From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Nikunj A Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 18:56:08 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804235611.4053375-8-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804235611.4053375-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>
As SNP-only features get added, adding them to the valid_vmsa_features mask
in __sev_guest_init() often gets neglected. Add SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK
to help group these common features together.
Also establish SNP_ONLY_FEATURES in the sev_init2 selftest as the
corresponding mask for features that must be rejected for non-SNP guests,
populate it with SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC, and exercise the rejection path
by masking those bits out of the features passed for SEV-ES guests. Define
the selftest's SNP_ONLY_FEATURES as ULL so future bits can use BIT_ULL()
there without truncation against the u64 supported_vmsa_features.
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/aaWog_UjW-M3412C@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Assisted-by: ClaudeCode:claude-opus-4-7
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 2 ++
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 2 +-
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c | 12 +++++++-----
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index 52c900bf7e20..a206a0ed2c58 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(5)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(9)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
+
#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
struct vmcb_seg {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 944aaea6501f..951f0e6be9e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
return -EINVAL;
if (!snp_active)
- valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+ valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK;
if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
index 7b0643bf7ca1..5f4032239f7f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
@@ -14,16 +14,18 @@
#include "kselftest.h"
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(5)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(9)
+
+/* Features valid only for SNP guests, rejected for SEV-ES and below. */
+#define SNP_ONLY_FEATURES (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
/*
* Some features may have hidden dependencies, or may only work
* for certain VM types. Err on the side of safety and don't
* expect that all supported features can be passed one by one
* to KVM_SEV_INIT2.
- *
- * (Well, right now there's only one...)
*/
-#define KNOWN_FEATURES SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP
+#define KNOWN_FEATURES (SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP | SNP_ONLY_FEATURES)
int kvm_fd;
u64 supported_vmsa_features;
@@ -112,7 +114,7 @@ void test_features(u32 vm_type, u64 supported_features)
if (!(supported_features & BIT_ULL(i)))
test_init2_invalid(vm_type,
&(struct kvm_sev_init){ .vmsa_features = BIT_ULL(i) },
- "unknown feature");
+ "unknown or unsupported feature for VM type");
else if (KNOWN_FEATURES & BIT_ULL(i))
test_init2(vm_type,
&(struct kvm_sev_init){ .vmsa_features = BIT_ULL(i) });
@@ -161,7 +163,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
test_features(KVM_X86_SEV_VM, 0);
if (have_sev_es)
- test_features(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, supported_vmsa_features);
+ test_features(KVM_X86_SEV_ES_VM, supported_vmsa_features & ~SNP_ONLY_FEATURES);
if (have_snp)
test_features(KVM_X86_SNP_VM, supported_vmsa_features);
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 23:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 0:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07 5:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
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