From: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
To: linux-audit@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] audit: remove CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
Date: Fri, 24 May 2013 12:11:47 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1369411910-13777-4-git-send-email-eparis@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1369411910-13777-1-git-send-email-eparis@redhat.com>
After trying to use this feature in Fedora we found the hard coding
policy like this into the kernel was a bad idea. Surprise surprise.
We ran into these problems because it was impossible to launch a
container as a logged in user and run a login daemon inside that container.
This reverts back to the old behavior before this option was added. The
option will be re-added in a userspace selectable manor such that
userspace can choose when it is and when it is not appropriate.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 14 --------------
kernel/auditsc.c | 10 ++++------
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 5341d72..2396945 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -272,20 +272,6 @@ config AUDIT_TREE
depends on AUDITSYSCALL
select FSNOTIFY
-config AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
- bool "Make audit loginuid immutable"
- depends on AUDIT
- help
- The config option toggles if a task setting its loginuid requires
- CAP_SYS_AUDITCONTROL or if that task should require no special permissions
- but should instead only allow setting its loginuid if it was never
- previously set. On systems which use systemd or a similar central
- process to restart login services this should be set to true. On older
- systems in which an admin would typically have to directly stop and
- start processes this should be set to false. Setting this to true allows
- one to drop potentially dangerous capabilites from the login tasks,
- but may not be backwards compatible with older init systems.
-
source "kernel/irq/Kconfig"
source "kernel/time/Kconfig"
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index f260281..bbc5a4f 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -1966,15 +1966,13 @@ static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
/* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
return 0;
-#else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
- if (capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
- return 0;
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
- return -EPERM;
+ /* it is set, you need permission */
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return 0;
}
static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
--
1.8.2.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-05-24 16:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-05-24 16:11 [PATCH 1/7] audit: implement generic feature setting and retrieving Eric Paris
2013-05-24 16:11 ` [PATCH 2/7] selinux: apply selinux checks on new audit message types Eric Paris
2013-05-24 16:11 ` [PATCH 3/7] audit: loginuid functions coding style Eric Paris
2013-05-24 16:11 ` Eric Paris [this message]
2013-05-24 16:11 ` [PATCH 5/7] audit: allow unsetting the loginuid (with priv) Eric Paris
2013-05-24 16:11 ` [PATCH 6/7] audit: audit feature to only allow unsetting the loginuid Eric Paris
2013-05-24 16:11 ` [PATCH 7/7] audit: audit feature to set loginuid immutable Eric Paris
2013-07-08 20:34 ` Steve Grubb
2013-07-08 20:51 ` Eric Paris
2013-07-08 21:26 ` Steve Grubb
2013-07-08 21:32 ` Eric Paris
2013-07-09 22:24 ` Steve Grubb
2013-07-09 23:51 ` LC Bruzenak
2013-07-10 13:46 ` Steve Grubb
2013-07-10 14:32 ` LC Bruzenak
2013-07-10 18:16 ` Eric Paris
2013-07-10 18:51 ` LC Bruzenak
2013-07-10 19:02 ` LC Bruzenak
2013-07-10 19:09 ` Eric Paris
2013-05-24 16:28 ` [PATCH 1/7] audit: implement generic feature setting and retrieving Eric Paris
2013-05-24 20:41 ` William Roberts
2013-05-24 20:56 ` William Roberts
2013-05-30 17:20 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2013-07-08 20:28 ` Steve Grubb
2013-07-08 21:55 ` Eric Paris
2013-07-09 1:18 ` William Roberts
2013-07-09 18:30 ` Steve Grubb
2013-07-09 20:59 ` Eric Paris
2013-07-09 22:08 ` Steve Grubb
2013-11-02 7:26 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2013-11-02 14:44 ` Eric Paris
2014-08-22 21:58 ` Steve Grubb
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