From: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Linux Audit <linux-audit@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: Limiting SECCOMP audit events
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2017 15:47:14 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20171215154713.GA16170@sec> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1605a80e588.280e.85c95baa4474aabc7814e68940a78392@paul-moore.com>
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6900 bytes --]
On 12/15/2017 08:08 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On December 14, 2017 6:06:49 PM Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> wrote:
>
>> On 12/14/2017 09:19 AM, Steve Grubb wrote:
>>> On Thursday, December 14, 2017 10:04:48 AM EST Tyler Hicks wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 12/13/2017 05:58 PM, Steve Grubb wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Over the last month, the amount of seccomp events in audit logs is
>>>
>>>>> sky-rocketing. I have over a million events in the last 2 days. Most of
>>>
>>>>> this is generated by firefox and qt webkit.
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> I am wondering if the audit package should ship a file for
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> /usr/lib/sysctl.d/60-auditd.conf
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> wherein it has
>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>>> kernel.seccomp.actions_logged = kill_process kill_thread errno
>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>> I agree with Kees here. IMO, you only want "kill_process kill_thread"
>>>
>>>> which is the default.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The default appears to be all of the types of events without setting
>>> kernel.seccomp.actions_logged.
>>
>> Ah, right. I didn't correctly remember the final implementation details.
>> The default sysctl setting is to allow all actions except for RET_ALLOW
>> to be logged.
>>
>> I think the easiest description of the logic is in the commit message of
>> 59f5cf44a38284eb9e76270c786fb6cc62ef8ac4:
>>
>> if action == RET_ALLOW:
>> do not log
>> else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
>> log
>> else if action == RET_LOG && RET_LOG in actions_logged:
>> log
>> else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
>> log
>> else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
>> log
>> else:
>> do not log
>>
>> I think I originally misunderstood your first email in this thread. I
>> thought you were saying that you were experiencing more seccomp audit
>> events in 4.14 versus 4.13 and that you felt a regression had been
>> introduced. After rereading, I think you're asking why you're getting
>> seccomp RET_TRAP actions logged even though "trap" isn't in the
>> actions_logged sysctl.
>>
>> The reason is because I didn't get clear direction from the audit
>> folks about to do when audit is enabled and the process is being audited
>> and, therefore, I didn't feel comfortable rocking the boat. In that
>> situation, the decision to log is the same as it was in earlier kernels.
>> Specifically, you're hitting the last "else if" conditional in the
>> pseudocode above.
>>
>> If you're happy with having the actions_logged sysctl control whether or
>> not to log seccomp actions taken for processes that are being audited,
>> then I think the following (untested) patch should do exactly what you
>> want. I imagine that you'd also want seccomp to emit audit events
>> whenever the value of the actions_logged sysctl is changed, which should
>> be pretty easy to do.
>>
>> I hope this helps!
>>
>> Tyler
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
>> index af410d9..095b5dd 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -304,12 +304,6 @@ static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
>> }
>> void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
>>
>> -static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
>> -{
>> - if (audit_enabled && unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
>> - __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code);
>> -}
>> -
>
> Looks good to me but two things:
>
> * Change the name of __audit_seccomp() to audit_seccomp() since we don't
> have two functions anymore.
>
> * Are we sure about removing the audit_enabled check? People got pretty
> upset when it wasn't there in the past.
Do you have any references to the complaints so that we can understand
them better? I remember being surprised by commit 96368701 adding the
audit_enabled check (my fault for not watching the list closer) and
having to revert it in Ubuntu with a distro patch.
After sleeping on it for a night, I'm now unsure if the patch I sent in
this thread is what you guys really want. I'll go back to talking in
pseudocode. This is what we have in 4.14:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL && RET_KILL in actions_logged:
log
else if action == RET_LOG && RET_LOG in actions_logged:
log
else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
log
else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not log
This is what the patch in this thread does:
--- a/seccomp-log.pseudo
+++ b/seccomp-log.pseudo
@@ -6,7 +6,5 @@
log
else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
log
- else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
- log
else:
do not log
Instead of that change, now I'm wondering if this is what you really
want:
--- a/seccomp-log.pseudo
+++ b/seccomp-log.pseudo
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
log
else if filter-requests-logging && action in actions_logged:
log
- else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
+ else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited &&
+ action in actions_logged:
log
else:
do not log
After refactoring the 'action in actions_logged' check, it would leave
us with this:
if action == RET_ALLOW:
do not log
else if action not in actions_logged:
do not log
else if action == RET_KILL:
log
else if action == RET_LOG:
log
else if filter-requests-logging:
log
else if audit_enabled && process-is-being-audited:
log
else:
do not log
Tyler
>
>> static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>> {
>> if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
>> @@ -502,8 +496,6 @@ static inline void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
>> { }
>> static inline void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
>> { }
>> -static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
>> -{ }
>> static inline int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
>> struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
>> {
>> diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> index 5f0dfb2ab..914a707 100644
>> --- a/kernel/seccomp.c
>> +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
>> @@ -590,12 +590,6 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall,
>> long signr, u32 action,
>> */
>> if (log)
>> return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
>> -
>> - /*
>> - * Let the audit subsystem decide if the action should be audited based
>> - * on whether the current task itself is being audited.
>> - */
>> - return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
>> }
>>
>> /*
>>
>> --
>> Linux-audit mailing list
>> Linux-audit@redhat.com
>> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
>
>
[-- Attachment #1.2: signature.asc --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 819 bytes --]
[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 0 bytes --]
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-12-15 15:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-12-13 23:58 Limiting SECCOMP audit events Steve Grubb
2017-12-14 0:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-12-14 0:31 ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-14 1:43 ` Paul Moore
2017-12-14 3:30 ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-14 12:42 ` Paul Moore
2017-12-14 15:29 ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-14 15:04 ` Tyler Hicks
2017-12-14 15:19 ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-14 23:06 ` Tyler Hicks
2017-12-14 23:16 ` Kees Cook
2017-12-15 14:08 ` Paul Moore
2017-12-15 15:47 ` Tyler Hicks [this message]
2017-12-15 16:09 ` Steve Grubb
2017-12-15 20:54 ` Paul Moore
2017-12-15 16:02 ` Steve Grubb
2018-01-02 20:03 ` Steve Grubb
2018-01-03 2:52 ` Tyler Hicks
2018-01-03 14:25 ` Paul Moore
2018-04-17 22:54 ` Steve Grubb
2018-04-18 1:57 ` Paul Moore
2018-04-25 0:00 ` Tyler Hicks
2018-04-26 14:41 ` Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20171215154713.GA16170@sec \
--to=tyhicks@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-audit@redhat.com \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=sgrubb@redhat.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox