* [PATCH] sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf
@ 2016-10-25 18:45 J. Bruce Fields
[not found] ` <20161025184538.GA4612-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: J. Bruce Fields @ 2016-10-25 18:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-nfs-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
Cc: Rusty Russell, Christoph Hellwig,
linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA
From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
As of ac4e97abce9b "scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear
mapping", sg_set_buf hits a BUG when make_checksum_v2->xdr_process_buf,
among other callers, passes it memory on the stack.
We only need a scatterlist to pass this to the crypto code, and it seems
like overkill to require kmalloc'd memory just to encrypt a few bytes,
but for now this seems the best fix.
Note many of these callers are in the NFS write paths, so we shouldn't
really be allocating GFP_KERNEL. But we already have other allocations
in these code paths. A larger redesign may be necessary to allow
allocations to be done earlier.
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty-8n+1lVoiYb80n/F98K4Iww@public.gmane.org>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org>
---
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 13 ++++--
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------
net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c | 21 ++++++---
3 files changed, 71 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
index d8bd97a5a7c9..6ecc30058f95 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c
@@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
{
struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred;
struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred);
- __be32 seq;
+ __be32 *seq = NULL;
struct kvec iov;
struct xdr_buf verf_buf;
struct xdr_netobj mic;
@@ -1631,9 +1631,12 @@ gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
goto out_bad;
if (flav != RPC_AUTH_GSS)
goto out_bad;
- seq = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno);
- iov.iov_base = &seq;
- iov.iov_len = sizeof(seq);
+ seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!seq)
+ goto out_bad;
+ *seq = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno);
+ iov.iov_base = seq;
+ iov.iov_len = 4;
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf);
mic.data = (u8 *)p;
mic.len = len;
@@ -1653,11 +1656,13 @@ gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p)
gss_put_ctx(ctx);
dprintk("RPC: %5u %s: gss_verify_mic succeeded.\n",
task->tk_pid, __func__);
+ kfree(seq);
return p + XDR_QUADLEN(len);
out_bad:
gss_put_ctx(ctx);
dprintk("RPC: %5u %s failed ret %ld.\n", task->tk_pid, __func__,
PTR_ERR(ret));
+ kfree(seq);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
index 244245bcbbd2..8a280a810439 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c
@@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout)
{
struct scatterlist sg[1];
- int err;
- u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ int err = -1;
+ u8 *checksumdata;
u8 rc4salt[4];
struct crypto_ahash *md5;
struct crypto_ahash *hmac_md5;
@@ -187,23 +187,22 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
+ checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!checksumdata)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(md5))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto out_free_cksum;
hmac_md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0,
CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5)) {
- crypto_free_ahash(md5);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5))
+ goto out_free_md5;
req = ahash_request_alloc(md5, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req) {
- crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5);
- crypto_free_ahash(md5);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_hmac_md5;
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
@@ -232,11 +231,8 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
ahash_request_free(req);
req = ahash_request_alloc(hmac_md5, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req) {
- crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5);
- crypto_free_ahash(md5);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_hmac_md5;
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
@@ -258,8 +254,12 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
out:
ahash_request_free(req);
- crypto_free_ahash(md5);
+out_free_hmac_md5:
crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5);
+out_free_md5:
+ crypto_free_ahash(md5);
+out_free_cksum:
+ kfree(checksumdata);
return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
}
@@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
struct ahash_request *req;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
- int err;
- u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ int err = -1;
+ u8 *checksumdata;
unsigned int checksumlen;
if (kctx->gk5e->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR)
@@ -291,15 +291,17 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
+ checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (checksumdata == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto out_free_cksum;
req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req) {
- crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_ahash;
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
@@ -349,7 +351,10 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength;
out:
ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_ahash:
crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+out_free_cksum:
+ kfree(checksumdata);
return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
}
@@ -368,8 +373,8 @@ make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
struct ahash_request *req;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
- int err;
- u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN];
+ int err = -1;
+ u8 *checksumdata;
