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* [PATCH v3 1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security
@ 2026-11-20 15:48 Luiz Augusto von Dentz
  2026-11-20 15:48 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Don't offer deferred channels before security is met Luiz Augusto von Dentz
  2026-11-20 21:37 ` [v3,1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security bluez.test.bot
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz @ 2026-11-20 15:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-bluetooth

From: Mohammed Alquraini <mohammed.saad.alquraini@gmail.com>

When the link security changes, l2cap_security_cfm() doesn't check
that the result meets the security level required by the channels:

 - If encryption completes it sets chan->sec_level to hcon->sec_level,
   so a channel requiring a higher security level than the one the
   link ended up with has its requirement lowered instead of being
   refused.

 - A channel in BT_CONNECT2 is accepted, or offered to the listener if
   it uses BT_DEFER_SETUP, as long as the status is success and the
   encryption key size is valid, e.g. if the peer disables encryption
   while the channel waits for userspace to authorize it, the channel
   is offered again and, once authorized, it is established over an
   unencrypted link.

Fix this by treating encryption completing with a security level
below the one required by a channel as a downgrade: the security level
of the channel is no longer lowered and the channel is disconnected,
or refused with L2CAP_CR_SEC_BLOCK if it was pending, and by only
accepting a channel in BT_CONNECT2 if the link meets its security
level.

This means a channel requiring a security level that pairing can't
provide, e.g. BT_SECURITY_HIGH when the IO capability is
NoInputNoOutput, is now refused instead of being connected with the
security level the link ended up with.

AI assistance was used in finding and preparing this patch.

Fixes: f66dc81f44d9 ("Bluetooth: Add support for deferring L2CAP connection setup")
Signed-off-by: Mohammed Alquraini <mohammed.saad.alquraini@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
---
v3: Don't use l2cap_chan_check_security(), which may start
    authentication or encryption, instead compare the security level
    of the link with the one of the channel. Treat encryption
    completing below the security level of the channel as a downgrade
    and disconnect the channel instead of lowering its security level.
v2: Drop BT_SK_ACCEPTED and the changes to l2cap_sock_defer(), only check
    l2cap_chan_check_security() in the BT_CONNECT2 branch of
    l2cap_security_cfm(). The early accept is handled by patch 2/2.
---
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
index 943effc86740..3fc0fecdbb5c 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c
@@ -8095,11 +8095,19 @@ static inline void l2cap_check_encryption(struct l2cap_chan *chan, u8 encrypt)
 	}
 }
 
+/* Check if the link meets the security level required by the channel */
+static bool l2cap_chan_sec_level_met(struct hci_conn *hcon,
+				     struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	return chan->sec_level <= BT_SECURITY_LOW ||
+	       hcon->sec_level >= chan->sec_level;
+}
+
 static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
 	__must_hold(&hcon->hdev->lock)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
-	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan, *tmp;
 
 	if (!conn)
 		return;
@@ -8108,7 +8116,9 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
 
 	mutex_lock(&conn->lock);
 
-	list_for_each_entry(chan, &conn->chan_l, list) {
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(chan, tmp, &conn->chan_l, list) {
+		bool downgrade = false;
+
 		l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
 
 		lockdep_assert_held(&chan->conn->lock);
@@ -8116,14 +8126,32 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
 		BT_DBG("chan %p scid 0x%4.4x state %s", chan, chan->scid,
 		       state_to_string(chan->state));
 
-		if (!status && encrypt)
-			chan->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
+		if (!status && encrypt) {
+			/* Encryption completing with a security level below
+			 * the one the channel requires is a downgrade, don't
+			 * lower the requirement of the channel to match it.
+			 */
+			if (!l2cap_chan_sec_level_met(hcon, chan))
+				downgrade = true;
+			else
+				chan->sec_level = hcon->sec_level;
+		}
 
 		if (!__l2cap_no_conn_pending(chan)) {
 			l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
 			continue;
 		}
 
