* [PATCH v14 01/11] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:57 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 02/11] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (9 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, Lee Jones, Feng Xue
From: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Commit f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly
synchronize_rcu()") replaced synchronize_rcu() in bcm_delete_rx_op()
with call_rcu() and introduced the RX_NO_AUTOTIMER flag.
However, this flag check was omitted for thrtimer in the packet rx
fast-path. During BCM RX operation teardown, a concurrent RCU reader
(bcm_rx_handler) can race and re-arm thrtimer via
bcm_rx_update_and_send() after call_rcu() has been scheduled. Once
the RCU grace period elapses, bcm_op is freed. The subsequently
firing thrtimer then dereferences the deallocated op, causing a UAF.
Adding flag checks to the rx fast-path (bcm_rx_update_and_send) does not
fully close the TOCTOU race and introduces latency for every CAN frame.
Conversely, calling hrtimer_cancel() directly inside the RCU callback
(softirq context) is fatal as hrtimer_cancel() can sleep, triggering
a "scheduling while atomic" panic.
Resolve this by deferring the timer cancellation and memory free to a
dedicated unbound workqueue (bcm_wq). The RCU callback now queues a
work item to bcm_wq, which safely cancels both timers and deallocates
memory in sleepable process context. A dedicated workqueue is used to
prevent system-wide WQ saturation and is cleanly flushed/destroyed
on module unload to avoid rmmod page faults.
Since the deferred work can now outlive the calling context by an
unbounded amount, also take a reference on op->sk when it is assigned
and drop it only once the deferred work has cancelled both timers, so a
socket can no longer be freed out from under a still-armed timer whose
callback (bcm_send_to_user()) dereferences op->sk.
Fixes: f1b4e32aca08 ("can: bcm: use call_rcu() instead of costly synchronize_rcu()")
Tested-by: Feng Xue <feng.xue@outlook.com>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index a4bef2c48a55..bdf53241bd7b 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -56,10 +56,11 @@
#include <linux/can.h>
#include <linux/can/core.h>
#include <linux/can/skb.h>
#include <linux/can/bcm.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <net/can.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -90,10 +91,12 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Oliver Hartkopp <oliver.hartkopp@volkswagen.de>");
MODULE_ALIAS("can-proto-2");
#define BCM_MIN_NAMELEN CAN_REQUIRED_SIZE(struct sockaddr_can, can_ifindex)
+static struct workqueue_struct *bcm_wq;
+
/*
* easy access to the first 64 bit of can(fd)_frame payload. cp->data is
* 64 bit aligned so the offset has to be multiples of 8 which is ensured
* by the only callers in bcm_rx_cmp_to_index() bcm_rx_handler().
*/
@@ -103,10 +106,11 @@ static inline u64 get_u64(const struct canfd_frame *cp, int offset)
}
struct bcm_op {
struct list_head list;
struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct work_struct work;
int ifindex;
canid_t can_id;
u32 flags;
unsigned long frames_abs, frames_filtered;
struct bcm_timeval ival1, ival2;
@@ -791,23 +795,40 @@ static struct bcm_op *bcm_find_op(struct list_head *ops,
}
return NULL;
}
-static void bcm_free_op_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
+static void bcm_free_op_work(struct work_struct *work)
{
- struct bcm_op *op = container_of(rcu_head, struct bcm_op, rcu);
+ struct bcm_op *op = container_of(work, struct bcm_op, work);
+
+ hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
+ hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer);
if ((op->frames) && (op->frames != &op->sframe))
kfree(op->frames);
if ((op->last_frames) && (op->last_frames != &op->last_sframe))
kfree(op->last_frames);
+ /* the last possible access to op->timer/op->thrtimer has now
+ * happened above via hrtimer_cancel() - op->sk is no longer
+ * needed by any pending timer callback, so drop our reference
+ */
+ sock_put(op->sk);
+
kfree(op);
}
+static void bcm_free_op_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
+{
+ struct bcm_op *op = container_of(rcu_head, struct bcm_op, rcu);
+
+ INIT_WORK(&op->work, bcm_free_op_work);
+ queue_work(bcm_wq, &op->work);
+}
+
static void bcm_remove_op(struct bcm_op *op)
{
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer);
@@ -1058,10 +1079,11 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
/* tx_ops never compare with previous received messages */
op->last_frames = NULL;
/* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */
op->sk = sk;
+ sock_hold(sk);
op->ifindex = ifindex;
/* initialize uninitialized (kzalloc) structure */
hrtimer_setup(&op->timer, bcm_tx_timeout_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
@@ -1219,10 +1241,11 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
}
}
/* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */
op->sk = sk;
+ sock_hold(sk);
op->ifindex = ifindex;
/* ifindex for timeout events w/o previous frame reception */
op->rx_ifindex = ifindex;
@@ -1837,15 +1860,19 @@ static struct notifier_block canbcm_notifier = {
static int __init bcm_module_init(void)
{
int err;
+ bcm_wq = alloc_workqueue("can-bcm-wq", WQ_UNBOUND, 0);
+ if (!bcm_wq)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
pr_info("can: broadcast manager protocol\n");
err = register_pernet_subsys(&canbcm_pernet_ops);
if (err)
- return err;
+ goto register_pernet_failed;
err = register_netdevice_notifier(&canbcm_notifier);
if (err)
goto register_notifier_failed;
@@ -1859,17 +1886,21 @@ static int __init bcm_module_init(void)
register_proto_failed:
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&canbcm_notifier);
register_notifier_failed:
unregister_pernet_subsys(&canbcm_pernet_ops);
+register_pernet_failed:
+ destroy_workqueue(bcm_wq);
return err;
}
static void __exit bcm_module_exit(void)
{
can_proto_unregister(&bcm_can_proto);
unregister_netdevice_notifier(&canbcm_notifier);
unregister_pernet_subsys(&canbcm_pernet_ops);
+ rcu_barrier();
+ destroy_workqueue(bcm_wq);
}
module_init(bcm_module_init);
module_exit(bcm_module_exit);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v14 01/11] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 01/11] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:57 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-07-14 11:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oliver Hartkopp
Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, linux-can, Oleksij Rempel,
Vincent Mailhol
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] The `/proc/net/can-bcm` read path contains data races when iterating over `bo->rx_ops` and `bo->tx_ops`, leading to a potential kernel panic (DoS).
--
--- Patch [1]: [PATCH v14 01/11] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF ---
commit f579f72c791d4b1c3e9b36c8937eb96317894b65
Author: Lee Jones <lee@kernel.org>
can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF
This commit resolves a use-after-free in the CAN BCM module by deferring
the timer cancellation and memory deallocation of bcm_op to a dedicated
workqueue. It introduces flag checks and takes a reference on the socket
to ensure it outlives the deferred work.
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index a4bef2c48a559..bdf53241bd7b3 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1060,6 +1081,7 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
>
> /* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */
> op->sk = sk;
> + sock_hold(sk);
> op->ifindex = ifindex;
>
> /* initialize uninitialized (kzalloc) structure */
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does the current code lack
proper RCU publish semantics when inserting new BCM operations?
While looking at bcm_tx_setup(), the new operation seems to be published
using list_add():
list_add(&op->list, &bo->tx_ops);
Similarly, bcm_rx_setup() appears to use list_add():
list_add(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops);
If bcm_proc_show() iterates over these lists while holding only
rcu_read_lock(), could this lead to uninitialized memory accesses or a
kernel panic (DoS)?
For example, bcm_proc_show() traverses tx_ops using a non-RCU iterator:
list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) {
Since list_add() lacks the smp_store_release() memory barrier provided by
list_add_rcu(), and the traversal in bcm_proc_show() lacks READ_ONCE() and
rcu_dereference() protections, could this expose the traversal to concurrent
list mutations?
An unprivileged user could potentially trigger this by continuously reading
/proc/net/can-bcm/<inode> while another thread repeatedly invokes sendmsg()
with TX_SETUP/RX_SETUP and TX_DELETE/RX_DELETE opcodes to modify the lists.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714-bcm_fixes-v14-0-867a4be60a61@hartkopp.net?part=1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v14 02/11] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 01/11] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:51 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 03/11] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (8 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, Ginger
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
bcm_sendmsg() reads bo->ifindex and checks bo->bound before taking
lock_sock(), while bcm_notify(), bcm_connect() and bcm_release() all
mutate both fields under that same lock. Because the lockless reads
and the locked writes are unordered with respect to each other, a
racing bcm_notify() (device unregister) or bcm_connect() (concurrent
bind on another thread sharing the socket) can make bcm_sendmsg()
observe an inconsistent combination, e.g. a stale bound=1 together
with the now-cleared ifindex=0, silently turning a socket bound to a
specific CAN interface into one that also matches "any" interface.
Keep the lockless bo->bound check purely as a fast-path reject, and
move the ifindex read (and a bo->bound re-check) into the locked
section, where every writer already serializes. This removes the
possibility of observing the two fields torn against each other,
rather than trying to fix it with more READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() pairs
on two independently updated fields. Annotate the now-purely-lockless
bo->bound accesses consistently across all its write sites.
Also fix bcm_rx_setup() silently returning success when the target
device disappears concurrently instead of reporting -ENODEV, so a
broken RX op is no longer left registered as if it had succeeded.
