* [PATCH v2 4/6] Bluetooth: SMP: clear the aes_cmac_key when done
[not found] <20260807125845.1477067-1-thuth@redhat.com>
@ 2026-08-07 12:58 ` Thomas Huth
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Thomas Huth @ 2026-08-07 12:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers, Marcel Holtmann, Luiz Augusto von Dentz
Cc: Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, linux-crypto, linux-kernel,
Steve French, Namjae Jeon, linux-bluetooth
From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Clear the local aes_cmac_key structure via __cleanup() function
when we're done with it to avoid that sensitive data could leak on
the stack.
While we're at it, also clear the tmp[] array here that is populated
with a raw version of the original key and thus would leak the same
information via the stack otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
---
net/bluetooth/smp.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index c4470958b0d57..4a32e4f80b48a 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static inline void swap_buf(const u8 *src, u8 *dst, size_t len)
static int smp_aes_cmac(const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, size_t len, u8 mac[16])
{
uint8_t tmp[16], mac_msb[16], msg_msb[CMAC_MSG_MAX];
- struct aes_cmac_key key;
+ struct aes_cmac_key key __cleanup(aes_cmac_zeroize_key);
int err;
if (len > CMAC_MSG_MAX)
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ static int smp_aes_cmac(const u8 k[16], const u8 *m, size_t len, u8 mac[16])
SMP_DBG("key %16phN", k);
err = aes_cmac_preparekey(&key, tmp, 16);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(err)) /* Should never happen, as 16 is valid keylen */
return err;
aes_cmac(&key, msg_msb, len, mac_msb);
--
2.55.0
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