+		if (downgrade && (chan->state == BT_CONNECTED ||
+				  chan->state == BT_CONFIG)) {
+			/* Fixed channels are removed from the list */
+			l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
+			__l2cap_chan_close(chan, ECONNREFUSED);
+			l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+			l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		if (!status && (chan->state == BT_CONNECTED ||
 				chan->state == BT_CONFIG)) {
 			chan->ops->resume(chan);
@@ -8133,7 +8161,8 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
 		}
 
 		if (chan->state == BT_CONNECT) {
-			if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan))
+			if (!status && !downgrade &&
+			    l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan))
 				l2cap_start_connection(chan);
 			else
 				__set_chan_timer(chan, L2CAP_DISC_TIMEOUT);
@@ -8143,7 +8172,8 @@ static void l2cap_security_cfm(struct hci_conn *hcon, u8 status, u8 encrypt)
 			struct l2cap_conn_rsp rsp;
 			__u16 res, stat;
 
-			if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan)) {
+			if (!status && l2cap_check_enc_key_size(hcon, chan) &&
+			    l2cap_chan_sec_level_met(hcon, chan)) {
 				if (test_bit(FLAG_DEFER_SETUP, &chan->flags)) {
 					res = L2CAP_CR_PEND;
 					stat = L2CAP_CS_AUTHOR_PEND;
-- 
2.56.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v3 2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Don't offer deferred channels before security is met
  2026-11-20 15:48 [PATCH v3 1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security Luiz Augusto von Dentz
@ 2026-11-20 15:48 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
  2026-11-20 21:37 ` [v3,1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security bluez.test.bot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz @ 2026-11-20 15:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-bluetooth

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>

A BR/EDR channel is moved to BT_CONNECT2 as soon as the connection
request is answered as pending, no matter if it is waiting for the
information exchange, for the link security or for userspace to
authorize it, and the socket state follows the channel state.

bt_accept_poll() assumes that a child in BT_CONNECT2 of a listener
using BT_DEFER_SETUP is waiting to be authorized, and
bt_accept_dequeue() returns any child of such a listener, so although
the listener is only notified once the security is met, a listener
that doesn't wait for it can accept() the child and then authorize it
with recvmsg() while authentication is still pending.
l2cap_sock_defer() then moves the channel to BT_CONFIG and responds
with L2CAP_CR_SUCCESS, and if authentication fails afterwards the
channel is left open since l2cap_security_cfm() doesn't close channels
in BT_CONFIG.

Fix this by only moving the socket to BT_CONNECT2 when the channel is
offered to the listener with l2cap_sock_defer_cb(), which is only
called once the security is met, and by only letting accept() return a
child of a listener using BT_DEFER_SETUP once it is in BT_CONNECT2, as
bt_accept_poll() does. The child stays in the accept queue so the
backlog limit and the cleanup done when the listener is closed are not
affected.

Fixes: f66dc81f44d9 ("Bluetooth: Add support for deferring L2CAP connection setup")
Assisted-by: OpenCode:claude-fable-5.2
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
---
v3: Only let accept() return children in BT_CONNECT2, as
    bt_accept_poll() does, instead of only skipping the ones in
    BT_OPEN.
v2: New patch.
---
 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c |  6 +++++-
 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c   | 10 +++++++++-
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
index 7758e9ea3848..103d61d13fbf 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c
@@ -330,8 +330,12 @@ struct sock *bt_accept_dequeue(struct sock *parent, struct socket *newsock)
 			continue;
 		}
 
+		/* With deferred setup only a child in BT_CONNECT2 has been
+		 * offered to the listener, see bt_accept_poll().
+		 */
 		if (sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECTED || !newsock ||
-		    test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags)) {
+		    (test_bit(BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP, &bt_sk(parent)->flags) &&
+		     sk->sk_state == BT_CONNECT2)) {
 			bt_accept_unlink(sk);
 			if (newsock)
 				sock_graft(sk, newsock);
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
index d5663a4642a9..57ada00f76eb 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c
@@ -1812,7 +1812,13 @@ static void l2cap_sock_state_change_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int state,
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
-	sk->sk_state = state;
+	/* BT_CONNECT2 also covers a channel still waiting for the information
+	 * exchange or link security. Only l2cap_sock_defer_cb() moves the
+	 * socket to BT_CONNECT2, once the channel can be offered to the
+	 * listener.
+	 */
+	if (state != BT_CONNECT2)
+		sk->sk_state = state;
 
 	if (err)
 		sk->sk_err = err;
@@ -1880,6 +1886,8 @@ static void l2cap_sock_defer_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 
 	lock_sock(sk);
 
+	sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT2;
+
 	parent = bt_sk(sk)->parent;
 	if (parent)
 		parent->sk_data_ready(parent);
-- 
2.56.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* RE: [v3,1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security
  2026-11-20 15:48 [PATCH v3 1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security Luiz Augusto von Dentz
  2026-11-20 15:48 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Don't offer deferred channels before security is met Luiz Augusto von Dentz
@ 2026-11-20 21:37 ` bluez.test.bot
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: bluez.test.bot @ 2026-11-20 21:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: linux-bluetooth, luiz.dentz

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2745 bytes --]

This is automated email and please do not reply to this email!

Dear submitter,

Thank you for submitting the patches to the linux bluetooth mailing list.
This is a CI test results with your patch series:
PW Link:https://patchwork.kernel.org/series/1217495/

---Test result---

Test Summary:
CheckPatch                    FAIL      1.73 seconds
VerifyFixes                   PASS      0.12 seconds
VerifySignedoff               PASS      0.12 seconds
GitLint                       PASS      0.64 seconds
SubjectPrefix                 PASS      0.22 seconds
BuildKernel                   PASS      30.39 seconds
CheckAllWarning               PASS      34.08 seconds
CheckSparse                   PASS      36.41 seconds
BuildKernel32                 PASS      29.58 seconds
CheckKernelLLVM               PASS      30.77 seconds
TestRunnerSetup               PASS      696.22 seconds
TestRunner_l2cap-tester       FAIL      14.53 seconds
TestRunner_iso-tester         PASS      12.76 seconds
TestRunner_bnep-tester        PASS      3.18 seconds
TestRunner_mgmt-tester        PASS      87.85 seconds
TestRunner_rfcomm-tester      PASS      4.51 seconds
TestRunner_sco-tester         PASS      5.61 seconds
TestRunner_ioctl-tester       PASS      4.61 seconds
TestRunner_mesh-tester        PASS      4.50 seconds
TestRunner_smp-tester         PASS      4.37 seconds
TestRunner_userchan-tester    PASS      3.25 seconds
TestRunner_6lowpan-tester     PASS      4.41 seconds
IncrementalBuild              PASS      29.87 seconds

Details
##############################
Test: CheckPatch - FAIL
Desc: Run checkpatch.pl script
Output:
[v3,2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Don't offer deferred channels before security is met
WARNING: Non-standard signature: Assisted-by:
#147: 
Assisted-by: OpenCode:claude-fable-5.2

ERROR: Unrecognized email address: 'OpenCode:claude-fable-5.2'
#147: 
Assisted-by: OpenCode:claude-fable-5.2

total: 1 errors, 1 warnings, 0 checks, 35 lines checked

NOTE: For some of the reported defects, checkpatch may be able to
      mechanically convert to the typical style using --fix or --fix-inplace.

/home/runner/work/bluetooth-next/bluetooth-next/src/patch/15006063.patch has style problems, please review.

NOTE: Ignored message types: UNKNOWN_COMMIT_ID

NOTE: If any of the errors are false positives, please report
      them to the maintainer, see CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.


##############################
Test: TestRunner_l2cap-tester - FAIL
Desc: Run l2cap-tester with test-runner
Output:
Total: 144, Passed: 143 (99.3%), Failed: 1, Not Run: 0

Failed Test Cases
L2CAP BR/EDR Client SSP - Success 2                  Failed       0.124 seconds


https://github.com/bluez/bluetooth-next/pull/1170

---
Regards,
Linux Bluetooth


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

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2026-11-20 15:48 [PATCH v3 1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2026-11-20 15:48 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Don't offer deferred channels before security is met Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2026-11-20 21:37 ` [v3,1/2] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix accepting channels with insufficient security bluez.test.bot

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