unsigned int checksumlen;
if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum == 0) {
@@ -383,16 +388,18 @@ make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
+ checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!checksumdata)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto out_free_cksum;
checksumlen = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!req) {
- crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
- return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- }
+ if (!req)
+ goto out_free_ahash;
ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL);
@@ -433,7 +440,10 @@ make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen,
}
out:
ahash_request_free(req);
+out_free_ahash:
crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+out_free_cksum:
+ kfree(checksumdata);
return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0;
}
@@ -666,14 +676,17 @@ gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf,
u32 ret;
struct scatterlist sg[1];
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cipher);
- u8 data[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2];
+ u8 *data;
struct page **save_pages;
u32 len = buf->len - offset;
- if (len > ARRAY_SIZE(data)) {
+ if (len > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2) {
WARN_ON(0);
return -ENOMEM;
}
+ data = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
/*
* For encryption, we want to read from the cleartext
@@ -708,6 +721,7 @@ gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf,
ret = write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len);
out:
+ kfree(data);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index d67f7e1bc82d..45662d7f0943 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -718,30 +718,37 @@ gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp)
static int
gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq)
{
- __be32 xdr_seq;
+ __be32 *xdr_seq;
u32 maj_stat;
struct xdr_buf verf_data;
struct xdr_netobj mic;
__be32 *p;
struct kvec iov;
+ int err = -1;
svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS);
- xdr_seq = htonl(seq);
+ xdr_seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!xdr_seq)
+ return -1;
+ *xdr_seq = htonl(seq);
- iov.iov_base = &xdr_seq;
- iov.iov_len = sizeof(xdr_seq);
+ iov.iov_base = xdr_seq;
+ iov.iov_len = 4;
xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data);
p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len;
mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1);
maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic);
if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
- return -1;
+ goto out;
*p++ = htonl(mic.len);
memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len);
p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len);
if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p))
- return -1;
- return 0;
+ goto out;
+ err = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(xdr_seq);
+ return err;
}
struct gss_domain {
--
2.7.4
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread[parent not found: <20161025184538.GA4612-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH] sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf [not found] ` <20161025184538.GA4612-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> @ 2016-10-25 19:34 ` Trond Myklebust 2016-10-25 19:59 ` Fields Bruce James 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Trond Myklebust @ 2016-10-25 19:34 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Fields Bruce James Cc: List Linux NFS Mailing, Rusty Russell, Christoph Hellwig, linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org > On Oct 25, 2016, at 14:45, J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com> > > As of ac4e97abce9b "scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > mapping", sg_set_buf hits a BUG when make_checksum_v2->xdr_process_buf, > among other callers, passes it memory on the stack. > > We only need a scatterlist to pass this to the crypto code, and it seems > like overkill to require kmalloc'd memory just to encrypt a few bytes, > but for now this seems the best fix. > > Note many of these callers are in the NFS write paths, so we shouldn't > really be allocating GFP_KERNEL. But we already have other allocations > in these code paths. A larger redesign may be necessary to allow > allocations to be done earlier. NACK… I agree that there may already be borkage in RPCSEC_GSS-land, but that’s not a reason to be adding to the pile of things that need to be fixed… The allocations that lie in the RPC client’s encode/decode path do need to be GFP_NOFS…. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf 2016-10-25 19:34 ` Trond Myklebust @ 2016-10-25 19:59 ` Fields Bruce James [not found] ` <20161025195930.GB5129-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Fields Bruce James @ 2016-10-25 19:59 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust Cc: List Linux NFS Mailing, Rusty Russell, Christoph Hellwig, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 07:34:43PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote: > > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 14:45, J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > > > From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com> > > > > As of ac4e97abce9b "scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear > > mapping", sg_set_buf hits a BUG when make_checksum_v2->xdr_process_buf, > > among other callers, passes it memory on the stack. > > > > We only need a scatterlist to pass this to the crypto code, and it seems > > like overkill to require kmalloc'd memory just to encrypt a few bytes, > > but for now this seems the best fix. > > > > Note many of these callers are in the NFS write paths, so we shouldn't > > really be allocating GFP_KERNEL. But we already have other allocations > > in these code paths. A larger redesign may be necessary to allow > > allocations to be done earlier. > > NACK… I agree that there may already be borkage in RPCSEC_GSS-land, but that’s not a reason to be adding to the pile of things that need to be fixed… The allocations that lie in the RPC client’s encode/decode path do need to be GFP_NOFS…. OK. Any disadvantage to keeping this patch with just GFP_NOFS allocations everywhere that might be in the write path? --b. