135 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -594,16 +594,6 @@ void __asan_handle_no_return(void);
void __asan_alloca_poison(void *, ssize_t size);
void __asan_allocas_unpoison(void *stack_top, ssize_t stack_bottom);
-void __asan_load1(void *);
-void __asan_store1(void *);
-void __asan_load2(void *);
-void __asan_store2(void *);
-void __asan_load4(void *);
-void __asan_store4(void *);
-void __asan_load8(void *);
-void __asan_store8(void *);
-void __asan_load16(void *);
-void __asan_store16(void *);
void __asan_loadN(void *, ssize_t size);
void __asan_storeN(void *, ssize_t size);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCH RFC bpf-next 0/8] bpf: add support for KASAN checks in JITed programs
From: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) @ 2026-04-13 18:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Song Liu, Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, John Fastabend,
David S. Miller, David Ahern, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Shuah Khan,
Maxime Coquelin, Alexandre Torgue, Andrey Ryabinin,
Alexander Potapenko, Andrey Konovalov, Dmitry Vyukov,
Vincenzo Frascino, Andrew Morton
Cc: ebpf, Bastien Curutchet, Thomas Petazzoni, Xu Kuohai, bpf,
linux-kernel, netdev, linux-kselftest, linux-stm32,
linux-arm-kernel, kasan-dev, linux-mm,
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation)
Hello,
this series aims to bring basic support for KASAN checks to BPF JITed
programs. This follows the first RFC posted in [1].
KASAN allows to spot memory management mistakes by reserving a fraction
of memory as "shadow memory" that will map to the rest of the memory and
allow its monitoring. Each memory-accessing instruction is then
instrumented at build time to call some ASAN check function, that will
analyze the corresponding bits in shadow memory, and if it detects the
access as invalid, trigger a detailed report. The goal of this series is
to replicate this mechanism for BPF programs when they are being JITed
into native instructions: that's then the (runtime) JIT compiler who is
in charge of inserting calls to the corresponding kasan checks, when a
program is being loaded into the kernel. This task involves:
- identifying at program load time the instructions performing memory
accesses
- identifying those accesses properties (size ? read or write ?) to
define the relevant kasan check function to call
- just before the identified instructions:
- perform the basic context saving (ie: saving registers)
- inserting a call to the relevant kasan check function
- restore context
- whenever the instrumented program executes, if it performs an invalid
access, it triggers a kasan report identical to those instrumented on
kernel side at build time.
As discussed in [1], this series is based on some choices and
assumptions:
- it focuses on x86_64 for now, and so only on KASAN_GENERIC
- not all memory accessing BPF instructions are being instrumented:
- it focuses on STX/LDX instructions
- it discards instructions accessing BPF program stack (already
monitored by page guards)
- it discards possibly faulting instructions, like BPF_PROBE_MEM or
BPF_PROBE_ATOMIC insns
The series is marked and sent as RFC:
- to allow collecting feedback early and make sure that it goes into the
right direction
- because it depends on Xu's work to pass data between the verifier and
JIT compilers. This work is not merged yet, see [2]. I have been
tracking the various revisions he sent on the ML and based my local
branch on his work
- because tests brought by this series currently can't run on BPF CI:
they expect kasan multishot to be enabled, otherwise the first test
will make all other kasan-related tests fail.
