* [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys [not found] <20260405231224.4008298-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> @ 2026-04-05 23:12 ` Stefan Berger 2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-05 23:12 UTC (permalink / raw) To: linux-integrity, linux-security-module Cc: linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, ebiggers, Stefan Berger, David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, keyrings, linux-crypto Remove the check for the hash_algo since ML-DSA is only used in pure mode and there is no relevance of a hash_algo for the input data. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 ----- 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c index 09a0b83d5d77..df6918a77ab8 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c @@ -147,11 +147,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) { if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) return -EINVAL; - if (!hash_algo) - return -EINVAL; - if (strcmp(hash_algo, "none") != 0 && - strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0) - return -EINVAL; } else { /* Unknown public key algorithm */ return -ENOPKG; -- 2.53.0 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys 2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers 2026-04-08 17:25 ` Stefan Berger 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Eric Biggers @ 2026-04-06 16:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Stefan Berger Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, keyrings, linux-crypto On Sun, Apr 05, 2026 at 07:12:22PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: > Remove the check for the hash_algo since ML-DSA is only used in pure mode > and there is no relevance of a hash_algo for the input data. > > Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> > Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> > Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win> > Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org > Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org > Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> > --- > crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 ----- > 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > index 09a0b83d5d77..df6918a77ab8 100644 > --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c > @@ -147,11 +147,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, > strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) { > if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) > return -EINVAL; > - if (!hash_algo) > - return -EINVAL; > - if (strcmp(hash_algo, "none") != 0 && > - strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0) > - return -EINVAL; Does this broaden which hash algorithms are accepted for CMS signatures that use ML-DSA and contain signed attributes? - Eric ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys 2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers @ 2026-04-08 17:25 ` Stefan Berger 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Stefan Berger @ 2026-04-08 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Eric Biggers Cc: linux-integrity, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, zohar, roberto.sassu, David Howells, Lukas Wunner, Ignat Korchagin, keyrings, linux-crypto On 4/6/26 12:53 PM, Eric Biggers wrote: > On Sun, Apr 05, 2026 at 07:12:22PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote: >> Remove the check for the hash_algo since ML-DSA is only used in pure mode >> and there is no relevance of a hash_algo for the input data. >> >> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> >> Cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> >> Cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@linux.win> >> Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org >> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org >> Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> >> --- >> crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c | 5 ----- >> 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c >> index 09a0b83d5d77..df6918a77ab8 100644 >> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c >> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c >> @@ -147,11 +147,6 @@ software_key_determine_akcipher(const struct public_key *pkey, >> strcmp(pkey->pkey_algo, "mldsa87") == 0) { >> if (strcmp(encoding, "raw") != 0) >> return -EINVAL; >> - if (!hash_algo) >> - return -EINVAL; >> - if (strcmp(hash_algo, "none") != 0 && >> - strcmp(hash_algo, "sha512") != 0) >> - return -EINVAL; > > Does this broaden which hash algorithms are accepted for CMS signatures > that use ML-DSA and contain signed attributes? Right... dropping this patch and using the "none" route now. > > - Eric > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2026-04-05 23:12 ` [PATCH 1/3] crypto: public_key: Remove check for valid hash_algo for ML-DSA keys Stefan Berger
2026-04-06 16:53 ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-08 17:25 ` Stefan Berger
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