Linux cryptographic layer development
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From: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
To: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net
Cc: nstange@suse.de, elliott@hpe.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, smueller@chronox.de,
	vdronov@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] crypto: xts - drop redundant xts key check
Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2022 23:41:08 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20221221224111.19254-4-vdronov@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221221224111.19254-1-vdronov@redhat.com>

xts_fallback_setkey() in xts_aes_set_key() will now enforce key size
rule in FIPS mode when setting up the fallback algorithm keys, which
makes the check in xts_aes_set_key() redundant or unreachable. So just
drop this check.

xts_fallback_setkey() now makes a key size check in xts_verify_key():

xts_fallback_setkey()
  crypto_skcipher_setkey() [ skcipher_setkey_unaligned() ]
    cipher->setkey() { .setkey = xts_setkey }
      xts_setkey()
        xts_verify_key()

Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
---
 arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c | 4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
index 526c3f40f6a2..c773820e4af9 100644
--- a/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
+++ b/arch/s390/crypto/aes_s390.c
@@ -398,10 +398,6 @@ static int xts_aes_set_key(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *in_key,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	/* In fips mode only 128 bit or 256 bit keys are valid */
-	if (fips_enabled && key_len != 32 && key_len != 64)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	/* Pick the correct function code based on the key length */
 	fc = (key_len == 32) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_128 :
 	     (key_len == 64) ? CPACF_KM_XTS_256 : 0;
-- 
2.38.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-12-21 22:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-21 22:41 [PATCH 0/6] Trivial set of FIPS 140-3 related changes Vladis Dronov
2022-12-21 22:41 ` [PATCH 1/6] crypto: xts - restrict key lengths to approved values in FIPS mode Vladis Dronov
2022-12-21 22:41 ` [PATCH 2/6] crypto: xts - drop xts_check_key() Vladis Dronov
2022-12-21 23:33   ` Eric Biggers
2022-12-22 16:41     ` Vladis Dronov
2022-12-21 22:41 ` Vladis Dronov [this message]
2022-12-21 22:41 ` [PATCH 4/6] crypto: testmgr - disallow plain cbcmac(aes) in FIPS mode Vladis Dronov
2022-12-21 22:41 ` [PATCH 5/6] crypto: testmgr - disallow plain ghash " Vladis Dronov
2022-12-21 22:41 ` [PATCH 6/6] crypto: testmgr - allow ecdsa-nist-p256 and -p384 " Vladis Dronov

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