- because some cases like atomic loads/stores are not instrumented yet
(and are still making me scratch my head)
- because it will hopefully provide a good basis to discuss the topic at
LSFMMBPF (see [3])
Despite this series not being ready for integration yet, anyone
interested in running it locally can perform the following steps to run
the JITed KASAN instrumentation selftests:
- rebasing locally this series on [2]
- building and running the corresponding kernel with kasan_multi_shot
enabled
- running `test_progs -a kasan`
And should get a variety of KASAN tests executed for BPF programs:
#162/1 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_read_1:OK
#162/2 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_read_2:OK
#162/3 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_read_4:OK
#162/4 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_read_8:OK
#162/5 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_write_1:OK
#162/6 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_write_2:OK
#162/7 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_write_4:OK
#162/8 kasan/bpf_kasan_uaf_write_8:OK
#162/9 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_read_1:OK
#162/10 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_read_2:OK
#162/11 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_read_4:OK
#162/12 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_read_8:OK
#162/13 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_write_1:OK
#162/14 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_write_2:OK
#162/15 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_write_4:OK
#162/16 kasan/bpf_kasan_oob_write_8:OK
#162 kasan:OK
Summary: 1/16 PASSED, 0 SKIPPED, 0 FAILED
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/DG7UG112AVBC.JKYISDTAM30T@bootlin.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/cover.1776062885.git.xukuohai@hotmail.com/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/DGGNCXX79H8O.2P6K8L1QW1M8K@bootlin.com/
Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
---
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) (8):
kasan: expose generic kasan helpers
bpf: mark instructions accessing program stack
bpf: add BPF_JIT_KASAN for KASAN instrumentation of JITed programs
bpf, x86: add helper to emit kasan checks in x86 JITed programs
bpf, x86: emit KASAN checks into x86 JITed programs
selftests/bpf: do not run verifier JIT tests when BPF_JIT_KASAN is enabled
bpf, x86: enable KASAN for JITed programs on x86
selftests/bpf: add tests to validate KASAN on JIT programs
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 106 +++++++++++++
include/linux/bpf.h | 2 +
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 2 +
include/linux/kasan.h | 13 ++
kernel/bpf/Kconfig | 9 ++
kernel/bpf/core.c | 10 ++
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 7 +
mm/kasan/kasan.h | 10 --
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kasan.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/kasan.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++
.../testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 79 ++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_loader.c | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.c | 5 +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/unpriv_helpers.h | 1 +
15 files changed, 551 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 7990a071b32887a1a883952e8cf60134b6d6fea0
change-id: 20260126-kasan-fcd68f64cd7b
Best regards,
--
Alexis Lothoré (eBPF Foundation) <alexis.lothore@bootlin.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 08/10] drm/bridge: lt8713sx: switch to of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 18:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260413-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-panel_or_bridge-v1-8-acd01cd79a1f@bootlin.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:40PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> This driver calls drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() with a NULL pointer in the
> @panel parameter, thus using a reduced feature set of that function.
> Replace this call with the simpler of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint().
>
> Since of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint() increases the refcount of the
> returned bridge, ensure it is put on removal. To achieve this, instead of
> adding an explicit drm_bridge_put(), migrate to the bridge::next_bridge
> pointer which is automatically put when the bridge is eventually freed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt8713sx.c | 7 +++----
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 06/10] drm/bridge: lt9611: switch to of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 18:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260413-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-panel_or_bridge-v1-6-acd01cd79a1f@bootlin.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:38PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> This driver calls drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() with a NULL pointer in the
> @panel parameter, thus using a reduced feature set of that function.
> Replace this call with the simpler of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint().
>
> Since of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint() increases the refcount of the
> returned bridge, ensure it is put on removal. To achieve this, instead of
> adding an explicit drm_bridge_put(), migrate to the bridge::next_bridge
> pointer which is automatically put when the bridge is eventually freed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt9611.c | 5 ++---
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 07/10] drm/bridge: adv7511: switch to of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 18:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260413-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-panel_or_bridge-v1-7-acd01cd79a1f@bootlin.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:39PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> This driver calls drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() with a NULL pointer in the
> @panel parameter, thus using a reduced feature set of that function.
> Replace this call with the simpler of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint().
>
> Since of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint() increases the refcount of the
> returned bridge, ensure it is put on removal. To achieve this, instead of
> adding an explicit drm_bridge_put(), migrate to the bridge::next_bridge
> pointer which is automatically put when the bridge is eventually freed.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511.h | 1 -
> drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/adv7511/adv7511_drv.c | 8 ++++----
> 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 05/10] drm/bridge: lontium-lt9611uxc: switch to of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 18:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <rivgablnl6s7u54gyv77vr5pitlvvgzby7qnu4ryc4tttaqa7t@hztujmxw5njt>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 09:01:34PM +0300, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:37PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> > This driver calls drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() with a NULL pointer in the
> > @panel parameter, thus using a reduced feature set of that function.
> > Replace this call with the simpler of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint().
> >
> > Since of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint() increases the refcount of the
> > returned bridge, ensure it is put on removal. To achieve this, instead of
> > adding an explicit drm_bridge_put(), migrate to the bridge::next_bridge
> > pointer which is automatically put when the bridge is eventually freed.
>
> What if the driver's _probe fails between increasing this refcount and
> actually registering the bridge? There are enough possible cases. I
> think this also applies to other patches in the series (BTW, including
> the msm/hdmi, which I ack'ed).
And after reading the code, I missed that it's handled as a part of
bridge_alloc / __drm_bridge_free(). Please ignore the comment.