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <20161025195930.GB5129-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH] sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf [not found] ` <20161025195930.GB5129-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> @ 2016-10-25 21:47 ` Trond Myklebust [not found] ` <DB39073B-8C4B-48BC-8D46-7B6173966037-7I+n7zu2hftEKMMhf/gKZA@public.gmane.org> 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Trond Myklebust @ 2016-10-25 21:47 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Fields Bruce James Cc: List Linux NFS Mailing, Rusty Russell, Christoph Hellwig, linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org > On Oct 25, 2016, at 15:59, Fields Bruce James <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 07:34:43PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote: >> >>> On Oct 25, 2016, at 14:45, J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: >>> >>> From: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@redhat.com> >>> >>> As of ac4e97abce9b "scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear >>> mapping", sg_set_buf hits a BUG when make_checksum_v2->xdr_process_buf, >>> among other callers, passes it memory on the stack. >>> >>> We only need a scatterlist to pass this to the crypto code, and it seems >>> like overkill to require kmalloc'd memory just to encrypt a few bytes, >>> but for now this seems the best fix. >>> >>> Note many of these callers are in the NFS write paths, so we shouldn't >>> really be allocating GFP_KERNEL. But we already have other allocations >>> in these code paths. A larger redesign may be necessary to allow >>> allocations to be done earlier. >> >> NACK… I agree that there may already be borkage in RPCSEC_GSS-land, but that’s not a reason to be adding to the pile of things that need to be fixed… The allocations that lie in the RPC client’s encode/decode path do need to be GFP_NOFS…. > > OK. Any disadvantage to keeping this patch with just GFP_NOFS > allocations everywhere that might be in the write path? It’s what we have to do everywhere else in the RPC client, so I can’t see why it should be a problem. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
[parent not found: <DB39073B-8C4B-48BC-8D46-7B6173966037-7I+n7zu2hftEKMMhf/gKZA@public.gmane.org>]
* Re: [PATCH] sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf [not found] ` <DB39073B-8C4B-48BC-8D46-7B6173966037-7I+n7zu2hftEKMMhf/gKZA@public.gmane.org> @ 2016-10-28 13:20 ` Fields Bruce James 2016-10-28 13:22 ` Fields Bruce James 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Fields Bruce James @ 2016-10-28 13:20 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust Cc: List Linux NFS Mailing, Rusty Russell, Christoph Hellwig, linux-crypto-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 09:47:16PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote: > > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 15:59, Fields Bruce James <bfields-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org> wrote: > > > > On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 07:34:43PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote: > >> NACK… I agree that there may already be borkage in RPCSEC_GSS-land, but that’s not a reason to be adding to the pile of things that need to be fixed… The allocations that lie in the RPC client’s encode/decode path do need to be GFP_NOFS…. > > > > OK. Any disadvantage to keeping this patch with just GFP_NOFS > > allocations everywhere that might be in the write path? > > It’s what we have to do everywhere else in the RPC client, so I can’t see why it should be a problem. OK, the below is what I intend to merge if nobody spots another problem. --b. commit 2876a34466ce Author: J. Bruce Fields <bfields-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> Date: Tue Oct 18 16:30:09 2016 -0400 sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf As of ac4e97abce9b "scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear mapping", sg_set_buf hits a BUG when make_checksum_v2->xdr_process_buf, among other callers, passes it memory on the stack. We only need a scatterlist to pass this to the crypto code, and it seems like overkill to require kmalloc'd memory just to encrypt a few bytes, but for now this seems the best fix. Many of these callers are in the NFS write paths, so we allocate with GFP_NOFS. It might be possible to do without allocations here entirely, but that would probably be a bigger project. Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty-8n+1lVoiYb80n/F98K4Iww@public.gmane.org> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields-H+wXaHxf7aLQT0dZR+AlfA@public.gmane.org> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index d8bd97a5a7c9..3dfd769dc5b5 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -1616,7 +1616,7 @@ gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p) { struct rpc_cred *cred = task->tk_rqstp->rq_cred; struct gss_cl_ctx *ctx = gss_cred_get_ctx(cred); - __be32 seq; + __be32 *seq = NULL; struct kvec iov; struct xdr_buf verf_buf; struct xdr_netobj mic; @@ -1631,9 +1631,12 @@ gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p) goto out_bad; if (flav != RPC_AUTH_GSS) goto out_bad; - seq = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno); - iov.iov_base = &seq; - iov.iov_len = sizeof(seq); + seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_NOFS); + if (!seq) + goto out_bad; + *seq = htonl(task->tk_rqstp->rq_seqno); + iov.iov_base = seq; + iov.iov_len = 4; xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_buf); mic.data = (u8 *)p; mic.len = len; @@ -1653,11 +1656,13 @@ gss_validate(struct rpc_task *task, __be32 *p) gss_put_ctx(ctx); dprintk("RPC: %5u %s: gss_verify_mic succeeded.