* Re: Trivial patches
From: Steve Grubb @ 2016-07-12 16:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <d9f987bb-ba5f-3626-0b5f-4787412124be@debian.org>
Hello,
On Tuesday, July 12, 2016 5:15:01 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
> Could you please merge the following patches that have been proposed to
> debian by Nicolas Braud-Santoni?
Yes, thanks.
> The patches add the Documentation key in the .service file and also fix
> some typos.
They are now applied. If anyone has any other bug fixes, please send them.
There will be a 2.6.5 release later this week that fixes events in the old
format that get passed to plugins such as selinux troubleshooter. This is
commit 1342 in case anyone needs it today.
-Steve
^ permalink raw reply
* Trivial patches
From: Laurent Bigonville @ 2016-07-12 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-audit
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 227 bytes --]
Hi,
Could you please merge the following patches that have been proposed to
debian by Nicolas Braud-Santoni?
The patches add the Documentation key in the .service file and also fix
some typos.
Cheers,
Laurent Bigonville
[-- Warning: decoded text below may be mangled, UTF-8 assumed --]
[-- Attachment #2: 02-Fix-typos-in-manpages-and-messages.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch; name="02-Fix-typos-in-manpages-and-messages.patch", Size: 4672 bytes --]
From: Nicolas Braud-Santoni <nicolas@braud-santoni.eu>
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 22:59:59 +0200
Subject: Fix typos in manpages and messages
---
bindings/python/auparse_python.c | 6 +++---
docs/auditd.conf.5 | 2 +-
docs/auparse_find_field.3 | 2 +-
docs/auparse_find_field_next.3 | 4 ++--
tools/auvirt/auvirt.8 | 2 +-
5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bindings/python/auparse_python.c b/bindings/python/auparse_python.c
index 6ec22c9..37d99be 100644
--- a/bindings/python/auparse_python.c
+++ b/bindings/python/auparse_python.c
@@ -1383,7 +1383,7 @@ PyDoc_STRVAR(find_field_doc,
"find_field(name) Search for field name.\n\
\n\
find_field() will scan all records in an event to find the first\n\
-occurance of the field name passed to it. Searching begins from the\n\
+occurence of the field name passed to it. Searching begins from the\n\
cursor’s current position. The field name is stored for subsequent\n\
searching.\n\
\n\
@@ -1413,9 +1413,9 @@ const char *auparse_find_field_next(auparse_state_t *au);
* auparse_find_field_next
********************************/
PyDoc_STRVAR(find_field_next_doc,
-"find_field_next() Get next occurrance of field name\n\
+"find_field_next() Get next occurrence of field name\n\
\n\
-find_field_next() returns the value associated next occurrance of field name.\n\
+find_field_next() returns the value associated next occurrence of field name.\n\
Returns value associated with field or None if there is no next field.\n\
Raises exception (EnvironmentError) on error.\n\
");
diff --git a/docs/auditd.conf.5 b/docs/auditd.conf.5
index 6715341..6a16c21 100644
--- a/docs/auditd.conf.5
+++ b/docs/auditd.conf.5
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ means that it will issue a warning to syslog.
.I rotate
will rotate logs, losing the oldest to free up space.
.I exec
-/path-to-script will execute the script. You cannot pass parameters to the script. The script is also responsible for telling the auditd daemon to resume loggin
+/path-to-script will execute the script. You cannot pass parameters to the script. The script is also responsible for telling the auditd daemon to resume login
g once its completed its action. This can be done by adding service auditd resume to the script.
.I Suspend
will cause the audit daemon to stop writing records to the disk. The daemon will still be alive. The
diff --git a/docs/auparse_find_field.3 b/docs/auparse_find_field.3
index 4062588..a9db80e 100644
--- a/docs/auparse_find_field.3
+++ b/docs/auparse_find_field.3
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ const char *auparse_find_field(auparse_state_t *au, const char *name);
.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-auparse_find_field will scan all records in an event to find the first occurance of the field name passed to it. Searching begins from the cursor's current position. The field name is stored for subsequent searching.
+auparse_find_field will scan all records in an event to find the first occurrence of the field name passed to it. Searching begins from the cursor's current position. The field name is stored for subsequent searching.
.SH "RETURN VALUE"
diff --git a/docs/auparse_find_field_next.3 b/docs/auparse_find_field_next.3
index f072fe7..e921080 100644
--- a/docs/auparse_find_field_next.3
+++ b/docs/auparse_find_field_next.3
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
.TH "AUPARSE_FIND_FIELD_NEXT" "3" "Feb 2007" "Red Hat" "Linux Audit API"
.SH NAME
-auparse_find_field_next \- find next occurrance of field name
+auparse_find_field_next \- find next occurrence of field name
.SH "SYNOPSIS"
.B #include <auparse.h>
.sp
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ const char *auparse_find_field_next(auparse_state_t *au);
.SH "DESCRIPTION"
-auparse_find_field_next finds the next occurrance of the previously stored field name. It will scan until it reaches the last record of the current event.
+auparse_find_field_next finds the next occurrence of the previously stored field name. It will scan until it reaches the last record of the current event.
.SH "RETURN VALUE"
diff --git a/tools/auvirt/auvirt.8 b/tools/auvirt/auvirt.8
index 96123f4..1fbc1f5 100644
--- a/tools/auvirt/auvirt.8
+++ b/tools/auvirt/auvirt.8
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ guest, both UUID or VM name can be given.
For each guest session the tool prints a record with the domain name, the user
that started the guest, the time when the guest was started and the time when
-the guest was stoped.
+the guest was stopped.
If the option "\-\-all\-events" is given a more detailed output is shown. In this
mode other records are shown for guest's stops, resource
[-- Attachment #3: 0003-Add-documentation-links-in-systemd-unit-file.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 640 bytes --]
From: Nicolas Braud-Santoni <nicolas@braud-santoni.eu>
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2016 23:25:01 +0200
Subject: Add documentation links in systemd unit file
---
init.d/auditd.service | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/init.d/auditd.service b/init.d/auditd.service
index cb0ebfb..0793a92 100644
--- a/init.d/auditd.service
+++ b/init.d/auditd.service
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ After=local-fs.target systemd-tmpfiles-setup.service
Conflicts=shutdown.target
Before=sysinit.target shutdown.target
ConditionKernelCommandLine=!audit=0
+Documentation=man:auditd(8) https://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit/
[Service]
ExecStart=/sbin/auditd -n
[-- Attachment #4: Type: text/plain, Size: 0 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Tejun Heo @ 2016-07-12 14:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Topi Miettinen
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, pmladek-IBi9RG/b67k,
luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA,
keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw, Paul Moore, Eric Paris, Li Zefan,
Johannes Weiner, Serge Hallyn, moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM,
open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP), open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <683cdbb9-c414-07c7-16d3-41c4138ddf8d-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 07:47:44PM +0000, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> It's really critical to be able to associate a task in the logs to
> cgroups which were valid that time. Or can we infer somehow what cgroups
When is "that time"? Without logging all operations, this is
meaningless.
> a task was taking part, long time after task exit? Perhaps task cgroup
> membership changes and changes in available cgroups should be logged too?
>
> Some kind of cgroup IDs could be logged instead of long paths. Then
> these IDs should be reliably resolvable to paths offline somehow.
I don't think that's doable. That pretty much requires the kernel to
remember paths of all past cgroups.
