Linux cryptographic layer development
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From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	nhorman@tuxdriver.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] Multiple changes to crypto/ansi_cprng.c
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 09:50:17 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <6843393.LtnAY8kkPy@tauon> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141215084244.10306.qmail@ns.horizon.com>

Am Montag, 15. Dezember 2014, 03:42:44 schrieb George Spelvin:

Hi George,

>> - the non-determinism you get from get_random_int is very weak. If
>> you start thinking about the information theoretical entropy behind
>> that function that is used once in a while, you may not get much
>> entropy. Please, please, please, I do not want to start a discussion
>> around entropy -- I will not participate in such discussion :-)
>
>I could have such a discussion, but there's no need to; for the most
>part, I agree with you.  I wasn't trying to design a *good* RNG, I was
>trying to comply slavishly with what X9.17, X9.31, and the NIST
>specification call for: a timetamp.
>
>To quote
>http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf,
>section 3:
>
># Let DT be a date/time vector which is updated on each iteration.
>
>That's what I was trying to produce, nothing more and nothing less.

If you look into other X9.31 implementations, you see that the DT vector 
is a time stamp (even sometimes initialized to just 0 or 1) and then 
incremented each time. Thus, you get "some form" of a counter mode for 
the AES core.

But of course, you could update DT with time stamps, provided you can 
prove that they are monotonically increasing. 
>
>You will agree, I hope, that the result from get_random_int *does*
>include the entropy of a high-resolution timestamp?  Which is

get_random_int does provide entropy, but my gut feeling (I have not done 
measurements) is that it is in the range of maybe 2 / 3 bits per 
invocation.

>cryptographically equivalent to including the unobfuscated timestamp?

Sure.
>
>> Thus, I am questioning whether such slightly non-deterministic RNG
>> would be used.
>
>As far as I know the only reason to *ever* use ansi_cprng is for
>regulatory/certification reasons.  It's not horrible, but it's
>definitely been superseded, by the NIST SP800-90A generators at least.

Yes, therefore we have the DRBG implementation.
>
>Which is why I'm trying to follow the spec as precisely as possible.

If you only look at the regulatory side, then you must be aware of 
SP800-131A applicable at least to the US side. X9.31 is sunsetted by the 
end of 2015 and even not FIPS 140-2 certifiable any more for new 
validations.

Ciao
Stephan

  reply	other threads:[~2014-12-15  8:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-12-07 12:26 [PATCH v2 00/25] Multiple changes to crypto/ansi_cprng.c George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - unroll _get_more_prng_bytes George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Additional _get_more_prng_bytes cleanup George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Use %phN rather than print_hex_dump for debug George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Make debug output more like NIST test vectors George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Eliminate ctx->I and ctx->last_rand_data George Spelvin
2014-12-14 11:50   ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-14 19:22     ` George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Make cont_test a bool George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Shrink context some more George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Don't call reset_prng_context from cprng_init George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Make length types consistent George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Use u8 data types consistently internally George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Eliminate unused PRNG_FIXED_SIZE flag George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Get rid of rdata buffer in fips_cprng_reset George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: Add appropriate consts to RNG API George Spelvin
2014-12-14 11:39   ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: tcrypt - Add const qualifiers all over the test code George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] crypto: testmgr - Merge seed arrays in struct cprng_testvec George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: testmgr - Report failure on zero-length crypto_rng_get_bytes George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: testmgr - Don't crash if CPRNG test result is large George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: testmgr - Add CPRNG stutter test George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - simplify get_prng_bytes George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - simplify xor_vectors() to xor_block() George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Rename rand_data_valid more sensibly George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Tweak comments George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Introduce a "union cipherblock" George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Introduce non-deterministic mode George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - If non-deterministic, don't buffer old output George Spelvin
2014-12-07 22:49   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-08 14:22     ` Neil Horman
2014-12-08 16:43       ` George Spelvin
2014-12-08 18:07         ` Neil Horman
2014-12-08 20:34           ` George Spelvin
2014-12-14 12:06 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Multiple changes to crypto/ansi_cprng.c Stephan Mueller
2014-12-14 19:47   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  6:18     ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-14 20:37   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  6:14     ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15  8:42       ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  8:50         ` Stephan Mueller [this message]
2014-12-15 10:45           ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15 11:08             ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15  5:53   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  6:27     ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15  8:28       ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  8:56         ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15 10:21           ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15 10:46             ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15 11:32               ` Neil Horman
2014-12-15 22:01                 ` George Spelvin
2014-12-16  7:22                   ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-16 11:32                   ` Neil Horman

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