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Reported-by: Ginger <ginger.jzllee@gmail.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/CAGp+u1aBK8QVjsvAxM2Ldzep4rEbsP9x_pV3At4g=h1kVEtyhA@mail.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index bdf53241bd7b..b612135b017d 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -1321,10 +1321,15 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
bcm_rx_handler, op,
"bcm", sk);
op->rx_reg_dev = dev;
dev_put(dev);
+ } else {
+ /* the requested device is gone - do not
+ * silently succeed without registering
+ */
+ err = -ENODEV;
}
} else
err = can_rx_register(sock_net(sk), NULL, op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
@@ -1394,16 +1399,17 @@ static int bcm_tx_send(struct msghdr *msg, int ifindex, struct sock *sk,
*/
static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct bcm_sock *bo = bcm_sk(sk);
- int ifindex = bo->ifindex; /* default ifindex for this bcm_op */
+ int ifindex;
struct bcm_msg_head msg_head;
int cfsiz;
int ret; /* read bytes or error codes as return value */
- if (!bo->bound)
+ /* Lockless fast-path check for bound socket */
+ if (!READ_ONCE(bo->bound))
return -ENOTCONN;
/* check for valid message length from userspace */
if (size < MHSIZ)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1415,43 +1421,65 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
cfsiz = CFSIZ(msg_head.flags);
if ((size - MHSIZ) % cfsiz)
return -EINVAL;
+ lock_sock(sk);
+
+ /* Re-validate under the socket lock: a concurrent bcm_notify()
+ * may have unbound this socket (device removal) after the
+ * lockless fast-path check above. bo->ifindex is only ever
+ * mutated under lock_sock(), so reading it here - instead of
+ * before taking the lock - guarantees it can't be observed
+ * torn against bo->bound.
+ */
+ if (!bo->bound) {
+ ret = -ENOTCONN;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
+
+ /* default ifindex for this bcm_op */
+ ifindex = bo->ifindex;
+
/* check for alternative ifindex for this bcm_op */
if (!ifindex && msg->msg_name) {
/* no bound device as default => check msg_name */
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_can *, addr, msg->msg_name);
- if (msg->msg_namelen < BCM_MIN_NAMELEN)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (msg->msg_namelen < BCM_MIN_NAMELEN) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
- if (addr->can_family != AF_CAN)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (addr->can_family != AF_CAN) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
/* ifindex from sendto() */
ifindex = addr->can_ifindex;
if (ifindex) {
struct net_device *dev;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
- if (!dev)
- return -ENODEV;
+ if (!dev) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_release;
+ }
if (dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN) {
dev_put(dev);
- return -ENODEV;
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_release;
}
dev_put(dev);
}
}
- lock_sock(sk);
-
switch (msg_head.opcode) {
case TX_SETUP:
ret = bcm_tx_setup(&msg_head, msg, ifindex, sk);
break;
@@ -1497,10 +1525,11 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
default:
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
+out_release:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
}
@@ -1533,11 +1562,16 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg,
if (sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read) {
remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir);
bo->bcm_proc_read = NULL;
}
#endif
- bo->bound = 0;
+ /* Paired with the lockless fast-path check in
+ * bcm_sendmsg(); bo->ifindex itself is only ever
+ * accessed under lock_sock() so it needs no
+ * annotation.
+ */
+ WRITE_ONCE(bo->bound, 0);
bo->ifindex = 0;
notify_enodev = 1;
}
release_sock(sk);
@@ -1674,11 +1708,11 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock)
list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list)
bcm_remove_op(op);
/* remove device reference */
if (bo->bound) {
- bo->bound = 0;
+ WRITE_ONCE(bo->bound, 0);
bo->ifindex = 0;
}
sock_orphan(sk);
sock->sk = NULL;
@@ -1744,11 +1778,14 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uaddr, int
goto fail;
}
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
- bo->bound = 1;
+ /* bo->ifindex above is fully assigned before this point; pairs
+ * with the lockless fast-path check in bcm_sendmsg()
+ */
+ WRITE_ONCE(bo->bound, 1);
fail:
release_sock(sk);
return ret;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v14 02/11] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 02/11] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:51 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-07-14 11:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oliver Hartkopp
Cc: Oleksij Rempel, Vincent Mailhol, linux-can, Marc Kleine-Budde,
Oliver Hartkopp
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Data race when updating CAN frames locklessly allows transmission of torn or partially updated frames and incorrect RX filtering.
--
--- Patch [2]: [PATCH v14 02/11] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure ---
commit 23919fa17f26320455e758411c450420d522db0a
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure
This commit fixes a race condition where bcm_sendmsg() reads bo->ifindex
and checks bo->bound locklessly while concurrent updates modify them,
preventing inconsistent socket bindings. It also ensures bcm_rx_setup()
returns an error when a requested device is concurrently removed instead of
silently failing.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/CAGp+u1aBK8QVjsvAxM2Ldzep4rEbsP9x_pV3At4g=h1kVEtyhA@mail.gmail.com/
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index bdf53241bd7b3..b612135b017d1 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1436,20 +1463,21 @@ static int bcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
> struct net_device *dev;
>
> dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
> - if (!dev)
> - return -ENODEV;
> + if (!dev) {
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto out_release;
> + }
>
> if (dev->type != ARPHRD_CAN) {
> dev_put(dev);
> - return -ENODEV;
> + ret = -ENODEV;
> + goto out_release;
> }
>
> dev_put(dev);
> }
> }
>
> - lock_sock(sk);
> -
> switch (msg_head.opcode) {
>
> case TX_SETUP:
[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but is there a data race when
updating CAN frames locklessly?
Looking at bcm_tx_setup(), it writes directly to op->frames using data from
userspace without holding any lock to synchronize with the timer:
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_tx_setup() {
...
err = memcpy_from_msg((u8 *)cf, msg, op->cfsiz);
...
}
Could the timer function bcm_can_tx() locklessly read op->frames and
transmit torn data if it races with bcm_tx_setup()?
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_can_tx() {
...
skb_put_data(skb, cf, op->cfsiz);
...
}
Similarly, bcm_rx_setup() updates RX filters locklessly:
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_rx_setup() {
...
err = memcpy_from_msg(op->frames, msg, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
...
}
Does this allow the RX softirq handler to evaluate incoming CAN frames against
partially written filters in bcm_rx_handler()?
net/can/bcm.c:bcm_rx_handler() {
...
if ((get_u64(op->frames, 0) & get_u64(rxframe, 0)) ==
...
}
Since memcpy_from_msg() can sleep on page faults, the data might be in a
partially written state for an extended period. Is it possible to copy the
data to a temporary buffer first, and then update op->frames under the
appropriate spinlocks?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714-bcm_fixes-v14-0-867a4be60a61@hartkopp.net?part=2
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v14 03/11] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 01/11] can: bcm: defer rx_op deallocation to workqueue to fix thrtimer UAF Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 02/11] can: bcm: fix lockless bound/ifindex race and silent RX_SETUP failure Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:52 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 04/11] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (7 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, syzbot+75e5e4ae00c3b4bb544e
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
KCSAN detected a simultaneous access to timer values that can be
overwritten in bcm_rx_setup() when updating timer and filter content
while bcm_rx_handler(), bcm_rx_timeout_handler() or bcm_rx_thr_handler()
run concurrently on incoming CAN traffic.
Protect the timer (ival1/ival2/kt_ival1/kt_ival2/kt_lastmsg) and filter
(nframes/flags/frames/last_frames) updates in bcm_rx_setup() with a new
per-op bcm_rx_update_lock, taken with the matching scope in the RX
handlers. memcpy_from_msg() is staged into a temporary buffer before the
lock is taken, since it can sleep and must not run under a spinlock.
hrtimer_cancel() is always called without bcm_rx_update_lock held, since
bcm_rx_timeout_handler()/bcm_rx_thr_handler() take the same lock and a
running callback would otherwise deadlock against the canceller.
Also close a related race: bcm_rx_setup() cleared the RTR flag in the
stored reply frame's can_id as a separate, unprotected step after the
frame content was already installed, so a concurrent bcm_rx_handler()
could transmit a stale reply with CAN_RTR_FLAG still set. Fold that
normalization into the initial frame preparation instead (on the staged
buffer for updates, directly on op->frames pre-registration for new
ops), so the installed frame is always atomically self-consistent.
bcm_rx_handler()'s RX_RTR_FRAME check now takes a lock-protected
snapshot of op->flags before deciding whether to call bcm_can_tx(),
but does not hold the lock across that call.
Also take a lock-protected snapshot of the currframe in bcm_can_tx()
to avoid partly overwrites by content updates in bcm_tx_setup().
Omit calling hrtimer_forward() with zero interval in bcm_rx_thr_handler().
kt_ival2 may have been concurrently cleared by bcm_rx_setup() before it
cancels this timer, so check kt_ival2 inside the bcm_rx_update_lock.
Fixes: c2aba69d0c36 ("can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates")
Reported-by: syzbot+75e5e4ae00c3b4bb544e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/6975d5cf.a00a0220.33ccc7.0022.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 136 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
1 file changed, 104 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index b612135b017d..af4bb4182bc2 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -127,10 +127,11 @@ struct bcm_op {
struct canfd_frame sframe;
struct canfd_frame last_sframe;
struct sock *sk;
struct net_device *rx_reg_dev;
spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */
+ spinlock_t bcm_rx_update_lock; /* protect filter/timer data updates */
};
struct bcm_sock {
struct sock sk;
int bound;
@@ -291,26 +292,30 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/*
* bcm_can_tx - send the (next) CAN frame to the appropriate CAN interface
* of the given bcm tx op
*/
-static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op)
+static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *cf)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct can_skb_ext *csx;
struct net_device *dev;
- struct canfd_frame *cf;
+ struct canfd_frame cframe;
int err;
/* no target device? => exit */
if (!op->ifindex)
return;
- /* read currframe under lock protection */
- spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
- cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe;
- spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ if (!cf) {
+ /* read currframe under lock protection */
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ memcpy(&cframe, op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe,
+ op->cfsiz);
+ cf = &cframe;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ }
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk), op->ifindex);
if (!dev) {
/* RFC: should this bcm_op remove itself here? */
return;
@@ -459,11 +464,11 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
{
struct bcm_op *op = container_of(hrtimer, struct bcm_op, timer);
struct bcm_msg_head msg_head;
if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) {
- bcm_can_tx(op);
+ bcm_can_tx(op, NULL);
if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) {
/* create notification to user */
memset(&msg_head, 0, sizeof(msg_head));
msg_head.opcode = TX_EXPIRED;
@@ -476,11 +481,11 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0);
}
} else if (op->kt_ival2) {
- bcm_can_tx(op);
+ bcm_can_tx(op, NULL);
}
return bcm_tx_set_expiry(op, &op->timer) ?
