From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
<linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
K Prateek Nayak <kprateek.nayak@amd.com>,
"Nikunj A Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
"Michael Roth" <michael.roth@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Naveen Rao <naveen.rao@amd.com>,
David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 08/10] KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE
Date: Tue, 4 Aug 2026 18:56:09 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260804235611.4053375-9-kim.phillips@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260804235611.4053375-1-kim.phillips@amd.com>
Allow userspace to set the feature in kvm_sev_init.vmsa_features.
KVM still needs to set the flag for backwards compatibility, but
disallowing SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE for an SNP guest is "bizarre."
Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/aaWog_UjW-M3412C@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Assisted-by: ClaudeCode:claude-opus-4-7
---
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 8 ++++++--
tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c | 4 +++-
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index a206a0ed2c58..facabba26a91 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -311,7 +311,8 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_4K_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AV
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(5)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(9)
-#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ONLY_MASK (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE | \
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 951f0e6be9e5..6baf458383f4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -3219,8 +3219,12 @@ void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP))
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
- if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
- sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+ if (sev_snp_enabled) {
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE;
+
+ if (tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+ }
}
void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
index 5f4032239f7f..2e016cae4ebe 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c
@@ -13,11 +13,13 @@
#include "svm_util.h"
#include "kselftest.h"
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE BIT_ULL(0)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT_ULL(5)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT_ULL(9)
/* Features valid only for SNP guests, rejected for SEV-ES and below. */
-#define SNP_ONLY_FEATURES (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
+#define SNP_ONLY_FEATURES (SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE | \
+ SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC)
/*
* Some features may have hidden dependencies, or may only work
--
2.43.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-04 23:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-04 23:56 [PATCH v4 00/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 0:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-05 14:51 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-05 22:49 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-06 20:12 ` Kim Phillips
2026-08-07 5:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] cpu/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] cpu/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] KVM: SEV: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL() Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single mask Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` Kim Phillips [this message]
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry Kim Phillips
2026-08-04 23:56 ` [PATCH v4 10/10] KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation Kim Phillips
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