> How usual migrations between cgroups are? Why would a task ever move
> from (say) systemd/system.slice/smartd.service to anywhere else?
In most cases, they won't move once set up initially but that's not
the point of audit subsystem. Logging this once one exit isn't gonna
help anything for auditing the system.
Thanks.
--
tejun
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2016-07-12 13:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Topi Miettinen
Cc: linux-kernel, pmladek, luto, serge, keescook, Paul Moore,
Eric Paris, Tejun Heo, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP),
open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <ab56ac20-1d56-714c-eb54-9a43db496526@gmail.com>
Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes:
> On 07/11/16 21:57, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>> Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>>> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities,
>>> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find
>>> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error.
>>>
>>> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used.
>>> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each
>>> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which
>>> capabilities the program will exercise.
>>>
>>> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used.
>>> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a
>>> software developer, maintainer or system administrator.
>>>
>>> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new
>>> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to
>>> rdshell):
>>
>> You totally miss the interactions with the user namespace so this won't
>> give you the information you are aiming for.
>
> Please correct me if this is not right:
>
> There are two cases:
> a) real capability use as seen outside the namespace
> b) use of capabilities granted by the namespace
> Both cases could be active independently.
>
> For auditing purposes, we're mostly interested in a) and log noise from
> b) could be even seen a distraction.
>
> For configuration purposes, both cases can be interesting, a) for the
> configuration of services and b) in case where the containerized
> configuration is planned to be deployed outside. I'd still only log
> a).
>
>
> The same logic should apply with cgroup namespaces.
Not logging capabilities outside of the initial user namespace is
certainly the conservative place to start, and what selinux does.
You should also be logging capability use from cap_capable. Not
ns_capable. You are missing several kinds of capability use as
a quick review of kernel/capability.c should have shown you.
Eric
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Topi Miettinen @ 2016-07-12 8:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA, pmladek-IBi9RG/b67k,
luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA,
keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw, Paul Moore, Eric Paris,
Tejun Heo, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP),
open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <87vb0bbzyo.fsf-JOvCrm2gF+uungPnsOpG7nhyD016LWXt@public.gmane.org>
On 07/11/16 21:57, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Topi Miettinen <toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org> writes:
>
>> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities,
>> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find
>> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error.
>>
>> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used.
>> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each
>> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which
>> capabilities the program will exercise.
>>
>> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used.
>> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a
>> software developer, maintainer or system administrator.
>>
>> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new
>> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to
>> rdshell):
>
> You totally miss the interactions with the user namespace so this won't
> give you the information you are aiming for.
Please correct me if this is not right:
There are two cases:
a) real capability use as seen outside the namespace
b) use of capabilities granted by the namespace
Both cases could be active independently.
For auditing purposes, we're mostly interested in a) and log noise from
b) could be even seen a distraction.
For configuration purposes, both cases can be interesting, a) for the
configuration of services and b) in case where the containerized
configuration is planned to be deployed outside. I'd still only log a).
The same logic should apply with cgroup namespaces.
-Topi
>
> Eric
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2016-07-11 21:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Topi Miettinen
Cc: linux-kernel, mladek, luto, serge, keescook, Paul Moore,
Eric Paris, Tejun Heo, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner, Serge Hallyn,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP CGROUP,
open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <1468235672-3745-1-git-send-email-toiwoton@gmail.com>
Topi Miettinen <toiwoton@gmail.com> writes:
> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities,
> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find
> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error.
>
> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used.
> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each
> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which
> capabilities the program will exercise.
>
> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used.
> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a
> software developer, maintainer or system administrator.
>
> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new
> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to
> rdshell):
You totally miss the interactions with the user namespace so this won't
give you the information you are aiming for.
Eric
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Topi Miettinen @ 2016-07-11 19:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tejun Heo
Cc: linux-kernel, ebiederm, pmladek, luto, serge, keescook,
Paul Moore, Eric Paris, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner, Serge Hallyn,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP),
open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <20160711170711.GB3337@htj.duckdns.org>
On 07/11/16 17:09, Tejun Heo wrote:
> Hello,
>
> On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 02:14:31PM +0300, Topi Miettinen wrote:
>> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032
>> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000
>> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test;
>
> Please don't put additions of the two different audit types into one
> patch and I don't think the cgroup audit logging makes much sense.
> Without logging all migrations, it doesn't help auditing all that
> much. Also, printing all cgroup membership like that can be
> problematic for audit it can be arbitrarily long.
>
> Thanks.
>
It's really critical to be able to associate a task in the logs to
cgroups which were valid that time. Or can we infer somehow what cgroups
a task was taking part, long time after task exit? Perhaps task cgroup
membership changes and changes in available cgroups should be logged too?
Some kind of cgroup IDs could be logged instead of long paths. Then
these IDs should be reliably resolvable to paths offline somehow.
How usual migrations between cgroups are? Why would a task ever move
from (say) systemd/system.slice/smartd.service to anywhere else?
-Topi
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Topi Miettinen @ 2016-07-11 19:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, pmladek-IBi9RG/b67k,
luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw,
Paul Moore, Eric Paris, Tejun Heo, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP),
open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <0355f70f-8356-f685-d37d-ba28668363a1-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
On 07/11/16 16:05, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> On 07/11/16 15:25, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Topi Miettinen (toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org):
>>> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities,
>>> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find
>>> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error.
>>>
>>> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used.
>>> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each
>>> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which
>>> capabilities the program will exercise.
>>>
>>> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used.
>>> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a
>>> software developer, maintainer or system administrator.
>>>
>>> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new
>>> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to
>>> rdshell):
>>
>> Thanks, Topi, I'll find time this week to look this over in detail.
>>
>> How much chattier does this make the syslog/journald during a regular
>> boot? I was thinking "this is audit, we can choose what messages
>> will show up", but I guess that' sonly what auditd actually listens to,
>> not what kernel emits? (sorry i've not looked at audit in a long
>> time). Drat, that makes it seem like tracepoints would be better
>> after all. But let's see how much it addes to the noise.
>
> For example "loadkeys" causes thousands of entries. :-( I'm checking how
> to avoid audit message rate limiting, now some messages are lost.
>
> It's still too easy to drown the logs with noise. That could be limited
> a lot by emitting a message only when the capability is used for the
> first time. But the question is how to define where to start counting
> (fork, exec, and/or setpcap?). I'm also not sure if that is the right
> way to log, since the first use of a capability could be expected and an
> innocent one, but then the 100th one could be malicious.
>
> It's also very complex and error-prone to collect a capability mask from
> audit logs, which was my original goal.
What if only a summary of capabilities was logged at task exit? That
should make the log volume reasonable.