\n", task->tk_pid, __func__); + kfree(seq); return p + XDR_QUADLEN(len); out_bad: gss_put_ctx(ctx); dprintk("RPC: %5u %s failed ret %ld.\n", task->tk_pid, __func__, PTR_ERR(ret)); + kfree(seq); return ret; } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index 244245bcbbd2..90115ceefd49 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -166,8 +166,8 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, unsigned int usage, struct xdr_netobj *cksumout) { struct scatterlist sg[1]; - int err; - u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + int err = -1; + u8 *checksumdata; u8 rc4salt[4]; struct crypto_ahash *md5; struct crypto_ahash *hmac_md5; @@ -187,23 +187,22 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, return GSS_S_FAILURE; } + checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS); + if (!checksumdata) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash("md5", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(md5)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto out_free_cksum; hmac_md5 = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5)) { - crypto_free_ahash(md5); - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - } + if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5)) + goto out_free_md5; req = ahash_request_alloc(md5, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) { - crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5); - crypto_free_ahash(md5); - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - } + if (!req) + goto out_free_hmac_md5; ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); @@ -232,11 +231,8 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, ahash_request_free(req); req = ahash_request_alloc(hmac_md5, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) { - crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5); - crypto_free_ahash(md5); - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - } + if (!req) + goto out_free_hmac_md5; ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); @@ -258,8 +254,12 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; out: ahash_request_free(req); - crypto_free_ahash(md5); +out_free_hmac_md5: crypto_free_ahash(hmac_md5); +out_free_md5: + crypto_free_ahash(md5); +out_free_cksum: + kfree(checksumdata); return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0; } @@ -276,8 +276,8 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, struct crypto_ahash *tfm; struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg[1]; - int err; - u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + int err = -1; + u8 *checksumdata; unsigned int checksumlen; if (kctx->gk5e->ctype == CKSUMTYPE_HMAC_MD5_ARCFOUR) @@ -291,15 +291,17 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, return GSS_S_FAILURE; } + checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS); + if (checksumdata == NULL) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto out_free_cksum; req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) { - crypto_free_ahash(tfm); - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - } + if (!req) + goto out_free_ahash; ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); @@ -349,7 +351,10 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, cksumout->len = kctx->gk5e->cksumlength; out: ahash_request_free(req); +out_free_ahash: crypto_free_ahash(tfm); +out_free_cksum: + kfree(checksumdata); return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0; } @@ -368,8 +373,8 @@ make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, struct crypto_ahash *tfm; struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg[1]; - int err; - u8 checksumdata[GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN]; + int err = -1; + u8 *checksumdata; unsigned int checksumlen; if (kctx->gk5e->keyed_cksum == 0) { @@ -383,16 +388,18 @@ make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, return GSS_S_FAILURE; } + checksumdata = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_CKSUM_LEN, GFP_NOFS); + if (!checksumdata) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(kctx->gk5e->cksum_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); if (IS_ERR(tfm)) - return GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto out_free_cksum; checksumlen = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!req) { - crypto_free_ahash(tfm); - return GSS_S_FAILURE; - } + if (!req) + goto out_free_ahash; ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); @@ -433,7 +440,10 @@ make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, } out: ahash_request_free(req); +out_free_ahash: crypto_free_ahash(tfm); +out_free_cksum: + kfree(checksumdata); return err ? GSS_S_FAILURE : 0; } @@ -666,14 +676,17 @@ gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf, u32 ret; struct scatterlist sg[1]; SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, cipher); - u8 data[GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2]; + u8 *data; struct page **save_pages; u32 len = buf->len - offset; - if (len > ARRAY_SIZE(data)) { + if (len > GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2) { WARN_ON(0); return -ENOMEM; } + data = kmalloc(GSS_KRB5_MAX_BLOCKSIZE * 2, GFP_NOFS); + if (!data) + return -ENOMEM; /* * For encryption, we want to read from the cleartext @@ -708,6 +721,7 @@ gss_krb5_cts_crypt(struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, struct xdr_buf *buf, ret = write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, offset, data, len); out: + kfree(data); return ret; } diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c index d67f7e1bc82d..45662d7f0943 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c @@ -718,30 +718,37 @@ gss_write_null_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp) static int gss_write_verf(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct gss_ctx *ctx_id, u32 seq) { - __be32 xdr_seq; + __be32 *xdr_seq; u32 