From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Oliver Hartkopp" <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Cc: "Oleksij Rempel" <o.rempel@pengutronix.de>,
"Vincent Mailhol" <mailhol@kernel.org>,
linux-can@vger.kernel.org,
"Marc Kleine-Budde" <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] can: bcm: use atomic access in receive statistics
Date: Tue, 09 Jun 2026 18:45:27 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260609184528.405221F0089B@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260522180758.51128-3-socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [Medium] Converting `frames_filtered` to `atomic_long_t` introduces a signed integer overflow on 32-bit systems during procfs statistics calculation, producing bogus corrupted percentages.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition in `bcm_proc_show()` can cause a division by zero and kernel panic due to multiple lockless reads of `op->frames_abs`.
--
commit 6749d4fcb2595ae8bc232f3dd041a194ebd9a9f4
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: use atomic access in receive statistics
This commit modifies the CAN broadcast manager (bcm) protocol to use atomic
operations for rx statistics. This prevents a data race detected by KCSAN when
multiple CAN frames are processed simultaneously by different CPUs.
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index dbdf5d4f4ed7b..8a2cb766603dc 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
> @@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> unsigned long reduction;
>
> /* print only active entries & prevent division by zero */
> - if (!op->frames_abs)
> + if (!atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs))
> continue;
>
> seq_printf(m, "rx_op: %03X %-5s ", op->can_id,
[ ... ]
> @@ -250,9 +251,12 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> (long long)ktime_to_us(op->kt_ival2));
>
> seq_printf(m, "# recv %ld (%ld) => reduction: ",
> - op->frames_filtered, op->frames_abs);
> + atomic_long_read(&op->frames_filtered),
> + atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs));
>
> - reduction = 100 - (op->frames_filtered * 100) / op->frames_abs;
> + reduction = 100 -
> + (atomic_long_read(&op->frames_filtered) * 100) /
> + atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs);
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does reading op->frames_abs
multiple times introduce a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use race here?
bcm_proc_show() in net/can/bcm.c first ensures op->frames_abs is not zero.
However, concurrently, bcm_rx_changed() can hit the overflow threshold and
reset it:
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_rx_changed() {
...
if (atomic_long_read(&op->frames_filtered) > ULONG_MAX / 100) {
atomic_long_set(&op->frames_filtered, 0);
atomic_long_set(&op->frames_abs, 0);
}
...
}
If this reset occurs precisely between the initial non-zero check and the
division above, could the denominator evaluate to 0 and cause a divide-by-zero
kernel panic?
Would it be safer to read the atomic values exactly once into local variables
at the beginning of the iteration?
[Severity: Medium]
Does changing the statistics variables to atomic_long_t introduce a signed
integer overflow on 32-bit systems?
atomic_long_read() returns a signed long. The expression
atomic_long_read(&op->frames_filtered) * 100 in bcm_proc_show() now evaluates
using signed 32-bit integer arithmetic on 32-bit systems.
While the overflow prevention in bcm_rx_changed() caps frames_filtered at
ULONG_MAX / 100, multiplying by 100 when frames_filtered exceeds LONG_MAX / 100
will overflow the maximum positive value for a signed 32-bit integer.
Dividing this negative intermediate result by frames_abs yields a negative
number, which corrupts the final reduction percentage.
Should the reads be cast to unsigned long before the calculation?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260522180758.51128-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net?part=2
prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-09 18:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-22 18:07 [PATCH v2 0/2] Fix two KCSAN issues Oliver Hartkopp
2026-05-22 18:07 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values Oliver Hartkopp
2026-06-09 18:55 ` sashiko-bot
2026-05-22 18:07 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] can: bcm: use atomic access in receive statistics Oliver Hartkopp
2026-06-09 18:45 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20260609184528.405221F0089B@smtp.kernel.org \
--to=sashiko-bot@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-can@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mailhol@kernel.org \
--cc=mkl@pengutronix.de \
--cc=o.rempel@pengutronix.de \
--cc=sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev \
--cc=socketcan@hartkopp.net \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox