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From: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
To: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org, pc@manguebit.org
Cc: linkinjeon@kernel.org, ronniesahlberg@gmail.com,
	sprasad@microsoft.com, tom@talpey.com, bharathsm@microsoft.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/10] smb: client: fix OOB reads and UAFs in SMB2/3 receive paths
Date: Sun, 13 Sep 2026 20:08:16 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a4e7d433-f5ed-4508-8749-90c433262b85@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260913214510.3071370-1-sorenson@redhat.com>

Notes on the Sashiko findings (https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260913214510.3071370-1-sorenson%40redhat.com):

patch:

  1) pre-existing; memory leak

  2) pre-existing; OOB read + memory leak

  3) 3 findings
     a. pre-existing; could incorrect iov_len be propagated
     b. pre-existing; error handler could leak memory
     c. pre-existing; could uninitialized heap memory be leaked
        to user-space?

  4) does the lower bound protect against header data parsed as
       UTF-16 strings with multiple referrals?
     Sashiko is correct, however the read stays in bounds so the
       result would be a garbage path, not an OOB access.
     Separate hardening could be done, if exact bound is desired.

  5) pre-existing; potential race condition
  8) 4 findings:
     a. pre-existing; can uninitialized memory be read on truncated
        packets?
     b. is the new check possible to hit?
        *** Sashiko is correct; the new check will never be true ***

     c. pre-existing; can logging via %s format string trigger OOB read
     d. pre-existing; do malformed packets bypass error handling and
        get processed as oplock breaks?
10) pre-existing; does bounds check rely on a structural offset to
     calculate end, potentially leading to leak of uninitialized heap
     memory?

Recommendation:
   patch 4 is still good
   drop patch 8 entirely--it's a dead check

The remainder of the findings are for pre-existing issues; could be
investigated & addressed in future work.


I can respin v5 without patch 8, or (assuming there isn't further
work to do on the rest of the patches) we can simply drop patch 8.


Frank

-- 
Frank Sorenson
sorenson@redhat.com
Principal Software Maintenance Engineer, filesystems
Red Hat


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-14  1:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-13 21:44 [PATCH v4 00/10] smb: client: fix OOB reads and UAFs in SMB2/3 receive paths Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:44 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] smb: client: validate minimum PDU size before smb2_get_data_area_len() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-15 15:04   ` Paulo Alcantara
2026-09-15 16:41     ` Frank Sorenson
2026-09-16 14:22       ` Paulo Alcantara
2026-09-16 19:55         ` Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] smb: client: fix server->total_read for compound encrypted PDUs Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] smb: client: fix missing lower-bound check on DFS referral string offsets Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] smb: client: reject short Next offsets in parse_server_interfaces() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] smb: client: fix OOB struct field reads in move_smb2_ea_to_cifs() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] smb: client: fix missing iov bounds check in parse_posix_sids() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] smb: client: fix underflow in is_valid_oplock_break() notify offset check Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] smb: client: fix potential OOB read in smb3_enum_snapshots() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-13 21:45 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] smb: client: fix reparse buffer bounds in cifs_query_reparse_point() Frank Sorenson
2026-09-14  1:08 ` Frank Sorenson [this message]
2026-09-15 15:50   ` [PATCH v4 00/10] smb: client: fix OOB reads and UAFs in SMB2/3 receive paths Paulo Alcantara

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