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From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 5/7] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 15:11:54 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YgL4umsyljm0R4Th@sol.localdomain> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220208155335.378318-6-Jason@zx2c4.com>

On Tue, Feb 08, 2022 at 04:53:33PM +0100, Jason A. Donenfeld wrote:
> Continuing the reasoning of "random: ensure early RDSEED goes through
> mixer on init", we don't want RDRAND interacting with anything without
> going through the mixer function, as a backdoored CPU could presumably
> cancel out data during an xor, which it'd have a harder time doing when
> being forced through a cryptographic hash function. There's actually no
> need at all to be calling RDRAND in write_pool(), because before we
> extract from the pool, we always do so with 32 bytes of RDSEED hashed in
> at that stage. Xoring at this stage is needless and introduces a minor
> liability.
> 
> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
> Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
>  drivers/char/random.c | 14 ++------------
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

Looks good,

Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

- Eric

  reply	other threads:[~2022-02-08 23:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-02-08 15:53 [PATCH v1 0/7] random: cleanups around per-cpu crng & rdrand Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 15:53 ` [PATCH v1 1/7] random: use RDSEED instead of RDRAND in entropy extraction Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 23:07   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-08 15:53 ` [PATCH v1 2/7] random: get rid of secondary crngs Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 15:53 ` [PATCH v1 3/7] random: inline leaves of rand_initialize() Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 23:08   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-08 15:53 ` [PATCH v1 4/7] random: ensure early RDSEED goes through mixer on init Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 23:10   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-08 15:53 ` [PATCH v1 5/7] random: do not xor RDRAND when writing into /dev/random Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 23:11   ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2022-02-08 15:53 ` [PATCH v1 6/7] random: use simpler fast key erasure flow on per-cpu keys Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 23:39   ` Eric Biggers
2022-02-09  0:21     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-02-08 15:53 ` [PATCH v1 7/7] random: remove outdated INT_MAX >> 6 check in urandom_read() Jason A. Donenfeld

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