-Topi
>
> -Topi
>
>>
>>> BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash)
>>> Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
>>>
>>> (initramfs) cd /sys/fs
>>> (initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup
>>> [ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed
>>> [ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null)
>>> [ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570
>>> [ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000
>>> [ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/;
>>> (initramfs) cd cgroup
>>> (initramfs) mkdir test; cd test
>>> [ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null)
>>> [ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374
>>> [ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002
>>> [ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/;
>>> (initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs
>>> (initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2
>>> [ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null)
>>> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032
>>> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000
>>> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test;
>>> (initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_*
>>> [ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null)
>>> [ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639
>>> [ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001
>>> [ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test;
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
>>> ---
>>> include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++
>>> include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++
>>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
>>> kernel/audit.c | 7 +++---
>>> kernel/audit.h | 1 +
>>> kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>>> kernel/capability.c | 5 ++--
>>> kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
>>> index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>>> @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
>>> __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags);
>>> }
>>>
>>> +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap);
>>> +
>>> extern int audit_n_rules;
>>> extern int audit_signals;
>>> #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
>>> @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
>>> { }
>>> static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>>> { }
>>> +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
>>> +{ }
>>> #define audit_n_rules 0
>>> #define audit_signals 0
>>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
>>> diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
>>> index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644
>>> --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
>>> +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
>>> @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen);
>>> int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry);
>>> int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
>>> struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk);
>>> +struct audit_buffer;
>>> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab);
>>>
>>> void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p);
>>> extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p);
>>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>>> index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644
>>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>>> @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@
>>> #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */
>>> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
>>> #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
>>> +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */
>>> +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */
>>>
>>> #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
>>> #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>>> index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>>> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
>>> #include <linux/kthread.h>
>>> #include <linux/kernel.h>
>>> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>>> +#include <linux/cgroup.h>
>>>
>>> #include <linux/audit.h>
>>>
>>> @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
>>> {
>>> int i;
>>>
>>> - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix);
>>> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
>>> audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
>>> cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
>>> @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>>> int log = 0;
>>>
>>> if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
>>> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
>>> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm);
>>> log = 1;
>>> }
>>> if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
>>> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
>>> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh);
>>> log = 1;
>>> }
>>>
>>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>>> index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>>> @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>>> };
>>> int fds[2];
>>> struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
>>> + kernel_cap_t cap_used;
>>> };
>>>
>>> extern u32 audit_ever_enabled;
>>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> index 2672d10..32c3813 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>>> @@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
>>> * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
>>> */
>>>
>>> -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
>>> static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
>>> {
>>> if (!ctx->prio) {
>>> @@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
>>> static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
>>> {
>>> struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
>>> @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
>>>
>>> audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
>>>
>>> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY);
>>> + if (ab) {
>>> + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used);
>>> + audit_log_end(ab);
>>> + }
>>> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP);
>>> + if (ab) {
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups=");
>>> + audit_cgroup_list(ab);
>>> + audit_log_end(ab);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
>>> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
>>> if (ab)
>>> @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
>>> return NULL;
>>> return &ctx->killed_trees;
>>> }
>>> +
>>> +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
>>> +{
>>> + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
>>> +
>>> + if (context) {
>>> + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap);
>>> + audit_set_auditable(context);
>>> + } else {
>>> + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY,
>>> + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context",
>>> + cap, task_pid_nr(current));
>>> + }
>>> +}
>>> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
>>> index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/capability.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
>>> @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
>>> * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
>>> * @cap: The capability to be tested for
>>> *
>>> - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
>>> - * available for use, false if not.
>>> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
>>> + * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message.
>>> *
>>> * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
>>> * assumption that it's about to be used.
>>> @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>>> }
>>>
>>> if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
>>> + audit_log_cap_use(cap);
>>> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
>>> return true;
>>> }
>>> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
>>> index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644
>>> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
>>> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
>>> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
>>> #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
>>> #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
>>> #include <net/sock.h>
>>> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>>>
>>> /*
>>> * pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal
>>> @@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out:
>>> return retval;
>>> }
>>>
>>> +/*
>>> + * audit_cgroup_list()
>>> + * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format()
>>> + * - Used for capability audit logging
>>> + * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show().
>>> + */
>>> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>>> +{
>>> + char *buf, *path;
>>> + struct cgroup_root *root;
>>> +
>>> + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS);
>>> + if (!buf)
>>> + return;
>>> +
>>> + mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex);
>>> + spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
>>> +
>>> + for_each_root(root) {
>>> + struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
>>> + struct cgroup *cgrp;
>>> + int ssid, count = 0;
>>> +
>>> + if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible)
>>> + continue;
>>> +
>>> + if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root)
>>> + for_each_subsys(ss, ssid)
>>> + if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid))
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
>>> + count++ ? "," : "",
>>> + ss->legacy_name);
>>> + if (strlen(root->name))
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "",
>>> + root->name);
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, ":");
>>> +
>>> + cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root);
>>> +
>>> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
>>> + path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX,
>>> + current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns);
>>> + if (!path)
>>> + goto out_unlock;
>>> + } else
>>> + path = "/";
>>> +
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path);
>>> +
>>> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp))
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);");
>>> + else
>>> + audit_log_format(ab, ";");
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> +out_unlock:
>>> + spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
>>> + mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
>>> + kfree(buf);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> /* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */
>>> static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>>> {
>>> --
>>> 2.8.1
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Upgrading audit package
From: Steve Grubb @ 2016-07-11 17:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Bhagwat, Shriniketan Manjunath; +Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
In-Reply-To: <AT5PR84MB0147DED332FD7CB7115B5B3BFA3F0@AT5PR84MB0147.NAMPRD84.PROD.OUTLOOK.COM>
Hello,
On Monday, July 11, 2016 8:17:50 AM EDT Bhagwat, Shriniketan Manjunath wrote:
> I am using audit in my development environment. My development environment
> is as below.
>
> RHEL 5.2 with kernel 2.6.32-431.el6.x86_64 and audit-2.2-2.el6.x86_64.
> SUSE 11 SP3 with kernel 3.0.76-0.11-default and audit-1.8-0.30.1
>
> As I understand the above audit packages I am using in my environment are
> user space audit. I want to upgrade it to the latest version.
RHEL5's last valid audit package would be 1.8. The 2.x branch removed
functions from the ABI and changed the buffer size which means that you would
have to recompile everything that has a dependency on audit-libs. If they are
using any removed functions you would have to patch them to use something
else.
> If I upgrade the audit packages to latest version 2.6.X will there be any
> issues?
Probably. The audit 2.x release also has a soname number change for libaudit.
Apps won't be able to find it during startup.
> Linux Audit kernel available with kernel 2.6.32-431.el6.x86_64 and
> 3.0.76-0.11 are compatible with user space audit 2.6.X?
I have never tested that configuration. I will likely work except for the
missing kernel support. The bigger issue is everything in user space that
links against libaudit.
> In your opinion what
> is the suitable audit package for my environment to upgrade? If these topics
> are already documented please guide me to the documentation.
Speaking for the RHEL side of things...if its a RHEL5 system, audit-1.8 is the
end of the line. After that and you are in unknown territory.
-Steve
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Tejun Heo @ 2016-07-11 17:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Topi Miettinen
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, mladek-IBi9RG/b67k,
luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA,
keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw, Paul Moore, Eric Paris, Li Zefan,
Johannes Weiner, Serge Hallyn, moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM,
open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP), open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <1468235672-3745-1-git-send-email-toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Hello,
On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 02:14:31PM +0300, Topi Miettinen wrote:
> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032
> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000
> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test;
Please don't put additions of the two different audit types into one
patch and I don't think the cgroup audit logging makes much sense.
Without logging all migrations, it doesn't help auditing all that
much. Also, printing all cgroup membership like that can be
problematic for audit it can be arbitrarily long.
Thanks.
--
tejun
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Topi Miettinen @ 2016-07-11 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, mladek-IBi9RG/b67k,
luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw,
Paul Moore, Eric Paris, Tejun Heo, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP),
open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <20160711152543.GA17459-7LNsyQBKDXoIagZqoN9o3w@public.gmane.org>
On 07/11/16 15:25, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Topi Miettinen (toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org):
>> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities,
>> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find
>> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error.
>>
>> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used.
>> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each
>> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which
>> capabilities the program will exercise.
>>
>> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used.
>> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a
>> software developer, maintainer or system administrator.
>>
>> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new
>> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to
>> rdshell):
>
> Thanks, Topi, I'll find time this week to look this over in detail.
>
> How much chattier does this make the syslog/journald during a regular
> boot? I was thinking "this is audit, we can choose what messages
> will show up", but I guess that' sonly what auditd actually listens to,
> not what kernel emits? (sorry i've not looked at audit in a long
> time). Drat, that makes it seem like tracepoints would be better
> after all. But let's see how much it addes to the noise.
For example "loadkeys" causes thousands of entries. :-( I'm checking how
to avoid audit message rate limiting, now some messages are lost.
It's still too easy to drown the logs with noise. That could be limited
a lot by emitting a message only when the capability is used for the
first time. But the question is how to define where to start counting
(fork, exec, and/or setpcap?). I'm also not sure if that is the right
way to log, since the first use of a capability could be expected and an
innocent one, but then the 100th one could be malicious.
It's also very complex and error-prone to collect a capability mask from
audit logs, which was my original goal.
-Topi
>
>> BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash)
>> Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
>>
>> (initramfs) cd /sys/fs
>> (initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup
>> [ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed
>> [ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null)
>> [ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570
>> [ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000
>> [ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/;
>> (initramfs) cd cgroup
>> (initramfs) mkdir test; cd test
>> [ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null)
>> [ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374
>> [ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002
>> [ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/;
>> (initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs
>> (initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2
>> [ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null)
>> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032
>> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000
>> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test;
>> (initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_*
>> [ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null)
>> [ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639
>> [ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001
>> [ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test;
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
>> ---
>> include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++
>> include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++
>> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
>> kernel/audit.c | 7 +++---
>> kernel/audit.h | 1 +
>> kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-
>> kernel/capability.c | 5 ++--
>> kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
>> index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
>> __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags);
>> }
>>
>> +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap);
>> +
>> extern int audit_n_rules;
>> extern int audit_signals;
>> #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
>> @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
>> { }
>> static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
>> { }
>> +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
>> +{ }
>> #define audit_n_rules 0
>> #define audit_signals 0
>> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
>> diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
>> index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
>> @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen);
>> int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry);
>> int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
>> struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk);
>> +struct audit_buffer;
>> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab);
>>
>> void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p);
>> extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p);
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
>> @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@
>> #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */
>> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
>> #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
>> +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */
>> +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */
>>
>> #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
>> #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
>> index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.c
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
>> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
>> #include <linux/kthread.h>
>> #include <linux/kernel.h>
>> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
>> +#include <linux/cgroup.h>
>>
>> #include <linux/audit.h>
>>
>> @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
>> {
>> int i;
>>
>> - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix);
>> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
>> audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
>> cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
>> @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
>> int log = 0;
>>
>> if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
>> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
>> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm);
>> log = 1;
>> }
>> if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
>> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
>> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh);
>> log = 1;
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
>> index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644
>> --- a/kernel/audit.h
>> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
>> @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context {
>> };
>> int fds[2];
>> struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
>> + kernel_cap_t cap_used;
>> };
>>
>> extern u32 audit_ever_enabled;
>> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> index 2672d10..32c3813 100644
>> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
>> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
>> @@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
>> * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
>> */
>>
>> -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
>> static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
>> {
>> if (!ctx->prio) {
>> @@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
>> static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
>> {
>> struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
>> @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
>>
>> audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
>>
>> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY);
>> + if (ab) {
>> + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used);
>> + audit_log_end(ab);
>> + }
>> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP);
>> + if (ab) {
>> + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups=");
>> + audit_cgroup_list(ab);
>> + audit_log_end(ab);
>> + }
>> +
>> /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
>> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
>> if (ab)
>> @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
>> return NULL;
>> return &ctx->killed_trees;
>> }
>> +
>> +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
>> +{
>> + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
>> +
>> + if (context) {
>> + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap);
>> + audit_set_auditable(context);
>> + } else {
>> + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY,
>> + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context",
>> + cap, task_pid_nr(current));
>> + }
>> +}
>> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
>> index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644
>> --- a/kernel/capability.c
>> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
>> @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
>> * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
>> * @cap: The capability to be tested for
>> *
>> - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
>> - * available for use, false if not.
>> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
>> + * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message.
>> *
>> * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
>> * assumption that it's about to be used.
>> @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
>> }
>>
>> if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
>> + audit_log_cap_use(cap);
>> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
>> return true;
>> }
>> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
>> index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644
>> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
>> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
>> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
>> #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
>> #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
>> #include <net/sock.h>
>> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>>
>> /*
>> * pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal
>> @@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out:
>> return retval;
>> }
>>
>> +/*
>> + * audit_cgroup_list()
>> + * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format()
>> + * - Used for capability audit logging
>> + * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show().
>> + */
>> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab)
>> +{
>> + char *buf, *path;
>> + struct cgroup_root *root;
>> +
>> + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS);
>> + if (!buf)
>> + return;
>> +
>> + mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex);
>> + spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
>> +
>> + for_each_root(root) {
>> + struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
>> + struct cgroup *cgrp;
>> + int ssid, count = 0;
>> +
>> + if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible)
>> + continue;
>> +
>> + if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root)
>> + for_each_subsys(ss, ssid)
>> + if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid))
>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
>> + count++ ? "," : "",
>> + ss->legacy_name);
>> + if (strlen(root->name))
>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "",
>> + root->name);
>> + audit_log_format(ab, ":");
>> +
>> + cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root);
>> +
>> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
>> + path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX,
>> + current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns);
>> + if (!path)
>> + goto out_unlock;
>> + } else
>> + path = "/";
>> +
>> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path);
>> +
>> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp))
>> + audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);");
>> + else
>> + audit_log_format(ab, ";");
>> + }
>> +
>> +out_unlock:
>> + spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
>> + mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
>> + kfree(buf);
>> +}
>> +
>> /* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */
>> static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
>> {
>> --
>> 2.8.1
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2016-07-11 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Topi Miettinen
Cc: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, mladek-IBi9RG/b67k,
luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA,
keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw, Paul Moore, Eric Paris,
Tejun Heo, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner, Serge Hallyn,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP),
open list:CAPABILITIES
In-Reply-To: <1468235672-3745-1-git-send-email-toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Quoting Topi Miettinen (toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org):
> There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities,
> cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find
> out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error.
>
> Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used.
> Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each
> capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which
> capabilities the program will exercise.
>
> Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used.
> This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a
> software developer, maintainer or system administrator.
>
> Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new
> message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to
> rdshell):
Thanks, Topi, I'll find time this week to look this over in detail.
How much chattier does this make the syslog/journald during a regular
boot? I was thinking "this is audit, we can choose what messages
will show up", but I guess that' sonly what auditd actually listens to,
not what kernel emits? (sorry i've not looked at audit in a long
time). Drat, that makes it seem like tracepoints would be better
after all. But let's see how much it addes to the noise.
> BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash)
> Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
>
> (initramfs) cd /sys/fs
> (initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup
> [ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed
> [ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null)
> [ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570
> [ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000
> [ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/;
> (initramfs) cd cgroup
> (initramfs) mkdir test; cd test
> [ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null)
> [ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374
> [ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002
> [ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/;
> (initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs
> (initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2
> [ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null)
> [ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032
> [ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000
> [ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test;
> (initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_*
> [ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null)
> [ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639
> [ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001
> [ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test;
>
> Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
> ---
> include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++
> include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
> kernel/audit.c | 7 +++---
> kernel/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-
> kernel/capability.c | 5 ++--
> kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
> index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/linux/audit.h
> @@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
> __audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags);
> }
>
> +extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap);
> +
> extern int audit_n_rules;
> extern int audit_signals;
> #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
> @@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
> { }
> static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
> { }
> +static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
> +{ }
> #define audit_n_rules 0
> #define audit_signals 0
> #endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
> diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
> index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644
> --- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
> +++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
> @@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen);
> int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry);
> int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
> struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk);
> +struct audit_buffer;
> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab);
>
> void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p);
> extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
> @@ -111,6 +111,8 @@
> #define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */
> #define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
> #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
> +#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */
> +#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */
>
> #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
> #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
> #include <linux/kthread.h>
> #include <linux/kernel.h>
> #include <linux/syscalls.h>
> +#include <linux/cgroup.h>
>
> #include <linux/audit.h>
>
> @@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
> {
> int i;
>
> - audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix);
> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
> audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
> cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
> @@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
> int log = 0;
>
> if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm);
> log = 1;
> }
> if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
> - audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
> + audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh);
> log = 1;
> }
>
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
> index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.h
> +++ b/kernel/audit.h
> @@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context {
> };
> int fds[2];
> struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
> + kernel_cap_t cap_used;
> };
>
> extern u32 audit_ever_enabled;
> diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
> index 2672d10..32c3813 100644
> --- a/kernel/auditsc.c
> +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
> @@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
> * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
> */
>
> -#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
> static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
> {
> if (!ctx->prio) {
> @@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
> }
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
> static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
> {
> struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
> @@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
>
> audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
>
> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY);
> + if (ab) {
> + audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used);
> + audit_log_end(ab);
> + }
> + ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP);
> + if (ab) {
> + audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups=");
> + audit_cgroup_list(ab);
> + audit_log_end(ab);
> + }
> +
> /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
> ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
> if (ab)
> @@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
> return NULL;
> return &ctx->killed_trees;
> }
> +
> +void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
> +{
> + struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
> +
> + if (context) {
> + cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap);
> + audit_set_auditable(context);
> + } else {
> + audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY,
> + "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context",
> + cap, task_pid_nr(current));
> + }
> +}
> diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
> index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644
> --- a/kernel/capability.c
> +++ b/kernel/capability.c
> @@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
> * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
> * @cap: The capability to be tested for
> *
> - * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
> - * available for use, false if not.
> + * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
> + * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message.
> *
> * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
> * assumption that it's about to be used.
> @@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
> }
>
> if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
> + audit_log_cap_use(cap);
> current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
> return true;
> }
> diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
> index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644
> --- a/kernel/cgroup.c
> +++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
> @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
> #include <linux/nsproxy.h>
> #include <linux/proc_ns.h>
> #include <net/sock.h>
> +#include <linux/audit.h>
>
> /*
> * pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal
> @@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out:
> return retval;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * audit_cgroup_list()
> + * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format()
> + * - Used for capability audit logging
> + * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show().
> + */
> +void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab)
> +{
> + char *buf, *path;
> + struct cgroup_root *root;
> +
> + buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS);
> + if (!buf)
> + return;
> +
> + mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex);
> + spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
> +
> + for_each_root(root) {
> + struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
> + struct cgroup *cgrp;
> + int ssid, count = 0;
> +
> + if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible)
> + continue;
> +
> + if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root)
> + for_each_subsys(ss, ssid)
> + if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid))
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
> + count++ ? "," : "",
> + ss->legacy_name);
> + if (strlen(root->name))
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "",
> + root->name);
> + audit_log_format(ab, ":");
> +
> + cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root);
> +
> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
> + path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX,
> + current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns);
> + if (!path)
> + goto out_unlock;
> + } else
> + path = "/";
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path);
> +
> + if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp))
> + audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);");
> + else
> + audit_log_format(ab, ";");
> + }
> +
> +out_unlock:
> + spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
> + mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
> + kfree(buf);
> +}
> +
> /* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */
> static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> {
> --
> 2.8.1
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 3/3] configure.ac: add subdir-objects
From: Thomas Petazzoni @ 2016-07-11 15:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve Grubb; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <2238710.OHli6nHpfy@x2>
Hello,
On Mon, 11 Jul 2016 10:55:08 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > Ah, right, that's due to a bug in automake < 1.16 when a variable is
> > used in _SOURCES. I've fixed that in v2 by using a simpler relative
> > path in the Python bindings Makefile.am. Patch coming shortly.
> >
> > Thanks for spotting the issue,
>
> I always run "make distcheck" when doing a release. If v2 passes this, then
> all is good.
Well, this raises another issue:
/bin/bash: ../../../../src/.dirstamp: Permission denied
So seems like my v2 is not good to go :-/
Thomas
--
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons
Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering
http://free-electrons.com
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 3/3] configure.ac: add subdir-objects
From: Steve Grubb @ 2016-07-11 14:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Thomas Petazzoni; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <20160711165205.14723222@free-electrons.com>
On Monday, July 11, 2016 4:52:05 PM EDT Thomas Petazzoni wrote:
> Hello,
>
> On Wed, 06 Jul 2016 18:47:47 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
> > Applying this breaks the build
> >
> > am__remove_distdir=: am__skip_length_check=: am__skip_mode_fix=:
> > distdir)
> >
> > make[4]: Entering directory
> > '/home/sgrubb/working/BUILD/audit/bindings/python/ python2'
> > Makefile:485:
> > ../../../bindings/python/.deps/auparse_la-auparse_python.Plo: No such
> > file or directory
> > make[4]: *** No rule to make target '../../../bindings/python/.deps/
> > auparse_la-auparse_python.Plo'. Stop.
>
> Ah, right, that's due to a bug in automake < 1.16 when a variable is
> used in _SOURCES. I've fixed that in v2 by using a simpler relative
> path in the Python bindings Makefile.am. Patch coming shortly.
>
> Thanks for spotting the issue,
I always run "make distcheck" when doing a release. If v2 passes this, then
all is good.