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 02/10] drm/msm/hdmi: switch to of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 18:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <t45cmunr6lhxrvqgwa2mrh765zmjjderfpd32islrbg7jey4fq@d5635guivyla>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 08:57:42PM +0300, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote:
> On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:34PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> > This driver calls drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() with a NULL pointer in the
> > @panel parameter, thus using a reduced feature set of that function.
> > Replace this call with the simpler of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint().
> >
> > Since of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint() increases the refcount of the
> > returned bridge, ensure it is put on removal.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
> > ---
> > drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c | 3 ++-
> > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
>
> Acked-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
>
> How common is the probe / remove path? Would it make sense to have a
> devm_ version of the function?
And probably the best way would be to change the driver to allocate the
bridge early and follow the rest of the bridge drivers. I will check it
out and possibly send a patch.
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 10/10] drm: of: forbid bridge-only calls to drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 18:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260413-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-panel_or_bridge-v1-10-acd01cd79a1f@bootlin.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:42PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> Up to now drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() can be called with a bridge pointer
> only, a panel pointer only, or both a bridge and a panel pointers. The
> logic to handle all the three cases is somewhat complex to read however.
>
> Now all bridge-only callers have been converted to
> of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint(), which is simpler and handles bridge
> refcounting. So forbid new bridge-only users by mandating a non-NULL panel
> pointer in the docs and in the sanity checks along with a warning.
Are there remaining users which still use either the bridge or the
panel? Would it be possible / better to drop the two-arg version?
>
> Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/drm_of.c | 26 ++++++++++++--------------
> 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH net-next] net: stmmac: enable RPS and RBU interrupts
From: Jakub Kicinski @ 2026-04-13 18:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Russell King (Oracle)
Cc: Andrew Lunn, Alexandre Torgue, Andrew Lunn, David S. Miller,
Eric Dumazet, linux-arm-kernel, linux-stm32, netdev, Paolo Abeni,
Sam Edwards
In-Reply-To: <E1wBBaR-0000000GZHR-1dbM@rmk-PC.armlinux.org.uk>
On Fri, 10 Apr 2026 14:07:51 +0100 Russell King (Oracle) wrote:
> Since we are seeing receive buffer exhaustion on several platforms,
> let's enable the interrupts so the statistics we publish via ethtool -S
> actually work to aid diagnosis. I've been in two minds about whether
> to send this patch, but given the problems with stmmac at the moment,
> I think it should be merged.
Sorry for a under-research response but wasn't there are person trying
to fix the OOM starvation issue? Who was supposed to add a timer?
Is your problem also OOM related or do you suspect something else?
Firing interrupts when Rx fill ring runs dry (which IIUC this patches
dies?) is not a good idea.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 05/10] drm/bridge: lontium-lt9611uxc: switch to of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 18:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260413-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-panel_or_bridge-v1-5-acd01cd79a1f@bootlin.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:37PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> This driver calls drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() with a NULL pointer in the
> @panel parameter, thus using a reduced feature set of that function.
> Replace this call with the simpler of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint().
>
> Since of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint() increases the refcount of the
> returned bridge, ensure it is put on removal. To achieve this, instead of
> adding an explicit drm_bridge_put(), migrate to the bridge::next_bridge
> pointer which is automatically put when the bridge is eventually freed.
What if the driver's _probe fails between increasing this refcount and
actually registering the bridge? There are enough possible cases. I
think this also applies to other patches in the series (BTW, including
the msm/hdmi, which I ack'ed).
>
> Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt9611uxc.c | 5 ++---
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt9611uxc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt9611uxc.c
> index 11aab07d88df..55b80a488c33 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt9611uxc.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/bridge/lontium-lt9611uxc.c
> @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@
> struct lt9611uxc {
> struct device *dev;
> struct drm_bridge bridge;
> - struct drm_bridge *next_bridge;
>
> struct regmap *regmap;
> /* Protects all accesses to registers by stopping the on-chip MCU */
> @@ -284,7 +283,7 @@ static int lt9611uxc_bridge_attach(struct drm_bridge *bridge,
> {
> struct lt9611uxc *lt9611uxc = bridge_to_lt9611uxc(bridge);
>
> - return drm_bridge_attach(encoder, lt9611uxc->next_bridge,
> + return drm_bridge_attach(encoder, lt9611uxc->bridge.next_bridge,
> bridge, flags);
> }
>
> @@ -487,7 +486,7 @@ static int lt9611uxc_parse_dt(struct device *dev,
>
> lt9611uxc->dsi1_node = of_graph_get_remote_node(dev->of_node, 1, -1);
>
> - return drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge(dev->of_node, 2, -1, NULL, <9611uxc->next_bridge);
> + return of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint(dev->of_node, 2, -1, <9611uxc->bridge.next_bridge);
> }
>
> static int lt9611uxc_gpio_init(struct lt9611uxc *lt9611uxc)
>
> --
> 2.53.0
>
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 02/10] drm/msm/hdmi: switch to of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 17:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260413-drm-bridge-alloc-getput-panel_or_bridge-v1-2-acd01cd79a1f@bootlin.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:58:34PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> This driver calls drm_of_find_panel_or_bridge() with a NULL pointer in the
> @panel parameter, thus using a reduced feature set of that function.
> Replace this call with the simpler of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint().
>
> Since of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint() increases the refcount of the
> returned bridge, ensure it is put on removal.
>
> Signed-off-by: Luca Ceresoli <luca.ceresoli@bootlin.com>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/msm/hdmi/hdmi.c | 3 ++-
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
Acked-by: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@oss.qualcomm.com>
How common is the probe / remove path? Would it make sense to have a
devm_ version of the function?
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 01/10] drm/bridge: add of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Dmitry Baryshkov @ 2026-04-13 17:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luca Ceresoli
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <DHS6WZRYGWZQ.1X6ABU4UWF730@bootlin.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 07:07:14PM +0200, Luca Ceresoli wrote:
> Hi Dmitry, Maxime,
>
> thanks Dmitry for the quick feedback!
>
> On Mon Apr 13, 2026 at 4:58 PM CEST, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote:
>
> >> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bridge.c
> >> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bridge.c
> >> @@ -1581,6 +1581,52 @@ struct drm_bridge *of_drm_find_bridge(struct device_node *np)
> >> return bridge;
> >> }
> >> EXPORT_SYMBOL(of_drm_find_bridge);
> >> +
> >> +/**
> >> + * of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint - return DRM bridge connected to a port/endpoint
> >> + * @np: device tree node containing output ports
> >> + * @port: port in the device tree node, or -1 for the first port found
> >> + * @endpoint: endpoint in the device tree node, or -1 for the first endpoint found
> >> + * @bridge: pointer to hold returned drm_bridge, must not be NULL
> >> + *
> >> + * Given a DT node's port and endpoint number, find the connected node and
> >> + * return the associated drm_bridge device.
> >> + *
> >> + * The refcount of the returned bridge is incremented. Use drm_bridge_put()
> >> + * when done with it.
> >> + *
> >> + * Returns zero (and sets *bridge to a valid bridge pointer) if successful,
> >> + * or one of the standard error codes (and the value in *bridge is
> >> + * unspecified) if it fails.
> >
> > Can we return drm_bridge or error cookie instead?
>
> (while replying I realized there is a design flaw in my implementation, but
> see below)
>
> I initially thought I'd do it, but I don't like returning an error cookie
> for functions getting a bridge pointer. The main reason is that with bridge
> refcounting the __free() cleanup actions are handy in a lot of places, so we
> are introdugin a lot of code like:
>
> struct drm_bridge *foo __free(drm_bridge_put) = some_func(...);
>
> Where some_func can be one of of_drm_find_bridge(),
> drm_bridge_get_next_bridge(), drm_bridge_chain_get_{first,last}_bridge()
> etc.
This is fine even with the functions returning a cookie: the free
function can explicitly check and return early if IS_ERR() pointer is
passed to it.
>
> Such code is very handy exactly because these functions return either a
> valid pointer or NULL, and thus the cleanup actions always does the right
> thing. If an error cookie were returned, the caller would have to be very
> careful in inhibiting the cleanup action by clearing the pointer before
> returning. This originate for example this discussion: [0]
>
> [0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4cd29943-a8d0-4706-b0c5-01d6b33863e4@bootlin.com/
>
> So I think never having a negative error value in the bridge pointer is
> useful to prevent bugs slipping in drivers. For this we should take one of
> these two opposite approaches:
>
> 1. don't return a bridge pointer which can be an ERR_PTR; return an int
> with the error code and take a **drm_bridge and:
> - on success, set the valid pointer in *bridge
> - on failure, set *bridge = NULL (*)
> 2. like the above-mentioned functions (of_drm_find_bridge(),
> drm_bridge_get_next_bridge() etc) return a drm_bridge pointer which is
> either a valid pointer or NULL
3. Return pointer or cookie, ignore cookie in the release function.
>
> (*) I didn't do it in this patch, that's a design flaw, I'll fix in case
> approach 1 is taken
>
> Clearly option 2 is the simplest to use, but it loses information about
> which error happened.
>
> What do you think about these options?
>
> >> + */
> >> +int of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint(const struct device_node *np,
> >> + int port, int endpoint,
> >> + struct drm_bridge **bridge)
> >
> > Nit: can it be drm_of_get_bridge_by_endpoint?
>
> Argh, this convention is changing periodically it seems! :-)
>
> I previous discussions I was asked to do either drm_of_ [1] of of_drm_ [2],
> but since the latter was the last one requested I sticked on it.
>
> @Maxime, Dmitry, I'm OK with either, just let me know if I need to change.
I missed Maxime's response, sorry. I'm fine with the suggested
convention of using the first argument.
>
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20250319-stylish-lime-mongoose-0a18ad@houat/
> -> search "called drm_of_find_bridge"
> [2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/DEH1VJUEJ8HQ.MIS45UOLCPXL@bootlin.com/
> -> search "What about"
>
> Luca
>
> --
> Luca Ceresoli, Bootlin
> Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
> https://bootlin.com
--
With best wishes
Dmitry
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH] mmc: host: sdhci-iproc: implement the .hw_reset callback
From: Florian Fainelli @ 2026-04-13 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Meagan Lloyd, rjui
Cc: sbranden, linux-arm-kernel, tgopinath, adrian.hunter, linux-mmc
In-Reply-To: <3305684d-8517-47dd-8852-2e34d40fc712@linux.microsoft.com>
On 4/13/26 10:38, Meagan Lloyd wrote:
>
> On 3/27/2026 3:21 PM, Meagan Lloyd wrote:
>> Implement the .hw_reset callback so that the eMMC can be reset as needed
>> given cap-mmc-hw-reset is set in the devicetree and the functionality is
>> enabled on the eMMC.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Meagan Lloyd <meaganlloyd@linux.microsoft.com>
>> ---
>>
>> SDHCI_POWER_CONTROL[4] (SD Host Controller Standard) has been repurposed
>> on my Broadcomm processor to be eMMC hardware reset
>> (SDIO*_eMMCSDXC_CTRL[12], HRESET).
>>
>> Can you confirm this repurposed bit is consistent across the Broadcomm
>> iProc processors and thus the .hw_reset callback can be uniformly
>> applied in this driver?
>
> Hi Ray & Scott,
>
> I hope you're doing well. This bit looks to have been repurposed from
> the SD Host Controller Standard's VDD2 Power Control to being used for
> toggling the hardware reset signal to eMMCs. Can you verify that it
> applies across the iProc processors so that I may finalize this patch?
Which iProc process are you using? If you are not sure this applies
broadly, can you at least make it specific to the SoC you are using?
--
Florian
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC PATCH] mmc: host: sdhci-iproc: implement the .hw_reset callback
From: Meagan Lloyd @ 2026-04-13 17:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: rjui; +Cc: sbranden, linux-arm-kernel, tgopinath, adrian.hunter, linux-mmc
In-Reply-To: <20260327222150.2108111-1-meaganlloyd@linux.microsoft.com>
On 3/27/2026 3:21 PM, Meagan Lloyd wrote:
> Implement the .hw_reset callback so that the eMMC can be reset as needed
> given cap-mmc-hw-reset is set in the devicetree and the functionality is
> enabled on the eMMC.
>
> Signed-off-by: Meagan Lloyd <meaganlloyd@linux.microsoft.com>
> ---
>
> SDHCI_POWER_CONTROL[4] (SD Host Controller Standard) has been repurposed
> on my Broadcomm processor to be eMMC hardware reset
> (SDIO*_eMMCSDXC_CTRL[12], HRESET).
>
> Can you confirm this repurposed bit is consistent across the Broadcomm
> iProc processors and thus the .hw_reset callback can be uniformly
> applied in this driver?
Hi Ray & Scott,
I hope you're doing well. This bit looks to have been repurposed from
the SD Host Controller Standard's VDD2 Power Control to being used for
toggling the hardware reset signal to eMMCs. Can you verify that it
applies across the iProc processors so that I may finalize this patch?
Thank you,
Meagan
>
> ---
> drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-iproc.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-iproc.c b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-iproc.c
> index 35ef5c5f51467..9018ed7fe2e66 100644
> --- a/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-iproc.c
> +++ b/drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-iproc.c
> @@ -181,12 +181,26 @@ static unsigned int sdhci_iproc_bcm2711_get_min_clock(struct sdhci_host *host)
> return 200000;
> }
>
> +static void sdhci_iproc_hw_reset(struct sdhci_host *host)
> +{
> + u8 val = sdhci_readb(host, SDHCI_POWER_CONTROL);
> +
> + /* Trigger reset and hold for at least 1us (eMMC spec requirement) */
> + sdhci_writeb(host, val | BIT(4), SDHCI_POWER_CONTROL);
> + usleep_range(2, 10);
> +
> + /* Release from reset and wait for at least 200us (eMMC spec requirement) */
> + sdhci_writeb(host, val & ~BIT(4), SDHCI_POWER_CONTROL);
> + usleep_range(250, 300);
> +}
> +
> static const struct sdhci_ops sdhci_iproc_ops = {
> .set_clock = sdhci_set_clock,
> .get_max_clock = sdhci_iproc_get_max_clock,
> .set_bus_width = sdhci_set_bus_width,
> .reset = sdhci_reset,
> .set_uhs_signaling = sdhci_set_uhs_signaling,
> + .hw_reset = sdhci_iproc_hw_reset,
> };
>
> static const struct sdhci_ops sdhci_iproc_32only_ops = {
> @@ -201,6 +215,7 @@ static const struct sdhci_ops sdhci_iproc_32only_ops = {
> .set_bus_width = sdhci_set_bus_width,
> .reset = sdhci_reset,
> .set_uhs_signaling = sdhci_set_uhs_signaling,
> + .hw_reset = sdhci_iproc_hw_reset,
> };
>
> static const struct sdhci_pltfm_data sdhci_iproc_cygnus_pltfm_data = {
> @@ -283,6 +298,7 @@ static const struct sdhci_ops sdhci_iproc_bcm2711_ops = {
> .set_bus_width = sdhci_set_bus_width,
> .reset = sdhci_reset,
> .set_uhs_signaling = sdhci_set_uhs_signaling,
> + .hw_reset = sdhci_iproc_hw_reset,
> };
>
> static const struct sdhci_pltfm_data sdhci_bcm2711_pltfm_data = {
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v2] dt-bindings: ARM: arm,vexpress-scc: convert to DT schema
From: Rob Herring @ 2026-04-13 17:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Khushal Chitturi
Cc: krzk+dt, conor+dt, liviu.dudau, sudeep.holla, lpieralisi,
pawel.moll, devicetree, linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260411183355.8847-1-khushalchitturi@gmail.com>
On Sun, Apr 12, 2026 at 12:03:55AM +0530, Khushal Chitturi wrote:
> Convert the ARM Versatile Express Serial Configuration Controller
> bindings to DT schema.
>
> Signed-off-by: Khushal Chitturi <khushalchitturi@gmail.com>
> ---
> Changelog:
> v1 -> v2:
> - Modified compatible string to use an enum instead of a generic pattern.
> - Updated maintainers list.
>
> .../bindings/arm/arm,vexpress-scc.yaml | 53 +++++++++++++++++++
> .../devicetree/bindings/arm/vexpress-scc.txt | 33 ------------
> 2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/arm,vexpress-scc.yaml
> delete mode 100644 Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/vexpress-scc.txt
Applied, thanks.
Rob
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] coresight: etm4x: introduce struct etm4_caps
From: Leo Yan @ 2026-04-13 17:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yeoreum Yun
Cc: coresight, linux-arm-kernel, linux-kernel, suzuki.poulose,
mike.leach, james.clark, alexander.shishkin, jie.gan
In-Reply-To: <20260413142003.3549310-2-yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 03:19:54PM +0100, Yeoreum Yun wrote:
> Introduce struct etm4_caps to describe ETMv4 capabilities
> and move capabilities information into it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yeoreum Yun <yeoreum.yun@arm.com>
LGTM:
Reviewed-by: Leo Yan <leo.yan@arm.com>
FWIW, two comments from Sashiko are valuable for me, please see below.
> ---
> .../coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c | 234 +++++++++---------
> .../coresight/coresight-etm4x-sysfs.c | 190 ++++++++------
> drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x.h | 176 ++++++-------
> 3 files changed, 328 insertions(+), 272 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
> index d565a73f0042..6443f3717b37 100644
> --- a/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
> +++ b/drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-etm4x-core.c
> @@ -88,8 +88,9 @@ static int etm4_probe_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
> */
> static bool etm4x_sspcicrn_present(struct etmv4_drvdata *drvdata, int n)
> {
> - return (n < drvdata->nr_ss_cmp) &&
> - drvdata->nr_pe &&
> + const struct etmv4_caps *caps = &drvdata->caps;
> +
> + return (n < caps->nr_ss_cmp) && caps->nr_pe &&
> (drvdata->config.ss_status[n] & TRCSSCSRn_PC);
As Sashiko suggests:
"This isn't a regression introduced by this patch, but should this be
checking caps->nr_pe_cmp instead of caps->nr_pe?"