HRTIMER_RESTART : HRTIMER_NORESTART;
}
@@ -620,10 +625,12 @@ static void bcm_rx_starttimer(struct bcm_op *op)
static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_rx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
{
struct bcm_op *op = container_of(hrtimer, struct bcm_op, timer);
struct bcm_msg_head msg_head;
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
/* if user wants to be informed, when cyclic CAN-Messages come back */
if ((op->flags & RX_ANNOUNCE_RESUME) && op->last_frames) {
/* clear received CAN frames to indicate 'nothing received' */
memset(op->last_frames, 0, op->nframes * op->cfsiz);
}
@@ -636,10 +643,12 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_rx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
msg_head.ival1 = op->ival1;
msg_head.ival2 = op->ival2;
msg_head.can_id = op->can_id;
msg_head.nframes = 0;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0);
return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
}
@@ -684,30 +693,43 @@ static int bcm_rx_thr_flush(struct bcm_op *op)
* Check for throttled data and send it to the userspace
*/
static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_rx_thr_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
{
struct bcm_op *op = container_of(hrtimer, struct bcm_op, thrtimer);
+ enum hrtimer_restart ret;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
- if (bcm_rx_thr_flush(op)) {
+ /* kt_ival2 may have been concurrently cleared by bcm_rx_setup()
+ * before it cancels this timer - never forward with a zero
+ * interval in that case.
+ */
+ if (bcm_rx_thr_flush(op) && op->kt_ival2) {
hrtimer_forward_now(hrtimer, op->kt_ival2);
- return HRTIMER_RESTART;
+ ret = HRTIMER_RESTART;
} else {
/* rearm throttle handling */
op->kt_lastmsg = 0;
- return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
+ ret = HRTIMER_NORESTART;
}
+
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
+ return ret;
}
/*
* bcm_rx_handler - handle a CAN frame reception
*/
static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
{
struct bcm_op *op = (struct bcm_op *)data;
const struct canfd_frame *rxframe = (struct canfd_frame *)skb->data;
+ struct canfd_frame rtrframe;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char traffic_flags;
+ bool rtr_frame;
if (op->can_id != rxframe->can_id)
return;
/* make sure to handle the correct frame type (CAN / CAN FD) */
@@ -727,13 +749,22 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
/* save originator for recvfrom() */
op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
/* update statistics */
op->frames_abs++;
- if (op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) {
+ /* snapshot the flag under lock: op->flags/op->frames may be updated
+ * concurrently by bcm_rx_setup().
+ */
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+ rtr_frame = op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME;
+ if (rtr_frame)
+ memcpy(&rtrframe, op->frames, op->cfsiz);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
+ if (rtr_frame) {
/* send reply for RTR-request (placed in op->frames[0]) */
- bcm_can_tx(op);
+ bcm_can_tx(op, &rtrframe);
return;
}
/* compute flags to distinguish between own/local/remote CAN traffic */
traffic_flags = 0;
@@ -741,10 +772,12 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
traffic_flags |= RX_LOCAL;
if (skb->sk == op->sk)
traffic_flags |= RX_OWN;
}
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
if (op->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) {
/* the easiest case */
bcm_rx_update_and_send(op, op->last_frames, rxframe,
traffic_flags);
goto rx_starttimer;
@@ -776,10 +809,12 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
}
}
rx_starttimer:
bcm_rx_starttimer(op);
+
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
}
/*
* helpers for bcm_op handling: find & delete bcm [rx|tx] op elements
*/
@@ -1114,11 +1149,11 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
/* spec: send CAN frame when starting timer */
op->flags |= TX_ANNOUNCE;
}
if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE)
- bcm_can_tx(op);
+ bcm_can_tx(op, NULL);
if (op->flags & STARTTIMER)
bcm_tx_start_timer(op);
return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ;
@@ -1128,10 +1163,28 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
kfree(op->frames);
kfree(op);
return err;
}
+static void bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head,
+ struct bcm_op *op, void *new_frames)
+{
+ /* funny feature in RX(!)_SETUP only for RTR-mode:
+ * copy can_id into frame BUT without RTR-flag to
+ * prevent a full-load-loopback-test ... ;-]
+ * normalize this on the staged buffer, before it is
+ * ever installed into op->frames.
+ */
+ if (msg_head->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) {
+ struct canfd_frame *frame0 = new_frames;
+
+ if ((msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) ||
+ frame0->can_id == op->can_id)
+ frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG;
+ }
+}
+
/*
* bcm_rx_setup - create or update a bcm rx op (for bcm_sendmsg)
*/
static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
int ifindex, struct sock *sk)
@@ -1162,10 +1215,12 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
return -EINVAL;
/* check the given can_id */
op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);
if (op) {
+ void *new_frames = NULL;
+
/* update existing BCM operation */
/*
* Do we need more space for the CAN frames than currently
* allocated? -> This is a _really_ unusual use-case and
@@ -1173,33 +1228,55 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
*/
if (msg_head->nframes > op->nframes)
return -E2BIG;
if (msg_head->nframes) {
- /* update CAN frames content */
- err = memcpy_from_msg(op->frames, msg,
+ /* get new CAN frames content before locking */
+ new_frames = kmalloc(msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_frames)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ err = memcpy_from_msg(new_frames, msg,
msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
- if (err < 0)
+ if (err < 0) {
+ kfree(new_frames);
return err;
+ }
- /* clear last_frames to indicate 'nothing received' */
- memset(op->last_frames, 0, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
+ bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, new_frames);
}
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
op->flags = msg_head->flags;
+ if (msg_head->nframes) {
+ /* update CAN frames content */
+ memcpy(op->frames, new_frames,
+ msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
+
+ /* clear last_frames to indicate 'nothing received' */
+ memset(op->last_frames, 0,
+ msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
+ /* free temporary frames / kfree(NULL) is safe */
+ kfree(new_frames);
+
/* Only an update -> do not call can_rx_register() */
do_rx_register = 0;
} else {
/* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */
op = kzalloc(OPSIZ, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!op)
return -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ spin_lock_init(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
op->can_id = msg_head->can_id;
op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
op->cfsiz = CFSIZ(msg_head->flags);
op->flags = msg_head->flags;
@@ -1237,10 +1314,12 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
if (op->last_frames != &op->last_sframe)
kfree(op->last_frames);
kfree(op);
return err;
}
+
+ bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, op->frames);
}
/* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */
op->sk = sk;
sock_hold(sk);
@@ -1264,45 +1343,38 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
} /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */
/* check flags */
if (op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) {
- struct canfd_frame *frame0 = op->frames;
-
/* no timers in RTR-mode */
hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer);
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
-
- /*
- * funny feature in RX(!)_SETUP only for RTR-mode:
- * copy can_id into frame BUT without RTR-flag to
- * prevent a full-load-loopback-test ... ;-]
- */
- if ((op->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) ||
- (frame0->can_id == op->can_id))
- frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG;
-
} else {
if (op->flags & SETTIMER) {
/* set timer value */
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1;
op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2;
op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1);
op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2);
+ op->kt_lastmsg = 0;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
/* disable an active timer due to zero value? */
if (!op->kt_ival1)
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
/*
* In any case cancel the throttle timer, flush
* potentially blocked msgs and reset throttle handling
*/
- op->kt_lastmsg = 0;
hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer);
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
bcm_rx_thr_flush(op);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
}
if ((op->flags & STARTTIMER) && op->kt_ival1)
hrtimer_start(&op->timer, op->kt_ival1,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v14 03/11] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 03/11] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:52 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-07-14 11:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oliver Hartkopp
Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde, Oliver Hartkopp, linux-can, Vincent Mailhol,
Oleksij Rempel
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [Medium] Split critical sections in `bcm_rx_setup()` create a window of inconsistent state.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Lockless reads and writes of timer values and flags in TX path cause a data race and potential torn reads.
- [High] Direct, lockless modification of `op->frames` array in `bcm_tx_setup()` leads to data races and unrecoverable state corruption.
- [High] Use of `list_add()` instead of `list_add_rcu()` causes data races with lockless RCU readers.
--
--- Patch [3]: [PATCH v14 03/11] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values ---
commit b803c079b36024599ab905728a0b29f52d124d0c
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values
This commit introduces bcm_rx_update_lock to protect timer and filter data
updates in bcm_rx_setup() and various RX handlers. It also adds read-side
locking in bcm_can_tx() and normalizes RTR frames in a staging buffer
before registering them.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/6975d5cf.a00a0220.33ccc7.0022.GAE@google.com/
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index b612135b017d1..af4bb4182bc29 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
> @@ -293,22 +294,26 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
> * bcm_can_tx - send the (next) CAN frame to the appropriate CAN interface
> * of the given bcm tx op
> */
> -static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op)
> +static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *cf)
> {
> struct sk_buff *skb;
> struct can_skb_ext *csx;
> struct net_device *dev;
> - struct canfd_frame *cf;
> + struct canfd_frame cframe;
> int err;
>
> /* no target device? => exit */
> if (!op->ifindex)
> return;
>
> - /* read currframe under lock protection */
> - spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
> - cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe;
> - spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
> + if (!cf) {
> + /* read currframe under lock protection */
> + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
> + memcpy(&cframe, op->frames + op->cfsiz * op->currframe,
> + op->cfsiz);
> + cf = &cframe;
> + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
> + }
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does this read-side lock actually protect
against concurrent updates?
While bcm_can_tx() acquires bcm_tx_lock here, the writer in bcm_tx_setup()
directly modifies the op->frames array without holding the lock and without
using a staging buffer:
bcm_tx_setup() {
...
for (i = 0; i < msg_head->nframes; i++) {
cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * i;
err = memcpy_from_msg((u8 *)cf, msg, op->cfsiz);
...
}
Because memcpy_from_msg() can sleep, it cannot be called under a spinlock.
Could this lead to bcm_can_tx() copying partially overwritten CAN frames, or
unrecoverable state corruption if memcpy_from_msg() fails midway?
[ ... ]
> @@ -461,7 +466,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
> struct bcm_msg_head msg_head;
>
> if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) {
> - bcm_can_tx(op);
> + bcm_can_tx(op, NULL);
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can this result in torn reads on 32-bit
platforms?
The bcm_tx_timeout_handler() reads kt_ival1, count, and flags locklessly
here. Concurrently, a user calling sendmsg() with TX_SETUP can trigger
bcm_tx_setup() to write new timer values locklessly:
bcm_tx_setup() {
...
if (op->flags & SETTIMER) {
op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1;
op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2;
op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1);
op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2);
}
...
}
Does this data race risk unpredictable timer expiration or spurious CAN
transmissions if inconsistent combinations of flags and counts are observed?
[ ... ]
> @@ -1175,19 +1230,40 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
> return -E2BIG;
>
> if (msg_head->nframes) {
> - /* update CAN frames content */
> - err = memcpy_from_msg(op->frames, msg,
> + /* get new CAN frames content before locking */
> + new_frames = kmalloc(msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz,
> + GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!new_frames)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
> + err = memcpy_from_msg(new_frames, msg,
> msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
> - if (err < 0)
> + if (err < 0) {
> + kfree(new_frames);
> return err;
> + }
>
> - /* clear last_frames to indicate 'nothing received' */
> - memset(op->last_frames, 0, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
> + bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, new_frames);
> }
>
> + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
> op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
> op->flags = msg_head->flags;
>
> + if (msg_head->nframes) {
> + /* update CAN frames content */
> + memcpy(op->frames, new_frames,
> + msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
> +
> + /* clear last_frames to indicate 'nothing received' */
> + memset(op->last_frames, 0,
> + msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
> + }
> + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
[ ... ]
> @@ -1266,29 +1345,20 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
> /* check flags */
>
> if (op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) {
> - struct canfd_frame *frame0 = op->frames;
> -
> /* no timers in RTR-mode */
> hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer);
> hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
> -
> - /*
> - * funny feature in RX(!)_SETUP only for RTR-mode:
> - * copy can_id into frame BUT without RTR-flag to
> - * prevent a full-load-loopback-test ... ;-]
> - */
> - if ((op->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) ||
> - (frame0->can_id == op->can_id))
> - frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG;
> -
> } else {
> if (op->flags & SETTIMER) {
>
> /* set timer value */
> + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
> op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1;
> op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2;
[Severity: Medium]
Could a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() process a frame during the gap between
these two critical sections?
In bcm_rx_setup(), the lock is acquired to update flags and frames, then
dropped, and re-acquired here to update the timer values. Does this create
a window where bcm_rx_handler() might see the new flags and frames alongside
stale kt_ival1 and kt_ival2 timer values, resulting in incorrect throttling
behavior?
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does publishing operations without RCU
primitives cause data races with lockless readers?
In bcm_tx_setup() and bcm_rx_setup(), operations are published to the lists
using list_add() rather than list_add_rcu():
bcm_tx_setup() {
...
list_add(&op->list, &bo->tx_ops);
...
}
However, readers like bcm_proc_show() traverse the list locklessly:
bcm_proc_show() {
...
list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) {
...
}
Since list_add() lacks the smp_store_release() barrier provided by
list_add_rcu(), can lockless readers observe uninitialized memory if they
reach a newly linked node before its contents are globally visible?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714-bcm_fixes-v14-0-867a4be60a61@hartkopp.net?part=3
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v14 04/11] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 03/11] can: bcm: add locking when updating filter and timer values Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:45 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 05/11] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (6 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
KCSAN detected a data race within the bcm_rx_handler() when two CAN frames
have been simultaneously received and processed in a single rx op by two
different CPUs.
Use atomic operations with (signed) long data types to access the
statistics in the hot path to fix the KCSAN complaint.
Additionally simplify the update and check of statistics overflow by
using the atomic operations in separate bcm_update_[rx|tx]_stats()
functions. The rx variant runs under bcm_rx_update_lock to prevent
races when resetting the two rx counters; the tx variant runs under
bcm_tx_lock and only needs to guard its own counter's overflow.
As the rx path resets its values already at LONG_MAX / 100, there is
no conflict between the two locking domains (bcm_rx_update_lock vs.
bcm_tx_lock) even for ops that use both paths.
The rx statistics update and the frames_filtered update in
bcm_rx_changed() were previously performed in two separate
bcm_rx_update_lock sections. For an rx op subscribed on all interfaces
(ifindex == 0), bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different
CPUs, so a counter reset by one CPU between these two sections could
leave frames_filtered larger than frames_abs on another CPU, producing
a bogus (even negative) reduction percentage in procfs. Update the
statistics in the same critical section as bcm_rx_changed() to close
this gap, which also removes the now unneeded extra lock/unlock pair
around the traffic_flags calculation.
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index af4bb4182bc2..38c3f690c1cd 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -110,11 +110,11 @@ struct bcm_op {
struct rcu_head rcu;
struct work_struct work;
int ifindex;
canid_t can_id;
u32 flags;
- unsigned long frames_abs, frames_filtered;
+ atomic_long_t frames_abs, frames_filtered;
struct bcm_timeval ival1, ival2;
struct hrtimer timer, thrtimer;
ktime_t rx_stamp, kt_ival1, kt_ival2, kt_lastmsg;
int rx_ifindex;
int cfsiz;
@@ -227,14 +227,17 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
- unsigned long reduction;
+ long reduction, frames_filtered, frames_abs;
+
+ frames_filtered = atomic_long_read(&op->frames_filtered);
+ frames_abs = atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs);
/* print only active entries & prevent division by zero */
- if (!op->frames_abs)
+ if (!frames_abs)
continue;
seq_printf(m, "rx_op: %03X %-5s ", op->can_id,
bcm_proc_getifname(net, ifname, op->ifindex));
@@ -252,13 +255,13 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (op->kt_ival2)
seq_printf(m, "thr=%lld ",
(long long)ktime_to_us(op->kt_ival2));
seq_printf(m, "# recv %ld (%ld) => reduction: ",
- op->frames_filtered, op->frames_abs);
+ frames_filtered, frames_abs);
- reduction = 100 - (op->frames_filtered * 100) / op->frames_abs;
+ reduction = 100 - (frames_filtered * 100) / frames_abs;
seq_printf(m, "%s%ld%%\n",
(reduction == 100) ? "near " : "", reduction);
}
@@ -278,20 +281,39 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
if (op->kt_ival2)
seq_printf(m, "t2=%lld ",
(long long)ktime_to_us(op->kt_ival2));
- seq_printf(m, "# sent %ld\n", op->frames_abs);
+ seq_printf(m, "# sent %ld\n",
+ atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs));
}
seq_putc(m, '\n');
rcu_read_unlock();
return 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
+static void bcm_update_rx_stats(struct bcm_op *op)
+{
+ /* prevent overflow of the reduction% calculation in bcm_proc_show() */
+ if (atomic_long_inc_return(&op->frames_abs) > LONG_MAX / 100) {
+ atomic_long_set(&op->frames_filtered, 0);
+ atomic_long_set(&op->frames_abs, 0);
+ }
+}
+
+static void bcm_update_tx_stats(struct bcm_op *op)
+{
+ /* tx_op has no reduction% calculation - use the full range and
+ * just keep the displayed counter non-negative on overflow
+ */
+ if (atomic_long_inc_return(&op->frames_abs) == LONG_MAX)
+ atomic_long_set(&op->frames_abs, 0);
+}
+
/*
* bcm_can_tx - send the (next) CAN frame to the appropriate CAN interface
* of the given bcm tx op
*/
static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *cf)
@@ -342,11 +364,11 @@ static void bcm_can_tx(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *cf)
/* update currframe and count under lock protection */
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
if (!err)
- op->frames_abs++;
+ bcm_update_tx_stats(op);
op->currframe++;
/* reached last frame? */
if (op->currframe >= op->nframes)
@@ -495,16 +517,13 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
*/
static void bcm_rx_changed(struct bcm_op *op, struct canfd_frame *data)
{
struct bcm_msg_head head;
- /* update statistics */
- op->frames_filtered++;
-
- /* prevent statistics overflow */
- if (op->frames_filtered > ULONG_MAX/100)
- op->frames_filtered = op->frames_abs = 0;
+ /* update statistics (frames_filtered <= frames_abs) */
+ if (atomic_long_read(&op->frames_abs))
+ atomic_long_inc(&op->frames_filtered);
/* this element is not throttled anymore */
data->flags &= ~RX_THR;
memset(&head, 0, sizeof(head));
@@ -746,38 +765,42 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
/* save rx timestamp */
op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp;
/* save originator for recvfrom() */
op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
- /* update statistics */
- op->frames_abs++;
- /* snapshot the flag under lock: op->flags/op->frames may be updated
- * concurrently by bcm_rx_setup().
- */
+ /* op->flags/op->frames may be updated concurrently by bcm_rx_setup() */
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
rtr_frame = op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME;
- if (rtr_frame)
+ if (rtr_frame) {
+ bcm_update_rx_stats(op);
+ /* snapshot RTR content under lock */
memcpy(&rtrframe, op->frames, op->cfsiz);
- spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
- if (rtr_frame) {
/* send reply for RTR-request (placed in op->frames[0]) */
bcm_can_tx(op, &rtrframe);
return;
}
+ /* update statistics in the same critical section as bcm_rx_changed()
+ * below: frames_filtered must never be checked/incremented against a
+ * frames_abs snapshot from a concurrent bcm_rx_handler() call on
+ * another CPU for the same (wildcard) op, or frames_filtered can end
+ * up larger than frames_abs.
+ */
+ bcm_update_rx_stats(op);
+
/* compute flags to distinguish between own/local/remote CAN traffic */
traffic_flags = 0;
if (skb->sk) {
traffic_flags |= RX_LOCAL;
if (skb->sk == op->sk)
traffic_flags |= RX_OWN;
}
- spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
-
if (op->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) {
/* the easiest case */
bcm_rx_update_and_send(op, op->last_frames, rxframe,
traffic_flags);
goto rx_starttimer;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v14 04/11] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 04/11] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:45 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-07-14 11:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oliver Hartkopp
Cc: Oleksij Rempel, Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde,
Vincent Mailhol, linux-can
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Concurrent updates to `op->rx_stamp` and `op->rx_ifindex` outside of `bcm_rx_update_lock` lead to torn writes and mismatched metadata being delivered to user space.
--
--- Patch [4]: [PATCH v14 04/11] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics ---
commit 1507f4edb289e7819b879095be4c4c84a3b1f750
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics
This commit addresses KCSAN-detected data races in bcm_rx_handler() by
using atomic operations for rx/tx statistics. It also restructures the
critical sections under bcm_rx_update_lock to prevent frames_filtered from
ever incorrectly exceeding frames_abs during concurrent updates.
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index af4bb4182bc29..38c3f690c1cd0 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -748,24 +767,30 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
> op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp;
> /* save originator for recvfrom() */
> op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
> - /* update statistics */
> - op->frames_abs++;
>
> - /* snapshot the flag under lock: op->flags/op->frames may be updated
> - * concurrently by bcm_rx_setup().
> - */
> spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but since this patch focuses on fixing
concurrent data races in bcm_rx_handler(), should these metadata fields
be moved inside the bcm_rx_update_lock as well?
If two CAN frames matching the same ANYDEV filter arrive concurrently on
different interfaces, could CPU2 overwrite op->rx_ifindex before CPU1
acquires the lock?
If CPU1 subsequently reads op->rx_ifindex inside bcm_send_to_user(), would
it attach CPU2's interface index to CPU1's CAN frame, delivering mismatched
metadata to user space?
Additionally, on 32-bit systems, could concurrent unprotected writes to the
64-bit ktime_t op->rx_stamp result in torn writes and corrupted timestamps?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714-bcm_fixes-v14-0-867a4be60a61@hartkopp.net?part=4
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v14 05/11] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 04/11] can: bcm: fix CAN frame rx/tx statistics Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:40 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 06/11] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (5 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, sashiko-reviews
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
sashiko-bot remarked the missing use of list_add_rcu() in
bcm_[rx|tx]_setup() to have a proper initialized bcm_op structure
when bcm_proc_show() traverses the bcm_op's under rcu_read_lock().
To cover all initial settings of the bcm_op's the list_add_rcu() calls
are moved to the end of the setup code.
While at it, also fix the mirroring removal side: bcm_release() called
bcm_remove_op() - which frees the op via call_rcu() - on ops that were
still linked in bo->tx_ops/bo->rx_ops, without list_del_rcu() first.
Unlink each op with list_del_rcu() before handing it to bcm_remove_op(),
matching the existing pattern in bcm_delete_tx_op()/bcm_delete_rx_op().
Reported-by: sashiko-reviews@lists.linux.dev
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260610094654.A1FFE1F00893@smtp.kernel.org/
Fixes: dac5e6249159 ("can: bcm: add missing rcu read protection for procfs content")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 38c3f690c1cd..940cd9df1cca 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -263,11 +263,11 @@ static int bcm_proc_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_printf(m, "%s%ld%%\n",
(reduction == 100) ? "near " : "", reduction);
}
- list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) {
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(op, &bo->tx_ops, list) {
seq_printf(m, "tx_op: %03X %s ", op->can_id,
bcm_proc_getifname(net, ifname, op->ifindex));
if (op->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME)
@@ -1007,10 +1007,11 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
int ifindex, struct sock *sk)
{
struct bcm_sock *bo = bcm_sk(sk);
struct bcm_op *op;
struct canfd_frame *cf;
+ bool add_op_to_list = false;
unsigned int i;
int err;
/* we need a real device to send frames */
if (!ifindex)
@@ -1148,12 +1149,11 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
/* currently unused in tx_ops */
hrtimer_setup(&op->thrtimer, hrtimer_dummy_timeout, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
- /* add this bcm_op to the list of the tx_ops */
- list_add(&op->list, &bo->tx_ops);
+ add_op_to_list = true;
} /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */
if (op->flags & SETTIMER) {
/* set timer values */
@@ -1171,10 +1171,14 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
/* spec: send CAN frame when starting timer */
op->flags |= TX_ANNOUNCE;
}
+ /* add this bcm_op to the list of the tx_ops? */
+ if (add_op_to_list)
+ list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->tx_ops);
+
if (op->flags & TX_ANNOUNCE)
bcm_can_tx(op, NULL);
if (op->flags & STARTTIMER)
bcm_tx_start_timer(op);
@@ -1355,13 +1359,10 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
hrtimer_setup(&op->timer, bcm_rx_timeout_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
hrtimer_setup(&op->thrtimer, bcm_rx_thr_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
- /* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */
- list_add(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops);
-
/* call can_rx_register() */
do_rx_register = 1;
} /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */
@@ -1429,14 +1430,16 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
err = can_rx_register(sock_net(sk), NULL, op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk);
if (err) {
/* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
- list_del_rcu(&op->list);
bcm_remove_op(op);
return err;
}
+
+ /* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */
+ list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops);
}
return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ;
}
@@ -1766,12 +1769,14 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock)
/* remove procfs entry */
if (net->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read)
remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, net->can.bcmproc_dir);
#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
- list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->tx_ops, list)
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->tx_ops, list) {
+ list_del_rcu(&op->list);
bcm_remove_op(op);
+ }
list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
/*
* Don't care if we're bound or not (due to netdev problems)
* can_rx_unregister() is always a save thing to do here.
@@ -1798,12 +1803,14 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock)
}
synchronize_rcu();
- list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list)
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(op, next, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
+ list_del_rcu(&op->list);
bcm_remove_op(op);
+ }
/* remove device reference */
if (bo->bound) {
WRITE_ONCE(bo->bound, 0);
bo->ifindex = 0;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v14 05/11] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 05/11] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:40 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-07-14 11:40 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oliver Hartkopp
Cc: linux-can, Marc Kleine-Budde, Vincent Mailhol, Oliver Hartkopp,
Oleksij Rempel
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Calling `list_add_rcu()` on an existing `bcm_op` structure causes list corruption when an existing RX operation is re-registered.
- [High] Missing `list_del_rcu()` on the error path causes an existing `bcm_op` to be freed while still in the socket's list.
--
--- Patch [5]: [PATCH v14 05/11] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations ---
commit c7e6469266e632779d9cd09483b591c4201b8a0d
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations
This commit updates bcm_rx_setup() and bcm_tx_setup() to use list_add_rcu()
when adding operations, ensuring the bcm_op structure is properly initialized
before traversal. It also updates bcm_release() to correctly unlink ops using
list_del_rcu() before freeing them.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260610094654.A1FFE1F00893@smtp.kernel.org/
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index 38c3f690c1cd0..940cd9df1cca3 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1431,10 +1432,12 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
> bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk);
> if (err) {
> /* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
> - list_del_rcu(&op->list);
> bcm_remove_op(op);
> return err;
> }
[Severity: High]
Does removing this list_del_rcu() introduce a use-after-free if an existing
operation fails to re-register?
If a virtual CAN interface is unregistered, the netdev notifier sets
op->rx_reg_dev to NULL but keeps the op in bo->rx_ops. If the socket updates
the RX operation while the interface is still gone, bcm_rx_setup() sets
do_rx_register = 1. If dev_get_by_index() then fails and returns an error,
this path is taken.
Since list_del_rcu() was removed, bcm_remove_op() will free the operation
via call_rcu() while it is still linked in bo->rx_ops, which could lead to
a crash during subsequent RCU list traversals.
> +
> + /* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */
> + list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops);
[Severity: High]
Does this unconditionally add the operation to the list, even if it is an
existing operation that is already linked?
Similar to the previous case, if an existing op is being updated and needs to
be re-registered because op->rx_reg_dev was cleared by a netdev unregister
event, do_rx_register is true.
If the registration succeeds, will this call list_add_rcu() on an op that
is already in bo->rx_ops, overwriting its list pointers and corrupting the
list?
> }
>
> return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ;
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714-bcm_fixes-v14-0-867a4be60a61@hartkopp.net?part=5
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v14 06/11] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 05/11] can: bcm: add missing rcu list annotations and operations Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:49 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 07/11] can: bcm: validate frame length in bcm_rx_setup() for RTR replies Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (4 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 1 reply; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Stage new CAN frame content for an existing tx op into a kmalloc()'d
buffer and validate it there, mirroring the approach already used in
bcm_rx_setup(). Only copy the validated data into op->frames while
holding op->bcm_tx_lock, so bcm_can_tx() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler()
can no longer observe a partially updated or unvalidated frame.
Add a missing error path for memcpy_from_msg() when copying CAN frame
data from userspace.
Also move the kt_ival1/kt_ival2/ival1/ival2 updates in bcm_tx_setup()
under op->bcm_tx_lock, and read kt_ival1/kt_ival2/count under the same
lock in bcm_tx_set_expiry() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler(), closing the
torn 64-bit ktime_t read on 32-bit platforms.
Fixes: c2aba69d0c36 ("can: bcm: add locking for bcm_op runtime updates")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 104 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 940cd9df1cca..d5ca5ca472f1 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -126,11 +126,11 @@ struct bcm_op {
void *last_frames;
struct canfd_frame sframe;
struct canfd_frame last_sframe;
struct sock *sk;
struct net_device *rx_reg_dev;
- spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect currframe/count in runtime updates */
+ spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect tx data and timer updates */
spinlock_t bcm_rx_update_lock; /* protect filter/timer data updates */
};
struct bcm_sock {
struct sock sk;
@@ -462,16 +462,22 @@ static void bcm_send_to_user(struct bcm_op *op, struct bcm_msg_head *head,
static bool bcm_tx_set_expiry(struct bcm_op *op, struct hrtimer *hrt)
{
ktime_t ival;
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+
if (op->kt_ival1 && op->count)
ival = op->kt_ival1;
- else if (op->kt_ival2)
+ else if (op->kt_ival2) {
ival = op->kt_ival2;
- else
+ } else {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
return false;
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
hrtimer_set_expires(hrt, ktime_add(ktime_get(), ival));
return true;
}
@@ -484,29 +490,51 @@ static void bcm_tx_start_timer(struct bcm_op *op)
/* bcm_tx_timeout_handler - performs cyclic CAN frame transmissions */
static enum hrtimer_restart bcm_tx_timeout_handler(struct hrtimer *hrtimer)
{
struct bcm_op *op = container_of(hrtimer, struct bcm_op, timer);
struct bcm_msg_head msg_head;
+ bool tx_ival1, tx_ival2;
+
+ /* snapshot kt_ival1/kt_ival2/count under lock to avoid torn
+ * ktime_t reads racing with concurrent bcm_tx_setup() updates
+ */
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ tx_ival1 = op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0);
+ tx_ival2 = !!op->kt_ival2;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+
+ if (tx_ival1) {
+ u32 flags, count;
+ struct bcm_timeval ival1, ival2;
- if (op->kt_ival1 && (op->count > 0)) {
bcm_can_tx(op, NULL);
- if (!op->count && (op->flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) {
+ /* snapshot variables under lock to avoid torn reads racing
+ * with concurrent bcm_tx_setup() updates
+ */
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ flags = op->flags;
+ count = op->count;
+ ival1 = op->ival1;
+ ival2 = op->ival2;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+
+ if (!count && (flags & TX_COUNTEVT)) {
/* create notification to user */
memset(&msg_head, 0, sizeof(msg_head));
msg_head.opcode = TX_EXPIRED;
- msg_head.flags = op->flags;
- msg_head.count = op->count;
- msg_head.ival1 = op->ival1;
- msg_head.ival2 = op->ival2;
+ msg_head.flags = flags;
+ msg_head.count = count;
+ msg_head.ival1 = ival1;
+ msg_head.ival2 = ival2;
msg_head.can_id = op->can_id;
msg_head.nframes = 0;
bcm_send_to_user(op, &msg_head, NULL, 0);
}
- } else if (op->kt_ival2) {
+ } else if (tx_ival2) {
bcm_can_tx(op, NULL);
}
return bcm_tx_set_expiry(op, &op->timer) ?
HRTIMER_RESTART : HRTIMER_NORESTART;
@@ -1026,64 +1054,80 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
return -EINVAL;
/* check the given can_id */
op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head, ifindex);
if (op) {
+ void *new_frames;
+
/* update existing BCM operation */
/*
* Do we need more space for the CAN frames than currently
* allocated? -> This is a _really_ unusual use-case and
* therefore (complexity / locking) it is not supported.
*/
if (msg_head->nframes > op->nframes)
return -E2BIG;
- /* update CAN frames content */
+ /* get new CAN frames content into a staging buffer before
+ * locking: validate and normalize the frames there so that
+ * bcm_can_tx() / bcm_tx_timeout_handler() never observe a
+ * partially updated or unvalidated frame in op->frames
+ */
+ new_frames = kmalloc(msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new_frames)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
for (i = 0; i < msg_head->nframes; i++) {
- cf = op->frames + op->cfsiz * i;
+ cf = new_frames + op->cfsiz * i;
err = memcpy_from_msg((u8 *)cf, msg, op->cfsiz);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ kfree(new_frames);
+ return err;
+ }
if (op->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) {
if (cf->len > 64)
err = -EINVAL;
} else {
if (cf->len > 8)
err = -EINVAL;
}
- if (err < 0)
+ if (err < 0) {
+ kfree(new_frames);
return err;
+ }
if (msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) {
/* copy can_id into frame */
cf->can_id = msg_head->can_id;
}
}
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+
+ /* update CAN frames content */
+ memcpy(op->frames, new_frames, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
+
op->flags = msg_head->flags;
- /* only lock for unlikely count/nframes/currframe changes */
if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
- op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX ||
- op->flags & SETTIMER) {
-
- spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
+ op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
+ /* potentially update changed nframes */
+ op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
+ /* restart multiple frame transmission */
+ op->currframe = 0;
+ }
- if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
- op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
- /* potentially update changed nframes */
- op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
- /* restart multiple frame transmission */
- op->currframe = 0;
- }
+ if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
+ op->count = msg_head->count;
- if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
- op->count = msg_head->count;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
- spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
- }
+ kfree(new_frames);
} else {
/* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */
op = kzalloc(OPSIZ, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1155,14 +1199,16 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
} /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->tx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */
if (op->flags & SETTIMER) {
/* set timer values */
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1;
op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2;
op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1);
op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
/* disable an active timer due to zero values? */
if (!op->kt_ival1 && !op->kt_ival2)
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
}
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v14 06/11] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 06/11] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:49 ` sashiko-bot
0 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: sashiko-bot @ 2026-07-14 11:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oliver Hartkopp
Cc: Oleksij Rempel, linux-can, Marc Kleine-Budde, Oliver Hartkopp,
Vincent Mailhol
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Preexisting TOCTOU race in `bcm_can_tx` causes CAN frame sequence corruption and skipped frames when an operation is updated concurrently.
--
--- Patch [6]: [PATCH v14 06/11] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates ---
commit 2415d37e8cc6682239aca2edf2ea4608c5e64f24
Author: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates
This commit stages new CAN frame content into a dynamically allocated
buffer to validate before acquiring the lock, and updates timer variables
under lock to fix a torn 64-bit ktime_t read on 32-bit platforms.
> diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
> index 940cd9df1cca3..d5ca5ca472f1f 100644
> --- a/net/can/bcm.c
> +++ b/net/can/bcm.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1052,36 +1094,38 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
> err = -EINVAL;
> }
>
> - if (err < 0)
> + if (err < 0) {
> + kfree(new_frames);
> return err;
> + }
>
> if (msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) {
> /* copy can_id into frame */
> cf->can_id = msg_head->can_id;
> }
> }
> +
> + spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
> +
> + /* update CAN frames content */
> + memcpy(op->frames, new_frames, msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
> +
> op->flags = msg_head->flags;
>
> - /* only lock for unlikely count/nframes/currframe changes */
> if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
> - op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX ||
> - op->flags & SETTIMER) {
> -
> - spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
>
> - if (op->nframes != msg_head->nframes ||
> - op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
> - /* potentially update changed nframes */
> - op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
> - /* restart multiple frame transmission */
> - op->currframe = 0;
> - }
> + op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX) {
> + /* potentially update changed nframes */
> + op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
> + /* restart multiple frame transmission */
> + op->currframe = 0;
> + }
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does bcm_can_tx in net/can/bcm.c have a
race condition with TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX that corrupts the sequence state?
When bcm_can_tx is called by the timer, it reads op->currframe under
op->bcm_tx_lock, drops the lock to send the frame, and reacquires the lock
to update the sequence state:
CPU1 (Timer context in bcm_can_tx)
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
// reads currframe
spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
can_send(skb, 1);
If a concurrent sendmsg triggers bcm_tx_setup while the lock is dropped:
CPU2 (User context in bcm_tx_setup)
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
if (op->flags & TX_RESET_MULTI_IDX)
op->currframe = 0;
if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
op->count = msg_head->count;
spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
Then CPU1 resumes and unconditionally increments the state:
CPU1 (Resuming in bcm_can_tx)
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
op->currframe++;
if (op->count > 0)
op->count--;
spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
Could this unconditional increment change the newly reset currframe from 0
to 1, causing frame 0 of the new sequence to be skipped? Also, wouldn't
this incorrectly decrement the new op->count limit?
>
> - if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
> - op->count = msg_head->count;
> + if (op->flags & SETTIMER)
> + op->count = msg_head->count;
>
> - spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
> - }
> + spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_tx_lock);
>
> - kfree(new_frames);
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260714-bcm_fixes-v14-0-867a4be60a61@hartkopp.net?part=6
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v14 07/11] can: bcm: validate frame length in bcm_rx_setup() for RTR replies
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 06/11] can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 08/11] can: bcm: add missing device refcount for CAN filter removal Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (3 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
bcm_tx_setup() validates cf->len against the CAN/CAN FD DLC limits
before installing frames for TX_SETUP, but bcm_rx_setup() never did
the same for the RTR-reply frame configured via RX_SETUP with
RX_RTR_FRAME.
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index d5ca5ca472f1..e2f8c54b2546 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -1236,26 +1236,41 @@ static int bcm_tx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
kfree(op->frames);
kfree(op);
return err;
}
-static void bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head,
- struct bcm_op *op, void *new_frames)
+static int bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head,
+ struct bcm_op *op, void *new_frames)
{
+ struct canfd_frame *frame0 = new_frames;
+
+ if (!(msg_head->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* this frame is sent out as-is by bcm_can_tx() whenever a matching
+ * remote request is received, so validate its length the same way
+ * bcm_tx_setup() validates TX_SETUP frames before installing it
+ */
+ if (msg_head->flags & CAN_FD_FRAME) {
+ if (frame0->len > 64)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ if (frame0->len > 8)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* funny feature in RX(!)_SETUP only for RTR-mode:
* copy can_id into frame BUT without RTR-flag to
* prevent a full-load-loopback-test ... ;-]
* normalize this on the staged buffer, before it is
* ever installed into op->frames.
*/
- if (msg_head->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) {
- struct canfd_frame *frame0 = new_frames;
+ if ((msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) ||
+ frame0->can_id == op->can_id)
+ frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG;
- if ((msg_head->flags & TX_CP_CAN_ID) ||
- frame0->can_id == op->can_id)
- frame0->can_id = op->can_id & ~CAN_RTR_FLAG;
- }
+ return 0;
}
/*
* bcm_rx_setup - create or update a bcm rx op (for bcm_sendmsg)
*/
@@ -1314,11 +1329,15 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
if (err < 0) {
kfree(new_frames);
return err;
}
- bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, new_frames);
+ err = bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, new_frames);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ kfree(new_frames);
+ return err;
+ }
}
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
op->nframes = msg_head->nframes;
op->flags = msg_head->flags;
@@ -1379,20 +1398,16 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
}
if (msg_head->nframes) {
err = memcpy_from_msg(op->frames, msg,
msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz);
- if (err < 0) {
- if (op->frames != &op->sframe)
- kfree(op->frames);
- if (op->last_frames != &op->last_sframe)
- kfree(op->last_frames);
- kfree(op);
- return err;
- }
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto free_op;
- bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, op->frames);
+ err = bcm_rx_setup_rtr_check(msg_head, op, op->frames);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto free_op;
}
/* bcm_can_tx / bcm_tx_timeout_handler needs this */
op->sk = sk;
sock_hold(sk);
@@ -1485,10 +1500,18 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
/* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */
list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops);
}
return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ;
+
+free_op:
+ if (op->frames != &op->sframe)
+ kfree(op->frames);
+ if (op->last_frames != &op->last_sframe)
+ kfree(op->last_frames);
+ kfree(op);
+ return err;
}
/*
* bcm_tx_send - send a single CAN frame to the CAN interface (for bcm_sendmsg)
*/
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v14 08/11] can: bcm: add missing device refcount for CAN filter removal
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 07/11] can: bcm: validate frame length in bcm_rx_setup() for RTR replies Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 09/11] can: bcm: fix stale rx/tx ops after device removal Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (2 subsequent siblings)
10 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, sashiko-bot
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
sashiko-bot remarked a problem with a concurrent device unregistration
in isotp.c which also is present in the bcm.c code. A former fix for raw.c
commit c275a176e4b6 ("can: raw: add missing refcount for memory leak fix")
introduced a netdevice_tracker which solves the issue for bcm.c too.
bcm_release(), bcm_delete_rx_op() and bcm_notifier() relied on
dev_get_by_index(ifindex) to re-find the device for an rx_op before
unregistering its filter. If a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER has already
unlisted the device from the ifindex table, that lookup fails and
can_rx_unregister() is silently skipped, leaving a stale CAN filter
pointing at the soon-to-be-freed bcm_op/socket.
Hold a netdev_hold()/netdev_put() tracked reference on op->rx_reg_dev
from the moment the rx filter is registered in bcm_rx_setup() until it
is unregistered in bcm_rx_unreg(), and use that reference directly in
bcm_release() and bcm_delete_rx_op() instead of re-looking the device
up by ifindex.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260707094716.63578-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index e2f8c54b2546..80ff3de66836 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -126,10 +126,11 @@ struct bcm_op {
void *last_frames;
struct canfd_frame sframe;
struct canfd_frame last_sframe;
struct sock *sk;
struct net_device *rx_reg_dev;
+ netdevice_tracker rx_reg_dev_tracker;
spinlock_t bcm_tx_lock; /* protect tx data and timer updates */
spinlock_t bcm_rx_update_lock; /* protect filter/timer data updates */
};
struct bcm_sock {
@@ -927,10 +928,11 @@ static void bcm_rx_unreg(struct net_device *dev, struct bcm_op *op)
can_rx_unregister(dev_net(dev), dev, op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id), bcm_rx_handler, op);
/* mark as removed subscription */
op->rx_reg_dev = NULL;
+ netdev_put(dev, &op->rx_reg_dev_tracker);
} else
printk(KERN_ERR "can-bcm: bcm_rx_unreg: registered device "
"mismatch %p %p\n", op->rx_reg_dev, dev);
}
@@ -957,21 +959,18 @@ static int bcm_delete_rx_op(struct list_head *ops, struct bcm_msg_head *mh,
if (op->ifindex) {
/*
* Only remove subscriptions that had not
* been removed due to NETDEV_UNREGISTER
* in bcm_notifier()
+ *
+ * op->rx_reg_dev is a tracked reference taken
+ * when the subscription was registered, so it
+ * stays valid here even if a concurrent
+ * NETDEV_UNREGISTER already unlisted the dev.
*/
- if (op->rx_reg_dev) {
- struct net_device *dev;
-
- dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(op->sk),
- op->ifindex);
- if (dev) {
- bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op);
- dev_put(dev);
- }
- }
+ if (op->rx_reg_dev)
+ bcm_rx_unreg(op->rx_reg_dev, op);
} else
can_rx_unregister(sock_net(op->sk), NULL,
op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
bcm_rx_handler, op);
@@ -1476,11 +1475,21 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
bcm_rx_handler, op,
"bcm", sk);
- op->rx_reg_dev = dev;
+ /* keep a tracked reference so that a later
+ * unregister can safely reach the device even
+ * if a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER has
+ * already unlisted it by ifindex
+ */
+ if (!err) {
+ op->rx_reg_dev = dev;
+ netdev_hold(dev,
+ &op->rx_reg_dev_tracker,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ }
dev_put(dev);
} else {
/* the requested device is gone - do not
* silently succeed without registering
*/
@@ -1853,20 +1862,18 @@ static int bcm_release(struct socket *sock)
if (op->ifindex) {
/*
* Only remove subscriptions that had not
* been removed due to NETDEV_UNREGISTER
* in bcm_notifier()
+ *
+ * op->rx_reg_dev is a tracked reference taken
+ * when the subscription was registered, so it
+ * stays valid here even if a concurrent
+ * NETDEV_UNREGISTER already unlisted the device.
*/
- if (op->rx_reg_dev) {
- struct net_device *dev;
-
- dev = dev_get_by_index(net, op->ifindex);
- if (dev) {
- bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op);
- dev_put(dev);
- }
- }
+ if (op->rx_reg_dev)
+ bcm_rx_unreg(op->rx_reg_dev, op);
} else
can_rx_unregister(net, NULL, op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
bcm_rx_handler, op);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v14 09/11] can: bcm: fix stale rx/tx ops after device removal
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 08/11] can: bcm: add missing device refcount for CAN filter removal Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 10/11] can: bcm: fix data race on rx_stamp/rx_ifindex in bcm_rx_handler() Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 11/11] can: bcm: track a single source interface for ANYDEV timeout/throttle ops Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
10 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, sashiko-bot
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
RX: an RX_SETUP update(!) for an existing op skipped can_rx_register()
unconditionally, even when a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER had already
torn down its registration (op->rx_reg_dev == NULL). This silently
did not re-enable frame delivery for that updated filter. bcm_rx_setup()
now re-registers in that case, while leaving rx_ops with ifindex = 0
(all CAN devices) which never carry a tracked rx_reg_dev registered as-is.
TX: bcm_notify() only handled bo->rx_ops on NETDEV_UNREGISTER, leaving
tx_ops with an active cyclic transmission re-arming its hrtimer
indefinitely to execute bcm_tx_timeout_handler(). Cancelling the hrtimer
prevents the runaway timer and any injection into a later reused ifindex,
since nothing else calls bcm_can_tx() for the op until an explicit
TX_SETUP update re-arms it.
Unlike bcm_rx_unreg(), which clears the tracked rx_reg_dev for rx_ops,
the ifindex is intentionally left unchanged for tx_ops. bcm_tx_setup()
always rejects ifindex 0, so clearing it would strand the op: neither a
later TX_SETUP (bcm_find_op()) nor TX_DELETE (bcm_delete_tx_op()) could
ever find it again, since both require an exact ifindex match.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260708094536.DDF821F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260708154039.347ED1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 52 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 80ff3de66836..55226e5fec07 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -1277,10 +1277,11 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
int ifindex, struct sock *sk)
{
struct bcm_sock *bo = bcm_sk(sk);
struct bcm_op *op;
int do_rx_register;
+ int new_op = 0;
int err = 0;
if ((msg_head->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) || (!(msg_head->nframes))) {
/* be robust against wrong usage ... */
msg_head->flags |= RX_FILTER_ID;
@@ -1353,12 +1354,19 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
/* free temporary frames / kfree(NULL) is safe */
kfree(new_frames);
- /* Only an update -> do not call can_rx_register() */
- do_rx_register = 0;
+ /* Don't register a new CAN filter for the rx_op update unless
+ * a concurrent NETDEV_UNREGISTER notifier already tore down
+ * the previous registration. In this case the receiver needs
+ * to be re-registered here so that this update doesn't
+ * silently stop delivering frames for the given ifindex.
+ * Ops with ifindex = 0 (all CAN interfaces) never carry a
+ * tracked rx_reg_dev and stay registered as-is.
+ */
+ do_rx_register = (ifindex && !op->rx_reg_dev) ? 1 : 0;
} else {
/* insert new BCM operation for the given can_id */
op = kzalloc(OPSIZ, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!op)
@@ -1421,10 +1429,11 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
hrtimer_setup(&op->thrtimer, bcm_rx_thr_handler, CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
/* call can_rx_register() */
do_rx_register = 1;
+ new_op = 1;
} /* if ((op = bcm_find_op(&bo->rx_ops, msg_head->can_id, ifindex))) */
/* check flags */
@@ -1462,11 +1471,14 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
if ((op->flags & STARTTIMER) && op->kt_ival1)
hrtimer_start(&op->timer, op->kt_ival1,
HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
}
- /* now we can register for can_ids, if we added a new bcm_op */
+ /* now we can register for can_ids, if we added a new bcm_op
+ * or need to re-register after a NETDEV_UNREGISTER tore down
+ * the previous registration of an existing op
+ */
if (do_rx_register) {
if (ifindex) {
struct net_device *dev;
dev = dev_get_by_index(sock_net(sk), ifindex);
@@ -1494,22 +1506,36 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
* silently succeed without registering
*/
err = -ENODEV;
}
- } else
+ } else {
err = can_rx_register(sock_net(sk), NULL, op->can_id,
REGMASK(op->can_id),
bcm_rx_handler, op, "bcm", sk);
+ }
+
if (err) {
- /* this bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
- bcm_remove_op(op);
+ /* newly created bcm rx op is broken -> remove it */
+ if (new_op) {
+ bcm_remove_op(op);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* an existing op just stays unregistered.
