[PATCH v3 1/2] Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put

[Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>]

virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly
from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we
posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf()
and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one().

Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because
alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually
handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore
report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put()
to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by
the device.

The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0)
leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type
byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory.

Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and
sg_init_one(), and gate virtbt_rx_work() on that same constant so
the bound checked matches the buffer actually exposed to the device.
Reject used.len == 0 in the same gate so an empty completion can
no longer reach virtbt_rx_handle().

Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the length value comes from an
untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log.

Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer
overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened the USB 9p
transport against unchecked device-reported length.

Fixes: 160fbcf3bfb9 ("Bluetooth: virtio_bt: Use skb_put to set length")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Soenke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
Changes in v3:
- split off the per-pkt-type header-length check into its own
  patch (2/2) per Luiz's request; this patch now only covers the
  used.len vs buffer-size hazard and the len == 0 path

Changes in v2:
- validate used.len against VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE (the 1000 bytes
  actually exposed to the device via sg_init_one()) rather than
  skb_tailroom(), which can exceed 1000 due to slab padding
- reject used.len == 0 before virtbt_rx_handle() reads the
  pkt_type byte, so zero-length completions can no longer pull an
  empty skb into hci_recv_frame()
- switch the error log to bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the
  length value comes from an untrusted backend that can otherwise
  flood the kernel log

 drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c | 16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c b/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
index 76d61af8a275..2c5c39356a1c 100644
--- a/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
+++ b/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
 
 #define VERSION "0.1"
+#define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE 1000
 
 enum {
 	VIRTBT_VQ_TX,
@@ -33,11 +34,11 @@ static int virtbt_add_inbuf(struct virtio_bluetooth *vbt)
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	int err;
 
-	skb = alloc_skb(1000, GFP_KERNEL);
+	skb = alloc_skb(VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!skb)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	sg_init_one(sg, skb->data, 1000);
+	sg_init_one(sg, skb->data, VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE);
 
 	err = virtqueue_add_inbuf(vq, sg, 1, skb, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (err < 0) {
@@ -227,8 +228,15 @@ static void virtbt_rx_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	if (!skb)
 		return;
 
-	skb_put(skb, len);
-	virtbt_rx_handle(vbt, skb);
+	if (!len || len > VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE) {
+		bt_dev_err_ratelimited(vbt->hdev,
+				       "rx reply len %u outside [1, %u]\n",
+				       len, VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE);
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+	} else {
+		skb_put(skb, len);
+		virtbt_rx_handle(vbt, skb);
+	}
 
 	if (virtbt_add_inbuf(vbt) < 0)
 		return;
-- 
2.53.0