Thanks,
-Steve
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH v2] configure.ac: add subdir-objects
From: Thomas Petazzoni @ 2016-07-11 14:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-audit
This allows to avoid the following warning when re-generating the
configure script:
auparse/Makefile.am:95: warning: source file '../lib/gen_tables.c' is in a subdirectory,
auparse/Makefile.am:95: but option 'subdir-objects' is disabled
To make this possible and avoid a bug in automake < 1.16, we have to
adjust two Makefile.am, to use a relative path rather in _SOURCES rather
than a path that uses $(top_srcdir). Indeed, $(top_srcdir) was not
properly expanded when used in _SOURCES in automake versions < 1.16.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Petazzoni <thomas.petazzoni@free-electrons.com>
---
bindings/python/python2/Makefile.am | 2 +-
bindings/python/python3/Makefile.am | 2 +-
configure.ac | 2 +-
3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/bindings/python/python2/Makefile.am b/bindings/python/python2/Makefile.am
index 1dcb5bc..208ae66 100644
--- a/bindings/python/python2/Makefile.am
+++ b/bindings/python/python2/Makefile.am
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_builddir) -I@PYINCLUDEDIR@
pyexec_LTLIBRARIES = auparse.la
-auparse_la_SOURCES = $(top_srcdir)/bindings/python/auparse_python.c
+auparse_la_SOURCES = ../auparse_python.c
auparse_la_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/auparse $(AM_CPPFLAGS)
auparse_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version -Wl,-z,relro
auparse_la_LIBADD = ${top_builddir}/auparse/libauparse.la ${top_builddir}/lib/libaudit.la
diff --git a/bindings/python/python3/Makefile.am b/bindings/python/python3/Makefile.am
index edd38e9..93495da 100644
--- a/bindings/python/python3/Makefile.am
+++ b/bindings/python/python3/Makefile.am
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ AM_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_builddir) $(PYTHON3_INCLUDES)
py3exec_LTLIBRARIES = auparse.la
-auparse_la_SOURCES = $(top_srcdir)/bindings/python/auparse_python.c
+auparse_la_SOURCES = ../auparse_python.c
auparse_la_CPPFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/auparse $(AM_CPPFLAGS)
auparse_la_LDFLAGS = -module -avoid-version -Wl,-z,relro
auparse_la_LIBADD = ${top_builddir}/auparse/libauparse.la ${top_builddir}/lib/libaudit.la
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index c5e87e7..1118f15 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ echo Configuring auditd $VERSION
AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
AC_CANONICAL_TARGET
-AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE
+AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE([subdir-objects])
AM_PROG_LIBTOOL
AC_SUBST(LIBTOOL_DEPS)
OLDLIBS="$LIBS"
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 3/3] configure.ac: add subdir-objects
From: Thomas Petazzoni @ 2016-07-11 14:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve Grubb; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <1929736.QCCH278Bsg@x2>
Hello,
On Wed, 06 Jul 2016 18:47:47 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
> Applying this breaks the build
>
> am__remove_distdir=: am__skip_length_check=: am__skip_mode_fix=: distdir)
> make[4]: Entering directory '/home/sgrubb/working/BUILD/audit/bindings/python/
> python2'
> Makefile:485: ../../../bindings/python/.deps/auparse_la-auparse_python.Plo: No
> such file or directory
> make[4]: *** No rule to make target '../../../bindings/python/.deps/
> auparse_la-auparse_python.Plo'. Stop.
Ah, right, that's due to a bug in automake < 1.16 when a variable is
used in _SOURCES. I've fixed that in v2 by using a simpler relative
path in the Python bindings Makefile.am. Patch coming shortly.
Thanks for spotting the issue,
Thomas
--
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons
Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering
http://free-electrons.com
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH] capabilities: audit capability use
From: Topi Miettinen @ 2016-07-11 11:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Cc: ebiederm-aS9lmoZGLiVWk0Htik3J/w, mladek-IBi9RG/b67k,
luto-DgEjT+Ai2ygdnm+yROfE0A, serge-A9i7LUbDfNHQT0dZR+AlfA,
keescook-F7+t8E8rja9g9hUCZPvPmw, Topi Miettinen, Paul Moore,
Eric Paris, Tejun Heo, Li Zefan, Johannes Weiner, Serge Hallyn,
moderated list:AUDIT SUBSYSTEM, open list:CONTROL GROUP CGROUP,
open list:CAPABILITIES
There are many basic ways to control processes, including capabilities,
cgroups and resource limits. However, there are far fewer ways to find
out useful values for the limits, except blind trial and error.
Currently, there is no way to know which capabilities are actually used.
Even the source code is only implicit, in-depth knowledge of each
capability must be used when analyzing a program to judge which
capabilities the program will exercise.
Generate an audit message at system call exit, when capabilities are used.
This can then be used to configure capability sets for services by a
software developer, maintainer or system administrator.
Test case demonstrating basic capability monitoring with the new
message types 1330 and 1331 and how the cgroups are displayed (boot to
rdshell):
BusyBox v1.22.1 (Debian 1:1.22.0-19) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
(initramfs) cd /sys/fs
(initramfs) mount -t cgroup2 cgroup cgroup
[ 12.343152] audit_printk_skb: 5886 callbacks suppressed
[ 12.355214] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234317.100:518): arch=c000003e syscall=165 success=yes exit=0 a0=7fffe1e9ae2d a1=7fffe1e9ae34 a2=7fffe1e9ae25 a3=8000 items=0 ppid=469 pid=470 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mount" exe="/bin/mount" key=(null)
[ 12.414853] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234317.100:518): proctitle=6D6F756E74002D74006367726F757032006367726F7570006367726F7570
[ 12.438338] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234317.100:518): cap_used=0000000000200000
[ 12.453893] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234317.100:518): cgroups=:/;
(initramfs) cd cgroup
(initramfs) mkdir test; cd test
[ 17.335625] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234322.092:519): arch=c000003e syscall=83 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffddfd75e29 a1=1ff a2=0 a3=1e2 items=0 ppid=469 pid=471 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mkdir" exe="/bin/mkdir" key=(null)
[ 17.392686] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234322.092:519): proctitle=6D6B6469720074657374
[ 17.409404] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234322.092:519): cap_used=0000000000000002
[ 17.425404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234322.092:519): cgroups=:/;
(initramfs) echo $$ >cgroup.procs
(initramfs) mknod /dev/z_$$ c 1 2
[ 28.385681] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234333.144:520): arch=c000003e syscall=133 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffe16324e11 a1=21b6 a2=102 a3=5c9 items=0 ppid=469 pid=472 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="mknod" exe="/bin/mknod" key=(null)
[ 28.443674] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234333.144:520): proctitle=6D6B6E6F64002F6465762F7A5F343639006300310032
[ 28.465888] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234333.144:520): cap_used=0000000008000000
[ 28.482080] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234333.144:520): cgroups=:/test;
(initramfs) chown 1234 /dev/z_*
[ 34.772992] audit: type=1300 audit(1468234339.532:521): arch=c000003e syscall=92 success=yes exit=0 a0=7ffd0b563e17 a1=4d2 a2=0 a3=60a items=0 ppid=469 pid=473 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=ttyS0 ses=4294967295 comm="chown" exe="/bin/chown" key=(null)
[ 34.828569] audit: type=1327 audit(1468234339.532:521): proctitle=63686F776E0031323334002F6465762F7A5F343639
[ 34.848747] audit: type=1330 audit(1468234339.532:521): cap_used=0000000000000001
[ 34.864404] audit: type=1331 audit(1468234339.532:521): cgroups=:/test;
Signed-off-by: Topi Miettinen <toiwoton-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++
include/linux/cgroup.h | 2 ++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
kernel/audit.c | 7 +++---
kernel/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/auditsc.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/capability.c | 5 ++--
kernel/cgroup.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
8 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index e38e3fc..971cb2e 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -438,6 +438,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
__audit_mmap_fd(fd, flags);
}
+extern void audit_log_cap_use(int cap);
+
extern int audit_n_rules;
extern int audit_signals;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
@@ -545,6 +547,8 @@ static inline void audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
{ }
static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{ }
+static inline void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
+{ }
#define audit_n_rules 0
#define audit_signals 0
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
diff --git a/include/linux/cgroup.h b/include/linux/cgroup.h
