[PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap

[Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>]

Rename has_cap to has_fcap to clarify it applies to file capabilities
since the entire source file is about capabilities.

Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
---
 security/commoncap.c |   20 ++++++++++----------
 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cf6e2b0..623f251 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
 					  struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 					  bool *effective,
-					  bool *has_cap)
+					  bool *has_fcap)
 {
 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
 	unsigned i;
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
 		*effective = true;
 
 	if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
-		*has_cap = true;
+		*has_fcap = true;
 
 	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
 		__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data 
  * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
  * constructed by execve().
  */
-static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap)
+static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap);
+	rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL)
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 		       __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -472,7 +472,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
 				   bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
 {
 	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
 	 * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user.  Do set it
 	 * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
 	 */
-	if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+	if (has_fcap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
 		warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
 		return;
 	}
@@ -523,20 +523,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	const struct cred *old = current_cred();
 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
-	bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+	bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
 	int ret;
 	kuid_t root_uid;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
+	ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
 	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
 
-	handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
+	handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
 
 	/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
 	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
 
 	/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
-	if (has_cap || is_setid)
+	if (has_fcap || is_setid)
 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
 
 	/*
-- 
1.7.1