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* [PATCH] cifs.upcall: resolve scraped ccache name explicitly
@ 2026-09-17  0:37 Paulo Alcantara
  2026-09-17  7:06 ` Shyam Prasad N
  2026-09-17 16:22 ` Paulo Alcantara
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Paulo Alcantara @ 2026-09-17  0:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Pavel Shilovsky
  Cc: Alexander Bokovoy, Shyam Prasad N, Bharath SM, David Howells,
	linux-cifs

get_existing_cc() selected the credentials cache scraped from the
initiating process' environment by exporting it via setenv($KRB5CCNAME)
and then calling krb5_cc_default().

MIT krb5 reads $KRB5CCNAME through secure_getenv(), which returns NULL
whenever the process runs with AT_SECURE set.  The request-key upcall
that spawns cifs.upcall triggers an SELinux domain transition, so on
systems with SELinux enforcing cifs.upcall runs with AT_SECURE=1.  The
setenv() is therefore silently ignored and krb5 falls back to the
profile default_ccache_name (KCM: on many distros).  As a result, a
valid TGT living in a FILE credential cache is never found, and the
mount fails with:

  cifs.upcall: main: valid TGT is not present in credential cache
  cifs.upcall: Unable to obtain service ticket

while the same TGT in a KCM cache (selected via the profile default,
not the environment) works fine.

Resolve the scraped name directly with krb5_cc_resolve(), which takes
the ccache name as an argument and does not consult secure_getenv(),
so the FILE ccache is honored regardless of AT_SECURE.  Fall back to
krb5_cc_default() only when nothing was scraped.

Reported-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
Fixes: ed97e4ecab4e ("cifs.upcall: allow scraping of KRB5CCNAME out of initiating task's /proc/<pid>/environ file")
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
Cc: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
---
 cifs.upcall.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/cifs.upcall.c b/cifs.upcall.c
index 76e88b79a760..8fdf1af710ef 100644
--- a/cifs.upcall.c
+++ b/cifs.upcall.c
@@ -534,15 +534,31 @@ get_existing_cc(const char *env_cachename)
 	krb5_ccache cc;
 	char *cachename;
 
+	/*
+	 * If we scraped a cache name out of the initiating process'
+	 * environment, resolve it explicitly instead of exporting it via
+	 * $KRB5CCNAME and relying on krb5_cc_default().  MIT krb5 reads
+	 * $KRB5CCNAME through secure_getenv(), which returns NULL whenever the
+	 * process runs with AT_SECURE set (e.g. an SELinux domain transition on
+	 * the request-key upcall).  In that case the setenv() is silently
+	 * ignored and krb5 falls back to the profile default_ccache_name (KCM:
+	 * on many distros), so a TGT living in a FILE ccache is never found.
+	 * krb5_cc_resolve() takes the name directly and is not affected.
+	 */
 	if (env_cachename) {
-		if (setenv(ENV_NAME, env_cachename, 1))
-			syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: failed to setenv %d\n", __func__, errno);
-	}
-
-	ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc);
-	if (ret) {
-		syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: krb5_cc_default returned %d", __func__, ret);
-		return NULL;
+		ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, env_cachename, &cc);
+		if (ret) {
+			syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: krb5_cc_resolve(%s) failed: %d\n",
+			       __func__, env_cachename, ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	} else {
+		ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc);
+		if (ret) {
+			syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: krb5_cc_default returned %d",
+			       __func__, ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
 	}
 
 	ret = krb5_cc_get_full_name(context, cc, &cachename);
-- 
2.55.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] cifs.upcall: resolve scraped ccache name explicitly
  2026-09-17  0:37 [PATCH] cifs.upcall: resolve scraped ccache name explicitly Paulo Alcantara
@ 2026-09-17  7:06 ` Shyam Prasad N
  2026-09-17 16:22 ` Paulo Alcantara
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Shyam Prasad N @ 2026-09-17  7:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Paulo Alcantara
  Cc: Pavel Shilovsky, Alexander Bokovoy, Shyam Prasad N, Bharath SM,
	David Howells, linux-cifs