I confirmed the ETMv4 specification (ARM IHI0064H.b), the comment
above is valid as the we should check caps->nr_pe_cmp instead.
Could you first use a patch to fix the typo and then apply
capabilities afterwards? This is helpful for porting to stable
kernels.
[...]
> @@ -525,14 +530,14 @@ static int etm4_enable_hw(struct etmv4_drvdata *drvdata)
> if (etm4x_wait_status(csa, TRCSTATR_IDLE_BIT, 1))
> dev_err(etm_dev,
> "timeout while waiting for Idle Trace Status\n");
> - if (drvdata->nr_pe)
> + if (caps->nr_pe)
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->pe_sel, TRCPROCSELR);
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->cfg, TRCCONFIGR);
> /* nothing specific implemented */
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, 0x0, TRCAUXCTLR);
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->eventctrl0, TRCEVENTCTL0R);
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->eventctrl1, TRCEVENTCTL1R);
> - if (drvdata->stallctl)
> + if (caps->stallctl)
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->stall_ctrl, TRCSTALLCTLR);
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->ts_ctrl, TRCTSCTLR);
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->syncfreq, TRCSYNCPR);
> @@ -542,17 +547,17 @@ static int etm4_enable_hw(struct etmv4_drvdata *drvdata)
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->vinst_ctrl, TRCVICTLR);
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->viiectlr, TRCVIIECTLR);
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->vissctlr, TRCVISSCTLR);
> - if (drvdata->nr_pe_cmp)
> + if (caps->nr_pe_cmp)
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->vipcssctlr, TRCVIPCSSCTLR);
> - for (i = 0; i < drvdata->nrseqstate - 1; i++)
> + for (i = 0; i < caps->nrseqstate - 1; i++)
> etm4x_relaxed_write32(csa, config->seq_ctrl[i], TRCSEQEVRn(i));
Sashiko's comment:
"If the hardware does not implement a sequencer, caps->nrseqstate (a u8)
will be 0. Does 0 - 1 evaluate to -1 as an int, which then gets promoted
to ULONG_MAX against val (an unsigned long)?"
This is a good catch. The condition check should be:
for (i = 0; i < caps->nrseqstate; i++)
...;
The issue is irrelevant to your patch, but could you use a patch to fix
"nrseqstate - 1" first and then apply the cap refactoring on it? This
would be friendly for porting to stable kernel.
Thanks,
Leo
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH bpf-next 2/2] bpf, riscv: Remove redundant bpf_flush_icache() after pack allocator finalize
From: Song Liu @ 2026-04-13 17:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Puranjay Mohan
Cc: bpf, Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Eduard Zingerman, Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi,
Yonghong Song, Jiri Olsa, Xu Kuohai, Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon,
Luke Nelson, Xi Wang, Björn Töpel, Pu Lehui,
Paul Walmsley, Palmer Dabbelt, Albert Ou, Alexandre Ghiti,
linux-arm-kernel, linux-riscv, linux-kernel
In-Reply-To: <20260413123256.3296452-3-puranjay@kernel.org>
On Mon, Apr 13, 2026 at 5:33 AM Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> bpf_flush_icache() calls flush_icache_range() to clean the data cache
> and invalidate the instruction cache for the JITed code region. However,
> since commit 48a8f78c50bd ("bpf, riscv: use prog pack allocator in the
> BPF JIT"), this flush is redundant.
>
> bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize() copies the JITed instructions to the ROX
> region via bpf_arch_text_copy() -> patch_text_nosync(), and
> patch_text_nosync() already calls flush_icache_range() on the written
> range. The subsequent bpf_flush_icache() repeats the same cache
> maintenance on an overlapping range.
>
> Remove the redundant bpf_flush_icache() call and its now-unused
> definition.