+ * Cancel op->timer and (defensively) op->thrtimer.
+ * Other settings can't be reached until the next
+ * successful RX_SETUP.
+ */
+ hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
+ hrtimer_cancel(&op->thrtimer);
return err;
}
- /* add this bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */
- list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops);
+ /* add a new bcm_op to the list of the rx_ops */
+ if (new_op)
+ list_add_rcu(&op->list, &bo->rx_ops);
}
return msg_head->nframes * op->cfsiz + MHSIZ;
free_op:
@@ -1725,15 +1751,23 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg,
switch (msg) {
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
lock_sock(sk);
- /* remove device specific receive entries */
+ /* rx_ops: remove device specific receive entries */
list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list)
if (op->rx_reg_dev == dev)
bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op);
+ /* tx_ops: stop device specific cyclic transmissions on the
+ * vanishing ifindex. Cancelling the timer is enough to stop
+ * cyclic bcm_can_tx() calls as there is no re-arming.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list)
+ if (op->ifindex == dev->ifindex)
+ hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
+
/* remove device reference, if this is our bound device */
if (bo->bound && bo->ifindex == dev->ifindex) {
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_FS)
if (sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir && bo->bcm_proc_read) {
remove_proc_entry(bo->procname, sock_net(sk)->can.bcmproc_dir);
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v14 10/11] can: bcm: fix data race on rx_stamp/rx_ifindex in bcm_rx_handler()
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 09/11] can: bcm: fix stale rx/tx ops after device removal Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 11/11] can: bcm: track a single source interface for ANYDEV timeout/throttle ops Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
10 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, sashiko-bot
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
For an rx op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0), the same op
is registered once in the shared per-netns wildcard filter list, so
bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs for frames
arriving on different net devices.
op->rx_stamp and op->rx_ifindex were written before bcm_rx_update_lock was
taken, allowing concurrent writers to race each other - including a torn
store of the 64-bit rx_stamp on 32-bit platforms.
Beyond a torn store bcm_send_to_user() must report the timestamp/ifindex
of the very same frame whose content it is delivering. So the assignment
is placed in the same unbroken bcm_rx_update_lock section as the content
comparison.
As a side effect, the RTR-request frame feature (which never reach
bcm_send_to_user()) no longer updates rx_stamp/rx_ifindex, since only
the notification path needs them.
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260707145135.5BC831F00A3A@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 55226e5fec07..9c6fe559c4e6 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -790,15 +790,10 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
}
/* disable timeout */
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
- /* save rx timestamp */
- op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp;
- /* save originator for recvfrom() */
- op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
-
/* op->flags/op->frames may be updated concurrently by bcm_rx_setup() */
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
rtr_frame = op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME;
if (rtr_frame) {
@@ -826,10 +821,18 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
traffic_flags |= RX_LOCAL;
if (skb->sk == op->sk)
traffic_flags |= RX_OWN;
}
+ /* save rx timestamp and originator for recvfrom() under lock.
+ * For an op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0)
+ * bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs so
+ * the CAN content and the meta data must be bundled correctly.
+ */
+ op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp;
+ op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
+
if (op->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) {
/* the easiest case */
bcm_rx_update_and_send(op, op->last_frames, rxframe,
traffic_flags);
goto rx_starttimer;
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread* [PATCH v14 11/11] can: bcm: track a single source interface for ANYDEV timeout/throttle ops
2026-07-14 11:30 [PATCH v14 00/11] can: bcm: collected fixes Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2026-07-14 11:30 ` [PATCH v14 10/11] can: bcm: fix data race on rx_stamp/rx_ifindex in bcm_rx_handler() Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
@ 2026-07-14 11:30 ` Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay
10 siblings, 0 replies; 18+ messages in thread
From: Oliver Hartkopp via B4 Relay @ 2026-07-14 11:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-can; +Cc: Oliver Hartkopp, Marc Kleine-Budde, sashiko-bot
From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
An ANYDEV rx op (ifindex == 0) with an active RX timeout and/or
throttle timer has no defined semantics when matching frames arrive
from several interfaces: bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently for
the same op on different CPUs, racing hrtimer_cancel()/
bcm_rx_starttimer() against bcm_rx_timeout_handler() and causing
spurious RX_TIMEOUT notifications and last_frames corruption. The
same concurrency lets throttled multiplex frames from different
interfaces clobber the single rx_ifindex/rx_stamp fields shared by
the op.
Add op->if_detected to track the first interface that delivers a
matching frame while a timeout/throttle timer is configured, and
reject frames from any other interface for that op. The claim is
decided in bcm_rx_handler() before hrtimer_cancel() touches
op->timer, so a rejected frame can never disturb the claimed
interface's watchdog. RTR-mode ops are excluded via RX_RTR_FRAME,
independent of kt_ival1/kt_ival2, since those may briefly hold a
stale value from an earlier non-RTR configuration.
The claim is released in bcm_notify() on NETDEV_UNREGISTER and in
bcm_rx_setup() when SETTIMER reconfigures the timer values.
A (re-)claim is only possible on CAN devices in NETREG_REGISTERED
dev->reg_state to cover the release in bcm_notify() where reg_state
becomes NETREG_UNREGISTERING until synchronize_net().
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-can/20260709105031.1A39C1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org/
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
---
net/can/bcm.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c
index 9c6fe559c4e6..c5be208c2f7c 100644
--- a/net/can/bcm.c
+++ b/net/can/bcm.c
@@ -115,10 +115,11 @@ struct bcm_op {
atomic_long_t frames_abs, frames_filtered;
struct bcm_timeval ival1, ival2;
struct hrtimer timer, thrtimer;
ktime_t rx_stamp, kt_ival1, kt_ival2, kt_lastmsg;
int rx_ifindex;
+ int if_detected; /* first received ifindex in ANYDEV rx_op mode */
int cfsiz;
u32 count;
u32 nframes;
u32 currframe;
/* void pointers to arrays of struct can[fd]_frame */
@@ -787,10 +788,37 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
} else {
if (!can_is_can_skb(skb))
return;
}
+ /* An ANYDEV op with an active RX timeout and/or throttle timer
+ * tracks a single source interface: claim the first interface that
+ * delivers a matching frame and reject frames from any other one,
+ * before hrtimer_cancel() below can touch op->timer - this avoids
+ * racing bcm_rx_timeout_handler() across concurrent interfaces.
+ * RX_RTR_FRAME ops are excluded, as kt_ival1/kt_ival2 may briefly
+ * hold a stale value from an earlier non-RTR configuration.
+ */
+ if (!op->ifindex) {
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+
+ if (!(op->flags & RX_RTR_FRAME) &&
+ (op->kt_ival1 || op->kt_ival2)) {
+ /* don't claim to vanishing interface */
+ if (!op->if_detected &&
+ READ_ONCE(skb->dev->reg_state) == NETREG_REGISTERED)
+ op->if_detected = skb->dev->ifindex;
+
+ if (op->if_detected != skb->dev->ifindex) {
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+ }
+
/* disable timeout */
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
/* op->flags/op->frames may be updated concurrently by bcm_rx_setup() */
spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
@@ -821,14 +849,13 @@ static void bcm_rx_handler(struct sk_buff *skb, void *data)
traffic_flags |= RX_LOCAL;
if (skb->sk == op->sk)
traffic_flags |= RX_OWN;
}
- /* save rx timestamp and originator for recvfrom() under lock.
- * For an op subscribed on all interfaces (ifindex == 0)
- * bcm_rx_handler() can run concurrently on different CPUs so
- * the CAN content and the meta data must be bundled correctly.
+ /* save rx timestamp and originator for recvfrom() under lock: an
+ * ANYDEV op without an active timer can still run concurrently on
+ * different CPUs, so content and meta data must be bundled here.
*/
op->rx_stamp = skb->tstamp;
op->rx_ifindex = skb->dev->ifindex;
if (op->flags & RX_FILTER_ID) {
@@ -1452,10 +1479,11 @@ static int bcm_rx_setup(struct bcm_msg_head *msg_head, struct msghdr *msg,
op->ival1 = msg_head->ival1;
op->ival2 = msg_head->ival2;
op->kt_ival1 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival1);
op->kt_ival2 = bcm_timeval_to_ktime(msg_head->ival2);
op->kt_lastmsg = 0;
+ op->if_detected = 0; /* reclaim ifindex in ANYDEV mode */
spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
/* disable an active timer due to zero value? */
if (!op->kt_ival1)
hrtimer_cancel(&op->timer);
@@ -1755,14 +1783,25 @@ static void bcm_notify(struct bcm_sock *bo, unsigned long msg,
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
lock_sock(sk);
/* rx_ops: remove device specific receive entries */
- list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list)
+ list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->rx_ops, list) {
if (op->rx_reg_dev == dev)
bcm_rx_unreg(dev, op);
+ /* release an ANYDEV op's claim (see bcm_rx_handler())
+ * on this now confirmed-gone interface.
+ */
+ if (!op->ifindex) {
+ spin_lock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+ if (op->if_detected == dev->ifindex)
+ op->if_detected = 0;
+ spin_unlock_bh(&op->bcm_rx_update_lock);
+ }
+ }
+
/* tx_ops: stop device specific cyclic transmissions on the
* vanishing ifindex. Cancelling the timer is enough to stop
* cyclic bcm_can_tx() calls as there is no re-arming.
*/
list_for_each_entry(op, &bo->tx_ops, list)
--
2.53.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 18+ messages in thread