On Thu, Sep 17, 2026 at 6:27 AM Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org> wrote:
>
> get_existing_cc() selected the credentials cache scraped from the
> initiating process' environment by exporting it via setenv($KRB5CCNAME)
> and then calling krb5_cc_default().
>
> MIT krb5 reads $KRB5CCNAME through secure_getenv(), which returns NULL
> whenever the process runs with AT_SECURE set.  The request-key upcall
> that spawns cifs.upcall triggers an SELinux domain transition, so on
> systems with SELinux enforcing cifs.upcall runs with AT_SECURE=1.  The
> setenv() is therefore silently ignored and krb5 falls back to the
> profile default_ccache_name (KCM: on many distros).  As a result, a
> valid TGT living in a FILE credential cache is never found, and the
> mount fails with:
>
>   cifs.upcall: main: valid TGT is not present in credential cache
>   cifs.upcall: Unable to obtain service ticket
>
> while the same TGT in a KCM cache (selected via the profile default,
> not the environment) works fine.
>
> Resolve the scraped name directly with krb5_cc_resolve(), which takes
> the ccache name as an argument and does not consult secure_getenv(),
> so the FILE ccache is honored regardless of AT_SECURE.  Fall back to
> krb5_cc_default() only when nothing was scraped.
>
> Reported-by: Alexander Bokovoy <ab@samba.org>
> Fixes: ed97e4ecab4e ("cifs.upcall: allow scraping of KRB5CCNAME out of initiating task's /proc/<pid>/environ file")
> Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
> Cc: Shyam Prasad N <sprasad@microsoft.com>
> Cc: Bharath SM <bharathsm@microsoft.com>
> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
> Cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
> ---
>  cifs.upcall.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/cifs.upcall.c b/cifs.upcall.c
> index 76e88b79a760..8fdf1af710ef 100644
> --- a/cifs.upcall.c
> +++ b/cifs.upcall.c
> @@ -534,15 +534,31 @@ get_existing_cc(const char *env_cachename)
>         krb5_ccache cc;
>         char *cachename;
>
> +       /*
> +        * If we scraped a cache name out of the initiating process'
> +        * environment, resolve it explicitly instead of exporting it via
> +        * $KRB5CCNAME and relying on krb5_cc_default().  MIT krb5 reads
> +        * $KRB5CCNAME through secure_getenv(), which returns NULL whenever the
> +        * process runs with AT_SECURE set (e.g. an SELinux domain transition on
> +        * the request-key upcall).  In that case the setenv() is silently
> +        * ignored and krb5 falls back to the profile default_ccache_name (KCM:
> +        * on many distros), so a TGT living in a FILE ccache is never found.
> +        * krb5_cc_resolve() takes the name directly and is not affected.
> +        */
>         if (env_cachename) {
> -               if (setenv(ENV_NAME, env_cachename, 1))
> -                       syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: failed to setenv %d\n", __func__, errno);
> -       }
> -
> -       ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc);
> -       if (ret) {
> -               syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: krb5_cc_default returned %d", __func__, ret);
> -               return NULL;
> +               ret = krb5_cc_resolve(context, env_cachename, &cc);
> +               if (ret) {
> +                       syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: krb5_cc_resolve(%s) failed: %d\n",
> +                              __func__, env_cachename, ret);
> +                       return NULL;
> +               }
> +       } else {
> +               ret = krb5_cc_default(context, &cc);
> +               if (ret) {
> +                       syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "%s: krb5_cc_default returned %d",
> +                              __func__, ret);
> +                       return NULL;
> +               }
>         }
>
>         ret = krb5_cc_get_full_name(context, cc, &cachename);
> --
> 2.55.0
>
>
Seems like a reasonable fix. Pending testing, you can add my Acked-by.

-- 
Regards,
Shyam

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] cifs.upcall: resolve scraped ccache name explicitly
  2026-09-17  0:37 [PATCH] cifs.upcall: resolve scraped ccache name explicitly Paulo Alcantara
  2026-09-17  7:06 ` Shyam Prasad N
@ 2026-09-17 16:22 ` Paulo Alcantara
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Paulo Alcantara @ 2026-09-17 16:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Pavel Shilovsky
  Cc: Alexander Bokovoy, Shyam Prasad N, Bharath SM, David Howells,
	linux-cifs

Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org> writes:

> get_existing_cc() selected the credentials cache scraped from the
> initiating process' environment by exporting it via setenv($KRB5CCNAME)
> and then calling krb5_cc_default().
>
> MIT krb5 reads $KRB5CCNAME through secure_getenv(), which returns NULL
> whenever the process runs with AT_SECURE set.  The request-key upcall
> that spawns cifs.upcall triggers an SELinux domain transition, so on
> systems with SELinux enforcing cifs.upcall runs with AT_SECURE=1.  The
> setenv() is therefore silently ignored and krb5 falls back to the
> profile default_ccache_name (KCM: on many distros).  As a result, a
> valid TGT living in a FILE credential cache is never found, and the
> mount fails with:
>
>   cifs.upcall: main: valid TGT is not present in credential cache
>   cifs.upcall: Unable to obtain service ticket
>
> while the same TGT in a KCM cache (selected via the profile default,
> not the environment) works fine.
>
> Resolve the scraped name directly with krb5_cc_resolve(), which takes
> the ccache name as an argument and does not consult secure_getenv(),
> so the FILE ccache is honored regardless of AT_SECURE.  Fall back to
> krb5_cc_default() only when nothing was scraped.
> ...

Applied.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-09-17 16:22 UTC | newest]

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