index a20320c..b5dc8aa 100644
--- a/include/linux/cgroup.h
+++ b/include/linux/cgroup.h
@@ -100,6 +100,8 @@ char *task_cgroup_path(struct task_struct *task, char *buf, size_t buflen);
int cgroupstats_build(struct cgroupstats *stats, struct dentry *dentry);
int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk);
+struct audit_buffer;
+void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab);
void cgroup_fork(struct task_struct *p);
extern int cgroup_can_fork(struct task_struct *p);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index d820aa9..c1ae016 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@
#define AUDIT_PROCTITLE 1327 /* Proctitle emit event */
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
+#define AUDIT_CAPABILITY 1330 /* Record showing capability use */
+#define AUDIT_CGROUP 1331 /* Record showing cgroups */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 8d528f9..98dd920 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -1682,7 +1683,7 @@ void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
{
int i;
- audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", prefix);
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
audit_log_format(ab, "%08x",
cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
@@ -1696,11 +1697,11 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
int log = 0;
if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
- audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fp", perm);
log = 1;
}
if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
- audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
+ audit_log_cap(ab, " cap_fi", inh);
log = 1;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index a492f4c..680e8b5 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ struct audit_context {
};
int fds[2];
struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
+ kernel_cap_t cap_used;
};
extern u32 audit_ever_enabled;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 2672d10..32c3813 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -197,7 +197,6 @@ static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
* References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
{
if (!ctx->prio) {
@@ -206,6 +205,7 @@ static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
{
struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
@@ -1439,6 +1439,18 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *ts
audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CAPABILITY);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_used", &context->cap_used);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CGROUP);
+ if (ab) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "cgroups=");
+ audit_cgroup_list(ab);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ }
+
/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
if (ab)
@@ -2428,3 +2440,17 @@ struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
return NULL;
return &ctx->killed_trees;
}
+
+void audit_log_cap_use(int cap)
+{
+ struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
+
+ if (context) {
+ cap_raise(context->cap_used, cap);
+ audit_set_auditable(context);
+ } else {
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_NOFS, AUDIT_CAPABILITY,
+ "cap_used=%d pid=%d no audit_context",
+ cap, task_pid_nr(current));
+ }
+}
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 45432b5..d45d5b1 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -366,8 +366,8 @@ bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
* @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
* @cap: The capability to be tested for
*
- * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
- * available for use, false if not.
+ * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability
+ * currently available for use, false if not. Write an audit message.
*
* This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
* assumption that it's about to be used.
@@ -380,6 +380,7 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
}
if (security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap) == 0) {
+ audit_log_cap_use(cap);
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
return true;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cgroup.c b/kernel/cgroup.c
index 75c0ff0..1931679 100644
--- a/kernel/cgroup.c
+++ b/kernel/cgroup.c
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
/*
* pidlists linger the following amount before being destroyed. The goal
@@ -5789,6 +5790,67 @@ out:
return retval;
}
+/*
+ * audit_cgroup_list()
+ * - Print task's cgroup paths with audit_log_format()
+ * - Used for capability audit logging
+ * - Otherwise very similar to proc_cgroup_show().
+ */
+void audit_cgroup_list(struct audit_buffer *ab)
+{
+ char *buf, *path;
+ struct cgroup_root *root;
+
+ buf = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!buf)
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&cgroup_mutex);
+ spin_lock_irq(&css_set_lock);
+
+ for_each_root(root) {
+ struct cgroup_subsys *ss;
+ struct cgroup *cgrp;
+ int ssid, count = 0;
+
+ if (root == &cgrp_dfl_root && !cgrp_dfl_visible)
+ continue;
+
+ if (root != &cgrp_dfl_root)
+ for_each_subsys(ss, ssid)
+ if (root->subsys_mask & (1 << ssid))
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+ count++ ? "," : "",
+ ss->legacy_name);
+ if (strlen(root->name))
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%sname=%s", count ? "," : "",
+ root->name);
+ audit_log_format(ab, ":");
+
+ cgrp = task_cgroup_from_root(current, root);
+
+ if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+ path = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX,
+ current->nsproxy->cgroup_ns);
+ if (!path)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ } else
+ path = "/";
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s", path);
+
+ if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) && cgroup_is_dead(cgrp))
+ audit_log_format(ab, " (deleted);");
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, ";");
+ }
+
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irq(&css_set_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&cgroup_mutex);
+ kfree(buf);
+}
+
/* Display information about each subsystem and each hierarchy */
static int proc_cgroupstats_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
--
2.8.1
^ permalink raw reply related
* Upgrading audit package
From: Bhagwat, Shriniketan Manjunath @ 2016-07-11 8:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve Grubb; +Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com
[-- Attachment #1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 770 bytes --]
Hi Steve,
I am using audit in my development environment. My development environment is as below.
RHEL 5.2 with kernel 2.6.32-431.el6.x86_64 and audit-2.2-2.el6.x86_64.
SUSE 11 SP3 with kernel 3.0.76-0.11-default and audit-1.8-0.30.1
As I understand the above audit packages I am using in my environment are user space audit. I want to upgrade it to the latest version.
If I upgrade the audit packages to latest version 2.6.X will there be any issues?
Linux Audit kernel available with kernel 2.6.32-431.el6.x86_64 and 3.0.76-0.11 are compatible with user space audit 2.6.X?
In your opinion what is the suitable audit package for my environment to upgrade?
If these topics are already documented please guide me to the documentation.
Regards,
Ketan
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[-- Attachment #2: Type: text/plain, Size: 0 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Missing linker flags when statically linking
From: Laurent Bigonville @ 2016-07-10 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve Grubb; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <1510754.00qYpxzr8S@x2>
Le 10/07/16 à 19:18, Steve Grubb a écrit :
> On Sunday, July 10, 2016 10:45:13 AM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
>> Le 09/07/16 à 23:41, Steve Grubb a écrit :
>>> On Saturday, July 9, 2016 11:02:44 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
>>>> Apparently the fix is not 100% correct:
>>>>
>>>> The "Libs.private" field should be _after_ the Libs one in the .pc file,
>>>> otherwise the ordering of the libraries is not OK during liking:
>>>>
>>>> -lcap-ng -laudit
>>>>
>>>> it should be: -laudit -lcap-ng instead.
>>> OK, I switched the order.
>> Thanks
>>
>>>> Also any reasons you are using Libs.private instead of Package.private?
>>> Libs.private is used to add flags for static linking. The dynamic linker
>>> shouldn't need a hint since libaudit its already linked to libcap-ng.
>> I was talking about Package*.private* not package itself.
>> Package.private is the equivalent to Libs.private but for libs that also
>> have a .pc file
> Do you mean Requires.private? (I don't see Package.private documented in the
> man page.) That takes a package name which is not available from the m4 macro
> that libcap-ng provides. I think what this means is that I should switch from
> using m4 to pkg-config which means reworking configure.ac and the Makefiles.am
> wherever libcap-ng is used. I'll look into this, but I think in the meantime
> what's in svn generally works. libcap-ng is most likley built with the same
> flags that audit is.
Yes I meant Requires.private.
The audit.pc file is used by 3rd party, so using Requires.private has no
impact over audit buildsystem I think. I would say that the 2 can be
changed independently.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Missing linker flags when statically linking
From: Steve Grubb @ 2016-07-10 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Laurent Bigonville; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <8e8169d1-647f-4ff2-0003-29fe51fa8488@debian.org>
On Sunday, July 10, 2016 10:45:13 AM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
> Le 09/07/16 à 23:41, Steve Grubb a écrit :
> > On Saturday, July 9, 2016 11:02:44 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
> >> Apparently the fix is not 100% correct:
> >>
> >> The "Libs.private" field should be _after_ the Libs one in the .pc file,
> >> otherwise the ordering of the libraries is not OK during liking:
> >>
> >> -lcap-ng -laudit
> >>
> >> it should be: -laudit -lcap-ng instead.
> >
> > OK, I switched the order.
>
> Thanks
>
> >> Also any reasons you are using Libs.private instead of Package.private?
> >
> > Libs.private is used to add flags for static linking. The dynamic linker
> > shouldn't need a hint since libaudit its already linked to libcap-ng.
>
> I was talking about Package*.private* not package itself.
> Package.private is the equivalent to Libs.private but for libs that also
> have a .pc file
Do you mean Requires.private? (I don't see Package.private documented in the
man page.) That takes a package name which is not available from the m4 macro
that libcap-ng provides. I think what this means is that I should switch from
using m4 to pkg-config which means reworking configure.ac and the Makefiles.am
wherever libcap-ng is used. I'll look into this, but I think in the meantime
what's in svn generally works. libcap-ng is most likley built with the same
flags that audit is.
-Steve
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Missing linker flags when statically linking
From: Thomas Petazzoni @ 2016-07-10 12:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Laurent Bigonville; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <8e8169d1-647f-4ff2-0003-29fe51fa8488@debian.org>
Hello,
On Sun, 10 Jul 2016 10:45:13 +0200, Laurent Bigonville wrote:
> >> Also any reasons you are using Libs.private instead of Package.private?
> > Libs.private is used to add flags for static linking. The dynamic linker
> > shouldn't need a hint since libaudit its already linked to libcap-ng.
>
> I was talking about Package*.private* not package itself.
> Package.private is the equivalent to Libs.private but for libs that also
> have a .pc file
Agreed. When possible, Package.private should be preferred over
Libs.private.
Thomas
--
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Free Electrons
Embedded Linux, Kernel and Android engineering
http://free-electrons.com
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Missing linker flags when statically linking
From: Laurent Bigonville @ 2016-07-10 8:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve Grubb; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <1593477.8QKBr1tzSR@x2>
Le 09/07/16 à 23:41, Steve Grubb a écrit :
> On Saturday, July 9, 2016 11:02:44 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
>> Le 05/07/16 à 14:15, Steve Grubb a écrit :
>>> Hello,
>>>
>>> On Monday, July 4, 2016 2:08:14 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
>>>> Apparently the audit.pc file is missing flags to allow libaudit to be
>>>> statically linked (see [0]).
>>>>
>>>> Adding something like "Requires.private: libcap-ng" should fix the
>>>> problem.
>>> OK. Fixed. There will be a new audit package release in a little while
>>> that
>>> has this fixed.
>> Apparently the fix is not 100% correct:
>>
>> The "Libs.private" field should be _after_ the Libs one in the .pc file,
>> otherwise the ordering of the libraries is not OK during liking:
>>
>> -lcap-ng -laudit
>>
>> it should be: -laudit -lcap-ng instead.
> OK, I switched the order.
Thanks
>> Also any reasons you are using Libs.private instead of Package.private?
> Libs.private is used to add flags for static linking. The dynamic linker
> shouldn't need a hint since libaudit its already linked to libcap-ng.
I was talking about Package*.private* not package itself.
Package.private is the equivalent to Libs.private but for libs that also
have a .pc file
> Also, anyone packaging up audit 2.6.4 will want to include this patch:
> https://fedorahosted.org/audit/changeset/1340
Thanks, I'll update the pkg in debian soon
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Missing linker flags when statically linking
From: Steve Grubb @ 2016-07-09 21:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Laurent Bigonville; +Cc: linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <c48d063c-55c1-ea02-5586-423ed0863264@debian.org>
On Saturday, July 9, 2016 11:02:44 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
> Le 05/07/16 à 14:15, Steve Grubb a écrit :
> > Hello,
> >
> > On Monday, July 4, 2016 2:08:14 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
> >> Apparently the audit.pc file is missing flags to allow libaudit to be
> >> statically linked (see [0]).
> >>
> >> Adding something like "Requires.private: libcap-ng" should fix the
> >> problem.
> >
> > OK. Fixed. There will be a new audit package release in a little while
> > that
> > has this fixed.
>
> Apparently the fix is not 100% correct:
>
> The "Libs.private" field should be _after_ the Libs one in the .pc file,
> otherwise the ordering of the libraries is not OK during liking:
>
> -lcap-ng -laudit
>
> it should be: -laudit -lcap-ng instead.
OK, I switched the order.
> Also any reasons you are using Libs.private instead of Package.private?
Libs.private is used to add flags for static linking. The dynamic linker
shouldn't need a hint since libaudit its already linked to libcap-ng.
Also, anyone packaging up audit 2.6.4 will want to include this patch:
https://fedorahosted.org/audit/changeset/1340
-Steve
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Missing linker flags when statically linking
From: Laurent Bigonville @ 2016-07-09 21:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steve Grubb, linux-audit
In-Reply-To: <11381031.WHaSpXZ8Zn@x2>
Le 05/07/16 à 14:15, Steve Grubb a écrit :
> Hello,
>
> On Monday, July 4, 2016 2:08:14 PM EDT Laurent Bigonville wrote:
>> Apparently the audit.pc file is missing flags to allow libaudit to be
>> statically linked (see [0]).
>>
>> Adding something like "Requires.private: libcap-ng" should fix the problem.
> OK. Fixed. There will be a new audit package release in a little while that
> has this fixed.
Apparently the fix is not 100% correct:
The "Libs.private" field should be _after_ the Libs one in the .pc file,
otherwise the ordering of the libraries is not OK during liking:
-lcap-ng -laudit
it should be: -laudit -lcap-ng instead.
Also any reasons you are using Libs.private instead of Package.private?
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC 0/7] netlink: Add allocation flag to netlink_unicast()
From: Masashi Honma @ 2016-07-09 3:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
netfilter-devel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-wireless-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-rdma-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA,
linux-audit-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
cluster-devel-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA
Cc: davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q, johannes-cdvu00un1VgdHxzADdlk8Q,
pablo-Cap9r6Oaw4JrovVCs/uTlw, kaber-dcUjhNyLwpNeoWH0uzbU5w,
kadlec-K40Dz/62t/MgiyqX0sVFJYdd74u8MsAO,
dledford-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
sean.hefty-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w,
hal.rosenstock-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w,
paul-r2n+y4ga6xFZroRs9YW3xA, eparis-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
zbr-i6C2adt8DTjR7s880joybQ, pshelar-l0M0P4e3n4LQT0dZR+AlfA,
ccaulfie-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA, teigland-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA,
bsingharora-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w
In-Reply-To: <1467764916-4983-1-git-send-email-masashi.honma-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
On 2016年07月06日 09:28, Masashi Honma wrote:
> Though netlink_broadcast() ...
Thanks for reply of David Miller, Eric Dumazet, David Teigrand.
On the basis of their comment, only rtnl_unicast() looks need to add gfp
flag
argument. So I will drop almost of patches except 0005.
I will send patch v2 to more limited destination.
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^ permalink raw reply
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