>
> Fixes: 48a8f78c50bd ("bpf, riscv: use prog pack allocator in the BPF JIT")
> Signed-off-by: Puranjay Mohan <puranjay@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
ditto on #include <asm/cacheflush.h>.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 01/10] drm/bridge: add of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint()
From: Luca Ceresoli @ 2026-04-13 17:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Dmitry Baryshkov
Cc: Maarten Lankhorst, Maxime Ripard, Thomas Zimmermann, David Airlie,
Simona Vetter, Rob Clark, Dmitry Baryshkov, Abhinav Kumar,
Jessica Zhang, Sean Paul, Marijn Suijten, Xinliang Liu, Tian Tao,
Xinwei Kong, Sumit Semwal, Yongqin Liu, John Stultz,
Andrzej Hajda, Neil Armstrong, Robert Foss, Laurent Pinchart,
Jonas Karlman, Jernej Skrabec, Tomi Valkeinen, Michal Simek,
Hui Pu, Ian Ray, Thomas Petazzoni, dri-devel, linux-kernel,
linux-arm-msm, freedreno, linux-arm-kernel
In-Reply-To: <u2awvqh2uoc2acuuvyavwwtuvtiaidhbkkj5a2d2wwph2s7j7g@b4j73kwzblgk>
Hi Dmitry, Maxime,
thanks Dmitry for the quick feedback!
On Mon Apr 13, 2026 at 4:58 PM CEST, Dmitry Baryshkov wrote:
>> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bridge.c
>> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_bridge.c
>> @@ -1581,6 +1581,52 @@ struct drm_bridge *of_drm_find_bridge(struct device_node *np)
>> return bridge;
>> }
>> EXPORT_SYMBOL(of_drm_find_bridge);
>> +
>> +/**
>> + * of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint - return DRM bridge connected to a port/endpoint
>> + * @np: device tree node containing output ports
>> + * @port: port in the device tree node, or -1 for the first port found
>> + * @endpoint: endpoint in the device tree node, or -1 for the first endpoint found
>> + * @bridge: pointer to hold returned drm_bridge, must not be NULL
>> + *
>> + * Given a DT node's port and endpoint number, find the connected node and
>> + * return the associated drm_bridge device.
>> + *
>> + * The refcount of the returned bridge is incremented. Use drm_bridge_put()
>> + * when done with it.
>> + *
>> + * Returns zero (and sets *bridge to a valid bridge pointer) if successful,
>> + * or one of the standard error codes (and the value in *bridge is
>> + * unspecified) if it fails.
>
> Can we return drm_bridge or error cookie instead?
(while replying I realized there is a design flaw in my implementation, but
see below)
I initially thought I'd do it, but I don't like returning an error cookie
for functions getting a bridge pointer. The main reason is that with bridge
refcounting the __free() cleanup actions are handy in a lot of places, so we
are introdugin a lot of code like:
struct drm_bridge *foo __free(drm_bridge_put) = some_func(...);
Where some_func can be one of of_drm_find_bridge(),
drm_bridge_get_next_bridge(), drm_bridge_chain_get_{first,last}_bridge()
etc.
Such code is very handy exactly because these functions return either a
valid pointer or NULL, and thus the cleanup actions always does the right
thing. If an error cookie were returned, the caller would have to be very
careful in inhibiting the cleanup action by clearing the pointer before
returning. This originate for example this discussion: [0]
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/4cd29943-a8d0-4706-b0c5-01d6b33863e4@bootlin.com/
So I think never having a negative error value in the bridge pointer is
useful to prevent bugs slipping in drivers. For this we should take one of
these two opposite approaches:
1. don't return a bridge pointer which can be an ERR_PTR; return an int
with the error code and take a **drm_bridge and:
- on success, set the valid pointer in *bridge
- on failure, set *bridge = NULL (*)
2. like the above-mentioned functions (of_drm_find_bridge(),
drm_bridge_get_next_bridge() etc) return a drm_bridge pointer which is
either a valid pointer or NULL
(*) I didn't do it in this patch, that's a design flaw, I'll fix in case
approach 1 is taken
Clearly option 2 is the simplest to use, but it loses information about
which error happened.
What do you think about these options?
>> + */
>> +int of_drm_get_bridge_by_endpoint(const struct device_node *np,
>> + int port, int endpoint,
>> + struct drm_bridge **bridge)
>
> Nit: can it be drm_of_get_bridge_by_endpoint?
Argh, this convention is changing periodically it seems! :-)
I previous discussions I was asked to do either drm_of_ [1] of of_drm_ [2],
but since the latter was the last one requested I sticked on it.
@Maxime, Dmitry, I'm OK with either, just let me know if I need to change.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/dri-devel/20250319-stylish-lime-mongoose-0a18ad@houat/
-> search "called drm_of_find_bridge"
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/DEH1VJUEJ8HQ.MIS45UOLCPXL@bootlin.com/
-> search "What about"
Luca
--
Luca Ceresoli, Bootlin
Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering
https://bootlin.com
^ permalink raw reply
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