maj_stat; struct xdr_buf verf_data; struct xdr_netobj mic; __be32 *p; struct kvec iov; + int err = -1; svc_putnl(rqstp->rq_res.head, RPC_AUTH_GSS); - xdr_seq = htonl(seq); + xdr_seq = kmalloc(4, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!xdr_seq) + return -1; + *xdr_seq = htonl(seq); - iov.iov_base = &xdr_seq; - iov.iov_len = sizeof(xdr_seq); + iov.iov_base = xdr_seq; + iov.iov_len = 4; xdr_buf_from_iov(&iov, &verf_data); p = rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_base + rqstp->rq_res.head->iov_len; mic.data = (u8 *)(p + 1); maj_stat = gss_get_mic(ctx_id, &verf_data, &mic); if (maj_stat != GSS_S_COMPLETE) - return -1; + goto out; *p++ = htonl(mic.len); memset((u8 *)p + mic.len, 0, round_up_to_quad(mic.len) - mic.len); p += XDR_QUADLEN(mic.len); if (!xdr_ressize_check(rqstp, p)) - return -1; - return 0; + goto out; + err = 0; +out: + kfree(xdr_seq); + return err; } struct gss_domain { -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-nfs" in the body of a message to majordomo-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf 2016-10-28 13:20 ` Fields Bruce James @ 2016-10-28 13:22 ` Fields Bruce James 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Fields Bruce James @ 2016-10-28 13:22 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Trond Myklebust Cc: List Linux NFS Mailing, Rusty Russell, Christoph Hellwig, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org On Fri, Oct 28, 2016 at 09:20:08AM -0400, Fields Bruce James wrote: > On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 09:47:16PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote: > > > > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 15:59, Fields Bruce James <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 07:34:43PM +0000, Trond Myklebust wrote: > > >> NACK… I agree that there may already be borkage in RPCSEC_GSS-land, but that’s not a reason to be adding to the pile of things that need to be fixed… The allocations that lie in the RPC client’s encode/decode path do need to be GFP_NOFS…. > > > > > > OK. Any disadvantage to keeping this patch with just GFP_NOFS > > > allocations everywhere that might be in the write path? > > > > It’s what we have to do everywhere else in the RPC client, so I can’t see why it should be a problem. > > OK, the below is what I intend to merge if nobody spots another problem. And we may as well fix up some more easy stuff while we're there. And actually moving the other crypto_alloc_* calls may be pretty easy too, I'll see if I can get to it later.... --b. commit 7e72f3a7c4db Author: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Date: Wed Oct 26 16:03:00 2016 -0400 sunrpc: GFP_KERNEL should be GFP_NOFS in crypto code Writes may depend on the auth_gss crypto code, so we shouldn't be allocating with GFP_KERNEL there. This still leaves some crypto_alloc_* calls which end up doing GFP_KERNEL allocations in the crypto code. Those could probably done at crypto import time. Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c index 90115ceefd49..fb39284ec174 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_crypto.c @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, if (IS_ERR(hmac_md5)) goto out_free_md5; - req = ahash_request_alloc(md5, GFP_KERNEL); + req = ahash_request_alloc(md5, GFP_NOFS); if (!req) goto out_free_hmac_md5; @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ make_checksum_hmac_md5(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, goto out; ahash_request_free(req); - req = ahash_request_alloc(hmac_md5, GFP_KERNEL); + req = ahash_request_alloc(hmac_md5, GFP_NOFS); if (!req) goto out_free_hmac_md5; @@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ make_checksum(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, if (IS_ERR(tfm)) goto out_free_cksum; - req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); if (!req) goto out_free_ahash; @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ make_checksum_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, char *header, int hdrlen, goto out_free_cksum; checksumlen = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); - req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_NOFS); if (!req) goto out_free_ahash; @@ -963,7 +963,7 @@ krb5_rc4_setup_seq_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, } desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_NOFS); if (!desc) { dprintk("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n", __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); @@ -1030,7 +1030,7 @@ krb5_rc4_setup_enc_key(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, struct crypto_skcipher *cipher, } desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_NOFS); if (!desc) { dprintk("%s: failed to allocate shash descriptor for '%s'\n", __func__, kctx->gk5e->cksum_name); diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c index 60595835317a..7bb2514aadd9 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_mech.c @@ -451,8 +451,7 @@ context_derive_keys_rc4(struct krb5_ctx *ctx) goto out_err_free_hmac; - desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac), - GFP_KERNEL); + desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(hmac), GFP_NOFS); if (!desc) { dprintk("%s: failed to allocate hash descriptor for '%s'\n", __func__, ctx->gk5e->cksum_name); ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
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2016-10-25 18:45 [PATCH] sunrpc: don't pass on-stack memory to sg_set_buf J. Bruce Fields
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2016-10-25 19:34 ` Trond Myklebust
2016-10-25 19:59 ` Fields Bruce James
[not found] ` <20161025195930.GB5129-uC3wQj2KruNg9hUCZPvPmw@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-25 21:47 ` Trond Myklebust
[not found] ` <DB39073B-8C4B-48BC-8D46-7B6173966037-7I+n7zu2hftEKMMhf/gKZA@public.gmane.org>
2016-10-28 13:20 ` Fields Bruce James
2016-10-28 13:22 ` Fields Bruce James
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