Re: [PATCH] Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put

[Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>]

Hi Michael,

On Fri, Apr 17, 2026 at 8:01 PM Michael Bommarito
<michael.bommarito@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly
> from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the skb we
> posted.  The RX skb is allocated as alloc_skb(1000) in
> virtbt_add_inbuf().  A malicious or buggy virtio-bt backend that
> reports used.len larger than the skb's tailroom causes skb_put() to
> call skb_over_panic() in net/core/skbuff.c, which triggers
> BUG() and panics the guest.
>
> Reproduced on a QEMU 9.0 whose virtio-bt backend reports
> used.len = 4096 into a 1000-byte rx skb:
>
>   skbuff: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffff83958e84 len:4096 put:4096
>       head:ffff88800c071000 data:ffff88800c071000 tail:0x1000
>       end:0x6c0 dev:<NULL>
>   ------------[ cut here ]------------
>   kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
>   Call Trace:
>    skb_panic+0x160/0x162
>    skb_put.cold+0x31/0x31
>    virtbt_rx_work+0x94/0x250
>    process_one_work+0x80d/0x1510
>    worker_thread+0x4af/0xd20
>    kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0
>
> Reject any len that exceeds skb_tailroom().  Drop the skb on the
> error path; virtbt_add_inbuf() reposts a fresh one for the next
> iteration.  With the check in place the same harness runs without
> BUG(); the driver logs "rx reply len %u exceeds skb tailroom %u"
> and the device keeps running.
>
> Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"),
> which hardened the USB 9p transport against unchecked device-reported length.
>
> Fixes: 160fbcf3bfb9 ("Bluetooth: virtio_bt: Use skb_put to set length")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Soenke Huster <soenke.huster@eknoes.de>
> Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito <michael.bommarito@gmail.com>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
> ---
>  drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c | 11 +++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c b/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
> index 76d61af8a275..157e68b6e75f 100644
> --- a/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
> +++ b/drivers/bluetooth/virtio_bt.c
> @@ -227,8 +227,15 @@ static void virtbt_rx_work(struct work_struct *work)
>         if (!skb)
>                 return;
>
> -       skb_put(skb, len);
> -       virtbt_rx_handle(vbt, skb);
> +       if (len > skb_tailroom(skb)) {
> +               bt_dev_err(vbt->hdev,
> +                          "rx reply len %u exceeds skb tailroom %u\n",
> +                          len, skb_tailroom(skb));
> +               kfree_skb(skb);
> +       } else {
> +               skb_put(skb, len);
> +               virtbt_rx_handle(vbt, skb);
> +       }
>
>         if (virtbt_add_inbuf(vbt) < 0)
>                 return;
> --
> 2.53.0

https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260418000138.1848813-1-michael.bommarito%40gmail.com

All seem like valid comments to me, first one is odd to me thought,
never would have though that skb_tailroom wouldn't be enough to check
if using `skb_put` is safe.

-- 
Luiz Augusto von Dentz